Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
c/o USMCFP #44202-086
P.O. Box 4000
Springfield, 65801-4000
Missouri, USA
In Propria Persona (initially)
In Forma Pauperis
United States District Court
Western District of Missouri
Southern Division / Springfield
United States )
Case No. 14-3460-CV-S-MDH-P
ex relatione )
Paul Andrew Mitchell, )
NOTICE OF MOTION AND
)
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
Civil Cross-Plaintiff, ) SUA
SPONTE:
)
v. )
18 U.S.C. 1514(b)(1),
3771.
)
Nancy Dell Freudenthal, )
Stephan Harris, )
L. Robert Murray, )
Linda Sanders, )
Scott W. Skavdahl )
Kelly H. Rankin, )
Christopher Crofts, and )
Does 5 thru 100, )
)
Civil Cross-Defendants. )
_________________________________________)
Comes now
the United States ex rel. Paul Andrew
Mitchell, B.A., M.S.,
Citizen of Washington State (expressly
not a federal citizen), Private
Attorney General under Civil RICO
and Agent of the United States under
the False Claims Act, to petition this Court for a
protective order,
as authorized by 18 U.S.C. 1514(b)(1) and 3771(a),
(d)(1) and (d)(3),
for a preponderance of reasons including but not limited
to those
considered in the following discussion, taken together with all
other
pleadings previously filed by Relator
and incorporated by reference
as if set forth fully here.
Relator now substitutes Scott W. Skavdahl, claiming to be a
U.S. District Court Judge, for John Doe #2; Kelly H. Rankin, claiming to
be a U.S. Magistrate, for John Doe #3; and, Christopher Crofts,
claiming to be a U.S. Attorney, for John Doe #4.
The Federal Statute at 18 U.S.C. 1514(b)(1) authorizes this
Court, upon its own motion (“sua sponte”) to issue a protective
order prohibiting harassment of a victim or witness in a Federal
criminal case or investigation, if the Court, after a hearing,
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(a) harassment of an identified victim or witness in a
Federal criminal case or investigation exists; or,
(b) such an order is necessary to prevent and restrain
offenses under [18
U.S.C.) section 1513 (Retaliating
against a witness,
victim, or an informant).
At 18 U.S.C. 1514(d)(1)(B), the word “harassment” is expressly
defined by Act of Congress as follows:
(i) causes substantial emotional
distress in such a person;
and,
(ii) serves no legitimate
purpose . . . .
Similarly, “serious act” is also
expressly defined by Congress
at 1514(d)(1)(F):
the term “serious act”
means a single act of threatening,
retaliatory, harassing,
or violent conduct that is reasonably
likely to influence the
willingness of a victim or witnesses
to testify or participate
in a Federal criminal case or
investigation . . . .
“Course of conduct” is also expressly defined by Congress at
1514(d)(1)(A):
the term “course of conduct”
means a series of acts over a
period of time, however
short, indicating a continuity of
purpose . . . .
“Specific person” is also expressly defined by Congress at
1514(d)(1)(G):
the term “specific person”
means a victim or witness in a
Federal criminal case or investigation,
and includes an
immediate family member of such a victim or witness.
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And, the above terms combine to define “intimidation” at 1514(d)(1)(D):
the term “intimidation”
means a serious act or course of conduct
directed at a specific
person that –
(i) causes fear or apprehension
in such person; and,
(ii) serves no legitimate purpose . . . .
Accordingly, the verified facts already found in this Court's
official records, and in the DWY Docket as already incorporated by
reference, call for the conclusions that:
(1) as a documented victim, qualified Federal witness and
Civil RICO investigator, Relator has suffered serious acts of
harassment (as defined above), including but not limited to a
course of conduct with a continuity of purpose to cause substantial
emotional distress, fear and apprehension, by means of false
search “warrant”, false arrest, multiple periods of solitary
confinement, continuous false imprisonment, “diesel therapy” torture,
sleep deprivation, and overt acts of retaliation, all serving no
legitimate purpose, in multiple violations of 18 U.S.C. 1513; and,
(2) as a documented victim, qualified Federal witness and
Civil RICO investigator, Relator has also suffered serious acts of
intimidation (as defined above), including but not limited to a
course of conduct with a continuity of purpose to cause substantial
emotional distress, fear and apprehension by means of malicious
and selective prosecution, vicious defamations per se, elder
abuse,
written and spoken threats of forced and involuntary
medication
using mind-altering and potentially dangerous psychotropic
drugs,
threats of further solitary confinement, tortious
interference with
his livelihood, with his professional education and
business plans,
and with his utility patent pending and related computer
storage
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research, all serving no legitimate purpose, in multiple
violations
of 18 U.S.C. 1513.
On the
Internet, for example, please see:
www.supremelaw.org/authors/mitchell/resume.htm
All of the above are serious acts of threatening,
retaliatory
and harassing conduct that was intentional, premeditated
and likely
to influence Relator's willingness
to testify and to participate
as a witness, and Civil RICO investigator, in a Federal
criminal
case, and in an ongoing investigation of missing and defective
credentials required by Law of Federal officers and employees.
Furthermore, violations of 18 U.S.C. 1513 are
also RICO
“predicate
acts” as defined by Congress at 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(B).
Only two (2) such RICO predicate
acts during any given 10-year period
constitute a “pattern of racketeering activity” as defined by
Congress
at 18 U.S.C. 1961(5).
The sheer number of RICO predicate acts Relator has now endured
-- after
volunteering to search for an estimated 2,500 children
reportedly missing in Tucson, Arizona circa 1996 -- easily
exceeds
one hundred (100). For example, on the Internet please
see:
Although it was never codified anywhere in
the U.S. Code,
Congress also expressly authorized
a liberal construction rule for
the RICO laws, as follows:
The provisions of this title shall be liberally
construed
to effectuate its
remedial purposes. P.L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 947,
October 15, 1970 (cf. Notes under 18 U.S.C. 1961)
- 4 of 9 -
In conclusion, a prompt protective ORDER is justified
and
necessary to prevent and restrain any and all further
violations
of 18 U.S.C. 1513 directed at Relator,
regardless of the source(s)
or motive(s) of those felony violations.
The Court
should not stop here, however. In point of well
documented facts, the retaliations directed against Relator began
in earnest when his classic book “The Federal Zone” was
stolen,
corruptly modified, and widely distributed via the Internet --
all without his knowledge or consent. After initial publication
in early 1992, he first discovered some of those
criminal copyright
violations in December 1995, several months after the market for
that book was effectively saturated by all those “free”
electronic
copies. Here, see 18
U.S.C. 2319 (Criminal infringement of a
copyright).
In August 2001, he sued 129 recalcitrant suspects
in the
Federal District Court in Sacramento,
California, but all 48 defense
attorneys eventually turned up without proper licenses
to practice
law in the State of California. On the internet, please
see:
www.supremelaw.org/counsels.htm
www.supremelaw.org/cc/statebar/
That civil case was ultimately appealed to
the U.S. Supreme
Court, and all 48 of those attorneys
either fell totally silent,
or they formally waived their clients' right to answer
this carefully
written and thoroughly researched brief:
www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/cert.htm#drama
(read no rebuttals from any
opposing parties)
- 5 of 9 -
There are presently more than 110,000
discrete files maintained
at the latter Internet website. Relator
is fond of pointing out a
simple numerical fact:
if Users read just one file per day, then
after 100 years they will have read 36,525 files, or only
one-third
of the files in the moderately large database! (Don't forget leap years.)
For purposes
of justifying a protective order sua sponte,
Relator's Civil RICO case, filed in the Superior Court of
California
with numerous Exhibits, does catalog many of the RICO
“predicate acts”
which had already occurred by that time:
Notably, the Act of July 2, 1996,
added 18 U.S.C. 2319 -- criminal
copyright infringement -- to the list of RICO predicate acts
itemized
at 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(B).
As defined by Congress at 18 U.S.C. 1961(5), the pattern of
racketeering activity did not stop with the Civil RICO complaint,
however; on the contrary, more obstruction of justice occurred when
many of the same Unlicensed ATTORNeys corruptly colluded with known
Federal impostors to prevent any jury trial(s). Relator never got
near a jury! The right of trial by jury is preserved to the parties
inviolate by Rule 38(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
One major finding did emerge from that Civil RICO
lawsuit:
all Federal District Judges in California, about
one-third on the
Ninth Circuit,
and three (3) Associate Justices on the U.S. Supreme
Court turned up without
valid licenses to practice law when they
were first admitted to The State Bar of California --
Kennedy, Breyer
and O'Connor:
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www.supremelaw.org/rsrc/commissions/
www.supremelaw.org/rsrc/oaths/
Relator therefore submits what should now be painfully
obvious:
his ongoing investigation of missing and defective
credentials,
required by Law of all Federal officers and employees, is the
single
most powerful hypothesis explaining the bulk of all the
criminal
retaliations he has suffered. To date, and to his knowledge,
not one single suspect has been prosecuted, despite numerous verified
criminal complaints (“VCC”) duly lodged, or filed, to satisfy
legal
obligations imposed by 18 U.S.C. 4 (Misprision of felony).
It is not hard to prove that Civil Cross-Defendant
Stephan Harris
has also conspired corruptly to retaliate against Relator for merely
requesting the U.S. Office of Personnel Management Standard Form
61
APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS and second
OATH OF OFFICE required of Mr. Harris
by Article VI, Clause 3, by 5 U.S.C. 2104, 2903, 3331,
3332,
3333, and
by 28 U.S.C. 951.
Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
was obviously
and painfully violated by DWY personnel when Relator's two (2) MOTIONs
TO DISMISS were never ruled on,
nor was Relator ever allowed to see
any pleadings in opposition to those 2 MOTIONs.
Since when it is illegal to
“request” oaths of office?
Is not such a “request” protected by the
First Amendment?
And, is it not a felony violation of 18
U.S.C. 241 to conspire
with specific intent to infringe the free exercise and
full enjoyment
of such a Fundamental Right?
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As if the above were not already more than sufficient
to justify
a prompt protective ORDER, this Court is also
encouraged to review,
and possibly also to study, the several documents
assembled in support
of Relator's Mail Fraud Report
(PS Form 8165), as lodged against one
William M. McCool:
Google site:supremelaw.org
“The Case Against William M. McCool”
A man meeting his description showed up in
the private parking
lot of Relator's Seattle apartment
building in July 2013, and
proceeded to harass and intimidate Relator
without providing any
forms of identification, even when asked to do so.
Relator pointed out that he needed an appointment, and had none;
but, the suspect and his companion refused to leave (read
“trespass”).
The suspect did admit his “reason”
for being there was a recent first-
class letter which Relator had
mailed to the Director of the U.S.
Marshals Services in Washington,
D.C., concerning probable cause of
malfeasance in the Office of the U.S. Attorney General. Relator
promptly reported the latter incident to three (3) Federal District
Judges seated on the USDC in downtown
Seattle (USDC/WDWA).
REMEDIES REQUESTED
Relator now submits
that more than sufficient justification exists
for a prompt protective ORDER detailing, at a minimum,
each of the
following elements for his benefit:
(1) Relator's immediate
release from any and all forms of detention
to unfettered Liberty, which is his Fundamental Right;
(2) a guarantee
expediting Relator's safe passage back to Seattle,
Washington State e.g. U.S. Marshal escort from the USMCFP
in
Springfield, Missouri thru airport security;
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(3) an emergency stipend of $10,000 USD cash to commence Relator's
immediate rehabilitation e.g.
food, shelter, clothing, computer
and telecommunications equipment, and Internet access;
(4) appointment of a
capable, qualified, experienced and zealous
civil rights lawyer legally to represent Relator
with all
further adjudication of the instant case, pursuant to 28
U.S.C.
section 1915(e);
(5) a preliminary
injunction enjoining and restraining all Federal
and IRS personnel from any further harassment or
intimidation
of Relator, as those terms are
defined at 18 U.S.C. 1514 supra;
(6) a preliminary
injunction enjoining and restraining all past and
present “members” of The State Bar of California from any
further
harassment or intimidation of Relator,
as those terms are defined
at 18 U.S.C. 1514 supra;
(7) a preliminary
injunction enjoining and restraining all Federal
and all IRS personnel from any and all forms of interference
with Internet domain supremelaw.org, or with any of Relator's
several email accounts;
(8) dismissal with prejudice of all charges alleged in the
“superseding indictment” still pending against Relator at the
USDC/DWY,
Docket #2:14-CR-00027-NDF-2 aka 14-CR-27-F; and,
(9) any and all other appropriate relief which this
honorable Court
deems just and proper for purposes of issuing a completely
satisfactory protective ORDER sua sponte in this case.
The above elements are really not too much to
ask, given 18 YEARS
of frequent suffering Relator was
forced to endure -- for research,
writing, teaching, counsel and court activism -- none of
which ever
injured anyone or damaged any property.
Thank you very much for your professional consideration.
Dated: 11/25/2014
Sincerely yours, [signed Paul
Mitchell PM]
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A.,
M.S. (chosen name)
Relator In Propria Persona (intially)
and In Forma Pauperis
All Rights Reserved (cf. UCC 1-308)
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FORMAL NOTICE OF FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS
TO: Psychologists and Psychiatrists
USMCFP / Springfield
DATE: November 10, 2014 A.D.
RE: 18 U.S.C. 241, 242
TO WHOM IT NOW CONCERNS:
The following court case abstracts
were provided to Cynthia Low
dba Forensic
Psychologist at FDC/SeaTac on 4/26/2014, and to you
and your subordinates as Exhibit B-1.1 attached to my
written
refusal of your BP-A0959 properly annotated to identify major
errors:
“If defense counsel is not present at [a] psychiatric
examination,
defendant should be asked
by examiner whether he understands
that counsel is entitled
to be present and if he consents to be
examined in the absence
of counsel; defendant should further be
informed that examination
is conducted on behalf of prosecution
and its results will
be available for use against defendant
-- State v. Mains, 295 Or 640, 669
P.2d 1112 (1983)
“Statements made during course of [a] court ordered
psychiatric
examination are 'testimonial'
in nature; thus, compelled
utterances during course
of examination must be viewed
as implicating [the]
privilege against self-incrimination;
statements obtained under
compulsion of court ordered
examination are not available
to prosecution even for
limited impeachment purposes.”
-- Blaisdell
v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass 753, 364 NE.2d 191 (1977)
“Protection of defendant's constitutional privilege
against
self-incrimination and
right to assistance of counsel
at [a] pre-trial court-ordered
psychiatric examination requires
that [a] tape-recording
of entire interview be given to his
and government's lawyer,
and [an] in camera suppression hearing
be held to guarantee
that court-ordered psychiatrist's testimony
will not contain any
incriminating statements.”
-- State v. Jackson, 171 W Va 329, 298 SE.2d 866 (1982)
At no time on 11/6/2014 or 11/7/2014
did you or any of your subordinates
observe or comply with the clear requirements of the Fifth
and Sixth
Amendments as stated above, even
after you were provided with printed
hard-copy NOTICE of same no later than 10/1/2014.
Please also be informed hereby
that a Counselor at USMCFP has now
threatened me, to my face, with destruction of evidence I
authored
in my case. Destruction of material records may be a
violation of
18 USC 1001
and/or 1519 and/or 2071. If “shredding”
documents is
a standard “practice” at USMCFP, that may fully or
partially explain
why some of you may have not received the case abstracts
repeated above.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A.,
M.S. [signed Paul Mitchell PM]
BOP Reg. No. 44202-086
[written: 14-3460-CV-S-MDH-P]
[new page]
[- C O P Y - PM]
5 As we have stated: “[The] individual's right to the protection
of his own good name 'reflects no
more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and
worth of every human being-a concept at the
root of any decent system of ordered liberty.'” Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323, 31 L Ed 2d
789, 94 S Ct 2997 (1974) (quoting
Rosenblatt v Baer, 383 US 75, 92, 15 L Ed 2d 597, 86 S Ct 669
(1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)); see also Milkovich v Lorain Journal Co., 497 US 1, 12, 111 L Ed 2d
1,
110 S Ct 2695 (1990) (“[H]e that
filches from me my good name / Robs me of that which not enriches
him, And makes me poor indeed'”
(quoting Shakespeare's Othello, Act III, scene 3)); Paul, 424 US, at
706, 47 L Ed 2d 405, 96 S Ct 1155
(“The Court has recognized the serious damages that could be
inflicted by branding a government employee as 'disloyal,' and
thereby stigmatizing his good name”);
Wisconsin v Constantineau, 400 US 433, 437, 27 L Ed 2d 515, 91 S Ct 507
(1971) (emphasizing the
importance of “a person's good name, reputation, honor, [and]
integrity”; holding that respondent was
entitled to due process before notices were posted stating
that he was prohibited from buying or
receiving alcohol); In
re Winship, 397 US 358, 363-364, 25 L Ed 2d 368, 90 S
Ct 1068 (1970)
(“[B]ecause
of the certainty that [one found guilty of criminal behavior] would be
stigmatized by the
conviction . . ., a society that values the good name and
freedom of every individual should not condemn
a man for commission of a crime when there is a
reasonable doubt about his guilt”); Wieman v
Updegraff, 344 US 183, 190-191, 97 L Ed 216, 73 S Ct 215 (1952)
(“There can be no dispute about the
consequences visited upon a person excluded from public employment
on disloyalty grounds. In the
view of the community, the stain is a deep one; indeed, it has become a badge of infamy”).
Indeed, vindicating one's reputation is the main
interest at stake in a defamation case, and that that
interest has always been held to constitute a sufficient
“personal stake.” See, e.g., Paul,
424 US, at 697,
47 L Ed 2d 405, 96 S Ct 1155 (“[R]espondent's complaint would appear to state a classical
claim for
defamation actionable in the courts of virtually every State. Imputing
criminal behavior to an individual
is generally considered defamatory per se, and
actionable without proof of special damages”);
Gertz, 418
US, at 349-350, 41 L Ed 2d 789,
94 S Ct 2997 (“We need not define 'actual injury' . . . . Suffice it to say
that actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss.
Indeed, the more customary types of actual harm
inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of
reputation and standing in the community,
personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering”); L. Eldridge, Law of Defamation § 53, pp.
293-294 (1978) (“There is no doubt
about the historical fact that the interest in one's good name was
considered an important interest requiring legal protection more
than a thousand years ago; and that so
far as Anglo-Saxon history is concerned this interest
became a legally protected interest comparatively
soon after the interest in bodily integrity was given legal protection”).
2LED2D
1
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[written: # 14-3460-CV-S-MDH-P]
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