CHAPTER II:
HOW AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP MAY BE ACQUIRED
A. IN THE NATION
By Birth
PURSUANT to the provisions of the XIV Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, the Federal statutes provide
as follows: "All persons born in the United States and not
subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are
declared to be citizens of the United States." (1)
This language has been held to include a person born in the
United States of parents of Chinese descent and subjects of the
Emperor of China, they being at the time of his birth domiciled
residents, engaged in business in the United States. It has also
been held to embrace the half-breed children of a white father
and an Indian mother living apart from her tribe, born within the
United States, reared and educated as other children of citizens;
(3) and even under the XIII Amendment colored persons were held
to be citizens. (4) But an Indian born a member of one of the
Indian tribes within the United States (5) does not, merely by
reason of his birth in the United States and his separation from
his tribe and residence among white citizens, become a citizen.
A negro born in slavery and afterwards becoming a citizen of the
Cherokee Nation has been held to be not an Indian. (6)
By special enactment, all persons born in the country
formerly known as the Territory of Oregon and subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States on the 18th day of May, 1872,
are declared citizens of the United States. (7)
By Naturalization
We have already seen that the power to enact a uniform
system of naturalization laws was among the first bestowed upon
Congress by the Constitution.
Naturalization is defined to be the act of adopting a
foreigner and clothing him with the privileges of a native
citizen. (8) The power of naturalization is vested exclusively
in Congress by the Constitution, and cannot be exercised by the
State. (9) Although the power to enact naturalization laws
existed from the time the Constitution went into effect in 1789,
the earliest Act of Congress on the subject of naturalization was
passed April 14, 1802, thirteen years after the Constitution went
into effect. Under the last named Act and sundry amendments,
admission to citizenship of three principal classes of persons
was provided for, to wit:
First, aliens who had resided for a certain time within the
limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States, to be
naturalized individually by proceedings in a court of record.
(10)
Second, the children of persons so naturalized dwelling
within the United States and being under the age of twenty-one at
the time of such naturalization. (11)
Third, foreign-born children of American citizens coming
within the definitions prescribed by Congress. (12)
Length of Residence Necessary
As early as 1813 Congress enacted that an alien, to be
entitled to admission as a citizen, must have resided within the
United States for a continuous term of five years. (13) This
general provision is modified by several special enactments, as
follows:
An alien who bas enlisted and has been honorably discharged
from the regular volunteer forces of the Army of the United
States is not required to prove more than one year's residence.
(14)
A seaman being a foreaper who declares his intention of
becoming a citizen and then serves three years aboard a merchant
vessel of the United States is entitled to be admitted. (15)
An alien may be admitted to become a citizen of the United
States in the following manner, and not otherwise (16):
First, a preliminary declaration of intention must be made.
It must be made at least two years prior to his admission to
citizenship. It must be made under oath before a circuit or
district court of the United States or a district or supreme
court of the Territories, or a court of record of any of the
States having common-law jurisdiction (17), and a seal and a
clerk. (18) The declaration must state that it is the bona fide
intention of the applicant to become a citizen of the United
states, and to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to
any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty,
particularly by name to the prince, potentate, state, or
sovereignty of which the alien may be at the time a citizen or
subject. (19) By an amendment enacted February 1, 1876 (20), the
preliminary declaration of intention may be made before the clerk
of any of the courts named above. (21)
A preliminary declaration, however, is not required in the
following cases:
1. The widow and children of an alien who has made his
preliminary declaration and died before he was actually
naturalized, are declared to be citizens upon taking
the oaths prescribed by law. (22)
2. By an act passed May 26, 1824, (23) an alien being
under twenty-one years of age who has resided in the
United States three years next preceding his arrival at
age, and who has continued to reside therein to the
time he makes application to be admitted a citizen,
may, after he attains the age of twenty-one and after
he has resided five years within the United States,
including the three years of his minority, be admitted
without preliminary declaration. (24)
3. By an Act passed July 17, 1862,(25) an alien of the age
of twenty-one years and upwards, who has enlisted or
may enlist in the armies of the United States, (26) and
has been honorably discharged, shall be admitted to
become a citizen of the United states upon his
petition, without any previous declaration of his
intention. (27)
4. By an Act passed July 26, 1894 (28), aliens over
twenty-one years of age, honorably discharged from the
navy or marine corps after five consecutive years'
service in the navy, or one enlistment in the marine
corps, may be admitted without any previous
declaration.
Second, he shall, at the time of his application to be
admitted, declare on oath before some one of the courts
specified;
a. That he will support the Constitution of the United
States.
b. That he renounces and abjures all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, etc.
c. Particularly, by name, the prince or potentate of whom
he was subject.
d. The proceedings shall be recorded by the clerk.
Third, it shall be made to appear to the court:
a. That he has resided in the United States five years at
least.
b. Within State or Territory one year at least.
c. That during that time he has behaved as a man of good
character. (29)
d. That he is attached to the principles of the
Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to
the good order and happiness of the same. (30)
e. But the oath of the applicant does not prove his
residence. (31)
Fourth, in case the alien applying to be admitted to
citizenship has borne any hereditary title or been of any of the
orders of nobility in the kingdom or state from which he came, he
shall, in addition to the above requisites make an express
renunciation of his title or order of nobility in the Court to
which his application is made, and his renunciation shall be
recorded in the court.
The fifth and sixth clauses of the Naturalization Law may be
omitted, as they simply declared certain persons residing in the
United grates prior to the 29th of January, 1795, and between
June 18, 1798, and June 18, 1812, to be citizens, and are no
longer of any practical importance.
The Naturalization Law further provides concerning children,
as follows:
1. Children under age when their parents were duly naturalized
under any law of the United States; or,
2. Children whose parents previous to the passing of the United
States naturalization laws became citizens of any State; or,
3. Children born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the
United States, of persons who are or have been citizens of
the United States -
All the above are declared to be citizens of the United
States.
b. IN A STATE
By Birth
Every State in the Union has enacted, either in its
constitution or in its statutes, that all persons born in the
State shall be deemed citizens of the State. The language is not
identical, but it will be found substantially the same by
reference to the constitutions and statutes of the several
States.
By State Enactments
All the States have, in one form or another, provided that
all persons born in any other State of the Union who may be or
become residents of the State enacting the law, and all aliens
naturalized under the laws of the United States who may be or
become residents of the State, shall be citizens of the State. A
particular inspection of the laws of each State will be necessary
to ascertain the precise language in which this general principle
is declared, and the length of residence requisite in any
particular state to require citizenship therein.
By Federal Enactments
The XIV Amendment to the Constitution of United States
declares that all persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of
the State wherein they reside. The question what residence
entitles a native or a naturalized citizen to all the privileges
of citizenship in a particular State is generally determined by
some State enactment prescribing the length of residence
necessary to entitle a person to all the privileges of State
citizenship. Until the enactment of the XIV Amendment, no
attempt was ever made by the Federal government to define or
limit the rights of citizenship in any State.
c. OUTSIDE THE NATION OR STATES
We have already seen that under certain Federal statutes the
widow and children of an alien who has made his preliminary
declaration, and died without being actually naturalized, have
certain inchoate rights of citizenship which they may make
perfect upon taking the oaths prescribed by law, even though they
have not been within the limits of the nation, or of the State.
So, too, children born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the
United States, of persons who are citizens of the United States,
are deemed citizens of the United States; and by the statutes of
many of the States they are also deemed citizens of the State
whereof their parents are citizens. For example, the author of
this volume was born in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1846, of
parents who were citizens of the United States and of the state
of Virginia. By the terms of the Federal statutes he is a
citizen of the United States; and by the terms of the statutes of
Virginia, all children, wherever born, whose fathers or if he be
dead whose mother, was a citizen of Virginia at the time of the
birth of such children, were to be deemed citizens of that State.
A notable instance of such foreign birth is George B. McClellan,
the present mayor of New York city, who was born in Dresden,
Saxony. At the time of his birth his parents were citizens of
New Jersey, his father, Capt. George B. McClellan, being in the
service of the United States abroad. He is as much a citizen of
the United States and of the State of New Jersey as if he had
been born in Trenton, the capital of the State of New Jersey.
But the citizenship of children whose fathers were citizens
is qualified to this extent: the rights of citizenship of the
parent do not descend to the children if the parents have never
resided in the United States. Thus, if Mayor George B. McClellan
had never resided in the United States, his son, George B.
McClellan, third, would not inherit his father's right of
citizenship in the United States.
d. OF THE PERSONS WHO MAY BE CITIZENS
As a matter of course, Men may be citizens, and we will not
discuss that further.
Women may be citizens as well as men. (32) The statutes of
the United States expressly provide that any woman who is now or
may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and
who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a
citizen. The naturalization laws themselves provide (33) that
the widow of an alien who has complied with the first condition
of naturalization, and died without being actually naturalized,
shall be considered a citizen.
The political status of the wife follows that of the
husband, with the modification that there must be withdrawal from
her native country, or equivalent act expressive of her election
to renounce her citizenship as a consequence of her marriage.
(34)
The citizenship acquired by the wife by marriage to a
citizen of the United States is not a qualified or contingent
one, but is as enduring and unqualified as if she had been
naturalized upon her own formal application. (35) It may
therefore happen that an alien may come to this country and
become a citizen, whereby his wife, who might herself be lawfully
naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen, although she did not come
to the United States until after his death. His citizenship, in
such case, confers citizenship upon her. (36) An alien woman
whose husband became a naturalized citizen of the United States,
thereby herself became a citizen, although she may have been
living at a distance from her husband for years and may never
have come into the United States until after his death. (37) And
a woman married to a citizen of the United States is, by reason
of her marriage, to be deemed a citizen, irrespective of the
time or place of marriage, and although she may never have
resided in the United States. (38) An alien widow of a
naturalized citizen of the United States, although she never
resided within the United States during the lifetime of her
husband, is a citizen of the United States and is entitled to
dower in his real estate. (39) A woman born in France, whose
father was a citizen of the United States, and who married a
French citizen and continued after the death of her husband to
reside in France, is a citizen of France but not of the United
States. (40)
Children may be citizens. They are citizens by birth, and,
as seen above, become citizens through the naturalization of
their parents. By the express terms of the statute, however, the
children born abroad of American citizens, whether the parents be
citizens by birth or by naturalization, do not transmit their
right of citizenship to their children unless they have
themselves resided in the United States.
e. NATIONAL AND STATE CITIZENSHIP NOT NECESSARILY COEXISTENT
A citizen of the United States does not thereby necessarily
become a citizen of any particular State. This distinction is
clearly pointed out in the Slaughter-house Cases cited above.
The XIV Amendment declares that all persons born or naturalized
in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside, but the amendment does not attempt to define what
constitutes residence in the States. It might very well happen,
for example, that a person had been naturalized in one State and
lost his residence in that State by removing from it, without
having acquired a residence in another State to which he had
removed. The XIV Amendment cannot be so read as to make him a
resident of any State except on the terms prescribed generally by
the laws of that State for the acquisition of citizenship
therein. (41)
A curious anomaly resulting from the last-named condition in
our complex system of national and State governments is found in
the following state of facts;
The Constitution of the United States provides (Art. I, Sec.
2) that the House of Representatives shall be composed of members
chosen every second year by the people of the several States, and
electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite
for electors of the most numerous branch of the State
legislature. The naturalization laws give an alien no political
rights as a citizen of the United States until he has been
admitted to citizenship. In many of the States the
qualifications for electors of the most numerous branch of the
State legislature are bestowed upon aliens who have made their
preliminary declarations; consequently, it happens that in many
instances the persons who vote for members of the Congress of
the United States are not even citizens of the United States.
Under this condition, it is conceivable that in the different
States the votes of aliens to the United States might elect
sufficient members of the House of Representatives of the United
States to control action of the Congress of the United States.
Footnotes:
(1) Revs Stat. U.S., Sec. 1992, 1 Fed. Stat. Annot. 785; The
Slaughter-House Cases, (1872) 83 U.S. 36; In re Rodriguez,
(1897) 81 Fed. Rep. 353.
"While this amendment.... was intended primarily for the
benefit of the negro race, It also confers the right of
citizenship upon persons of all other races, white, yellow,
or red, born or naturalized in the United States, and
`subject to the jurisdiction thereof.' The language has been
held to embrace even Chinese, to whom the laws of
naturalization do not extend." In re Rodriguez (1897) 81
Fed. Rep. 353.
(2) U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark. (1898) 169 U.S. 649; Citizenship etc.,
(1884) 21 Fed. Rep. 905; Lee Sing Far 9. U.S., (C.C.A. 1899)
94 Fed. Rep. 834; In re Yung Sing Hee, (1888) 36 Fed. Rep.
437; In re Giovanna, (1899) 93 Fed. Rep. 659; In re Wy
Shing, (1898) 36 Fed. Rep. 553; Ex p. Chin King, (1888) 35
Fed. Rep. 354.
(3) U.S. v. Hadley, (1900) 99 Fed. Rep. 437; U.S. v. Ward(1890)
42 Fed. Rep. 320; U.S. v. Higgins, (1901)110 Fed. Rep. 609,
distinguishing U.S. v. Higgins, (1900) 103 Fed. Rep. 348.
See also Farrell v. U.S., (C.C.A. 1901) 110 Fed. Rep. 942;
Ex. p. Reynolds, (1879) 5 Dill. U.S. 394
(4) Hall v. De Cuir, (1877) 95 U.S. 509. See also U.S. v.
Rhodes, (1866) 1 Ab. U.S. 28, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,151.
(5) Elk v. Wilkins, (1884) 112 U.S. 94; U.S. v. Osborne, (1880)
6 Sawy. U.S. 406; U.S. v. Boyd, (C.C.A. 1897) 82 Fed. Rep.
547.
"Indians born within the territorial limits of the United
States. members of, and owing immediate allegiance to, one
of the Indian tribes (an alien, though dependent, power),
although in a geographical sense born in the United States,
are no more , born in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, within the meaning of the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment, than the children of
subjects of any foreign government born within the domain of
that government, or the children born within the United
States, of ambassadors or other public ministers of foreign
nations.... Such Indians, then, not being citizens by birth,
can only become citizens in the second way mentioned in the
Fourteenth Amendment, by being `naturalized in the United
States,' by or tinder home treaty or statute." Elk v.
Wilkins, (1884) 112 U. S. 94.
By Act of Congress, of Feb. 8, 1887. every Indian born
within the territorial limits of the United States to whom
allotments of land shall have been made under the provisions
of the act, or under any law or treaty, and every Indian
born within the territorial limits of the United States who
has voluntarily taken up, within said limits. his residence
separate and apart from any tribe of Indians therein, and
has adopted the habits of civilized life. is declared to be
a citizen of the United States and entitled to all the
rights, privileges, and immunities of such citizens. U. S.
v. Kopp, (1901) 110 Fed. Rep. 160; In re Celestine, (1902)
114 Fed. Rep. 553; State v. Denoyer, (1897) 6 N. Dak. 586.
See also U.S. v. Boyd, (C.C.A. 1897) 83 Fed. Rep. 547.
(6) Alberly v. U. S., (1896) 162 U. S. 499.
The term "Indian" is one descriptive of race, and therefore
men of other races who are adopted into an Indian tribe do
not thereby become Indians. They may by such adoption become
entitled to certain privileges In the tribe, and make
themselves amenable to its laws and usages. Yet they are not
Indians. Responsibility to the laws of the United States
cannot thus be thrown off and a right acquired to be treated
by the government and its officers as if they were Indians
born. U.S. v. Rogers, (1846) 4 How. U.S. 567. See also
Westmoreland v. U.S., (1895) 155 U.S. 545; Roff v. Burney,
(1897) 168 U. S. 218; Raymond v. Rayummd, (C. C. A. 1897) 83
Fed. Rep. 721.
(7) Revs Stat. U.S., Sec. 1995, 1 Fed. Stat. Annot.788.
(8) Bouvier's Law Dictionary. Osborn v. U.S. Bank, (1824) 9
Wheat. U.S. 827; Boyd v. Thayer, (1892) 143 U.S. 162;
Postmaster at New Orleans, (1858) 9 OP. Atty. Gen., 259;
Minneapolis v. Reum, (1893)12 U.S. App. 446; Am. & Engl.
Encyc. of Law(2d ed.) Vol. 6, p. 19.
(9) U. S. v. Villato, (1797) 2 Dall. (Pa.) 373; Thurlow v.
Massachusetts, (1847) 5 How. U.S. 504; Smith v. Turner,.
(1849) 7 How. U.S. 283; Chirse v. Chirse, (1817) 2 Wheat.
U.S. 269; Collet w. Collet, (1792) 2 Dall. U.S. 294; U.S. v.
Wong Kim Ark. (1898) 169 U.S. 640.
That the exercise of the power to pass naturalization laws
by the State governments is incompatible with the grant of a
power to Congress to pass uniform laws on that subject, is
obvious, from the consideration that the former would be
dissimilar and frequently contradictory; whereas the system
is directed to be uniform, which can only be rendered so by
the exclusive power in one body to form them. Golden v.
Prince, (1814) 3 Wash. cU. S.) 313.
Our foreign intercourse being exclusively committed to the
general government, it is peculiarly their province to
determine who are entitled to the privileges of American
citizens, and the protection of American government. And the
citizens of any one State being entitled by the Constitution
to enjoy tho rights of citizenship in every other State,
that fact creates an interest in this particular in each
other's acts, which does not exist with regard to their
bankrupt laws; since State acts of naturalization would thus
be extra-territorial in their operation, and have an
influence on the most vital interests of other States. Ogden
v. Saunders, (1827) 12 Wheat (U.S.) 277.
(10) See U.S. Revs Stat., Title XXX, Sec. 2165, 5Fed. Stat.
Annot..
(11) See U.S. Revs Stat., Title XXX, Sec. 2172, 5 Fed. Stat.
Annot. 209.
(12) U.S. Revs Stat., Title XXX, Sec. 1993, 1 Fed. Stat. Annot.
786.
(13) U.S. Revs Stat., Title XXX, Sec. 2170, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot.
208.
(14) U.S. Revs Stat., Sec. 2166,5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 205.
(15) U.S. Revs Stat., Sec. 2174, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot.210.
(16) U.S. Revs Stat., Sec. 2165, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 200.
(17) Congress has power to confer and the State courts authority
to accept and exercise the power to nationalize aliens.
Levin v. U. S.. (C. C. A. 1904) 128 Fed. Rep. 826; Croesue
Min, etc., Co. v. Colorado Land, etc., Co.. (1884) 19 Fed.
Rep. 78. A State court is the judicial agency of the Federal
Government in such proceedings. People v. Sweetmnn, (Supm.
Ct. Gen. T. 1857, 3 Park.Crim. N.Y. 374; In the Matter of
Christern. (1978) 43 N. Y. Super. Ct. 523.
Congress cannot constrain a State court to exercise this
jurisdiction, and the State legislatures may, if they see
fit, limit or restrain the exercise of this jurisdiction by
the State courts. Rushworth v. Judges. (1895) 58 N.J.L. 97.
Ex p. Knowles, (1855) 5 Cal. 300; Matter of Ramsden, (N.Y.
Super. Ct. Spec. T.1857) 13 How. Pr. (n.Y.) 429
Concerning the meaning of "having common-law jurisdiction"
see Levin v. U.S. (C.C.A. 1904) 128 Fed. Rep. 826; U.S. v.
Power (1877) 14 Blatchf. U.S. 223; Gladhill, Petitioner,
(1844) 8 Met. (Mass.) 168; Citizenship- Levy's Case, (1874)
14 Op. Atty. Gen. 509; Morgan v. Dudley, (1857) 18 B. Mon.
(Ky.) 693; U.S. v. Lehman, (1899) 39 Fed.Rep. 49; Ex p.
Tweedy, (1884) 22 Fed. Rep. 34 Matter of Conner, (1870) 39
Cal. 98; People v. McGowan. (1875) 77 Ill. 649; People v.
Sweetmen, (Supm. Ct. Gen. T. 1857) ? Park. Crim. (N.Y.) 358;
Ex p. McKenzie, (1897) 51 S. Car. 244.
"If the court may exercise any part of that jurisdiction it
is within the language of the statute and within its meaning
as well." U.S. v. Power, (1877) 14 Blatchf. U.S. 223.
(18) As to a court without a clerk, see Dean, Petitioner, (1891)
?3 Me. 489; Ex p. Cregg, (1854) 2 Curt. U.S. 98; State v.
Whittemore, (1870) 50N.H. 245; State v. Webster, (1878) 7
Web. 471; Gladhill, Petitioner, (1844) 8 Met. (Mass.) 171.
The court must have a clerk distinct from the judge; not
necessarily an officer denominated clerk, but a permanent
recording officer, charged with the duty of keeping a true
record of the doings of the court and afterwards of
authenticating them. Dean, Petitioner, (1891) 83 Me. 489.
(19) Omission of name not fatal. ex p. Smith. (1647) 8 Blackf.
(Ind.) 395.
"An applicant for naturalization is a suitor, who, by his
petition, institutes a proceeding in a court of justice for
the judicial determination of an asserted right. Every such
petition must, of course, allege the existence of all facts,
and the fulfillment of all conditions. upon the existence
and fulfillment of which the statutes which confer the right
asserted have made it dependent." In re Bodek, (1894) 63
Fed. Rep. 813, 3 Pa. Dist. 725.
(20) 19 Stat. L., c. 5. p. 2, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 205.
(21) In re Langtry, (1887) 31 Fed. Rep. 879; Andres v. Arnold
(1889) 77 Mich. 87.
The last named case discusses the location of the place at
which the clerk may take the declaration. See also
Butterwortb, Applicant, (1846) 1 Woodb. & M. U.S. 323.
Proof of declaration Is made by production of the record or
by due certification thereof. In re Fronascone, (1900) 99
Fed. Rep. 48; State v. Barrett, (1889) 40 Minn. 65; Berry v.
Hull, (1892) 6 N. Mex. 643.
(22) Revs Stat. U. S. Sec. 2168, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 205.
(23) Revs Stat. U. S. Sec. 2167, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 206.
(24) Contzen v. U.S. (1900) 179 U.S. 195.
If he has lived in the United States five years when he
attains the age of twenty-one years, he may be admitted to
citizenship the next day. Schutz's Petition, (1886) 64 N.H.
241.
(25) U.S. Stat. L., Vol. 12, p. 597. This is now Sec.2166 of the
Revised Statutes. See 5 Fed. Stat. annot. 205.
(26) In re Bailey, (1872) 2 Sawy. U.S. 200; Berry v. Hull, (1892)
6 N. Mex. 643.
(27) In re Bailey, (1872) 2 Sawy. U.S. 200; Berry v. Hull, (1892)
6 N. Mex. 643.
(28) U.S. Stat. L., Vol. 28, p. 124, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 206.
(29) The fact that he cannot read or write does not make him
ineligible, if he is shown to be of good moral character. In
re Rodriquez, (1897) 81 Fed. Rep. 355. But a perjurer is
ineligible. In re Spenser, (1878) 5Sawy. U.S. 195; and a
Socialist was rejected. Ex p. Sauer, (1891) 81 Fed. Rep.
355, note.
"Upon general principles it would seem that whatever is
forbidden by the law of the land ought to be considered,
for the time being, immoral, within the purview of this
statute." In re Spenser4, (1878) 5 Sawy. U.S. 195.
(30) But a foreigner ignorant of the English language and who did
not know the name of the President, but thought that
Washington was President, was held ineligible. In re Kanska
Nian, (1889) 6Utah 259.
(31) See 5 Fed. Stat. Annot., p. 202, and the following cases
cited: In re Bodek, (1894) 63 Fed. Rep. 814; Lanz v.
Randall, (1876) 4 Dill. U.S. 425; Baird v. Byrne, (1854) 3
Wall. Jr. (C. C.) 1; Johnson v. U.S., (1893) 29 Ct. Cl. 1;
State v. Barrett, (1889) 40 Minn. 65; Matter of -, (1845) 7
Hill (N. Y.) 137; In ew Spenser, (1878) 5 Sawy. U.S. 195; Ex
p. Sauer, (1891) 81 Fed. Rep. 355, note; Matter of Clark,
(1854) 18 Barb. (N.Y.) 446; Citizenship -- Levy's Case,
(1874) 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 509; Matter of Christern, (1878) 43
N. Y. Super. Ct. 623; McCarthy v. Marsh. (l85l) 5 N.Y. 263;
State v. Macdonald, (1877) 24 Minn. 48; Banks v. Walker,
(1848) 3 Barb. Ch. (N.Y.) 438; Sprat v. Spratt, (1830) 4
Pet. U.S. 406; Green v. Salas (1887) 31 Fed. Rep. 106; Stark
9. Chesapeake Ins. Co., (1813) 7 Cranch U.S. 420; The Acorn,
(1870) 2 Abb.U.S. 434;People v. McGowan, (1875) 77 Ill. 644;
Ritchie v. Putnam, (1835) 13 Wend. (N.Y.) 524; Com. v.
Towles, (1835) 5 Leigh (Va.) 743; McDaniel v. Richards,
(1821) 1 McCord L. (S. Car.) 187; State v. Hoeflinger,
(1874) 35 Wis. 393; Vaux v. Nesbit, (1826) 1 McCord Eq. (S.
Car.) 352; In re McCoppin, (1869) 5 Sawy. U.S. 630; Contzen
v. U.S. (1900) 179U.S. 191; Boyd v. Thayer, (1892) 143 U.S.
178; Blight v. Rochester, (1822) 7 Wheat. U.S. 546;
Strickley v. HIll, (1900) 22 Utah 268; Hogan v. Kurtz,
(1876) 94 U.S. 773; Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, (1888) 125 Ill.
141; People v. McNally, (Supm. Ct. Spec. T. 1880) ?9 How.
Pr. (N.Y.) 500; Sasportas v. De la Motta, (1858) 10 RichEq.
(S. Car.) 38; Nalle v. Fenwick, (1826) 4 Rand. (Va.) 585;
Miller v. Reinhart, (1855) 18 Ga. 239; Belcer v. Farren,
(1891) ?9 Cal. 78; Matter of Desty, (N.Y. Super. Ct. Spec.
T. 1880) 8 Abb. ". Cas. (N.Y.) 250; Prentice v. MIller,
(1890) 82 Cal. 570; Slade v. Minor, (1817) 2 Cranch (C.C.)
139; Gagnon v. U.S. (1902) ?8 Ct. Cl. 10; Dryden v.
Swinburne, (1882) 20 W. Va. 89; Navigation Laws, (1883) 17
Op. Atty. Gen. 534; In re An Alien, (1842) 1?ed. Cas. No.
201a; Anonymous, (1846) 4 N.Y. Leg. Obs. 98, 1 "ed. Cas. No.
465; U.S. v. Norsch, (1890) 42 Fed. Rep. 417; U.S. v.
Grottkau, (1887) 30 Fed. Rep. 672.
(32) Minor w. Hoppersett, (1874) 21 Wall. U.S. 142; U.S. Stat.
L., Sec. 1994, 1 Fed. Stat. Annot. 786; Dorsey v. Brigham,
(1898) 177 Ill. 250; Kane v. McCarthy, (1869) 63 N. Car.
299.
Since the extension of the naturalization laws to persons of
African descent, this statutory provision is applicable to
negro as well as white women. Broadis v. Broadis, (1898) 66
Fed. Rep. 951.
(33) Revs Stat. U.S. Sec. 2168, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 207.
(34) Ruckgaber v. Moore, (1900)104 Fed. Rep. 948.
(35) Leonard v. Grant, (1880)5 Fed. Rep. 11; U.S. v. Kellar,
(1882) 13 Fed. Rep. 82, (1882) 11 Biss. U.S. 314.
"No law expressly providing for a temporary or contingent
citizenship is known to the legislation of the United
States, and so unusual and singular a purpose ought not to
be attributed to Congress without an explicit provision to
that effect." Leonard v. Grant (1880) 5 Fed. Rep.11.
(36) Kelly v. Owen. (1868) 7 Wall. U.S. 496.
Notwithstanding the letter of the statute "might herself be
lawfully naturalized," it is only necessary that the woman
should be a person of the class or race permitted to be
naturalized by existing laws. It is not required that she
should have the statutory qualifications as to residence,
conduct, and opinions. Being the wife of a citizen, she is
regarded as qualified for citizenship, and therefore is
considered a citizen. Leonard v. Grant, (1880) 5 Fed. Rep.
11.
(37) Headman v. Rose, (1879) 63Ga. 458.
(38) See (1874) 14Op. Atty. Gen. 402; butsee Ruckgaber v. Moore,
(1900) 104 Fed. Rep. 948.
(39) Burton v. Burton, (1864) 1 Keyes (N.Y.) 359; approved in
Kelly v. Owen, (1868) 7 Wall. U.S. 496; Kane v. McCarthy,
(1869) 63 N. Car. 299.
(40) Berthemy's Case, (1866) 12 Op. Atty.-Gen. 7.
(41) "Not only may a man be a citizen of the United Sates without
being a citizen of a State, but an important element is
necessary to convert the former into the latter. He must
reside within the State to make him a citizen of it, but it
is only necessary that he should be born or naturalized in
the United States to be a citizen of the Union." Slaughter-
House Cases, (1872) 16 Wall. U.S. 36.
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John S. Wise