Vazrik A. Makarian, Sui Juris
c/o Forwarding Agent
8617 Raindrop Canyon Avenue
Las Vegas 89129
All Rights Reserved
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Case No. 01-50422
Plaintiffs/Appellees, ) NOTICE OF MOTION AND
) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION:
) Due Process Clause,
VAZRIK A. MAKARIAN, ) Fifth Amendment;
) Article 14,
Defendant/Appellant. ) International Covenant on
_________________________________) Civil and Political Rights.
COMES NOW Vazrik A. Makarian, Citizen of Nevada State and alleged Defendant in the above entitled matter (hereinafter “Appellant”), to move this honorable Court to reconsider its ORDER filed in the instant appeal on October 22, 2001 A.D., and to provide formal NOTICE to all interested Party(s) of same.
In its ORDER filed on September 14, 2001 A.D., this Court ordered Appellant either to move for voluntary dismissal of the appeal, or to show cause why it should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Then, this Court issued the following promise:
If appellant does not comply with this order, the Court will consider appellant’s motion for permission to appeal an interlocutory order.
[ORDER, September 14, 2001, Page 2]
Appellant decided against a motion for voluntary dismissal and, after careful research, concluded that the instant appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, there was no point for Appellant to show cause why it should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Appellant does not believe in contradicting Himself, if at all possible.
Appellant then had every reason to expect that this Court would consider His MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL INTERLOCUTORY ORDER.
The ORDER dated October 22, 2001 A.D. does appear to constitute evidence that this Court has, in fact, considered that MOTION.
In the judgment of this Court, Appellant’s appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Appellant concurs with this decision, because it is correct. This Court lacks appellate jurisdiction to entertain interlocutory orders issued by the United States District Courts. See 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1).
Appellant submits that statutes granting appellate jurisdiction must be strictly construed.
Such a holding will conform to the well established, and rather extensive, case law which has held that statutes granting original jurisdiction to federal district courts must be strictly construed. In pari materia, see Ninth Amendment.
Then, however, this Court goes on to cite the decision of this Court in the case of U.S. v. Powell, 24 F.3d 28, 31 (9th Cir. 1994). This citation is completely off-point, however.
In Powell supra, the Ninth Circuit reiterated a rather self‑evident definition:
Final judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is the judgment ....
This Court has committed a plain error by appearing to forget that Appellant has already stipulated that final judgment has not yet been reached in the instant case. Trial was never begun. There is no point in belaboring the obvious.
The attorneys for the government never challenged or rebutted Appellant’s stipulation, in any manner whatsoever.
Thus, to shift the discussion to 28 U.S.C. 1291 ‑‑ the Final Judgments Act ‑‑ is to commit a plain error. Confer at “Plain error rule” in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition.
The pertinent statute is 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1).
Under this latter statute, the courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction of appeals from interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States (“DCUS”). However, the United States District Courts (“USDC”) are not mentioned.
Confer at “Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius” in Black’s Sixth.
Appellant has already briefed this honorable Court concerning the all important differences between the Article III DCUS and the Article IV USDC. See Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment.
Moreover, Article 14 in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“Covenant”) guarantees to Appellant a tribunal that is competent, independent and impartial.
The USDC is not competent to prosecute Appellant, because it enjoys no such original jurisdiction, by Law.
The USDC is not independent either. As a legislative tribunal, its summary proceedings are subject to the undue influence of the Legislative Branch. This influence violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine.
And, the USDC is not impartial. The judge presiding on the USDC below has a demonstrable conflict of interest, because his compensation is being diminished by federal income taxes, in violation of Article III, Section 1.
Thus, to commence a “criminal” prosecution against a Citizen of one of the United States of America in the USDC is a Treaty violation, rendering the United States (federal government) liable to Appellant for tortious misconduct under 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1) and Article 14(6) in the Covenant.
Criminal prosecutions against a Citizen of one of the United States of America (read “50 States”) must proceed in the Article III DCUS, because that is the federal district court on which Congress has conferred original jurisdiction to prosecute alleged violations of Title 18 of the United States Code. See 18 U.S.C. 3231, in chief.
If the USDC below lacked all original jurisdiction in the first instance, Appellant should not be compelled procedurally to reach conviction or sentence, before either can be reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law. See Covenant, Article 14(5).
Under such a scenario, the “conviction” would be void on its face anyway. Confer at “Barratry” in Black’s Sixth.
Jurisdiction can be raised at any time.
Furthermore, the statute at 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1) dramatically illustrates the summary nature of proceedings in the USDC, where due process is not a guarantee but a matter of legislative discretion (only as Congress makes those guaranties [sic] applicable, by statutes). See Hooven & Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 674 (1945).
If this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders issued by the USDC, then the latter is surely a summary tribunal. Summary proceedings are diametrically opposed to Due Process of Law, as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
Due process also implies that ultra vires proceedings be halted as soon as humanly possible, so as to avoid all unnecessary costs. Otherwise, the costs of further litigation become an oppressive and unlawful burden upon the litigants, particularly defendants.
For any criminal conviction to pass the well established standards of review, original jurisdiction must be vested in the lower court in which the action commenced, as a threshold matter.
It is not so vested in the USDC.
It is so vested in the DCUS.
All premises having been duly considered, Appellant respectfully requests that this honorable Court now reconsider its ORDER dated October 22, 2001 A.D.
In particular, Appellant seeks a published opinion holding:
(1) that this United States Court of Appeals is authorized by 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1) to entertain appellate review of interlocutory orders issued by district courts of the United States within the Ninth Circuit;
(2) that this United States Court of Appeals is not authorized by 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1) to entertain appellate review of interlocutory orders issued by United States District Courts within the Ninth Circuit; and,
(3) that statutes granting appellate jurisdiction to courts of appeal must be strictly construed, as a matter of Law.
I, Vazrik A. Makarian, hereby verify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1). See Supremacy Clause.
Dated: November 1, 2001 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Vazrik A. Makarian
Printed: Vazrik A. Makarian
I, Alan Wu, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that I am at least 18 years of age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I personally served the following document(s):
NOTICE OF MOTION AND
Due Process Clause, Fifth Amendment;
Article 14, International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to the following:
United States Attorney Clerk of Court
Attention: Miriam A. Krinsky Attention: Kathy A. Catterson
United States Courthouse United States Court of Appeals
312 North Spring Street P.O. Box 193939
Los Angeles 90012 San Francisco 94119-3939
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Hon. John Ashcroft Office of the Solicitor General
Attorney General U.S. Department of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
10th and Constitution, N.W. Room 5614
Washington 20530 Washington 20530-0001
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Hon. George W. Bush
President of the United States of America (2:1:1)
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Lonnie G. Schmidt Prof. Emeritus Kenneth L. Karst
Private Attorney General UCLA School of Law
11230 Gold Express Dr., #310-188 P.O. Box 951476
Gold River 95670 Los Angeles 90095-1476
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Paul Andrew Mitchell
Private Attorney General
c/o Forwarding Agent
350 – 30th Street, Suite 444
Dated: November 1, 2001 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Alan Wu
Printed: Alan Wu, Sui Juris