Tally H. Eddings, II
c/o 2905-B Lakeview Drive
Fern Park 32730
All Rights Reserved
Circuit Court of Florida State
Sixth Judicial Circuit
Tally H. Eddings, II, and ) Case No. _______________________
Does 1 thru 10, )
Plaintiffs, ) VERIFIED INITIAL COMPLAINT FOR
v. ) DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
) AND DAMAGES; JURY DEMANDED:
Raymond James Financial )
Services, Inc., and ) Florida State common laws; and,
Does 1 thru 20, ) 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq.
COMES NOW Tally H. Eddings, II, Sui Juris, Citizen of Florida State (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) to petition this honorable Court for declaratory and injunctive relief and damages in connection with the Defendants’ acts: (1) unlawfully converting $1,177,254.99 of Plaintiff’s own private funds, entrusted to the professional care and management of Defendant Raymond James Financial Services, Inc.; and, (2) breaching fiduciary contracts. Both acts violate Florida State common laws and also the federal RICO laws at 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.
Plaintiff seeks triple damages authorized by 18 U.S.C. 1964. Plaintiff also demands trial by jury, and hereby petitions this Court for all other relief which this Court deems just and proper.
This Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to the Florida State Constitution, the civil RICO remedies at 18 U.S.C. 1964, and the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court in Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990) and of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, hn. 4 (9th Cir. 1987) (State courts have original and concurrent jurisdiction of civil RICO claims).
Plaintiff Tally H. Eddings, II, is a Citizen of Florida State and retired medical doctor living in Fern Park, Florida.
Does 1 thru 10 are as yet unnamed Co‑Plaintiffs.
Defendant Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. (“R/J”) is a Florida domestic corporation that is registered, and presently in good standing, with the Florida Secretary of State, with offices in St. Petersburg, Florida. Does 1 thru 20 are as yet unnamed Co‑Defendants.
On or about December 14, 1999 A.D., Defendant R/J disbursed two (2) bank checks in the amounts of $445,834.28 and $731,420.71 from funds which Plaintiff had previously entrusted to R/J’s care and management, as His fiduciary.
R/J made the checks in question payable to an extortion racket and money laundry domiciled in Puerto Rico under color of the Federal Alcohol Administration (“FAA”), and masquerading as a lawful bureau or department of the U.S. Department of the Treasury in Washington, D.C., in frequent violations of the federal statutes at 31 U.S.C. 333, the Lanham Act (1946), the Sherman Act (1890), and 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.
Plaintiff then commenced timely to protest this conversion in a lengthy series of letters which attempted to explain the many legal errors which R/J had committed by disbursing the funds in question, and which attempted in vain to persuade R/J to correct said errors.
Plaintiff then contacted an experienced and qualified Private Attorney General, who presented Plaintiff with a key holding from the case of U.S. v. O’Dell, 160 F.2d 304, 307 (6th Cir. 1947). Originating in the District Court of the United States, the O’Dell court held:
The method followed in the cases is that of issuing warrants of distraint, making the bank a party, and serving with the notice of levy copy of the warrants of distraint and notice of lien.
Similarly, this holding corresponds to headnote 3 in O’Dell, to wit:
The method of accomplishing a levy on a bank account is the issuing of warrants of distraint, the making of the bank a party, and the serving with notice of levy, copy of the warrants of distraint, and notice of lien.
[bold emphasis added]
Plaintiff then confirmed that the holding in O’Dell is based upon each Citizen’s fundamental Right to due process of law, and that the legal standard for waivers of fundamental Rights is quite stringent. See Brady v. U.S, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (waivers of fundamental Rights must be knowingly intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences).
Plaintiff also confirmed that waivers of fundamental Rights can never be presumed. See Ohio Bell v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292 (1937) (we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental Rights).
Plaintiff hereby testifies that He never waived any fundamental Rights in the matter of the funds entrusted to, and later disbursed by Defendant R/J. Any such waiver assumes facts not in evidence.
Plaintiff also testifies here that He was never served with the requisite CIVIL SUMMONS, COMPLAINT or any WARRANT OF DISTRAINT (court order) in the matters of said funds, or their disposition.
Plaintiff likewise alleges that Defendant R/J was never served with the requisite WARRANT OF DISTRAINT (court order) either!
To pursue these questions further, Plaintiff wrote and served on Defendant R/J His CERTIFIED AND REGISTERED MAIL, dated August 9, 2002, whereby Plaintiff demanded that Defendant R/J promptly disclose certified copies of any and all documentary evidence in the latter’s possession or control which might suggest or indicate that Plaintiff had waived His fundamental Right to due process of law.
Plaintiff’s stated deadline for production and exhibition of any competent waiver(s) was 5:00 p.m. on Monday, August 19, 2002.
A true and correct copy of said CERTIFIED AND REGISTERED MAIL, dated August 9, 2002, is attached as Exhibit “A” and incorporated by reference, as if set forth fully here.
By the time said deadline had passed, Defendant R/J had failed to exhibit any competent waiver(s) in the matter of the funds disbursed.
Then, on August 20, 2002, under penalty of perjury Plaintiff testified as to Defendant R/J’s failure to exhibit any competent waiver(s) in the matter of the funds disbursed, by executing and serving His AFFIDAVIT OF DEFAULT AND OF ESTOPPEL BY ACQUIESCENCE.
A true and correct copy of said AFFIDAVIT OF DEFAULT AND OF ESTOPPEL BY ACQUIESCENCE, dated August 20, 2002, is attached as Exhibit “B” and incorporated by reference, as if set forth fully here.
Then, in a one-page letter dated August 23, 2002, and signed by a Mr. John M. Norton II, Assistant Vice President and Assistant Corporate Counsel, Defendant R/J openly admitted that it had no other documents responsive to Plaintiff’s “requests” [sic].
A true and correct copy of said letter dated August 23, 2002, from Mr. John M. Norton II, is attached as Exhibit “C” and incorporated by reference, as if set forth fully here.
On September 3, 2002 A.D., Plaintiff then executed and served a comprehensive NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR RESTORATION OF ACCOUNTS upon Defendant R/J, attention: John M. Norton II supra.
Said NOTICE AND DEMAND explained in detail the many errors which had already been committed by Defendant R/J, and demanded prompt restoration of funds in an amount indicated to be at least $1,175,254.99 [sic] (in hindsight, a $2,000.00 typographical error.)
The deadline for restoration of said accounts was stated to be thirty (30) days from the date of said NOTICE AND DEMAND, which deadline was October 3, 2002 A.D. (September 3 + 30 days = October 3).
A true and correct copy of said NOTICE AND DEMAND dated September 3, 2002, is attached as Exhibit “D” and incorporated by reference, as if set forth fully here.
As of the morning of October 4, 2002 A.D., Defendant R/J had failed to restore any accounts with any of Plaintiff’s funds that had been entrusted to Defendant R/J’s professional care and management.
Accordingly, Plaintiff now believes, for all of the verified reasons stated above, that: (1) Defendant R/J never did receive any competent waiver(s) of Plaintiff’s fundamental Right to due process of law; (2) Defendant R/J never did receive any WARRANT OF DISTRAINT as required by the court holding in the case of U.S. v. O’Dell supra; and, (3) Defendant R/J is now liable to Plaintiff for damages including, but not limited to, the full amount of all funds disbursed plus all interest allowable by applicable Florida State law(s).
Moreover, Plaintiff now believes that all Defendants are also liable to Plaintiff for racketeering, in violation of the applicable federal statutes at 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., by conspiring with a well known extortion racket and money laundry to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity across State lines, to Plaintiff’s detriment.
In support of Plaintiff’s racketeering allegation supra, Plaintiff attaches a true and correct copy of the document entitled “31 Questions and Answers about the Internal Revenue Service,” embossed and certified under penalty of perjury by its author, one Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Citizen of California State, Private Attorney General and qualified Federal Witness. Respondeat superior.
Plaintiff attaches said document as Exhibit “E” and incorporates same by reference, as if set forth fully here.
Plaintiff now believes that Exhibit “E” constitutes sufficient probable cause to charge all Defendants with at least one (1) count each of conspiring to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) and (d). This Court shall liberally construe said statutes, pursuant to their legislative intent at 84 Stat. 947, Sec. 904(a), P.L. 91-452 (Oct. 15, 1970) (never codified).
Plaintiff later requested Mr. Mitchell supra to mail an identical copy of Exhibit “E” to Defendant R/J before this lawsuit commenced.
Accordingly, Exhibit “F” is a true and correct copy of the letter of TRANSMITTAL by which Paul Andrew Mitchell supra did transmit a certified and embossed copy of Exhibit “E” to Defendant R/J via first class U.S. Mail on September 25, 2002 A.D.
Breach of contract and unlawful conversion of funds,
in violation of Florida State common laws
In connection with the verified facts as stated above, Plaintiff charges that Defendant R/J did breach its fiduciary contract with Plaintiff, and Defendant R/J did unlawfully convert Plaintiff’s own private funds into the exclusive possession and control of an unauthorized foreign entity.
Said foreign entity is now proven by certified evidence to be a money laundry and extortion racket that is domiciled in Puerto Rico under color of the former Federal Alcohol Administration (“FAA”) and that is frequently violating the federal statutes at 31 U.S.C. 333, the Lanham Act (1946), the Sherman Act (1890), and the RICO statutes at 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq. Compare the definitions at 27 CFR 26.11 (formerly 27 CFR 250.11) where “CFR” = “Code of Federal Regulations”.
But, said FAA was declared to be unconstitutional inside the several States of the Union by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in U.S. v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935), because the Eighteenth Amendment (aka Prohibition) had already been repealed.
Said entity was never created by any known Act(s) of Congress. See footnote 23 in Chrysler Corporation v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) (an organic Act of Congress could not be found, after the U.S. Supreme Court searched all the way back to the Civil War); also Article I, Section 1 in the U.S. Constitution (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States ....”)
Accordingly, Defendant R/J is specifically liable to Plaintiff Tally H. Eddings, II, for each and every unlawful act alleged in COUNT ONE above.
Conspiracy to engage in a pattern
of racketeering activity,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) and (d)
In connection with the verified facts as stated above, and also in connection with other facts as yet to be formally discovered and with other Defendants as yet to be formally named, Plaintiff charges that Defendant R/J did conspire with a known extortion racket and money laundry, and Defendant R/J and its agents did engage in a clear pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) and (d), by also committing two (2) or more predicate acts itemized at 18 U.S.C. 1961(1) during the ten (10) calendar years preceding October 1, 2002 A.D., in the course of aiding and abetting its breach(s) of contract and its unlawful conversion(s) of certain funds entrusted by all Plaintiffs to Defendant R/J’s professional care and management, as their trusted professional fiduciary (trustee in fact).
Plaintiff did entrust Defendant R/J with sole responsibility for managing a sizeable portion of Plaintiff’s private estate. As such, Defendant R/J owed a specific duty to Plaintiff ‑‑ to be an adversary in defense of Plaintiff’s private estate, as trustee in fact.
Then, Defendant R/J violated that duty outright, not only by conversion and breach of contract, but also by multiple predicate acts in a conspiracy to engage in a pattern of interstate racketeering.
As such, Defendant R/J is at least vicariously liable if not also specifically liable to Plaintiff Tally H. Eddings, II, and to multiple other Co-Plaintiffs as yet unnamed, for all unlawful acts alleged in COUNT TWO above.
Respondeat superior (“Let the superior respond,” in Latin).
SUMMARY OF DAMAGES
first bank check: $ 445,834.28
second bank check: $ 731,420.71
First Subtotal: $1,177,254.99
Allowable interest (see Note 1)
5.00% APR compounded monthly: $ 173,056.48
Second Subtotal: $1,350,311.47
Triple damage multiplier: x 3.00
Third Subtotal: $4,050,934.41 $4,050,934.41
Consequential damages: tba
Costs of this lawsuit: tba
Fourth Subtotal: tba
Triple damage multiplier: x 3.00
Fifth Subtotal: tba
Other exemplary damages: tba
GRAND TOTAL: tba
“tba” means “to be arranged” i.e. jury verdict
1. interest calculated as follows:
5.00% APR compounded monthly for 33 consecutive months
(December 14, 1999 A.D. thru September 14, 2002 A.D.)
((1. + (.05/12.0))^33) – 1.00 = 0.1470 x $1,177,254.99
“^” means “raised to the power of” (using MS-QBASIC)
The Undersigned hereby verifies, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1). See Supremacy Clause (U.S. Constitution, Laws and Treaties are all the supreme Law of the Land, like the federal Law at 28 U.S.C. 1746).
Dated: October ____, 2002 A.D.
Printed: Tally H. Eddings, II, Sui Juris, Plaintiff In Propria Persona
Plaintiff’s CERTIFIED AND REGISTERED MAIL
To: Defendant R/J
Dated: August 9, 2002 A.D.
Plaintiff’s AFFIDAVIT OF DEFAULT AND
OF ESTOPPEL BY ACQUIESCENCE
To: Defendant R/J
Dated: August 20, 2002 A.D.
Letter from Mr. John M. Norton II
To: Plaintiff Tally H. Eddings, II
Dated: August 23, 2002 A.D.
Plaintiff’s NOTICE AND DEMAND
FOR RESTORATION OF ACCOUNTS
To: Defendant R/J
Dated: September 3, 2002 A.D.
Written and Certified
under Penalty of Perjury
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Webmaster, Supreme Law Library:
Letter of TRANSMITTAL
with Delivery Confirmation
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Dated: September 25, 2002 A.D.
Published Decision of the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit
160 F.2d 304 (March 10, 1947)
Appeal from the Article III
District Court of the United States
Eastern District of Michigan