[NAME-OF-APPLICANT], Sui Juris Citizen of [UNION-STATE] state c/o [MAILING-LOCATION] [CITY], [UNION-STATE] state zip code exempt In Propria Persona All Rights Reserved without Prejudice DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF MONTANA BILLINGS DIVISION People of the United States ) Case No. CV 96-163-BLG of America, ex relatione ) Paul Andrew Mitchell, ) NOTICE OF APPLICATION, ) AND APPLICATION FOR Petitioners, ) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT: ) v. ) FRCP Rule 24(a) ) Article III, Section 1 United States et al., ) ) Respondents. ) ________________________________) COMES NOW [NAME-OF-APPLICANT], Sui Juris, Citizen of [UNION- STATE] state (hereinafter "Applicant"), to apply to this honorable Court for Intervention of Right, and to provide formal notice of same to all interested parties. Applicant hereby sets forth the causes for this Application for Intervention of Right, to wit: 1. Applicant is not one of the named Persons or persons identified among the Respondents, or the Relator, in the record before this Court. 2. Applicant claims interests relating to the Rights and properties which are the subject of the action. Application for Intervention of Right: Page 1 of 18 3. Applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede Applicant's ability to protect the interests of the Applicant. 4. To the best of the Applicant's current information, knowledge, and belief, the interests of the Applicant are not adequately represented by the existing Parties to the action. 5. Applicant requires unbiased, competent, and qualified federal judges whose compensation is not being diminished by federal income taxes, thus eliminating a major source of undue influence upon the judges who are appointed to preside over this honorable Court. REMEDY REQUESTED Wherefore, Applicant prays that this Application for Intervention of Right be granted. Executed on [MM/DD/YY3] Respectfully submitted, [SIGNATURE-OF-APPLICANT] _____________________________________ [NAME-OF-APPLICANT], Sui Juris Citizen of [UNION-STATE] state All Rights Reserved without Prejudice _____________________________________ Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S. Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness, Counselor at Law, and Relator Application for Intervention of Right: Page 2 of 18 [NAME-OF-APPLICANT], Sui Juris Citizen of [UNION-STATE] state c/o [MAILING-LOCATION] [CITY], [UNION-STATE] state zip code exempt In Propria Persona All Rights Reserved without Prejudice DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF MONTANA BILLINGS DIVISION People of the United States ) Case No. CV 96-163-BLG of America, ex relatione ) Paul Andrew Mitchell, ) BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ) APPLICATION FOR Petitioners, ) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT, ) WITH POINTS AND AUTHORITIES: v. ) ) FRCP Rule 24(a) United States et al., ) ) Respondents. ) ________________________________) COMES NOW [NAME-OF-APPLICANT], Sui Juris, Citizen of [UNION- STATE] state (hereinafter "Applicant"), to plead the grounds upon which this Application for Intervention is sought, to wit: 1. Applicant has previously filed a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request with the Office of the United States Attorneys in Billings, Montana state, requesting certified and admissible copies of the implementing regulations, as published in the Federal Register, for the following federal statutes: (a) 18 United States Code ("U.S.C.") Section 3231 (b) Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") Section 7402 (c) 28 U.S.C. 1861 et seq. (Jury Selection and Service Act) (d) 4 U.S.C. 105 et seq. (Buck Act) Application for Intervention of Right: Page 3 of 18 2. The language of 18 U.S.C. 3231 very clearly and expressly states, "The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States." Under the rule of statutory construction known as inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of all other things not expressly mentioned), the United States District Courts [sic] are not mentioned, as such. Thus, their omission can be irrefutably inferred as intentional. See above rule defined in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition. 3. The Supreme Court of the United States has already clarified the important, even crucial, distinction between United States District Courts ("USDC"), and the District Courts of the United States ("DCUS"). The latter Courts are Article III judicial forums; the former Courts are Article IV territorial tribunals, with no criminal jurisdiction whatsoever. 4. The courts of appropriate jurisdiction for violations of Title 18, United States Code, are designated at Section 3231, specifically naming them as "district courts of the United States" [sic]. 5. There is a distinct and definite difference between a USDC and a DCUS. The words "District Court of the United States" commonly describe constitutional courts created under Article III of the Constitution, not the legislative courts which have long been the federal courts for enclaves, territories and possessions within the federal zone. See International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237 at 241 (1952), 72 S.Ct. 235, 96 L.Ed. 275, 13 Alaska 536. Application for Intervention of Right: Page 4 of 18 6. The term "District Court of the United States" commonly describes Article III courts or "courts of the United States", and not legislative courts for the Territories. See American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511 (1828), 7 L.Ed 242; International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union v. Wirtz, 170 F.2d 183 (9th Cir., 1948), cert. den. 336 U.S. 919, 93 L.Ed. 1082, 69 S.Ct. 641, reh. den. 336 U.S. 971, 93 L.Ed 1121, 69 S.Ct. 936. 7. Though the judicial system set up in a Territory of the United States is a part of federal jurisdiction, the phrase "court of the United States", when used in a federal statute, is generally construed as not referring to "territorial courts." See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 at 312 (1921), 42 S.Ct. 343, 66 L.Ed. 627. In Balzac, the high Court stated: The United States District Court is not a true United States court established under Article III of the Constitution to administer the judicial power of the United States therein conveyed. It is created by virtue of the sovereign congressional faculty, granted under Article IV, Section 3, of that instrument, of making all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The resemblance of its jurisdiction to that of true United States courts in offering an opportunity to nonresidents of resorting to a tribunal not subject to local influence, does not change its character as a mere territorial court. [emphasis added] 8. The distinction within the dual nature of the federal court system is also noted in Title 18, U.S.C., Section 3241, which states that the United States District Court [sic] for the Canal Zone shall have jurisdiction "concurrently with the district courts of the United States, of offenses against the laws of the United States committed upon the high seas." Application for Intervention of Right: Page 5 of 18 9. The distinction between "district courts of the United States" and "United States district courts" is readily apparent in the Section of Title 18 dealing with civil remedies for activities prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 1962 (i.e. racketeering). Subsection (a) of 28 U.S.C. 1964 makes explicit reference to the Article III "district courts of the United States", as follows: (a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders .... [emphasis added] Subsection (c) of 28 U.S.C. 1964 makes explicit reference to the Article IV "United States district court", as follows: (c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court .... [emphasis added] The language of these two subsections is almost identical in scope, with the important difference resulting from an apparent need to legislate separate and distinct court authorities for the Article III and for the Article IV forums, respectively. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius; also 28 U.S.C. 1441 et seq. 10. The Jury Selection and Service Act at 28 U.S.C. 1861 declares the policy of the United States (federal government) with respect to jury selection and service, to wit: It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes. It is further the policy of the United States that all citizens shall have the opportunity to be considered for service on grand and petit juries in the district courts of the United States, and shall have an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose. [28 U.S.C. 1861, emphasis added] Application for Intervention of Right: Page 6 of 18 11. Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly reserves to litigants the fundamental Right to trial by jury as guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution for the United States of America, as lawfully amended (hereinafter "U.S. Constitution"), to wit: (a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by statute of the United States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate. [FRCP Rule 38] 12. It is well established that there are two (2) classes of citizenship in America today: (1) state Citizenship and (2) "Federal citizenship" (confer in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition). A Person may be a state Citizen without also being a federal citizen, even after the so-called Fourteenth Amendment was forced upon the southern states after the Civil War, e.g.: There are, then, under our republican form of government, two classes of citizens, one of the United States and one of the state. One class of citizenship may exist in a person, without the other, as in the case of a resident of the District of Columbia; but both classes usually exist in the same person. [Gardina v. Board of Registrars, 160 Ala. 155] [48 S. 788, 791 (1909), emphasis added] 13. Although the organic U.S. Constitution does utilize a capital "C" in all references to state Citizens, and although the so-called Fourteenth Amendment and all of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") do consistently utilize a lower-case "c" in all references to federal citizens, Congress does not appear to have adopted a similar convention in the Jury Selection and Service Act ("JSSA"). The term "all citizens" as that term is used in section 1861 of that Act must, therefore, be construed to mean and include both state Citizens and federal citizens, without prejudice to any one particular class. Application for Intervention of Right: Page 7 of 18 14. However, in a subsequent section of said Act, Congress clearly stipulates that only federal citizens are currently qualified to serve on federal grand and petit juries. See 28 U.S.C. 1865, to wit: ... [T]he chief judge of the district court, or such other district court judge as the plan may provide, shall deem any person qualified to serve on grand and petit juries in the district court unless he -- (1) is not a citizen of the United States eighteen years old who has resided for a period of one year within the judicial district; .... [emphasis added] 15. Thus, there is a clear and irreconcilable conflict between section 1861 and section 1865 in Title 28, United States Code. If Congress did intend to embrace all citizens, both state and federal, within its policy for qualifying candidates for jury service, then section 1865 clearly discriminates against state Citizens, in favor of federal citizens, for grand and petit jury service, and does so with an unconstitutional result, namely, such class discrimination proves that federal grand and petit juries are not legal bodies which have no power to issue indictments or verdicts of any kind whatsoever. Applicant hereby stipulates that federal citizens do not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the JSSA; state Citizens do. 16. Furthermore, it is the policy of Congress that all citizens shall have an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose. See 28 U.S.C. 1861. The respective Civil Codes of the several states of the Union, united by and under the U.S. Constitution, contain explicit provisions which restrict the kinds of obligations which can be imposed by the operation of law. For example, in California state, the only Application for Intervention of Right: Page 8 of 18 obligation that arises from the operation of law is to abstain from injuring the Person or property of another, or infringing upon any of His Rights, pursuant to section 1708 of the California Civil Code ("CCC"). All other obligations derive from the contract of the Parties, under the CCC and under the Civil Codes of similar Union states. 17. Therefore, there are currently many cases in which the respective Civil Codes of the several Union states are in direct conflict with the JSSA, because said Act imposes a legal obligation upon all citizens to serve on grand and petit juries when summoned to do so. Traditionally, the normal means of resolving such conflicts is to rely entirely upon the Supremacy Clause in the U.S. Constitution, that is, when conflicts arise, federal law(s) prevail(s). See Article VI, Clause 2 ("6:2"). 18. Furthermore, Congress has failed to mention any District Courts of the United States [sic] anywhere in its "Plan for Random Jury Selection" at 28 U.S.C. 1863, to wit: 1863. Plan for random jury selection (a) Each United States district court [sic] shall devise and place into operation a written plan for random selection of grand and petit jurors that shall be designed to achieve the objectives of sections 1861 and 1862 of this title, and that shall otherwise comply with the provisions of this title. One is entirely justified in concluding that the omission of any mention of District Courts of the United States was intentional. This raises some very important questions concerning the intent of Congress, if any, with respect to jury selection in the DCUS, as distinct from the USDC. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. Application for Intervention of Right: Page 9 of 18 19. Evidently, it is the current intent of Congress to discriminate actively against state Citizens when qualifying candidates for service on grand and petit juries convened by United States District Courts. See 28 U.S.C. 1861, 1865. However, Congress is presently silent about federal policy with respect to jury selection and service in the District Courts of the United States. The JSSA contains the following qualifying definition of the term "district court of the United States": 1869. Definitions For purposes of this chapter -- ... (f) "district court of the United States", "district court", and "court" shall mean any district court established by chapter 5 of this title, and any court which is created by Act of Congress in a territory and is invested with any jurisdiction of a district court established by chapter 5 of this title. 20. The Declaration of Policy at section 1861 refers specifically to "district courts of the United States" [sic]. See supra. Chapter 5 of Title 28 contains the following section concerning the "creation and composition of district courts": 132. Creation and composition of district courts (a) There shall be in each judicial district a district court which shall be a court of record known as the United States District Court [sic] for the district. 21. Therefore, there is a policy for jury selection and service, and there is a plan for random jury selection, within the United States District Courts [sic]; but there is, evidently, no such policy for jury selection and service, and there is no such plan for random jury selection, within the District Courts of the United States [sic]. Application for Intervention of Right: Page 10 of 18 22. Moreover, the JSSA is currently lacking any regulations which have been duly promulgated and published in the Federal Register. See 44 U.S.C. 1505(a). Applicant submits that the absence of regulations for the JSSA restricts the application of said Act to federal officers, employees, and agents only, and cannot be enforced upon the inhabitants of the several Union states, whether they be state Citizens or federal citizens. This dearth of regulations undermines the applicability of the Supremacy Clause (6:2), in the event that Union state laws should conflict with said Act with respect to the kinds of "obligations" which can be imposed upon state Citizens by the operation of law. 23. Applicant claims a fundamental Right to presiding judges who are unbiased, competent, and qualified to preside over this Article III judicial forum. Pursuant to Article III, Section 1, of the U.S. Constitution, the compensation of federal judges shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. See also 28 U.S.C. 461(b). The basis for this guarantee was more fully explained by the Supreme Court in Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920): [T]he primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was ... to attract good and competent men to the bench and to promote that independence of action and judgment which is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations and pervading principles of the Constitution. In Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 (1925), the high Court explained which amount of compensation is protected against diminution: The words and history of the clause indicate that the purpose was to impose upon Congress the duty definitely to declare what sum shall be received by each judge out of the public funds and the times for payment. When this duty has been complied with the amount specified becomes the compensation which is protected against diminution during his continuance in office. Application for Intervention of Right: Page 11 of 18 However, Evans and Miles were not the last words that the Court was to express on the issue of taxation of judicial incomes. In O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939), the Court repudiated both Evans and Miles and held that a non- discriminatory general income tax may be applied to federal judges without diminishing judicial compensation within the meaning of the compensation clause. ["The Constitutional Guaranty Against] [Diminution of Judicial Compensation,"] [UCLA Law Review, Vol. 24, pgs. 308-350] After reviewing O'Malley v. Woodrough supra, Applicant submits that the holding in that case is based on a faulty premise, namely, that there is only one (1) class of citizenship in America. O'Malley should be overturned: in light of the preponderance of cases which demonstrate two (2) classes of citizenship; in light of newly found evidence; and in light of the notable and demonstrable decline in the American judiciary since 1939, the year the Public Salary Tax Act was first enacted. 24. The basis for the O'Malley decision is the high Court's mistaken belief that a federal judge can be taxed in his (her) capacity as a citizen, without violating Article III, Section 1, and without compromising the judge's competence and independence. However, there is nothing in this decision to indicate that the high Court adequately understood how two classes of citizenship bear on this question (taxing the pay of federal judges). 25. The uncontroverted evidence establishing the failed ratification of the so-called Sixteenth Amendment casts this entire debate in an entirely new light. See People v. Boxer, California Supreme Court, Case Number S-030016, December 1992. The fundamental guarantees against direct taxation of all citizens without apportionment, and against diminution of the Application for Intervention of Right: Page 12 of 18 compensation of federal judges, remain as operative today as they were on the day the U.S. Constitution was first adopted. See 1:2:3, 1:9:4, and 3:1 in the U.S. Constitution, which have never been repealed. Repeals by implication are not favored. 26. Applicant submits that the only logical basis on which these guarantees can now be avoided is the doctrine of territorial heterogeneity. Confer in The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue, Fourth Edition, available on the Internet via the Alta Vista search engine; see also U.S. v. Lopez, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995): Each of these [schools] now has an invisible federal zone [sic] extending 1,000 feet beyond the (often irregular) boundaries of the school property. [emphasis added] Here, the U.S. Supreme Court utilized the term "federal zone" as a common noun, without any citations or footnotes. The doctrine of territorial heterogeneity, as such, is summarized as follows in the Conclusions of The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue, to wit: In exercising its exclusive authority over the federal zone, Congress is not subject to the same constitutional limitations that exist inside the 50 States. For this reason, the areas that are inside and outside the federal zone are heterogeneous with respect to each other. This difference results in a principle of territorial heterogeneity: the areas within the federal zone are subject to one set of rules; the areas without (or outside) the federal zone are subject to a different set of rules. The Constitution rules outside the zone and inside the 50 States. The Congress rules inside the zone and outside the 50 States. The 50 States are, therefore, in one general class, because all constitutional restraints upon Congress are in force throughout the 50 States, without prejudice to any one State. The areas within the federal zone are in a different general class, because these same constitutional restraints simply do not limit Congress inside that zone. [The Federal Zone, electronic Fifth Edition, Conclusions] Application for Intervention of Right: Page 13 of 18 27. In the pivotal case of Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), which is discussed at several places in the book The Federal Zone supra, the U.S. Supreme Court established a doctrine whereby the Constitution for the "United States", as such, does not extend beyond the limits of the states which are united by and under it. This doctrine of territorial heterogeneity is now commonly identified as the "Downes Doctrine." 28. This doctrine has been reinforced by subsequent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, notably, the case of Hooven & Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), in which the high Court ruled that the guarantees of the U.S. Constitution extend to the federal zone only as Congress has made those guarantees applicable. The United States District Courts are currently established by Congress as territorial (federal zone) courts, with constitutional authority emanating from Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, to wit: The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needed Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; .... [U.S. Constitution, Art. 4, Sec. 3, Cl. 2] [emphasis added] 29. Applicant wishes to litigate the instant case against the United States, and against Does 1 thru 1000, in an Article III Court of competent jurisdiction, and with judicial power appropriate to the subject matter. In particular, Applicant wishes to invoke the judicial power of the United States of America, among several reasons, in order to enjoin the Respondent(s) from withholding the agency records which Applicant has requested in lawful and proper requests under the FOIA, and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the Applicant. See 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B), to wit: Application for Intervention of Right: Page 14 of 18 On complaint, the district court of the United States ... has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant. [5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B), emphasis added] 30. In re: Grand Jury Subpoena Served on New Life Health Center Company, USDC, Tucson, Arizona, case number GJ-95-1-6, United States District Judge John M. Roll did rule that the USDC is not the proper forum to bring a request under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). See ORDER dated May 21, 1996. If the USDC is not the proper forum to bring a request under the FOIA, then neither is it the proper forum for prosecuting any criminal violations of Title 18, U.S.C. See 18 U.S.C. 3231 quoted supra and the rules of statutory construction in Title 1, U.S.C. Singular and plural refer to the same entity always. Title 1, U.S.C., has been enacted into positive law. 31. Applicant hereby specifically complains that Congress knew, or should have known, that the federal court of original jurisdiction to enforce the FOIA is the District Court of the United States ("DCUS"), not the United States District Court ("USDC"), when Congress published A CITIZEN'S GUIDE ON USING THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 TO REQUEST GOVERNMENT RECORDS, First Report by the House Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Information, Justice, Transportation, and Agriculture, 1993 Edition, House Report 103- 104, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, Union Calendar No. 53. Said CITIZEN'S GUIDE incorrectly cited the United States District Application for Intervention of Right: Page 15 of 18 Court ("USDC") as the federal court of original jurisdiction for judicial enforcement of FOIA requests. See 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B). There is no statute of limitations on fraud, whether actual or constructive. 32. In order for this case to proceed forward, and it is Petitioners' fundamental Right under the Fifth Amendment that it do so, this honorable Court must be seated with unbiased, competent, and qualified Judges who are not subject to any outside executive (or other) controls whatsoever. This means, among other things, that Article III judges must be designated and temporarily appointed to preside over the instant case, whose compensation is not being diminished by federal income taxes, and whose integrity and independence from all other governments and all other government branches are unassailable and beyond question. Fundamental Rights are unalienable. 33. Applicant hereby objects strenuously to the existence of any contract, either verbal or written, either expressed or implied in fact, between any currently seated United States District Judge or any currently seated Judge of the Court of International Trade, on the one hand, and the "Internal Revenue Service" [sic] or any other controlling interests, on the other hand, on grounds of conflicts of interest. Completed "IRS" Forms W-4 and 1040 are expressed, written contracts. 34. Applicant is guaranteed the fundamental right to an independent and unbiased judiciary. See Evans v. Gore supra. The existence of any contract between any presiding Judges and any other branch of the federal government, or any of its agencies, assigns, or instrumentalities, is evidence of a Application for Intervention of Right: Page 16 of 18 conflict of interest and proof of a dependent and biased judiciary. See Lord v. Kelley, 240 F.Supp. 167, 169 (1965) and compare with Evans v. Gore supra, to measure how far our civilization has degenerated under the Downes Doctrine. This honorable Court will please take formal judicial notice of the holding and the dicta in Evans, which case proves that American courts have an obligation to rule on matters which properly come before them. Executed on [MM/DD/YY3] Respectfully submitted, [SIGNATURE-OF-APPLICANT] _____________________________________ [NAME-OF-APPLICANT], Sui Juris Citizen of [UNION-STATE] state All Rights Reserved without Prejudice _____________________________________ Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S. Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness, Counselor at Law, and Relator All Rights Reserved without Prejudice # # # Application for Intervention of Right: Page 17 of 18 [NAME-OF-APPLICANT], Sui JurisCitizen of [UNION-STATE] state c/o [MAILING-LOCATION] [CITY], [UNION-STATE] state zip code exempt In Propria Persona All Rights Reserved without Prejudice DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF MONTANA BILLINGS DIVISION People of the United States ) Case No. CV 96-163-BLG of America, ex relatione ) Paul Andrew Mitchell, ) ) ORDER TO ALLOW Petitioners, ) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT: ) v. ) FRCP Rule 24(a) ) United States et al., ) ) Respondents. ) ________________________________) Good cause having been shown by [NAME-OF-APPLICANT], Sui Juris, Citizen of [UNION-STATE] state in the above-entitled proceeding, it is hereby: ORDERED that [NAME-OF-APPLICANT], Sui Juris, be allowed to intervene in the above-entitled case. ORDERED this ________ day of ____________________, 19 _____, at Billings, Montana state, United States of America. __________________________________________ Judge, District Court of the United States under Article III of the U.S. Constitution Application for Intervention of Right: Page 18 of 18 PROOF OF SERVICE I, Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness and Counselor at Law, do hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the "United States," that I am at least 18 years of age, a Citizen of one of the United States of America, and that I personally served the following document(s): NOTICE AND APPLICATION FOR INTERVENTION OF RIGHT: FRCP Rule 24(a) BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR INTERVENTION OF RIGHT, WITH POINTS AND AUTHORITIES: FRCP Rule 24(a) ORDER TO ALLOW INTERVENTION OF RIGHT: FRCP Rule 24(a) by placing one true and correct copy of same in first class U.S. Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to: Attorney General William H. Rehnquist, C.J. Department of Justice Supreme Court of the United States 10th and Constitution, N.W. 1 First Street, N.E. Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C. Solicitor General Office of the U.S. Attorneys Department of Justice Department of Justice 10th and Constitution, N.W. c/o 316 North 26th Street Washington, D.C. Billings, Montana state James M. Burns Chief Judge United States District Court Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals c/o 316 North 26th Street c/o P.O. Box 193939 Billings, Montana state San Francisco, California state Warren Christopher Judge J. Clifford Wallace U.S. Secretary of State Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Department of State c/o P.O. Box 193939 Washington, D.C. San Francisco, California state LeRoy Michael; Schweitzer Judge Alex Kozinski Yellowstone County Jail Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals c/o 3165 King Avenue East c/o P.O. Box 193939 Billings, Montana state San Francisco, California state Dated: _________________________________________________________ Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S. Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness, Counselor at Law, and Relator # # #
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Instructions for Intervention