William Neal., Lanter, Sui Juris
c/o general delivery
Billings, Montana state
zip code exempt

In Propria Persona

Under Protest, Necessity, and
by Special Visitation Only






                  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                       DISTRICT OF MONTANA

                        BILLINGS DIVISION


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, [sic] )  Case No. CR 96-40-BLG-JDS-01
                                )
     Plaintiff, [sic]           )  NOTICE AND DEMAND
                                )  TO DISMISS FOR LACK
     v.                         )  OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
                                )
WILLIAM NEAL LANTER, [sic]      )  28 U.S.C. 1359;
                                )  FRCP Rules 9(b),
     Defendant.                 )  12(b)(1),(2), 12(h)(3)
________________________________)


COMES NOW  William Neal.,  Lanter, Sui Juris,  Citizen of Montana

state and  Defendant in  the above  entitled matter  (hereinafter

"Defendant"), to  demand an  immediate dismissal  of the  instant

criminal case,  with prejudice, for lack of criminal jurisdiction

to proceed  in the first instance, either over the subject matter

or over  the Person  or property of the Defendant, and to provide

formal Notice  to all  interested parties  of  same.    Defendant

hereby incorporates by reference all authorities cited in Exhibit

"A": Federal  Criminal Jurisdiction, and in His MEMORANDUM OF LAW

IN SUPPORT  OF CHALLENGE  TO CRIMINAL  JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT

[i.e. There  is  none.],  Rules  301,  302:    Federal  Rules  of

Evidence, as if all were set forth fully herein.


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 1 of 17


                   KNOW ALL BY THESE PRESENTS:

     I, William  Neal., Lanter,  Sui Juris,  and Defendant in the

above  entitled  matter,  hereby  demand  that  this  territorial

(legislative) tribunal  dismiss the  instant criminal  case  with

prejudice because  it lacks exclusive jurisdiction over the exact

geographical  location   where  the   alleged  criminal  activity

mentioned in  the indictment  is alleged  to have taken place.  I

was not  arrested  in  any  fort,  magazine,  arsenal,  dockyard,

"needful building",  or other  federal enclave within the Montana

Republic, nor  was My  Person or  My  private  property  situated

within any of the aforementioned federal areas (a/k/a the federal

zone).

     A very  recent U.S.  Supreme Court decision, dated April 26,

1995, addressed  the issue  of exclusive legislative jurisdiction

of the  Congress, and  the  powers  of  the  federal  government.

Justice Thomas,  in a  concurring majority  opinion  in  U.S.  v.

Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995), 131 L.Ed.2d 626, very clearly says:

     Indeed, on  this crucial  point, the  majority  and  Justice
     Breyer  [dissenting]   agree  in  principle:    the  Federal
     Government has  nothing approaching  a police power.  Id. at
     page 64.


     Justice Thomas  went on  to discuss "a regulation of police"

at page 86, wherein he stated as follows:

     U.S. v.  DeWitt, 76  U.S. 41, 9 Wall. 41, 19 L.Ed 593 (1870)
     marked the first time the court struck down a federal law as
     exceeding the  power conveyed by the commerce clause.   In a
     2 page  opinion, the  court  invalidated  a  nationwide  law
     prohibiting all  sales of naptha, and illuminating oils.  In
     so doing,  the court  remarked that the commerce clause "has
     always been  understood as  limited by  its terms;  and as a
     virtual denial  of any  power to interfere with the internal
     trade and business of the separate states."  Id. at page 44.


     The law  in question  was "plainly  a regulation of police,"

which could  have constitutional  application only where Congress

had exclusive authority, such as the territories.  Id. pp. 44-45.


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 2 of 17


     Earlier in  the text,  Justice Thomas, Id. at page 85, said,

"Even before  Gibbons, Chief  Justice Marshall,  writing for  the

Court in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat 264, 5 L.Ed 257

(1821), noted that Congress had no general right to punish murder

committed within  any of the states," and that Congress could not

punish felonies  generally.   However, Congress  could enact laws

for places  where it  enjoyed plenary  powers, for instance, over

the District  of Columbia,  and whatever effect ordinary murders,

or robbery,  or gun  possession might have on interstate commerce

was irrelevant to the question of Congressional power.

     The  first   Federal  Criminal   Act  did  not  establish  a

nationwide prohibition  against murder  and the like.  See Act of

April 30,  1790, Chapter  9 [1  Stat. 112];   rather,  only  when

committed in United States territories and possessions, or on the

high  seas.    With  the  single  exceptions  of  treason  and/or

counterfeiting, and  notwithstanding any  of  the  effects  which

murder, robbery,  and gun  possession might  have  on  interstate

commerce,  Congress   understood  that  it  could  not  establish

nationwide prohibitions.

     Justice Thomas  summed up  his opinion dramatically with the

statement quoted in part herein:

     If we wish to be true to a Constitution that does not cede a
     police power to the Federal Government ....


     (1)  "All federal  crimes are statutory."  Doble, "Venue and

Criminal Cases in the United States District Court," Virginia Law

Review, 287,  289 (1926).   "  ...[O]n the  other hand, since all

Federal Crimes are statutory and all criminal prosecutions in the

Federal territorial  courts  are  based  on  Acts  of  Congress,"

Federal Rules  of Criminal  Procedure  Rule  26,  in  "taking  of

testimony," notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, pararaph 2.


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 3 of 17


     (2)  Rule 54,  Application  and  Exception,  paragraph  (c),

Federal Rules  of Criminal  Procedure, "Act of Congress" includes

any act  of Congress  locally applicable  to and  in force in the

District of  Columbia, in  Puerto Rico,  in a  territory or in an

insular possession.

     (3)  There is  no presumption  in favor of jurisdiction, and

the basis  for jurisdiction must be affirmatively shown.  Hanford

v. Davis, 16 S.Ct. 1051, 163 U.S. 273, 41 L.Ed. 157 (1896).

     (4)  See exact  wording of  Article I, Section 8, Clause 17,

Constitution for  the United  States of  America, which  grant of

authority does  not extend  over every  square  inch  of  the  48

contiguous Union States.

     (5)  In principle, the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of

the federal government is not addressed to subject matter, but to

geographical location.  See U.S. v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat) 336

(1818).

     (6)  It is  axiomatic that the prosecution must always prove

territorial jurisdiction  over a  crime in  order  to  sustain  a

conviction therefor.  U.S. v. Benson, 495 F.2d 475 at 481 (1974).

The jurisdictional  challenge issue  can never  be waived  by the

Accused, nor  acquiesced by  the Accused,  in the  absence  of  a

positive showing  upon the  record that  jurisdiction was clearly

and unambiguously established.


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 4 of 17


     (7)  Without proof  of the requisite ownership or possession

by the  United States,  the crime has not been made out.  U.S. v.

Watson, 80  Fed. Supp. 649 (1948, E.D. Va.).  Only in America can

We be forced into the status of subjects of a foreign corporation

by fiat  legislation, and the stroke of a CEO's pen, at the point

of a  gun, and  thereby be  immediately divested  of standing  in

judicio, and  declared to  be debtors  and  enemies  of  our  Own

government.

     (8)  In criminal  prosecutions, where the federal government

is the  moving party, it must not only establish ownership of the

property upon  which the  crime was  allegedly committed,  but it

must also  produce documentation  that the  state has ceded to it

jurisdiction over that property.  It was held by the U.S. Supreme

Court in  the case  of Fort  Leavenworth Railway Co. v. Iowa, 114

U.S. 525 at 531 (1885):

     Where  lands   are  acquired   without  such   consent,  the
     possession  of   the   United   States,   unless   political
     jurisdiction be  ceded to  them in some other way, is simply
     that of an ordinary proprietor.


     (9)  No jurisdiction  exists in the United States to enforce

federal criminal  laws until  consent to accept jurisdiction over

acquired lands  has been  published and  filed in  behalf of  the

United States,  as provided  in 40  U.S.C. 255, and the fact that

the  state   authorized  the  government  to  take  and  exercise

jurisdiction was  immaterial.   See Adams  v. United  States, 319

U.S. 312, 63 S.Ct. 1122, 87 L.Ed. 1421 (1943).

     (10) All courts  of justice  are duty-bound to take judicial

notice of  the territorial extent of jurisdiction, although those

acts are  not formally  put into  evidence, nor  in  accord  with

pleadings.   Jones v. U.S., 137 U.S. 202, 11 S.Ct. 80 (1890).


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 5 of 17


     (11) Where a  federal court  is without  jurisdiction of the

offense, judgment  of conviction  of the court and/or the jury is

void ab  initio, on  its face.  Bauman v. U.S., 156 F.2d 534 (5th

Cir. 1946).

     (12) Federal criminal  jurisdiction is  never presumed;   it

must always  be proven;   and  it can  never be  waived.  U.S. v.

Rogers, 23 Fed. 658 (D.C., W.D. Ark., 1885).

     (13) The federal courts are limited both by the Constitution

and by  Acts of  Congress.  Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger,

98 S.Ct. 2396, 437 U.S. 365, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978).

     (14) The jurisdiction  of federal  courts is  defined in the

Constitution at  Article III  for judicial  courts;  in Article I

for legislative  courts;   and  in  Article  IV  for  territorial

courts.   Some courts  created by  Acts  of  Congress  have  been

referred  to  as  "Constitutional  Courts,"  whereas  others  are

regarded as  "Legislative Tribunals."   O'Donoghue  v. U.S.,  289

U.S. 516 (1933), 77 L.Ed 1356, 53 S.Ct. 74;  Mookini v. U.S., 303

U.S. 201 at 205 (1938), 82 L.Ed 748, 58 S.Ct. 543.

     (15) Legislative court  judges  do  not  enjoy  Article  III

guarantees;   "inherently judicial"  tasks must  be performed  by

judges deriving  power under  Article III.   See U.S. v. Sanders,

641 F.2d  659 (1981), cert. den. 101 S.Ct. 3055, 452 U.S. 918, 69

L.Ed 422.

     The United  States District  Court creation  and composition

were accomplished  by Acts of Congress on June 25, 1948 [62 Stat.

895], and November 13, 1963 [77 Stat. 331], currently codified at

28  U.S.C.   132;    and  the  jurisdiction  thereof,  previously

demonstrated herein,  i.e. Chapter  85 of  Title 28, lists civil,

admiralty, maritime, patent, bankruptcy, etc.,  and does not once

list, mention, or describe any criminal jurisdiction.  It just is

not there, so don't bother looking for it!


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 6 of 17


     (16) Acts of  Congress creating  the United  States District

Courts do  not vest  said territorial tribunals with any criminal

jurisdiction;   these courts  have only  such jurisdiction  as is

conferred upon  them by  Act of  Congress under the Constitution.

See Hubbard  v. Ammerman,  465 F.2d  1169 (5th Cir., 1972), cert.

den. 93 S.Ct. 967, 410 U.S. 910, 35 L.Ed.2d 272.

     (17) The United  States District  Court is  not a  court  of

general jurisdiction,  and has  no other  power bestowed  upon it

except as  prescribed by Congress.  See Graves v. Snead, 541 F.2d

159 (6th Cir., 1976), cert. den. 97 S.Ct. 1106, 429 U.S. 1093, 51

L.Ed.2d 539.

     (18) It is  apparent that  the United  States District Court

for the  District of Montana was created and established under 28

U.S.C. 132,  and its  jurisdiction  is  defined  and  limited  by

Chapter 85 of Title 28, United States Code.

     (19) The courts  of appropriate  jurisdiction for violations

of Title  18 U.S.C.  are designated at Section 3231, specifically

naming them as "district courts of the United States" [sic].

     (20) There is  a distinct  and definite difference between a

"United States  District Court"  and a  "District  Court  of  the

United States".   The words "District Court of the United States"

commonly describe constitutional courts created under Article III

of the  Constitution, not  the legislative courts which have long

been  the   courts  of   the  Territories.     See  International

Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342

U.S. 237, 241 (1952), 72 S.Ct. 235, 96 L.Ed. 275, 13 Alaska 536.


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 7 of 17


     (21) The term "District Court of the United States" commonly

describes Article  III courts  or "courts  of the United States",

and not  legislative courts  of the  territories.   See  American

Insurance Co.  v. 356  Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511 (1828), 7 L.Ed

242;   International Longshoremen's  and Warehousemen's  Union v.

Wirtz, 170 F.2d 183 (9th Cir., 1948), cert. den. 336 U.S. 919, 93

L.Ed. 1082,  69 S.Ct.  641, reh. den. 336 U.S. 971, 93 L.Ed 1121,

69 S.Ct. 936.

     (22) Though the judicial system set up in a territory of the

United States  is a  part of  federal  jurisdiction,  the  phrase

"court of  the United  States" when  used in a federal statute is

generally construed  as not  referring to  "territorial  courts."

See Balzac  v. Porto  Rico, 258  U.S. 298 at 312 (1921), 42 S.Ct.

343, 66 L.Ed. 627.  In Balzac, the High Court stated:

     The United States District Court is not a true United States
     court established  under Article  III of the Constitution to
     administer the  judicial power  of the United States therein
     conveyed.    It  is  created  by  virtue  of  the  sovereign
     congressional faculty,  granted under Article IV, Section 3,
     of  that   instrument,  of  making  all  needful  rules  and
     regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United
     States.  The resemblance of its jurisdiction to that of true
     United  States   courts  in   offering  an   opportunity  to
     nonresidents of resorting to a tribunal not subject to local
     influence,  does   not  change   its  character   as   amere
     territorial court.  [emphasis added]


     The distinction  within the dual nature of the federal court

system is  also noted  in Title 18 U.S.C. 3241, which states that

the United  States District  Court for  the Canal Zone shall have

jurisdiction "concurrently with the district courts of the United

States, of  offenses  against  the  laws  of  the  United  States

committed upon the high seas."


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 8 of 17


     This distinction is the reason why federal jurisdiction over

prosecutions  is   more  than   a  technical   concept;    it  is

Constitutional requirement.   See  U.S. v. Johnson, 337 F.2d 180,

aff'd 383  U.S. 169  (1966), 86  S.Ct. 749, 15 L.Ed.2d 681, cert.

den. 87 S.Ct. 44, 134, and 385 U.S. 846, 17 L.Ed.2d 77, 117.

     (23) Besides the recent Lopez decision, it is interesting to

note that  at least two other courts, i.e. United States District

Courts, have come to the same or similar conclusions.  See U.S.A.

v. Wilson,  Stambaughr, Skott,  Ketchum, Braun,  and Ballin, Case

No. 94-CR-140 (March 16, 1995) (U.S.D.C. Wisconsin);  and U.S. v.

Kearns,  Case  No.  SA-95-CR-201  (October  6,  1995)  (U.S.D.C.,

Texas).

     (24) Interestingly enough,  in a bankruptcy case in the U.S.

Bankruptcy Court,  Middle District  of Pennsylvania (Chapter 13),

Case No.  5-94-00839, titled  In re:  Francis Patrick  Farrell v.

IRS/BATF, the  alleged debtor  sued out a compulsory counterclaim

against the  IRS/BATF after  the alleged  creditor submitted  its

proof of claim.

     The counterclaim showed an extent of corruption unparalleled

in American  history, to which agencies of the federal government

will  often   resort,  specifically  by  placing  a  "T-Code"  on

someone's Individual Master File ("IMF").

     In this  way,  the  IRS/BATF  used  Admiralty  and  Maritime

forfeiture laws  to deprive  a  State  Citizen  of  property  and

assets, and  to mis-classify  Him  as  a  "high  level  narcotics

trafficker."   This occurred on November 17,1995!  Why?  See U.S.

v. Good, 114 S.Ct. 492 at 502, footnote 2 (1993).


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 9 of 17


                             SUMMARY

     The  United   States  District   Courts  have   no  criminal

jurisdiction whatsoever  to prosecute  a State Citizen within one

of the  50 States  of the Union which comprises the United States

of America,  until and unless Congress says so.  Until and unless

the federal government can prove ownership over said geographical

land mass,  particularly that parcel of land which is the private

real property of the Defendant, the United States District Courts

have no  criminal jurisdiction  whatsoever within  the  50  Union

States.   Not a  single Act  of Congress  vests the United States

District Courts,  as distinct  from District Courts of the United

States, with anything but "civil" authority.  There is absolutely

no criminal jurisdiction vested in said territorial tribunals.


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 10 of 17


                         REMEDY DEMANDED

     Therefore, Defendant  hereby demands  that this  Article  IV

legislative  tribunal   establish   exclusive   jurisdiction   by

producing certified documents consisting of the following:

     (a)  Documentation   showing    "United   States"   (federal

government) ownership  of each  and every  geographical  location

mentioned in the instant indictment, wherein the alleged criminal

activity took place;

     (b)  Documentation  from   the  Montana   Legislature  which

provides evidence  of a  cession by  Montana  state  surrendering

jurisdiction to the "United States" (federal government) over the

same geographical location as stated in (a) above;

     (c)  Documentation pursuant  to Title 40 U.S.C. 255, wherein

the "United States" (federal government) accepted jurisdiction to

the same  geographical location  as  stated  in  (a)  above,  or,

documentation showing  concurrent jurisdiction with Montana state

over the geographical location as stated in (a) above;

     (d)   Alternatively,  absent  the  requisite  documentation,

Defendant hereby  demands that  this United States District Court

vacate the  jury's guilty  verdict and  dismiss the  instant case

with prejudice and in the interests of justice.


Executed on: ____________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


/s/ William Lanter

William Neal., Lanter, Sui Juris
Citizen of Montana state


/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell

Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Counselor at Law, federal witness,
and Citizen of Arizona state


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 11 of 17


                          Exhibit "A":
                  Federal Criminal Jurisdiction

     It is  a well established principle of law that "all federal
legislation applies  only within  the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States unless a contrary intent appears";  see Caha v.
United States,  152 U.S. 211, 215, 14 S.Ct. 513 (1894);  American
Banana Company  v. United  Fruit Company,  213 U.S.  347, 357, 29
S.Ct. 511  (1909);  United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97, 98,
43 S.Ct.  39 (1922);   Blackmer  v. United  States, 284 U.S. 421,
437, 52  S.Ct. 252 (1932);  Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,
285, 69 S.Ct. 575 (1949);  United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217,
222, 70  S.Ct. 10  (1949);   and United  States v. First National
City Bank,  321 F.2d 14, 23 (2nd Cir., 1963).  And this principle
of law  is expressed  in a  number  of  cases  from  the  federal
appellate courts;   see  McKeel v.  Islamic Republic of Iran, 722
F.2d 582,  589 (9th  Cir., 1983)  (holding the  Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act  as territorial);   Meredith v. United States, 330
F.2d 9, 11 (9th Cir., 1964) (holding the Federal Torts Claims Act
as territorial);   United  States v.  Cotroni, 527  F.2d 708, 711
(2nd Cir.,  1975) (holding  federal wiretap laws as territorial);
Stowe v.  Devoy, 588  F.2d 336,  341 (2nd Cir., 1978);  Cleary v.
United States  Lines, Inc.,  728 F.2d  607, 609  (3rd Cir., 1984)
(holding federal age discrimination laws as territorial);  Thomas
v. Brown  & Root,  Inc., 745  F.2d  279,  281  (4th  Cir.,  1984)
(holding same  as Cleary, supra);  United States v. Mitchell, 553
F.2d  996,  1002  (5th  Cir.,    1977)  (holding  marine  mammals
protection act  as territorial);   Pfeiffer  v. William  Wrigley,
Jr., Co.,  755 F.2d  554,  557  (7th  Cir.,  1985)  (holding  age
discrimination  laws   as  territorial);     Airline  Stewards  &
Stewardesses Assn. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 267 F.2d 170, 175
(8th Cir.,  1959) (holding  Railway Labor  Act  as  territorial);
Zahourek v.  Arthur Young  and Co., 750 F.2d 827, 829 (10th Cir.,
1984)  (holding   age  discrimination   laws   as   territorial);
Commodities Futures  Trading Comm.  v. Nahas,  738 F.2d  487, 493
(D.C.Cir.,  1984)  (holding  commission's  subpoena  power  under
federal law  as territorial);   Reyes v. Secretary of H.E.W., 476
F.2d 910,  915 (D.C.Cir., 1973) (holding administration of Social
Security Act  as territorial);  and Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268
F.Supp. 385,  392 (S.D.N.Y.,  1967) (holding  securities  act  as
territorial).    But,  because  of  statutory  language,  certain
federal drug laws operate extra-territorially;  see United States
v. King,  552 F.2d  833, 851 (9th Cir., 1976).  The United States
has  territorial  jurisdiction  only  in  Washington,  D.C.,  the
federal enclaves  within the  States, and  in the territories and
insular possessions  of the  "United States".  However, it has no
territorial jurisdiction  over non-federally  owned areas  inside
the territorial  jurisdiction of  the States  within the American
Union.   And this  proposition of  law is  supported by literally
hundreds of cases.

     As a general rule, the power of the United States criminally
to  prosecute  is,  for  the  most  part,  confined  to  offenses
committed within  "its jurisdiction".  This is born out simply by
examination of Title 18, U.S.C.  Section 5 which defines the term
"United  States"  in  clear  jurisdictional  terms.    Section  7
contains the fullest statutory definition of the "jurisdiction of
the United States" [sic].  The United States District Courts have
jurisdiction of  offenses occurring  within the  "United States",
pursuant to Title 18, U.S.C., section 3231.


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 12 of 17


     Examples of  this proposition  are numerous.   In Pothier v.
Rodman, 291  F. 311  (1st  Cir.,  1923),  the  question  involved
whether a  murder committed at Camp Lewis Military Reservation in
the State  of Washington  was a  federal crime.  Here, the murder
was committed  more than  a year  before the U.S. acquired a deed
for  the   property  in  question.    Pothier  was  arrested  and
incarcerated in  Rhode Island  and filed a Habeas Corpus petition
seeking his release on the grounds that the federal courts had no
jurisdiction over  an offense not committed in U.S. jurisdiction.
The First  Circuit agreed  that there was no federal jurisdiction
and ordered  his release.   But,  on appeal  to the  U.S. Supreme
Court, in  Rodman v.  Pothier, 264 U.S. 399, 44 S.Ct. 360 (1924),
that Court  reversed;   although agreeing with the jurisdictional
principles enunciated by the First Circuit, it held that only the
federal court  in Washington  State could  hear that  issue.   In
United States  v. Unzeuta,  35 F.2d  750 (8th  Cir.,  1929),  the
Eighth Circuit  held that  the U.S.  had no  jurisdiction over  a
murder committed  in a  railroad car  at Fort Robinson, the state
cession statute being construed as not including railroad rights-
of-way.   This decision was reversed in United States v. Unzeuta,
281 U.S.  138, 50  S.Ct. 284  (1930), the  court holding that the
U.S. did  have jurisdiction  over the  railroad rights-of-way  in
Fort Robinson.   In  Bowen v.  Johnson, 97  F.2d 860  (9th  Cir.,
1938), the  question presented  was whether  jurisdiction over an
offense prosecuted in federal court could be raised in a petition
for Habeas  Corpus.   The denial of Bowen's petition was reversed
in Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 59 S.Ct. 442 (1939), the Court
concluding that  such a  jurisdictional challenge could be raised
in a  Habeas Corpus  petition.  But, the Court then addressed the
issue, and  found that  the  U.S.  both  owned  the  property  in
question and had a state legislative grant ceding jurisdiction to
the United  States, thus  there was  jurisdiction in  the  United
States to prosecute Bowen.  But, if jurisdiction is not vested in
the United  States pursuant to statute, there is no jurisdiction;
see Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312, 63 S.Ct. 1122 (1943).

     And the  lower federal  courts also  require the presence of
federal jurisdiction  in criminal  prosecutions.    In  Kelly  v.
United States, 27 F. 616 (D.Me., 1885), federal jurisdiction of a
manslaughter committed  at Fort  Popham was  upheld when  it  was
shown that the U.S. owned the property where the offense occurred
and the state had ceded jurisdiction.  In United States v. Andem,
158 F.  996 (D.N.J.,  1908), federal  jurisdiction for  a forgery
offense was  upheld on a showing that the United States owned the
property where  the offense was committed and the state had ceded
jurisdiction of  the property  to the  U.S.   In United States v.
Penn, 48  F. 669  (E.D.Va., 1880),  since the  U.S. did  not have
jurisdiction over  Arlington National Cemetery, a federal larceny
prosecution was  dismissed.  In United States v. Lovely, 319 F.2d
673 (4th  Cir., 1963), federal jurisdiction was found to exist by
U.S.  ownership   of  the   property  and   a  state  cession  of
jurisdiction.   In  United  States  v.  Watson,  80  F.Supp.  649
(E.D.Va., 1948),  federal criminal  charges were  dismissed,  the
court stating as follows:


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 13 of 17


     Without proof  of the  requisite ownership  or possession of
     the United  States, the  crime has  not been  made out.   80
     F.Supp., at 651.


     In Brown  v. United  States, 257  F. 46  (5th  Cir.,  1919),
federal jurisdiction  was upheld on the basis that the U.S. owned
the post  office site  where a murder was committed and the state
had ceded  jurisdiction;   see also England v. United States, 174
F.2d 466  (5th Cir., 1949);  Krull v. United States, 240 F.2d 122
(5th Cir.,  1957);   Hudspeth v. United States, 223 F.2d 848 (5th
Cir., 1955);   and  Gainey v.  United States,  324 F.2d  731 (5th
Cir., 1963).   In  United States  v. Townsend,  474 F.2d 209 (5th
Cir., 1973),  a conviction  for  receiving  stolen  property  was
reversed when  the court  reviewed the  record and  learned  that
there was  absolutely no  evidence disclosing  that the defendant
had committed  this offense within the jurisdiction of the United
States.   And in United States v. Benson, 495 F.2d 475 (5th Cir.,
1974), in finding federal jurisdiction for a robbery committed at
Fort Rucker, the court stated:

     It is  axiomatic that  the  prosecution  must  always  prove
     territorial jurisdiction  over a crime in order to sustain a
     conviction therefor.  495 F.2d, at 481.


     In two  Sixth Circuit cases, United States v. Tucker, 122 F.
518 (W.D.Ky.,  1903), a  case involving an assault committed at a
federal dam, and United States v. Blunt, 558 F.2d 1245 (6th Cir.,
1977), a case involving an assault within a federal penitentiary,
jurisdiction was  sustained by  finding that  the U.S.  owned the
property  in   question  and   the  state   involved  had   ceded
jurisdiction.   In In  re Kelly,  71 F.  545 (E.D.Wis.,  1895), a
federal assault charge was dismissed when the court held that the
state cession  statute in  question was  not adequate  to  convey
jurisdiction of  the property  in question  to the United States.
In United  States v.  Johnson, 426  F.2d 1112 (7th Cir., 1970), a
case  involving   a   federal   burglary   prosecution,   federal
jurisdiction was sustained upon the showing of U.S. ownership and
cession.   And cases  from the Eighth and Tenth Circuits likewise
require the same elements to be shown to demonstrate the presence
of federal jurisdiction;  see United States v. Heard, 270 F.Supp.
198 (W.D.Mo.,  1967);   United States  v. Redstone,  488 F.2d 300
(8th Cir.,  1973);   United States  v. Goings,  504 F.2d 809 (8th
Cir., 1974)  (demonstrating loss  of  jurisdiction);    Hayes  v.
United States,  367 F.2d 216 (10th Cir., 1966);  United States v.
Carter, 430  F.2d 1278 (10th Cir., 1970);  Hall v. United States,
404 F.2d  1367 (10th  Cir., 1969);  and United States v. Cassidy,
571 F.2d 534 (10th Cir., 1978).

     Of  all  the  circuits,  the  Ninth  Circuit  has  addressed
jurisdictional issues  more than  any of  the rest.    In  United
States v.  Bateman, 34  F. 86 (N.D.Cal., 1888), it was determined
that the United States did not have jurisdiction to prosecute for
a murder  committed at  the Presidio because California had never
ceded jurisdiction;   see also United States v. Tully, 140 F. 899
(D.Mon., 1905).  But later, California ceded jurisdiction for the
Presidio to  the United  States, and it was held in United States
v. Watkins,  22 F.2d  437 (N.D.Cal., 1927), that this enabled the
U.S. to maintain a murder prosecution;  see also United States v.
Holt, 168  F. 141 (W.D. Wash., 1909), United States v. Lewis, 253
F. 469  (S.D.Cal, 1918), and United States v. Wurtzbarger, 276 F.
753 (D.Or.,  1921).   Because the  U.S. owned,  and had  a  state
cession of  jurisdiction for,  Fort Douglas  in Utah, it was held
that the  U.S. had  jurisdiction for a rape prosecution in Rogers
v. Squier,  157 F.2d  948 (9th  Cir.,  1946).    But,  without  a
cession, the U.S. has no jurisdiction;  see Arizona v. Manypenny,
445 F.Supp. 1123 (D.Ariz., 1977).


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 14 of 17


     The above  cases from  the U.S.  Supreme Court  and  federal
appellate  courts   set  forth   the  rule   that   in   criminal
prosecutions, the  government, as  the party seeking to establish
the existence  of federal jurisdiction, must prove U.S. ownership
of the  property in question and a state cession of jurisdiction.
This same rule manifests itself in state cases.  State courts are
courts  of   general  jurisdiction   and  in   a  state  criminal
prosecution, the  state must  only prove  that  the  offense  was
committed within  the state and a county thereof.  If a defendant
contends that  only the  federal government has jurisdiction over
the offense,  he, as  proponent  for  the  existence  of  federal
jurisdiction, must  likewise prove U.S. ownership of the property
where the crime was committed and state cession of jurisdiction.

     Examples of  the operation  of this  principle are numerous.
In Arizona,  the State has jurisdiction over federal lands in the
public domain,  the state  not having  ceded jurisdiction of that
property to  the U.S.;   see  State v.  Dykes, 114 Ariz. 592, 562
P.2d 1090  (1977).   In California,  if it  is not  proved  by  a
defendant in  a  state  prosecution  that  the  state  has  ceded
jurisdiction, it  is presumed  the state  does have  jurisdiction
over a  criminal offense;   see  People v.  Brown, 69 Cal. App.2d
602, 159  P.2d 686  (1945).  If the cession exists, the state has
no jurisdiction;   see  People v. Mouse, 203 Cal. 782, 265 P. 944
(1928).   In Montana, the state has jurisdiction over property if
it is  not proved there is a state cession of jurisdiction to the
U.S.;   see State  ex rel Parker v. District Court, 147 Mon. 151,
410 P.2d  459 (1966);   the  existence  of  a  state  cession  of
jurisdiction to  the U.S.  ousts the  state of jurisdiction;  see
State v. Tully, 31 Mont. 365, 78 P. 760 (1904).  The same applies
in Nevada;  see State v. Mack, 23 Nev. 359, 47 P. 763 (1897), and
Pendleton v.  State, 734  P.2d 693  (Nev., 1987);   it applies in
Oregon (see State v. Chin Ping, 91 Or. 593, 176 P. 188 (1918) and
State v.  Aguilar, 85  Or.App. 410, 736 P.2d 620 (1987));  and in
Washington (see State v. Williams, 23 Wash.App. 694, 598 P.2d 731
(1979)).

     In People  v. Hammond, 1 Ill.2d 65, 115 N.E.2d 331 (1953), a
burglary  of   an  IRS   office  was  held  to  be  within  state
jurisdiction, the  court holding  that the defendant was required
to prove  existence of  federal jurisdiction by U.S. ownership of
the property  and state  cession of  jurisdiction.   In two cases
from Michigan,  larcenies committed  at U.S.  Post Offices  which
were rented  were held  to be  within state  jurisdiction;    see
People v. Burke, 161 Mich. 397, 126 N.W. 446 (1910) and People v.
Van Dyke,  276 Mich.  32, 267  N.W. 778  (1936);   see also In re
Kelly, 311  Mich. 596,  19 N.W.2d  218 (1945).  In Kansas City v.
Garner, 430 S.W.2d 630 (Mo.App., 1968), state jurisdiction over a
theft offense occurring in a federal building was upheld, and the
court stated that a defendant had to show federal jurisdiction by
proving  U.S.   ownership  of  the  building  and  a  cession  of
jurisdiction from  the state  to the  United States.   A  similar
holding was  made for  a theft at a U.S. missile site in State v.
Rindall, 146  Mon. 64,  404 P.2d  327 (1965).   In  Pendleton  v.
State, 734  P.2d 693  (Nev., 1987),  the state  court was held to
have jurisdiction  over a  DUI ("driving  under  the  influence")
committed on  federal lands,  the defendant having failed to show
U.S. ownership and state cession of jurisdiction.


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 15 of 17


     In People  v. Gerald,  40 Misc.2d  819,  243  N.Y.S.2d  1001
(1963), the  state was held to have jurisdiction of an assault at
a U.S. Post Office since the defendant did not meet his burden of
showing  presence   of  federal  jurisdiction;    and  because  a
defendant failed  to prove  title and  jurisdiction in the United
States for  an offense  committed at  a  customs  station,  state
jurisdiction was  upheld in  People v. Fisher, 97 A.D.2d 651, 469
N.Y.S.2d 187  (A.D. 3 Dept., 1983).  The proper method of showing
federal jurisdiction  in  state  court  is  demonstrated  by  the
decision in People v. Williams, 136 Misc.2d 294, 518 N.Y.S.2d 751
(1987).  This rule was likewise enunciated in State v. Burger, 33
Ohio App.3d 231, 515 N.E.2d 640 (1986), in a case involving a DUI
offense committed on a road near a federal arsenal.

     In Kuerschner  v. State,  493 P.2d 1402 (Okl.Cr.App., 1972),
the state  was held  to have jurisdiction of a drug sales offense
occurring  at  an  Air  Force  Base,  the  defendant  not  having
attempted to  prove federal  jurisdiction by  showing  title  and
jurisdiction of  the property  in question  in the United States;
see also  Towry v.  State,  540  P.2d  597  (Okl.Cr.App.,  1975).
Similar holdings  for murders committed at U.S. Post Offices were
made in State v. Chin Ping, 91 Or. 593, 176 P. 188 (1918), and in
United States  v. Pate,  393 F.2d  44 (7th  Cir., 1968).  Another
Oregon case,  State v.  Aguilar, 85  Or.App. 410,  736  P.2d  620
(1987), demonstrates  this rule.  And finally, in Curry v. State,
111 Tex.  Cr. 264, 12 S.W.2d 796 (1928), it was held that, in the
absence of proof that the state had ceded jurisdiction of a place
to the  United States,  the state courts had jurisdiction over an
offense.

     Therefore, in  federal criminal prosecutions, the government
must prove  the existence of federal jurisdiction by showing U.S.
ownership of  the place  where the  crime was committed and state
cession of  jurisdiction.   If the  government contends  for  the
power criminally  to prosecute  for an  offense occurring outside
"its  jurisdiction",   it   must   prove   an   extra-territorial
application  of   the  statute   in  question   as  well   as   a
constitutional foundation  supporting  the  same.    Absent  this
showing, no  federal prosecution  can be  commenced for  offenses
committed outside "its jurisdiction", i.e. the federal zone.


                             #  #  #


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 16 of 17


                        PROOF OF SERVICE

I, William  Neal.,  Lanter,  Sui  Juris,  hereby  certify,  under

penalty of  perjury, under  the laws  of  the  United  States  of

America, without the "United States," that I am at least 18 years

of age,  a Citizen  of one  of the  United States of America, and

that I personally served the following document(s):

                  NOTICE AND DEMAND TO DISMISS
               FOR LACK OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION:
                28 U.S.C. 1359;  FRCP Rules 9(b),
                     12(b)(1),(2), 12(h)(3)

by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first

class United  States Mail,  with  postage  prepaid  and  properly

addressed to the following:


Office of the United States Attorney
Federal Building
316 North 26th Street
Billings, Montana state

Attorney General
Department of Justice
10th and Constitution, N.W.
Washington
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Solicitor General
Department of Justice
10th and Constitution, N.W.
Washington
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA


Executed on: ____________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


/s/ William Lanter
__________________________________________
William Neal., Lanter, Sui Juris
Citizen of Montana state

All Rights Reserved without Prejudice


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 17 of 17


                             #  #  #
      


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U.S.A. v. Lanter