Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris

c/o Forwarding Agent at:

350 – 30th Street, Suite 444

Oakland 94609-3426



In Propria Persona


All Rights Reserved

without Prejudice






District Court of the United States


Eastern Judicial District of California



Paul Andrew Mitchell,         )  No. CIV. S-01-1480 WBS DAD PS


          Plaintiff,          )  NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR

                              )  TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT OF A

     v.                       )  JUDGE OF THE COURT OF

                              )  INTERNATIONAL TRADE

AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al., )  TO PRESIDE OVER THIS

                              )  DISTRICT COURT OF THE

          Defendants.         )  UNITED STATES:

                              )  28 U.S.C. 293, 296, 297,

______________________________)  461(b)


Greetings to You:


Judge Alex Kozinski

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

P.O. Box 91510

Pasadena 91109-1510


Formal NOTICE AND DEMAND are hereby respectfully made of You, Judge Kozinski, by Me, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, Citizen of California State, expressly not a citizen of the United States ("federal citizen"), and Plaintiff in the above entitled matter (hereinafter "Plaintiff"), to present to the Chief Justice of the United States a certificate of necessity that the Chief Justice designate and assign temporarily a competent and qualified judge from the Court of International Trade to perform judicial duties in this honorable District Court of the United States (“DCUS”).  See 28 U.S.C. 293, 296, 297, 461(b);  also Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920) (never overturned).

The authority in Evans is particularly poignant.  It is apparent to Plaintiff, because of exhaustive research which He has completed during the past 5 years, that all sitting United States District Judges in America are appointed to serve in either an Article I or in an Article IV capacity at the present time.  In this capacity, said Judges do not enjoy the explicit immunity which is found in Article III, Section 1 ("3:1") of the Constitution for the United States of America, as lawfully amended (hereinafter "U.S. Constitution"), to wit:


The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.


[U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section 1]

[emphasis added]


Plaintiff submits that one of the major reasons why said Judges do not enjoy the explicit immunity at 3:1 is the doctrine of territorial heterogeneity.  Confer in The Federal Zone:  Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue, Eleventh Edition, available from the Supreme Law Library at Internet Domain;  see also U.S. v. Lopez, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995):


Each of these [schools] now has an invisible federal zone [sic] extending 1,000 feet beyond the (often irregular) boundaries of the school property.


[emphasis added]

Here, in his concurring opinion in that case, Justice Kennedy utilized this term as a household word, without any citations or footnotes, only three (3) years after The Federal Zone was first published.  The doctrine of territorial heterogeneity is summarized as follows in the Conclusions of The Federal Zone, to wit:


In exercising its exclusive authority over the federal zone, Congress is not subject to the same constitutional limitations that exist inside the 50 States.  For this reason, the areas that are inside and outside the federal zone are heterogeneous with respect to each other.  This difference results in a principle of territorial heterogeneity:  the areas within the federal zone are subject to one set of rules;  the areas without (or outside) the federal zone are subject to a different set of rules.  The Constitution rules outside the zone and inside the 50 States.  The Congress rules inside the zone and outside the 50 States.  The 50 States are, therefore, in one general class, because all constitutional restraints upon Congress are in force throughout the 50 States, without prejudice to any one State.  The areas within the federal zone are in a different general class, because these same constitutional restraints simply do not limit Congress inside that zone.


[The Federal Zone, electronic 11th Edition, Conclusions]


In the pivotal case of Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), which is discussed at several places in the book The Federal Zone supra, the U.S. Supreme Court fabricated a doctrine whereby the Constitution of the "United States", as such, does not extend beyond the limits of the States which are united by and under it.  This doctrine of territorial heterogeneity is now commonly identified as the "Downes Doctrine."

This doctrine has been reinforced by subsequent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, notably, the case of Hooven & Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), in which the high Court ruled that the guarantees of the Constitution extend to the federal zone only as Congress has made those guarantees applicable.  In Hooven supra, the high Court also acknowledged that the term “United States” has three (3) entirely different legal meanings.

The United States District Courts (“USDC”) are currently established by Congress as territorial (federal zone) courts, with constitutional authority emanating from Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, to wit:


The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needed Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States;  ....


[U.S. Constitution, Art. 4, Sec. 3, Cl. 2]

[emphasis added]


Plaintiff wishes to litigate the instant case in an Article III Court of competent jurisdiction.  In particular, Plaintiff wishes to invoke the judicial Power of the United States, among several reasons, in order to obtain all relief itemized in Plaintiff’s Initial COMPLAINT as filed in the instant case.  See Article III, Section 1.

In order for this case to proceed forward, and it is Plaintiff's fundamental Right under the Seventh Amendment that it do so, this honorable Court must be seated with a competent and qualified Judge who is not subject to any undue executive or legislative influence whatsoever.

This means, among other things, that an Article III judge must be designated and temporarily appointed to preside over all proceedings in the instant case, who is not a "taxpayer" and whose integrity and independence from all other governments and all other government branches are unassailable and beyond question.

Plaintiff hereby objects strenuously to the existence of any contract, either verbal or written, either expressed or implied in fact, between any currently seated United States District Judge and the "Internal Revenue Service" [sic] or any other controlling interests, on grounds of conflicts of interest.  A completed Form W-4 Employee’s Withholding Allowance Certificate is an expressed, written contract.

Plaintiff is guaranteed the fundamental right to an independent and unbiased judiciary.  See Evans v. Gore supra.  The existence of a contract between the presiding Judge and any other branch of the federal government, or any of its agencies, assigns, or instrumentalities, is evidence of a conflict of interest and proof of a dependent and biased judiciary.  See Lord v. Kelley, 240 F.Supp. 167, 169 (1965) and compare with Evans v. Gore supra, to measure how far American society has degenerated under the Downes Doctrine.

This honorable Court will please take formal judicial notice of the holding and the dicta in Evans, which case proves that American courts have an obligation to rule on matters which properly come before them.

Plaintiff's NOTICE AND DEMAND, as made herein, now comes properly before You, Sir.



For the edification of Judge Kozinski, of this honorable Court, and of all interested Parties, Plaintiff attaches a true and correct copy of a recent Press Release entitled “Private Attorney General Cracks Title 28 of the United States Code,” dated November 26, 2001 A.D., and incorporates same by reference as Attachment “A”, as if set forth fully herein.



     Wherefore, Plaintiff hereby makes this formal Demand upon You, Judge Alex Kozinski of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:

(1)  to prepare and present to the Chief Justice of the United States a Certificate of Necessity that the Chief Justice designate and assign temporarily a competent and qualified judge from the Article III Court of International Trade to perform judicial duties in this honorable District Court of the United States;

(2)  to file said Certificate in the official Court record of the instant case;  and,

(3)  to serve said Certificate on all interested parties.  See PROOF OF SERVICE infra.



I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, Plaintiff in the above entitled action, hereby verify under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).


Dated:   November 28, 2001 A.D.


Signed:  /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell


Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Sui Juris


I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that I am at least 18 years of age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I personally served the following document(s):





28 U.S.C. 293, 296, 297, 461(b)


by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to the following:


Clerk of Court

District Court of the United States

501 “I” Street, Suite 4-200

Sacramento 95814-2322




Courtesy copies to:


Ropers, Majeski, Kohn & Bentley     DeForest & Koscelnik

(failed to exhibit oaths)          (failed to exhibit oath)

1001 Marshall Street                3000 Koppers Building

Redwood City 94063                  436 Seventh Avenue

CALIFORNIA, USA                     Pittsburgh 15219

                                    PENNSYLVANIA, USA


Murphy Austin Adams Schoenfeld LLP  Pillsbury Winthrop LLP

(failed to exhibit oaths)          (failed to exhibit oaths)

P.O. Box 1319                       400 Capitol Mall, Suite 1700

Sacramento 95814-1319               Sacramento 95814-4419




Dated:   November 28, 2001 A.D.



Signed:  /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell


Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, Plaintiff In Propria Persona

         (notPro Se” [sic])











Attachment “A”:


Press Release:


Private Attorney General Cracks

Title 28 of the United States Code


November 26, 2001 A.D.





































Private Attorney General Cracks

Title 28 of the United States Code




Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

Counselor at Law, Federal Witness

and Private Attorney General



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE                      November 26, 2001 A.D.



Sacramento.  Paul Andrew Mitchell, the Private Attorney General at the Supreme Law Firm and Webmaster of the Supreme Law Library on the Internet, today announced major developments in his ongoing project to decode Title 28 ‑‑ the set of American laws that govern the federal court system.


In a brief but direct application of this knowledge, written for a trainee in federal litigation, Mitchell demonstrated how the federal courts lacked original jurisdiction in the anti-trust case against the Microsoft Corporation.


That case was allegedly brought by the “United States of America” (or “USA”), but attorneys for the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) have no powers of attorney to represent the “USA”, as such.  Willful misrepresentation is a violation of the McDade Act at 28 U.S.C. 530B, which requires DOJ attorneys to obey State Bar disciplinary guidelines:


The federal government recently reversed its policy in the case against the Microsoft Corporation, and is now pushing equitable settlements across the board.


The term “USA” is mentioned only once in Title 28 ‑‑ at section 1746 ‑‑ and there it is clearly distinguished from the “United States” ‑‑ the proper legal term that is used for the federal government throughout Title 28:


Mitchell’s findings have consequences that reach far beyond the anti-trust case against Microsoft.  It is now painfully apparent that DOJ are pretending to represent the “USA” in all civil and criminal cases, intentionally to avoid exercising the judicial power of the United States.


Under Article III in the U.S. Constitution, this power must be exercised in constitutional courts that guarantee cherished fundamental Rights, like the Right to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.  Article III courts must be convened to hear Controversies to which the United States is a Party (singular).


To make matters worse, the U.S. Supreme Court has also erred by ruling that the term “Party” as used in Article III means “Plaintiff” but not “Defendant”.  See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933).  In Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, the term “Party” embraces both plaintiffs and defendants.


By substituting the “USA” as Plaintiffs (plural), DOJ have perpetrated a fraud by switching to legislative courts where fundamental Rights are not guarantees, but merely privileges granted (or denied) at the discretion of arbitrary judges, sitting on legislative tribunals.  Mitchell describes these courts as operating in legislative mode as opposed to constitutional mode.


Glaring proof of this fraud can be seen at section 132 of Title 28.  In this section, Congress attempted to broadcast into all 50 States a territorial tribunal ‑‑ the United States District Court (“USDC”).  Congress did this under another pretense, namely, that those States could be treated as if they were all federal Territories:


More than a century ago, the U.S. Supreme Court invented a false doctrine by which the U.S. Constitution did not extend into U.S. Territories and Possessions.  Mitchell later refuted this doctrine, after discovering two Acts of Congress that expressly extended the U.S. Constitution into the District of Columbia in 1871 A.D., and then into all federal Territories in 1873 A.D.  See 16 Stat. 419, 426, Sec. 34;  and 18 Stat. 325, 333, Sec. 1891, respectively.


In the year 1992 A.D., Paul Mitchell authored a popular classic book entitled The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue.  The Federal Zone is now in its eleventh edition.


In that book, he proved that federal municipal law governs U.S. Territories like Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands, but federal municipal law does not extend into any of the 50 States of the Union.  The income tax statutes in the Internal Revenue Code are federal municipal law.


Because they are not yet States of the Union, Congress is the state legislature for all Territories, Possessions, and Enclaves like military bases ‑‑ an area now collectively called the federal zone.  In the year 1995 A.D., Justice Kennedy used the term “federal zone” as a household word in his concurring opinion in U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).


Section 132 of Title 28 is even more deceptive for creating the false notion that the Article III District Court of the United States (“DCUS”) was abolished, but nothing could be further from the truth.  A careful reading of section 132 reveals that the DCUS is not even mentioned in that statute.


The DCUS was never expressly abolished by any Act of Congress, and it is still mentioned in numerous other places throughout Title 28.  Congress knows how to abolish a court when it wants to do so.  The Ninth Circuit has also ruled that repeals by implication are not favored.  Thus, for the DCUS to be abolished, a clear Act of Congress would be required to effect that result.  Whatever Congress creates, Congress must destroy.


Another stunning application of this knowledge came recently, when a federal criminal defendant appealed to the Ninth Circuit to review interlocutory orders issued by the USDC.  An interlocutory order is one that occurs before final judgment is reached at sentencing after a jury verdict.


In response to Mitchell’s pleadings, the Ninth Circuit cited a case which ruled that final judgment in a criminal case means the sentence.  That citation was U.S. v. Powell, 24 F.3d. 28, 31 (9th Cir. 1994).  Then, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the defendant’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.


Under Mitchell’s expert guidance, the defendant proved that the Ninth Circuit has no appellate jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders issued by the legislative USDC.  However, the Ninth Circuit does have appellate jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders issued by the constitutional DCUS.  The proof is found at 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1):


Mitchell then persuaded the defendant to request a published opinion holding that statutes granting appellate jurisdiction must be strictly construed also.  It is already well decided that statutes granting original jurisdiction must be strictly construed.  Such a holding is a logical extension of existing federal case law.


Clearly, these findings expose the USDC in all 50 States as a summary tribunal that compels criminal defendants to endure lengthy trials, conviction and sentencing before any U.S. Court of Appeals can take jurisdiction under the Final Judgments Act at 28 U.S.C. 1291:


In closely related developments, the main culprit has now been identified as the Act of June 25, 1948, in which Congress radically re-organized the entire federal court system.  This is the Act of Congress that broadcasted the USDC from the federal Territories into all 50 States of the Union.  This Act has now been formally challenged for being deliberately vague, and therefore unconstitutional.


By attempting to re-define the DCUS retroactively, this Act also violates the ex post facto prohibition at Article I, Section 9, Clause 3, in the U.S. Constitution.  This prohibition strictly bars Congress from enacting laws that have any retroactive effect.  Without a clear amending statute, Congress cannot later re-define the term “District Court of the United States” in statutes that predate June 25, 1948 A.D.


For example, the Sherman Antitrust Act was first enacted in the year 1890 A.D., and that Act granted original jurisdiction to the DCUS.  Subsequently, the Act of June 25, 1948, did not change or otherwise amend that grant of original jurisdiction to the DCUS.  Therefore, cases enforcing the Sherman Antitrust Act must be brought by the “United States” (not the “USA”) in an Article III federal court proceeding in constitutional mode.  Identical results obtain from many other federal laws, like the Securities and Exchange Acts.


Other sections of Title 28 have already been challenged properly in court for violating the U.S. Constitution.  In 1996 A.D., in the case of a subpoena issued by a federal grand jury, Mitchell was allowed to prove that the federal Jury Selection and Service Act is also unconstitutional.  That Act expressly discriminates against Citizens of the 50 States ‑‑ the only class of Citizens contemplated when Article III was being drafted, circa 1787 A.D.  For definitive authority on this crucial point, see Pannill v. Roanoke, 252 F. 910, 914.


There are now two (2) classes of citizens under American laws that have never been repealed ‑‑ State Citizens and federal citizens ‑‑ but only State Citizens are qualified to be federal lawmakers.  See the Qualifications Clauses in the U.S. Constitution;  the “United States” in those provisions means “States united”.


Moreover, those Citizens who are qualified to make federal laws cannot vote or serve on any juries, State or federal.  And, those who can vote and serve on juries are not qualified to make federal laws.


This seriously twisted situation is due, in part, to the Act of June 25, 1948, and related Congressional efforts to foist a legislative democracy upon all 50 States.  These efforts violate the Guarantee Clause in the U.S. Constitution.  The federal government is required by that Clause to guarantee a Republican Form of Government to the 50 States of the Union.


Paul Andrew Mitchell can be reached at email address:


He is currently available for speaking engagements on this, and related topics in American constitutional law, the focus of his extensive judicial activism.





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