Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris
c/o General Delivery
Arivaca [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA STATE

In Propria Persona

Under Protest, Necessity, and
by Special Visitation Only






                  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                  JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ARIZONA


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,       )    Case No. 95-484-WDB
                                )
     Plaintiff,                 )  MEMORANDUM OF LAW
                                )  IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE
     v.                         )  TO CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
                                )  OF THIS COURT
Sheila Terese, Wallen,          )  [i.e. There is none.]
                                )
     Defendant.                 )  Rules 301, 302:
                                )  Federal Rules of Evidence
                                )  Rule 54:  Federal Rules
                                )  of Criminal Procedure
________________________________)


COMES NOW  Sheila Terese,  Wallen, Sui  Juris, Citizen of Arizona

state and  Defendant in  the above  entitled matter  (hereinafter

"Defendant"), to present this Her Memorandum of Law in Support of

Her Challenge to the Jurisdiction of this Court, i.e. there is no

jurisdiction in a United States District Court [sic], as distinct

from a  District Court  of the  United States  [sic], to  bring a

criminal prosecution  for alleged  violations of Title 21, United

States  Code,  Section  841(a)(1).    Defendant  now  presents  a

detailed Memorandum  of Law  on the  subject of  Federal Judicial

Authority within  the several  States of  the Union  (hereinafter

"the several States"), to wit:


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 1 of 40


      Federal Judicial Authority within the Several States

   This memorandum  will be  construed to  comply with provisions
necessary to  establish presumed fact (Rules 301 and 302, Federal
Rules of  Evidence, and attending State rules), should interested
parties fail  to rebut any given allegation of fact, or matter of
law, addressed  herein.   This  position  will  be  construed  as
adequate to  meet  all  requirements  of  judicial  notice,  thus
preserving fundamental  Law.   Matters addressed  herein, if  not
rebutted, will  be construed  to have  general application.  This
memorandum  addresses  jurisdiction  of  United  States  District
Courts  and  related  agencies  of  the  United  States  (federal
government).


 Part I:  Foundation of Law, Jurisdiction, Principles & History

   In the American system of Government, the Separation of Powers
Doctrine works in two ways:  First, it assures separation between
the three branches of government, the branches being legislative,
executive, and  judicial.   Second, the Doctrine effects vertical
separation between  the  operations  of  the  state  and  federal
governments, or  put another way, operations of the government of
the United States and the governments of the several States which
are parties to the Constitution for the United States of America,
as lawfully amended (hereinafter "U.S. Constitution").

   In this  system, as  asserted  by  American  Founders  in  the
Declaration of  Independence, all  Men (and  Women)  are  created
equal, and  are equally  endowed by  their Creator  with  certain
unalienable or  inherent Rights,  those listed in the Declaration
of Independence  being the  Rights  to  life,  liberty,  and  the
pursuit of happiness, or in the less poetic phrasing of the Fifth
Amendment to  the U.S. Constitution:  life, liberty and property.
This list,  of course,  is not  exhaustive, as articulated in the
Ninth and  Tenth Amendments  to the  U.S. Constitution,  and all,
individually and  collectively, are  accountable in the framework
of "the  laws of Nature and Nature's God."  The phrase, in modern
terms, is  better understood  as physical  and moral  law.    Man
cannot author  or amend  the laws of Nature and Nature's God, but
is directly  accountable in the framework of cause and effect, or
where moral law is concerned, cause and consequence.

  By  establishing  these  principles  prior  to  addressing  the
reasons for, and the power and operation of, government, American
Founders preserved  the essence  of English  and American-lineage
Common Law  which evolved  and was  proven by cultural experience
over many  hundreds of  years.   The Magna  Charta,  drafted  and
signed by  King John in 1215, is commonly recognized as the point
of demarcation  so far  as a formal proclamation of common rights
is concerned.   The  foundation was  basically biblical, with the
understanding that  People  are  individually  created  and  are,
therefore,  individually   accountable  to   God.     Even   when
governments encroache on the special relationship between Man and
God, Man is still accountable, individually and collectively, and
s/he invariably suffers the consequences of tyranny.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 2 of 40


   The Founders  went on  to say that governments are established
among Men  for the  sole purpose of securing inherent Rights, and
governments so  established may  rule only  by the consent of the
Governed.

   In July  1776, the  notion of specifically delegated authority
conveyed  by  constitutions  was  well  understood,  because  the
English  considered  the  Magna  Charta  and  subsequent  similar
documents to be elements of their unwritten constitution.  On the
other hand,  American colonies  had  continuing  experience  with
written constitutions  for civil  government which  began in 1636
(Massachusetts).

   Lowell H.  Becraft, Jr., an attorney from Huntsville, Alabama,
addresses historical  events leading  to the American Revolution,
in his  privately distributed memorandum on federal jurisdiction,
as follows:

      The original  thirteen colonies  of America  were  each
    separately  established  by  charters  from  the  English
    Crown.   Outside of  the common  bond  of  each  being  a
    dependency and colony of the mother country, England, the
    colonies were  not otherwise  united.   Each had  its own
    governor, legislative  assembly and  courts, and each was
    governed separately  and  independently  by  the  English
    Parliament.

      The political  connections of  the separate colonies to
    the English  Crown and Parliament descended to an unhappy
    state of  affairs as  the direct  result of Parliamentary
    acts adopted in the late 1760's and early 1770's.  Due to
    the real  and perceived  dangers caused  by these various
    acts, the  First Continental  Congress  was  convened  by
    representatives of the several colonies in October, 1774,
    the  purpose  of  which  was  to  submit  a  petition  of
    grievances to  the British  Parliament and Crown.  By the
    Declaration  and   Resolves  of   the  First  Continental
    Congress,  dated   October   14,   1774,   the   colonial
    representatives labeled these Parliamentary acts of which
    they complained as "impolitic, unjust, and cruel, as well
    as unconstitutional,  and most  dangerous and destructive
    of American  rights,"  and  the  purpose  of  which  were
    designs, schemes  and plans  "which demonstrate  a system
    formed to  enslave America."  Revolution was assuredly in
    the formative  stages  absent  conciliation  between  the
    mother country and colonies.

      Between October,  1775, and the middle of 1776, each of
    the colonies  separately severed their ties and relations
    with England,  and several  adopted constitutions for the
    newly formed  States.   By July,  1776, the  exercise  of
    British  authority  in  any  and  all  colonies  was  not
    recognized in  any degree.   The  capstone of this actual
    separation of  the colonies  from England  was  the  more
    formal Declaration of Independence.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
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      The legal effect of the Declaration of Independence was
    to  make  each  new  State  a  separate  and  independent
    sovereign over  which there  was no  other government  of
    superior power  or jurisdiction.   This was clearly shown
    in M'Ilvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 209, 212
    (1808), where it was held:

          This opinion  is predicated  upon  a  principle
        which is  believed to  be  undeniable,  that  the
        several states  which composed this Union, so far
        at least as regarded their municipal regulations,
        became entitled, from the time when they declared
        themselves independent,  to all  the  rights  and
        powers of sovereign states, and that they did not
        derive them  from concessions made by the British
        king.  The treaty of peace contains a recognition
        of their  independence, not  a grant of it.  From
        hence it  results, that  the laws  of the several
        state governments  were  the  laws  of  sovereign
        states, and  as such  were  obligatory  upon  the
        people of  such state,  from the  time they  were
        enacted.


      And a  further expression of similar import is found in
    Harcourt v.  Gaillard, 25  U.S. (12 Wheat.) 523, 526, 527
    (1827), where the Court stated:

          There was no territory within the United States
        that was  claimed in any other right than that of
        some one  of the confederated states;  therefore,
        there could  be no  acquisition of territory made
        by  the   United   States   distinct   from,   or
        independent of some one of the states.

          Each declared itself sovereign and independent,
        according to the limits of its territory.

          [T]he  soil   and  sovereignty   within   their
        acknowledged limits  were as  much theirs  at the
        declaration of independence as at this hour.


      Thus, unequivocally,  in July,  1776,  the  new  States
    possessed all  sovereignty, power,  and jurisdiction over
    all the  soil and persons in their respective territorial
    limits.

      This condition  of supreme  sovereignty of  each  State
    over all  property and persons within the borders thereof
    continued notwithstanding the adoption of the Articles of
    Confederation.   In Article  II of  that document, it was
    expressly stated:

          Article   II.      Each   state   retains   its
        sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every
        Power, Jurisdiction  and right,  which is  not by
        this confederation  expressly  delegated  to  the
        United States, in Congress assembled.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 4 of 40


      As  the   history  of   the  confederation   government
    demonstrated,  each   State  was   indeed  sovereign  and
    independent to  the  degree  that  it  made  the  central
    government   created    by   the   confederation   fairly
    ineffectual.     These  defects   of  the   confederation
    government strained  the relations  between and among the
    States  and   the  remedy   became  the   calling  of   a
    constitutional convention.

      The representatives  which assembled in Philadelphia in
    May, 1787,  to attend  the Constitutional  Convention met
    for the  primary  purpose  of  improving  the  commercial
    relations among  the States,  although the product of the
    Convention produced  more than  this.   But, no intention
    was demonstrated  for the  States  to  surrender  in  any
    degree the  jurisdiction so  possessed by  the States  at
    that time, and indeed the Constitution as finally drafted
    continued the same territorial jurisdiction of the States
    as existed  under the  Articles of  Confederation.    The
    essence of  this  retention  of  state  jurisdiction  was
    embodied in  Art. I,  8, Cl. 17 of the U.S. Constitution,
    which reads as follows:

          To exercise  exclusive Legislation in all Cases
        whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten
        Miles square)  as may,  by Cession  of particular
        States, and  the Acceptance  of Congress,  become
        the Seat  of the Government of the United States,
        and to  exercise like  Authority over  all Places
        purchased by  the Consent  of the  Legislature of
        the State  in which  the Same  shall be,  for the
        Erection of  Forts,  Magazines,  Arsenals,  dock-
        Yards, and other needful Buildings;  ....


   The necessity for granting federal government sovereignty over
land which  would serve  as the  seat of  that government  became
conspicuous during  the Revolution,  when a  contingent of  irate
folks from the Continental Army beleaguered Congress while it was
in  session   in  Philadelphia.     Members   of  Congress   fled
Philadelphia  to   Princeton,  New  Jersey,  and  from  there  to
Annapolis, Maryland.   Philadelphia  and Pennsylvania governments
were unable, or unwilling, to disperse the rebels who taunted and
insulted Members  of Congress.   Problems  persisted for the weak
government under  the Articles  of  Confederation  following  the
Revolution, and  it was in this framework that the Constitutional
Convention was  called in  1787.   The purpose for establishing a
seat  of   government  under   Congress'  exclusive   legislative
jurisdiction was addressed in Essay No. 43 of The Federalist:

      The indispensable  necessity of  complete authority  at
    the seat  of government carries its own evidence with it.
    It is  a power  exercised by  every  legislature  of  the
    Union, I might say of the world, by virtue of its general
    supremacy.   Without it  not only  the  public  authority
    might be  insulted and  its proceedings  interrupted with
    impunity, but  a dependence of the members of the general
    government on  the State  comprehending the  seat of  the
    government for  protection in  the exercise of their duty
    might bring on the national councils an imputation of awe
    or influence  equally dishonorable  to the government and
    dissatisfactory to  the other members of the Confederacy.
    This consideration  has the  more weight  as the  gradual
    accumulation of  public improvements  at  the  stationary
    residence of  the government  would be  both too  great a
    public pledge  to be left in the hands of a single State,
    and would  create so  many obstacles  to a removal of the
    government, as  still further  to abridge  its  necessary
    independence.   The extent  of this  federal district  is
    sufficiently circumscribed  to satisfy  every jealousy of
    an opposite  nature.   And as it is to be appropriated to
    this use with the consent of the State ceding it;  as the
    State will no doubt provide in the compact for the rights
    and the  consent of  the citizens  inhabiting it;  as the
    inhabitants will  find sufficient inducements of interest
    to become  willing parties  to the cession;  as they will
    have had  their voice  in the  election of the government
    which is to exercise authority over them;  as a municipal
    legislature for  local purposes,  derived from  their own
    suffrages, will  of course  be allowed  them;  and as the
    authority of  the legislature  of the  State, and  of the
    inhabitants of  the ceded  part of  it, to  concur in the
    cession will  be derived  from the  whole people  of  the
    State  in  their  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  every
    imaginable objection seems to be obviated.

      The  necessity   of  a   like  authority   over  forts,
    magazines, etc.,  established by  the general government,
    is not  less evident.   The public money expended on such
    places,  and  the  public  property  deposited  in  them,
    require that  they should be exempt from the authority of
    the particular  State.   Nor would  it be  proper for the
    places on  which the  security of  the entire  Union  may
    depend to  be in  any degree  dependent on  a  particular
    member of  it.  All objections and scruples are here also
    obviated by  requiring  the  concurrence  of  the  States
    concerned in every such establishment.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 5 of 40


   Becraft cites  several early  court cases  which addressed the
matter of  State  versus  "United  States"  (federal  government)
jurisdiction,  with   each  of   the  decisions  reinforcing  the
principle of  State sovereignty, unless or until land is ceded by
a State legislature to the United States:

      Perhaps one of the earliest decisions on this point was
    United States  v. Bevans,  16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336 (1818),
    which  involved   a  federal  prosecution  for  a  murder
    committed on board the Warship, Independence, anchored in
    the  harbor   of  Boston,  Massachusetts.    The  defense
    complained  that  only  the  state  had  jurisdiction  to
    prosecute and  argued that the federal Circuit Courts had
    no jurisdiction of this crime supposedly committed within
    the federal  government's  admiralty  jurisdiction.    In
    argument before the Supreme Court, counsel for the United
    States admitted as follows:


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          The exclusive  jurisdiction  which  the  United
        States have  in forts  and  dock-yards  ceded  to
        them, is  derived from  the express assent of the
        states by  whom the  cessions are made.  It could
        be derived  in no  other manner;  because without
        it, the  authority of  the state would be supreme
        and exclusive therein, 3 Wheat., at 350, 351.


      In  holding   that  the   State  of  Massachusetts  had
    jurisdiction over the crime, the Court held:

          What, then, is the extent of jurisdiction which
        a state possesses?

          We answer, without hesitation, the jurisdiction
        of a  state is  co-extensive with  its territory;
        co-extensive  with   its  legislative   power,  3
        Wheat., at 386, 387.

          The article  which describes the judicial power
        of the  United States  is not  intended  for  the
        cession of  territory or of general jurisdiction.
        ... Congress  has  power  to  exercise  exclusive
        jurisdiction over  this district,  and  over  all
        places  purchased   by   the   consent   of   the
        legislature of  the state in which the same shall
        be,  for   the  erection   of  forts,  magazines,
        arsenals,   dock-yards,    and   other    needful
        buildings.

          It is  observable that  the power  of exclusive
        legislation (which  is  jurisdiction)  is  united
        with cession  of territory,  which is  to be  the
        free act  of the  states.   It  is  difficult  to
        compare  the   two  sections   together,  without
        feeling a  conviction, not  to be strengthened by
        any commentary  on them,  that, in describing the
        judicial power,  the framers  of our constitution
        had not  in view  any cession  of territory;  or,
        which  is   essentially  the   same,  of  general
        jurisdiction, 3 Wheat., at 388.


      Thus in  Bevans, the Court established a principle that
    federal jurisdiction  extends only over the areas wherein
    it possesses the power of exclusive legislation, and this
    is a principle incorporated into all subsequent decisions
    regarding the  extent of  federal jurisdiction.   To hold
    otherwise would  destroy the  purpose, intent and meaning
    of the entire U.S. Constitution.

      The  decision   in  Bevans   was  closely  followed  by
    decisions made  in two state courts and one federal court
    within the  next two  years.   In Commonwealth  v. Young,
    Brightly, N.P.  302, 309 (Pa. 1818), the Supreme Court of
    Pennsylvania was  presented with  the  issue  of  whether
    lands owned  by the  United States for which Pennsylvania
    had never  ceded jurisdiction  had to be sold pursuant to
    state  law.     In   deciding  that   the  state  law  of
    Pennsylvania exclusively  controlled this sale of federal
    land, the Court held:


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                          Page 7 of 40


          The legislation  and authority  of congress  is
        confined to cessions by particular states for the
        seat of government, and purchases made by consent
        of the  legislature of the state, for the purpose
        of erecting  forts.   The legislative  power  and
        exclusive jurisdiction  remained in  the  several
        states, of all territory within their limits, not
        ceded to,  or purchased  by, congress,  with  the
        assent of  the state  legislature, to prevent the
        collision of  legislation and  authority  between
        the United States and the several states.


      A year  later,  the  Supreme  Court  of  New  York  was
    presented with the issue of whether the State of New York
    had jurisdiction over a murder committed at Fort Niagara,
    a federal fort.  In People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225, 233
    (N.Y. 1819), that court held that the fort was subject to
    the jurisdiction  of the  State since  the lands therefor
    had not  been ceded  to the United States.  The rationale
    of its opinion stated:

          To oust  this  state  of  its  jurisdiction  to
        support and  maintain its  laws,  and  to  punish
        crimes,  it   must  be   shown  that  an  offense
        committed within  the acknowledged  limits of the
        state, is  clearly and  exclusively cognizable by
        the laws and courts of the United States.  In the
        case  already   cited,  Chief   Justice  Marshall
        observed, that  to bring  the offense  within the
        jurisdiction of  the courts of the union, it must
        have been  committed out  of the  jurisdiction of
        any state;   it  is not  (he says,)  the  offense
        committed,  but   the  place   in  which   it  is
        committed, which  must be out of the jurisdiction
        of the state.


      The case  relied upon  by this court was U.S. v. Bevans
    supra.

      At about  the same time that the New York Supreme Court
    rendered its opinion in Godfrey, a similar fact situation
    was before  a federal  court, the  only difference  being
    that the  murder committed  in the  case occurred on land
    which had  been ceded  to the  United States.   In United
    States v.  Cornell,  25  Fed.Cas.  646,  648  No.  14,867
    (C.C.D.R.I., 1819),  the court  held that  the case  fell
    within federal jurisdiction, describing such jurisdiction
    as follows:


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 8 of 40


          But  although   the  United   States  may  well
        purchase and  hold  lands  for  public  purposes,
        within the  territorial limits  of a  state, this
        does not  of  itself  oust  the  jurisdiction  or
        sovereignty of  such  State  over  the  lands  so
        purchased.    It  remains  until  the  State  has
        relinquished its  authority over  the land either
        expressly or by necessary implication.

          When therefore  a purchase  of land  for any of
        these  purposes   is   made   by   the   national
        government, and  the State  Legislature has given
        its  consent   to  the   purchase,  the  land  so
        purchased by  the very  terms of the constitution
        ipso facto falls within the exclusive legislation
        of  Congress,   and  the  State  jurisdiction  is
        completely ousted.


   Through the  first half  of the 19th century, State and United
States territorial  jurisdiction  was  reasonably  clear-cut,  as
accounts  above   evidence.    But,  during  the  Civil  War  and
afterwards, entrenched  powers concluded that Congress, on behalf
of the  United States,  has a  unique role  in  and  through  the
territorial United  States  in  those  lands,  whether  ceded  by
legislatures of  the several  States,  or  acquired,  by  war  or
otherwise, by  the United  States.   This alleged authority is at
Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 (4:3:2) of the U.S. Constitution:

      The Congress  shall have  Power to  dispose of and make
    all  needful   Rules  and   Regulations  respecting   the
    Territory and  other Property  belonging  to  the  United
    States ....


   During the  Reconstruction period  immediately  following  the
Civil War,  an Imperial  Congress postured  to make  an  end  run
around the  U.S.  Constitution.    One  of  the  first  important
measures was  promulgation in  their proposal  for  a  Fourteenth
Amendment.   This amendment,  secured at bayonet point, created a
colorable citizenship  known as a "citizen of the United States".
To that  point, People  generally thought of themselves as United
States citizens  just as they do today;  and the body of the U.S.
Constitution even  makes rhetorical  use of  the term "Citizen of
the United  States", but People were Citizens of their respective
Union States,  and this  term could  have referred  to  no  other
status, since  there was  no such  thing as "federal citizenship"
when the  U.S. Constitution was written.  The distinction between
separate classes  of citizens  is best  demonstrated by comparing
court decisions, the first in 1855, the second in 1875:

      A citizen  of any  one of  the States  of the union, is
    held to  be, and  called a  citizen of the United States,
    although technically  and abstractly  there  is  no  such
    thing.  To conceive a citizen of the United States who is
    not a  citizen of  some one  of the  States,  is  totally
    foreign to  the idea,  and inconsistent  with the  proper
    construction and  common understanding  of the expression
    as used  in the  Constitution, which must be deduced from
    its various  other provisions.   The  object then  to  be
    attained, by the exercise of the power of naturalization,
    was to make citizens of the respective States.  (Ex Parte
    Knowles, 5 Cal. 300 (1855))


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                          Page 9 of 40


      We have  in our  political system  a Government  of the
    United States  and a  government of  each of  the several
    States.   Each one  of these governments is distinct from
    the others,  and each  has citizens of its own who owe it
    allegiance, and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it
    must protect.   The same person may be at the same time a
    citizen of  the United  States and  a citizen of a State,
    but  his   rights  of  citizenship  under  one  of  these
    governments will be different from those he has under the
    other.  (United States v. Cruikshank, 95 U.S. 542 (1875))


   Where the  State Citizen,  identified in  the Preamble  of the
U.S. Constitution  and in  1:2:2, 1:3:3,  3:2:1, and  4:2:1, is a
Sovereign or  Principal, the  Fourteenth Amendment citizen of the
United States  belongs to  a subject,  or subordinate  class,  as
demonstrated by Section 1 of that "amendment":

      Section 1.  All persons  born  or  naturalized  in  the
    United States,  and subject  to the jurisdiction thereof,
    are citizens  of the  United  States  and  of  the  State
    wherein they  reside.  No State shall make or enforce any
    law which  shall abridge  the privileges or immunities of
    citizens of  the United  States;   nor  shall  any  State
    deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
    due process  of law;   nor  deny to any person within its
    jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.


   The citizen of the United States (a/k/a "federal citizen") was
distinct from  the State Citizen, or there wouldn't have been any
need to  restate due  process rights  already articulated  in the
Fifth Amendment.   In  the framework  of what  has  already  been
covered, it  is clear  that Citizens  of the  States (a/k/a State
Citizens) were  not then,  and  are  not  now,  "subject  to  the
jurisdiction" of  the United  States within  the several  States.
This matter  was addressed  by Thomas  Jefferson by  way of  "The
Kentucky Resolutions"  in response to the Alien and Sedition Acts
in 1798.   The second of nine resolutions addressed the matter of
United States authority to punish crimes:

      2.  Resolved,  That  the  Constitution  of  the  United
    States, having  delegated to  Congress a  power to punish
    treason, counterfeiting  the securities  and current coin
    of the United States, piracies, and felonies committed on
    the high  seas, and  offenses against the law of nations,
    and no other crimes whatsoever.


   Where Jefferson  articulated  the  limited,  direct  authority
which the  United States  could exercise over State Citizens, the
Fourteenth Amendment  citizen of  the United States appears to be
subject to  United  States  authority  wherever  s/he  might  be,
whether in  the geographical  United States  (a/k/a "the  federal
zone"), or  in any of the several States which are parties to the
U.S. Constitution  (a/k/a "the  state zone").  More to the point,
however, the subject class of citizens of the United States would
be viewed  on a  par with  corporations, associations,  and other
artificial entities  created, franchised,  and/or  sanctioned  by
government, and  United States  authority would  reach  into  the
States under  the auspices  not of inherent or unalienable Rights
-- Rights  which American  Founders proclaimed  to be  the direct
endowments from  God, but  under the  notion of  civil rights  --
rights granted by government to its subject classes.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 10 of 40


   From this  point forward, the American dialogue concerning Law
was to  change, departing  the biblical  base of Common Law where
God is  Sovereign and  Man is endowed directly by His Creator, to
embrace a  secular view  of man  whereby the individual is little
more  than   a  chattel  property,  and  exists  solely  for  the
convenience  and   exploitation  of   entrenched   powers   (read
"Oligarchy").   This change  is easily demonstrated in the Roe v.
Wade decision  which threw  the door  open to abortion on demand.
Even though  medical science  long  ago  demonstrated  that  life
begins at  conception, the  U.S. Supreme  Court did  not consider
either  the  existence  or  sanctity  of  life  in  the  landmark
decision.   The  unborn  baby,  conveniently  referred  to  as  a
"fetus," does  not qualify  as a  "person" in  the context of the
Fourteenth Amendment  definition  promulgated  by  Congress,  so,
since the  unborn lacks legal standing, the law is indifferent to
his existence;  whether or not life has intrinsic value or unborn
babies have God-given rights wasn't and isn't even considered.

   The  so-called   Fourteenth  Amendment   effected   a   subtle
perversion  of   first  causes.    Where  State  Citizens,  being
Sovereign, have  God-given rights which are merely secured by the
state and  federal constitutions,  the  subject  citizen  of  the
United  States  falls  under  Congress'  Article  IV  legislative
jurisdiction;  the list of his constitutionally assured rights is
itemized in  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.    Beyond  that,  he  is
dependent on  Congress for grants of privilege;  rather than God,
government is the federal citizen's prime mover.

   The next  important move  was incorporation of the District of
Columbia as  a municipal corporation and political subdivision of
the geographical,  or  self-interested,  United  States  (federal
government).   Original incorporation  was in  1871, with several
re-organizations during  that decade  and since.  Thereafter, the
corporate  federal   government  became  increasingly  important,
particularly through  late-century westward  development, as  the
United States  (federal government)  managed settlement territory
simultaneously with  post-Civil War reconstruction -- the days of
Carpet Bagger plunder.  Then, in 1884, the Supreme Court gave way
to powerful  influences in  the Julliard  case when  it  reversed
Justice  Fields  from  four  years  earlier  by  concluding  that
Congress could  print paper  money because  the U.S. Constitution
does not expressly prohibit United States paper money.

   Considering provisions of Article I, Sec. 8, Clause 5 (1:8:5),
and Article  I, Section  10,  Clause  1  (1:10:1),  of  the  U.S.
Constitution, which  stipulate that  Congress will  mint coin and
regulate value,  and the  several States cannot make anything but
gold and  silver coin  a tender for payment of debt, the Julliard
decision was conspicuously contrary to constitutional intent, but
as Naval  Academy  founder  George  Bancroft  pointed  out  in  a
detailed rebuttal to the decision (A Plea for the Constitution of
the United  States:   Wounded in  the House  of  Its  Guardians),
Julliard was  based on  Congress' legislative  jurisdiction under
Article IV  of the  U.S. Constitution, in the geographical United
States.   Thus, manifestation  of Congress' dual role -- exercise
only of  delegated power  under  Article  I  within  the  several
States, and  exercise of any power not specifically prohibited by
the U.S.  Constitution within the geographical United States (the
federal zone)  under Article  IV.   So far as lawful implication,
the People  and the  governments of  the several  States had  the
Right to  reject United  States paper  money,  as  several  court
decisions confirm;   but,  as a  practical matter, the nation was
largely changed  over to paper money, rather than gold and silver
coin, by the time the Federal Reserve Act established the Federal
Reserve System  in 1913.   By 1933, the Federal Reserve Note, not
to be  confused with  the current  Federal Reserve Bank Note, was
backed 60% by obligations of the United States, and by 40% gold.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 11 of 40


   Congress also  engaged in  massive land-grabs  both within the
Continental United  States and  abroad.  Takeover of the Hawaiian
Islands, going  to war with Spain to take the Philippines, Puerto
Rico, etc., and nearly all States admitted to the Union after the
Civil War  were blackmailed  into land  concessions.    Oklahoma,
admitted in  1907, adopted  the following provision at Article I,
Section 3 of the state constitution:

      The people  inhabiting the  State do  agree and declare
    that they  forever disclaim  all right and title in or to
    any  unappropriated   public  lands   lying  within   the
    boundaries thereof.


   Even though  the U.S.  Constitution grants  authority for  the
United States (federal government) to establish nothing more than
forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards and other needful buildings
within the  several States,  from the time of the Civil War, well
into  this   century,  including  mineral-rich  Alaska,  Congress
indulged its  greed for  land;   whereas the  intent of  American
Founders, via the U.S. Constitution, the "Ordinance of 1887:  The
Northwest Territorial  Government", and  other such  instruments,
was clearly  to keep  the federal beast locked soundly within its
box which was, for the most part, limited to the ten miles square
(100 square  miles)  authorized  for  the  seat  of  the  federal
government.

   Toward the  end of  the 19th  century, some  of  the  retained
federal lands  within the  several States  were  declared  to  be
national  parks.     Development  of  federally  owned  resources
accelerated in  the 1930's  via public  works programs,  such  as
building dams  for flood control and electrical generation, and a
multitude of other enterprises.

   On  the   enforcement  and   judicial  fronts,   there  was  a
corresponding re-organization.   The  Department of  Justice  was
created  by  Act  of  Congress  on  June  22,  1870  (Forty-First
Congress, Session  II, Chapter  150, pages 162 et seq.), with the
Attorney General  at the  head of  this organization.    To  that
point, each government agency or department pretty well took care
of its  own legal  affairs, but  the Act establishing the Justice
Department consolidated authority over most enforcement and legal
matters, including those of the Department of the Interior.

   Changing United  States courts  around was  a somewhat  longer
process, but it was managed over time.  The United States Circuit
Courts became  United States Courts of Appeal via Act of Congress
on March  3, 1891,  and organization  of United  States  District
Courts,  with  amendments  since,  was  accomplished  by  Act  of
Congress on  March 3,  1911 (Sixty-First  Congress, Session  III,
Chapter 231, pages 1087 et seq.).


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 12 of 40


      Part II:  Current Federal Jurisdiction in the States

   While some of the seemingly unrelated history conveyed in Part
I of  this memorandum  might appear  not to address United States
judicial authority  within the  several States, it will fall into
place when  the office  of  "federal  magistrate"  is  addressed.
Magistrates in  United States  District Courts are simply federal
park commissioners  and nothing  more.  The name was changed, but
the character and jurisdiction of the office did not.

   The territorial  jurisdiction of federal magistrates, which is
easily demonstrated  by way  of two  statutes, is concurrent with
jurisdiction of  United States District Courts within the several
States.   Or at  least it would appear so.  The first definition,
in relative  part, comes from Title 18 of the United States Code,
the Code  of Criminal  Procedure, at  Section 7,  with particular
attention to 7(3) (U.S.C., 1979 edition):

        7.  Special maritime  and territorial jurisdiction of
    the United States defined

      The term "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
    of the  United States",  as used in this title [18 U.S.C.
    1 et seq.], includes:

      (3) Any  lands reserved  or acquired for the use of the
    United States,  and under  the  exclusive  or  concurrent
    jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise
    acquired  by   the  United   States  by  consent  of  the
    legislature of  the State in which the same shall be, for
    the erection  of a  fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or
    other needful building.


   The second  comes from  the so-called  Buck Act, at 4 U.S.C.
 110 (1995 Lawyer's Cooperative CD-ROM edition):

      110. Same;  definitions

      As used in sections 105-109 of this title -- ...

      (d)  The   term  "State"   includes  any  Territory  or
    possession of the United States.

      (e) The term "Federal area" means any lands or premises
    held or  acquired by  or for the use of the United States
    or any department, establishment, or agency of the United
    States;  and any Federal area, or any part thereof, which
    is located  within the  exterior boundaries of any State,
    shall be  deemed to be a Federal area located within such
    State.
                                             [emphasis added]


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 13 of 40


   Definition of  the term  "State" as included in the above cite
as used  in both  the United  States Code and in the codes of the
various States  is essential  to understanding that most statutes
in the United States Code presume application in federal "States"
such as  the District  of Columbia,  Puerto Rico,  etc., and  not
within  the   several  States  which  are  parties  to  the  U.S.
Constitution.  The distinction in 18 U.S.C. 7(3) is subtle, but
becomes clearer  when read  very carefully:   special territorial
jurisdiction, where  the United States Code of Criminal Procedure
is applicable, embraces:  (1) "Any lands reserved or acquired for
the use  of  the  United  States,  and  under  the  exclusive  or
concurrent  jurisdiction,"   (2)  "or   any  place  purchased  or
otherwise acquired  by  the  United  States  by  consent  of  the
legislature of  the State  in which  the same  shall be,  for the
erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful
building."

   In the  first instance, the United States (federal government)
has exclusive  or concurrent  jurisdiction over any land acquired
for any  purpose;   whereas, in  the second  instance, the United
States (federal  government) has  jurisdiction  only  over  lands
which are  acquired for a constitutional purpose, as specified in
Article I,  after the land has been ceded to the United States by
the State Legislature.  In the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
the Virgin  Islands and  other United States (federal government)
possessions classified  as "States"  in  federal  municipal  law,
Congress has unrestricted and exclusive legislative jurisdiction,
pursuant to  Article IV,  so purchase  of land  for United States
(federal government)  use  automatically  comes  under  Congress'
legislative jurisdiction,  with or  without consent  of the State
Legislative body.   In  the second  instance, legislatures of the
several States  must cede  jurisdiction over acquired property to
the  United  States  (federal  government)  before  any  judicial
authority can be exercised.

   The Buck Act definition of "State" is about as straightforward
as any  of the  various definitions of "State" which refer to the
federal "States":

     The term "State" includes any Territory or possession of the
     United States.


   A similar  definition of the term is located in Rule 54 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:

     "State"  includes   District  of   Columbia,  Puerto   Rico,
     territory and insular possession.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 14 of 40


   Jurisdiction of  United States  District Courts, being limited
to federal  "States" and  to federal  enclaves within the several
States, is further reinforced by another Rule 54 application:

     "Act of  Congress" includes  any  act  of  Congress  locally
     applicable to  and in  force in the District of Columbia, in
     Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an insular possession.


   The distinction  between  federal  "States"  and  the  several
[Union] States is clarified in the jurisdiction and venue statute
(territorial jurisdiction)  governing conduct  of  United  States
District Courts.   According  to  The  United  States  Government
Manual for  1995/96, at  page 75,  is  18  U.S.C. 3231  (1979
edition, U.S.C.):

      3231. District courts

      The district  courts of  the United  States shall  have
    original jurisdiction,  exclusive of  the courts  of  the
    States, of  all offenses  against the  laws of the United
    States.

      Nothing  in this title  [18 U.S.C. 1 et seq.]  shall be
    held to  take away  or impair  the  jurisdiction  of  the
    courts of the several States under the laws thereof.


   If the  distinction  between  the  federal  "States"  and  the
several  [Union]  States  is not made clear enough by 3231, proof
of the  distinction is  found in  the legislative  history for 18
U.S.C.  3241,  again using the 1979 edition  of the United States
Code ("U.S.C."):

      3241. Jurisdiction of offenses under certain sections

      The United States District Court for the Canal Zone and
    the District  Court of  the  Virgin  Islands  shall  have
    jurisdiction of  offenses under  the laws  of the  United
    States, not locally inapplicable, concurrently within the
    territorial   jurisdiction    of   such    courts,    and
    jurisdiction, concurrently  with the  district courts  of
    the United  States, of  offenses against  the laws of the
    United States committed upon the high seas.


   At various  times, other  territorial courts  were included in
this statute.   The district court of the Philippines was removed
in  1946   when  the   island  nation   became   an   independent
commonwealth;  then "Act July 7, 1958 deleted 'District Court for
the Territory of Alaska'...."  In other words, up until the point
at which  Alaska was  admitted to  the Union,  that Territory was
considered a  federal "State."    Once  admitted  to  the  Union,
Alaskan courts  no longer  qualified  as  courts  of  the  United
States.   State courts,  because of Tenth and Eleventh Amendments
and the  Separation of  Powers Doctrine,  could not  legitimately
exercise any  federal authority.   The  Canal Zone district court
has been  removed from this statute since the 1979 U.S.C. edition
was published, so the District Court of the Virgin Islands is the
only remaining  federal "State"  court that  exercises concurrent
jurisdiction  with United States District Courts  under 18 U.S.C.
3241.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 15 of 40


   We turn now to the "special territorial" jurisdiction found at
18 U.S.C. 7(3)  by  way  of examining  the evolution  of what are
today known  as "federal  magistrate judges",  formerly known  as
"federal  magistrates",   and  before  that,  as  "national  park
commissioners".   The first  selection comes  from  historic  and
amendment  notes  following  28 U.S.C. 631,  which  provides  for
appointment  and   tenure  of  federal  magistrate  judges  (1995
Lawyer's Cooperative CD-ROM edition of U.S.C.):

      1979. Act  Oct. 10,  1979, in  subsec. (a), substituted
    "Where the  conference deems  it desirable,  a magistrate
    may be  designated to  serve in  one  or  more  districts
    adjoining the  district for which he is appointed. Such a
    designation  shall  be  made  by  the  concurrence  of  a
    majority of  the judges  of each  of the  district courts
    involved and  shall specify the duties to be performed by
    the magistrate  in the  adjoining district or districts."
    for "Where  an  area  under  the  administration  of  the
    National Park  Service, or  the United  States  Fish  and
    Wildlife Service,  or any  other Federal  agency, extends
    into two  or more  judicial districts  and it  is  deemed
    desirable  by   the  conference   that  the   territorial
    jurisdiction of  a magistrate's  appointment include  the
    entirety of  such area,  the appointment or reappointment
    shall be  made by  the concurrence  of a  majority of all
    judges of  the district  courts of the judicial districts
    involved, and  where there  is no such concurrence by the
    concurrence  of   the  chief   judges  of  such  district
    courts.";   in subsec.  (b), in  the introductory matter,
    inserted "reappointed  to", in para. (1), inserted ", and
    has been  for at  least 5  years,", in  cl. (A), inserted
    "or", in  cl.  (B),  deleted  "or"  following  "Islands;"
    deleted cl.  (C) which  read:   "in  an  area  under  the
    administration of  the National  Park Service, the United
    States Fish  and Wildlife  Service, or  any other Federal
    agency that  extends into two or more States, a member in
    good standing  of the  bar of the highest court of one of
    those States;"'  in para. (4), substituted ";  and" for a
    period and added para. (5), redesignated subsecs. (f)ü(j)
    as subsecs.  (g)ü(k) respectively;  and added new subsec.
    (f).
                                             [emphasis added]


   Before examining  deletions made  in the 1979 amending Act, it
will be useful to import the index from earlier law pertaining to
national park commissioners before all the name changes, with the
current Magistrate Act at 28 U.S.C. 631-639:

    Amendments  (1995  Lawyer's  Cooperative  CD-ROM  edition  of
U.S.C.):


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 16 of 40


      1954. Act  Aug. 13, 1954, ch 728, 1(c), 68 Stat. 704,
    amended the  analysis of  this  chapter  by  adding  "and
    expenses" to item 633.

      1968. Act  Oct. 17, 1968, P. L. 90-578, Title I, 101,
    82 Stat.  1108, amended  the analysis  of this chapter by
    substituting items 632 through 639 for items which read:

      "632 .Park  commissioners;   jurisdiction  and  powers;
    procedure

      "633 .Fees and expenses

      "634 .Salaries  of Park  Commissioners;  disposition of
    fees

      "635 .Park Commissioners;  residence

      "636 .Accounts

      "637   .Oaths,    acknowledgments,    affidavits    and
    depositions

      "638 .Seals

      "639 .Dockets and forms;  United States Code".

      1972. Act  Mar. 1, 1972, P.L. 92-239, 3, 86 Stat. 47,
    amended the  analysis of  this chapter by substituting ",
    powers, and  temporary assignment"  for "and  powers"  in
    item 636.


   It is  also useful  to see the evolution of this Act dating to
the last century:

      Based  on  title 28,  U.S.C.,  1940  ed.,  526 and 527,
    sections 27,  66, 80e,  100, 117e,  129, 172, 198e, 204e,
    256d, 395e, 403c-5, 403h-5, 404c-5, and 408m of title 16,
    U.S.C., 1940  ed., Conservation, and section 863 of title
    48, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Territories and Insular Possessions
    (May 27,  1894,  ch.  72, 5,  28 Stat. 74;  May 28, 1896,
    ch. 252,  19,  20,  29  Stat. 184;   Apr. 12, 1900,   ch.
    191,  34,  31 Stat. 84;  Mar. 2, 1901,  ch. 814, 31 Stat.
    956;   Mar. 3, 1911,  ch. 231, 291,  36 Stat. 1167;  Jan.
    7, 1913, ch. 6, 37 Stat. 648;  Aug. 22, 1914.

      Section consolidates  section 526 and a portion of 527,
    both of  title 28,  U.S.C., 1940  ed., with provisions of
    sections 27,  66, 80e,  100, 117e,  129, 172, 198e, 204e,
    256d, 395e,  403c-5, 403h-5, 404c-5 and 408m of title 16,
    U.S.C., 1940  ed., and provisions of section 863 of title
    48,   U.S.C.,   1940   ed.,   Territories   and   Insular
    Possessions, relating  to appointment  of  United  States
    commissioners. For  other provisions of said sections see
    Distribution Table.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 17 of 40


      Some of  the provisions  of section  863 of  title  48,
    U.S.C., 1940  ed., Territories  and  Insular  Possessions
    were retained in that title.

      The provision  of sections  395e, 403c-5,  404c-5,  and
    408m of  title 16,  U.S.C., 1940  ed., for appointment of
    the  Park  Commissioner  in  the  Hawaii  National  Park,
    Shenandoah National  Park, Great Smoky Mountains National
    Park, Mammoth Cave National Park and Isle Royale National
    Park upon  "the recommendation  of the  Secretary of  the
    Interior" was omitted as inconsistent not only with other
    provisions  of   this  title   but  with  other  statutes
    applicable to other national parks.

      All  such   park  commissioners   are   United   States
    commissioners and  the revision  of these  sections makes
    possible uniformity  and  consistency  in  administrative
    matters  concerning   such  commissioners.   (See,  also,
    sections 604 and 634 of this title.)

      Words "the Director of the Administrative Office of the
    United States  Courts"  were  substituted  for  "Attorney
    General" in section 526 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., in
    view of  the general  supervision by  the  Director  over
    clerks and  commissioners under  section 601  et seq.  of
    this title.

      A provision  in section  526 of  title 28, U.S.C., 1940
    ed., that  commissioners should  have the same powers and
    duties as  are conferred  and imposed by law, was omitted
    as superfluous.
                                             [emphasis added]


   Jurisdiction  provisions   relating  to   federal   magistrate
judges/national park  commissioners were  enacted  in  definitive
terms for the Grand Canyon National Park Commissioner:

      Special commissioner  for Grand  Canyon National  Park;
    appointment;   jurisdiction;  compensation. Act Sept. 14,
    1959, P. L. 86-258, 1-3, 73 Stat. 546, provided:

      "Sec .1.  The United  States  District  Court  for  the
    District of  Arizona shall appoint a special commissioner
    for  the   Grand  Canyon   National  Park,  Arizona.  The
    commissioner shall  hold office  for four  years,  unless
    sooner removed  by the  district court,  and he  shall be
    subject to  the general  laws and requirements applicable
    to United States commissioners.

      "Sec  .2.  The  jurisdiction  of  the  commissioner  in
    adjudicating cases brought before him shall be limited to
    the trial,  and sentencing  upon conviction,  of  persons
    charged  with   the  commission   of  those  misdemeanors
    classified as  petty offenses (18 U.S.C. 1) [18 U.S.C. 1]
    relating to  the violation of Federal laws or regulations
    applicable within  the park:   Provided,  That any person
    charged with a petty offense may elect to be tried in the
    district   court   of  the   United  States;    and   the
    commissioner shall  apprise the defendant of his right to
    make such election, but shall not proceed to try the case
    unless the  defendant, after  being so  apprised, signs a
    written consent to be tried before the commissioner.  The
    exercise of  additional  functions  by  the  commissioner
    shall be consistent with and be carried out in accordance
    with the  authority, laws,  and  regulations  of  general
    application to United States commissioners.  The rules of
    procedure set  forth in  title 18,  section 3402,  of the
    United States Code [18 U.S.C. 3402], shall be followed in
    the  handling   of  cases  by  such  commissioner.    The
    probation laws  shall be  applicable to  persons tried by
    the  commissioner  and  he  shall  have  power  to  grant
    probation.
                                             [emphasis added]


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 18 of 40


   Now we go to a few court cases to nail the matter down:

      Powers and  duties  were  coextensive  with  limits  of
    judicial district  in which  he was  appointed.    United
    States v.  Harden, 10  F 802  (D.C. N.C.,  1881);  United
    States v. Stern, 177 F 479 (D.C. Pa. 1910).

      Purpose  of  Federal Magistrates Act,  28 U.S.C. 631 et
    seq., was  to provide method to relieve judges of some of
    their non-Article  III functions.  United States v. First
    National Bank  of Rush,  576 F.2d  852 (10th Cir., 1978),
    78-1 USTC 9462, 42 AFTR 2d 78-5049.

      Purpose  of  Federal  Magistrates  Act  (28 U.S.C. 631-
    638) is to remove from workload of United States District
    Courts matters  which are  more  desirably  performed  by
    lower tier  of  judicial  officers.    United  States  v.
    Richardson, 57 FRD 196 (D.C. N.Y., 1972).


   Evolution of the federal magistrate judge demonstrates that he
is merely  a glorified  national park commissioner, who is a bar-
licensed attorney, and his territorial jurisdiction is concurrent
with jurisdiction  of the  United States  District Court where he
serves.   As previously  demonstrated  via analysis  of 18 U.S.C.
7(3)  and  4 U.S.C.110(d)  & (e),  there  is  a  gray area  where
there might  be some discretion.  In the federal "States", United
States District  Court  venue  and  jurisdiction  may  extend  to
national parks and other lands retained by the United States, but
in the several States which are parties to the U.S. Constitution,
United States judicial authority may be exercised only on federal
enclaves, i.e.  lands ceded  to the United States by legislatures
of the  several States,  "for the  erection of  a fort, magazine,
arsenal, dockyard,  or other  needful  building"  (1979  edition,
U.S.C.).   There is,  and was,  no constitutional  authority  for
Congress to retain land for the United States, as was the case in
Oklahoma, Colorado,  Nevada, Alaska,  etc., in States admitted to
the Union  subsequent to  the Civil  War.   Nevada appears  to be
leading the charge on this issue, namely, the right of the United
States (federal  government) to retain land in the several States
other than  for constitutional  purposes;   and it  is clear,  by
distinctly separate  authorities pertaining  to federal  "States"
and  to  the several  States in   18 U.S.C. 7(3)  &  3231  and  4
U.S.C. 1001(d) & (e),  that application  of judicial authority in
the United  States Code of Criminal Procedure limits jurisdiction
to federal  enclaves which have been ceded by legislatures of the
several States for constitutional purposes only.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 19 of 40


   Still, this  is a  vague area  which has  yet to be thoroughly
explored:   Within the  several States,  the  United  States  has
judicial authority  either:   (1) on  federal enclaves  ceded  by
legislatures of  the several  States for constitutional purposes,
or (2)  on federal enclaves ceded for constitutional purposes and
in national  parks.    In  his  memorandum,  Becraft  frames  his
conclusion concerning  United  States  judicial  jurisdiction  by
basing it  on an  1885 Supreme  Court decision,  even though  the
decision  was   premised  on   facts  relative   to  the  federal
reservation at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas:

      The single most important case regarding the subject of
    federal jurisdiction  appears to  be Fort  Leavenworth R.
    Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 531, 5 S.Ct. 995 (1885), which
    sets forth  the law  on this  point fully.    There,  the
    railroad company  property which  passed through the Fort
    Leavenworth  federal   enclave  was  being  subjected  to
    taxation by  Kansas, and the company claimed an exemption
    from state  taxation.    In  holding  that  the  railroad
    company's property  could be  taxed, the  Court carefully
    explained federal jurisdiction within the States:

          The consent  of the  states to  the purchase of
        lands within them for the special purposes named,
        is, however,  essential, under  the constitution,
        to the  transfer to  the general government, with
        the  title,   of   political   jurisdiction   and
        dominion.   Where lands are acquired without such
        consent, the  possession of  the  United  States,
        unless political jurisdiction be ceded to them in
        some other  way, is  simply that  of an  ordinary
        proprietor.   The property  in that  case, unless
        used as  a means to carry out the purposes of the
        government,  is   subject  to   the   legislative
        authority and  control of the states equally with
        the property of private individuals.

      Thus, the cases decided within the 19th century clearly
    disclosed the  extent and scope of both State and federal
    jurisdiction.    In  essence,  these  cases,  among  many
    others, hold  that the  jurisdiction  of  any  particular
    State is  co-extensive with its borders or territory, and
    all persons  and property  located or  found therein  are
    subject to  such  jurisdiction;    this  jurisdiction  is
    superior.   Federal  jurisdiction  results  only  from  a
    conveyance  of   state  jurisdiction   to   the   federal
    government for  lands owned or otherwise possessed by the
    federal government,  and  thus  federal  jurisdiction  is
    extremely limited  in nature.   And  there is  no federal
    jurisdiction  if   there  be   no  grant  or  cession  of
    jurisdiction by  the State  to  the  federal  government.
    Therefore, federal  territorial jurisdiction  exists only
    in Washington,  D.C., the  federal  enclaves  within  the
    States, and the territories and possessions of the United
    States.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 20 of 40


   During the  Eisenhower administration,  the matter  of federal
jurisdiction within  the States  was addressed  at  length  by  a
specially formed  Interdepartmental Committee  for the  Study  of
Jurisdiction Over  Federal Areas  Within the  States,  with  both
State and  United  States  (federal  government)  representatives
participating in the study.  Assistant Attorney General Mansfield
D. Sprague  chaired the  committee.  Part I of the report, titled
"The Facts  and  Committee  Recommendations,"  was  submitted  to
Attorney General  Herbert  Brownell,  Jr.,  then  transmitted  to
President Eisenhower  in April, 1956, and Part II, titled "A Text
of the  Law of  Legislative Jurisdiction," was submitted in June,
1957.   The latter  report, in particular, affirms the conclusion
that United  States judicial  authority within the several States
extends only so far as the constitutional grant:

      The Constitution  gives express  recognition to but one
    means of  Federal acquisition of legislative jurisdiction
    ... by  State consent  under Article I, section 8, clause
    17.   ... Justice  McLean suggested that the Constitution
    provided the  sole mode for transfer of jurisdiction, and
    that  if  this  mode  is  not  pursued,  no  transfer  of
    jurisdiction can take place.  [Page 41]

      It scarcely needs to be said that unless there has been
    a transfer of jurisdiction (1) pursuant to clause 17 by a
    Federal acquisition of land with State consent, or (2) by
    cession from  the State  to the  Federal  Government,  or
    unless the  Federal Government  has reserved jurisdiction
    upon the  admission of  the State, the Federal Government
    possesses  no  legislative  jurisdiction  over  any  area
    within a  State, such  jurisdiction being for exercise by
    the State,  subject to non-interference by the State with
    Federal functions.  [Id., at 45]

      The Federal  Government cannot, by unilateral action on
    its part,  acquire legislative jurisdiction over any area
    within the exterior boundaries of a State.  [Id., at 46]

      On the  other hand,  while the  Federal Government  has
    power under  various provisions  of the  Constitution  to
    define,  and   prohibit  as  criminal,  certain  acts  or
    omissions occurring anywhere in the United States, it has
    no power to punish for various other crimes, jurisdiction
    over which  is retained  by the States under our Federal-
    State system  of government,  unless such crime occurs on
    areas as  to  which  legislative  jurisdiction  has  been
    vested in the Federal Government.  [Id., at 107]


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 21 of 40


   The 1957  report appears to accommodate United States (federal
government) retention  and/or acquisition  of land, and therefore
legislative  and   judicial   jurisdiction,   other   than   that
specifically prescribed  in the U.S. Constitution under Article I
authority.   Therefore, if  the report  is correct  on this hair-
splitting matter,  congressional blackmail  of States admitted to
the Union after the Civil War would appear to be legitimized, and
the report  seems to  accommodate legislative  cession of land to
the  United   States  (federal   government)   for   other   than
constitutional purposes  ... national  parks, flood  control, and
electrical generation dams, etc.

   However, the  jury is still out on this matter, because recent
U.S. Supreme Court decisions such as New York v. United States et
al., 505  U.S. ___,  120 L.Ed.2d 120, 112 S.Ct. 2408 (1992), seem
to condemn this conclusion under authority of the Tenth Amendment
and the  Separation  of  Powers  Doctrine.    The  United  States
(federal government)  cannot exercise  any authority  within  the
several States  which is not specifically enumerated in Article I
of the  U.S. Constitution;   and  officers of  the several States
cannot  accommodate   any  United   States  (federal  government)
exercise of  power which  is  not  specifically  delegated  under
Article I, without first securing a constitutional amendment.

   Regardless of the Tenth Amendment and the Separation of Powers
issues, any  given Act  of Congress, under United States judicial
authority, applies  only to  the extent  of the Act and attending
regulations,  with  territorial  limits  prescribed at  18 U.S.C.
7(3) and 4 U.S.C. 110(d) & (e).

   Generally  speaking,  territorial  bounds  for  United  States
judicial authority  are applicable with respect to both civil and
criminal matters,  with diversity  of citizenship  being the only
exception in  civil matters.   This  expansion of  United  States
judicial authority does not extend to criminal matters, except as
specified by Thomas Jefferson in "The Kentucky Resolutions."  The
U.S. Supreme  Court  has  repeatedly  prescribed  the  limits  of
federal  criminal   jurisdiction  in   definitive  terms.     The
conclusive statement  is this:   "[Federal]  legislation  applies
only within  the territorial  jurisdiction of  the United  States
unless a  contrary intent appears [in the legislation] ...."  See
Caha v.  United States,  152 U.S.  211, 215 (1894), 14 S.Ct. 513;
American Banana  Company v.  United Fruit  Company, 213  U.S. 347
(1909), 357,  29 S.Ct. 511;  United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94
(1922), 97, 93, 43 S.Ct. 39;  Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S.
421 (1932),  437, 52 S.Ct. 252;  Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S.
281 (1949), 285, 69 S.Ct. 575;  United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S.
217, 222  (1949), 70  S.Ct. 10;    and  United  States  v.  First
National City Bank, 321 F.2d 14, 23 (2nd Cir. 1963).

   The matter  is addressed  in Rule  54 of  the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure [selected portions, 1978 edition, U.S.C.]:

      Rule 54. Application and Exception

      (a)  Courts.   These  rules   apply  to   all  criminal
    proceedings in the United States District Courts ....

      (c) Application  of terms.   As used in these rules the
    following terms have the designated meanings.

      "Act of  Congress" includes any act of Congress locally
    applicable to  and in  force in the District of Columbia,
    in  Puerto   Rico,  in  a  territory  or  in  an  insular
    possession.

      The words  "demurrer,"  "motion  to  quash,"  "plea  in
    abatement," "plea  in bar"  and "special plea in bar," or
    words to the same effect, in any act of Congress shall be
    construed  to  mean  the  motion  raising  a  defense  or
    objection provided in Rule 12.

      "Federal Magistrate"  means a  United States magistrate
    as  defined in  28 U.S.C. 631-639,  a judge of the United
    States or  another judge or judicial officer specifically
    empowered  by  statute  in  force  in  any  territory  or
    possession, the  Commonwealth  of  Puerto  Rico,  or  the
    District of  Columbia, to  perform a  function to which a
    particular rule relates.

      "Judge of  the United  States" includes  a judge  of  a
    district court, court of appeals, or the Supreme Court.

      "Law" includes statutes and judicial decisions.

      "Magistrate" includes  a United  States  magistrate  as
    defined in  28 U.S.C. 631-639,  a judge of the United
    States, another  judge or  judicial officer  specifically
    empowered  by  statute  in  force  in  any  territory  or
    possession, the  Commonwealth  of  Puerto  Rico,  or  the
    District of  Columbia, to  perform a  function to which a
    particular rule  relates, and  a state  or local judicial
    officer, authorized  by 18  U.S.C. 3041 to perform the
    functions prescribed in Rule 3, 4, and 5.

      "State" includes  District of  Columbia,  Puerto  Rico,
    territory and insular possession.

      "United States magistrate" means the officer authorized
    by 28 U.S.C.631-639.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 22 of 40


   Application of  Acts of  Congress was  clearly articulated  in
Caha v.  United States  supra, where  the Supreme Court stated as
follows:

      The laws of Congress in respect to those matters do not
    extend into  the territorial  limits of  the states,  but
    have force  only in  the District  of Columbia, and other
    places that  are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
    national government.


   Application of  terms in  Rule 54  of  the  Federal  Rules  of
Criminal Procedure  appears to  exclude  jurisdiction  of  United
States courts on national parks within the several States, as has
repeatedly been  demonstrated  via  4 U.S.C. 110(d) & (e)  and 18
U.S.C. 7(3)  definitions and applications,  and the definition of
"State" cited  above;   but, regardless  of this  hair splitting,
United States  judicial  authority  via  United  States  District
Courts, which  is concurrent  with the  jurisdiction of  national
park commissioners (now known as federal magistrate judges), does
not extend  to the  several States in any general way, other than
in territory  ceded by  the legislatures  of the  several States,
whether for constitutional purposes or for national parks.  Thus,
the  law   of  legislative   jurisdiction  is  preserved  in  the
convoluted  United  States  Code  by  tracking  the  history  and
evolution of United States courts and their officers.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 23 of 40


   Part III:  Character of Law & Court Effect on Jurisdiction

   Judicial authority  of the  United States  is  established  in
Article III of the U.S. Constitution:

      Article III

      Section 1.  The judicial  Power of  the United  States,
    shall be  vested  in  one  supreme  Court,  and  in  such
    inferior Courts  as the  Congress may  from time  to time
    ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and
    inferior Courts,  shall hold  their Offices  during  good
    Behavior, and  shall, at  stated Times, receive for their
    Services a  Compensation, which  shall not  be diminished
    during their Continuance in Office.

      Section 2.  [1] The  judicial Power shall extend to all
    Cases,  in   Law   and   Equity,   arising   under   this
    Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
    made, or  which shall be made, under their Authority;  --
    to  all   Cases  affecting   Ambassadors,  other   public
    Ministers and  Consuls;  -- to all Cases of admiralty and
    maritime Jurisdiction;   -- to Controversies to which the
    United States  shall be  a Party;   --  to  Controversies
    between two  or more  States;   -- between  a  State  and
    Citizens of  another  State;    --  between  Citizens  of
    different States;   -- between Citizens of the same State
    claiming Lands  under the Grants of different States, and
    between a  State, or  the Citizens  thereof, and  foreign
    States, Citizens or Subjects.

      [2] In  all Cases  affecting Ambassadors,  other public
    Ministers and  Counsels, and those in which a State shall
    be  a  Party,  the  Supreme  Court  shall  have  original
    Jurisdiction. In  all the  other Cases  before mentioned,
    the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both
    as to  Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
    Regulations as the Congress shall make.

      [3] The  Trial  of  all  Crimes,  except  in  Cases  of
    Impeachment, shall  be by  Jury;  and such Trial shall be
    held in  the State  where the said Crimes shall have been
    committed;   but when not committed within any State, the
    Trial shall  be at  such Place  or Places as the Congress
    may by Law have directed.

      Section 3. [1] Treason against the United States, shall
    consist only in levying War against them, or, in adhering
    to their Enemies, giving Aid and Comfort. No person shall
    be convicted  of Treason  unless on  the Testimony of two
    Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open
    Court.

      [2] The  Congress  shall  have  Power  to  declare  the
    Punishment of  Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall
    work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the
    Life of  the Person  attainted. [copied  from Black's Law
    Dictionary, 6th edition]


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 24 of 40


   The U.S.  Supreme Court  has classified the judicial authority
which is granted under Article III into three categories:  First,
those cases  in Common Law and equity which are cognizable within
the framework  of the Section 2, Clause 1 "arising under" clause;
second, admiralty  and maritime  jurisdiction  under  Section  2,
Clause 1;   and  third, cases  pertaining  to  ambassadors,  etc.
Cases relating to the several States are affected by the Eleventh
Amendment, ratified  in 1798,  but don't  materially  affect  the
instant matter.

   Concern in  this context  focuses on  two types of law and the
originating source.   Use of the term "law" in Article III of the
U.S. Constitution,  as is  the case for due process amendments in
the Bill  of  Rights  (first  Ten  Amendments,  particularly  the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh), contemplates the Common Law of
English-American  lineage.    Equity,  also  known  as  chancery,
pertains  primarily   to  commercial  or  contract  law,  and  is
voluntary on  the part of participating parties.  In other words,
Common Law  was assumed  and construed  to be the Law of the Land
applicable both  within the  United  States  (federal  zone)  and
within the several States.

   Constitutional intent  was carried  out by  the first Congress
via the  Judicial act  of 1789.  In this Act, original cognizance
over admiralty  and maritime  affairs was vested in courts of the
United States,  exclusive of the several States, with a safeguard
built in,  known as  the "saving  to suitors clause." Suitors, or
parties to  an action,  could remove  to Common  Law jurisdiction
where the  Common Law  was competent  to provide  a remedy.   The
saving to suitors clause is retained in the current United States
Code.  See 28 U.S.C. 1333(1).

   In the  beginning, admiralty and maritime jurisdiction applied
only to matters concerning international contracts and affairs on
the high seas, with the law of nations providing a guiding light.
The Supreme  Court, early  on, concluded  that,  while  admiralty
jurisdiction  is  conveyed in  Article III,  2,  Clause 1,  it is
distinct  from  authority  pertaining  to  law  and  equity  and,
therefore, does  not fall  under authority of the "arising under"
clause   See American  Insurance Co.  v. 356  Bales of Cotton, 26
U.S. 511  (1828), 7  L.Ed 242;   Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co.,  358 U.S. 354 (1959), 3 L.Ed.2d 368, 79 S.Ct. 468,
reh. den. 359 U.S. 962, 3 L.Ed.2d 769, 79 S.Ct. 795.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 25 of 40


   The nature and origin of admiralty law is set out in Vol. 1 of
Corpus Juris, 1914 edition, p. 1249, as follows:

      I. DEFINITION

      [1]  Admiralty  is  that  branch  or  department  of
    jurisprudence which  relates to  and  regulates  maritime
    property, affairs,  and transactions,  whether  civil  or
    criminal.   In a  more limited  sense it  is the tribunal
    exercising  jurisdiction   over   maritime   causes   and
    administering the Maritime law by a procedure peculiar to
    itself and  distinct from  that followed by courts either
    of equity or of common law.


      II. ORIGIN AND GROWTH

      [2]  A. Under  the Civil  Law.   Admiralty courts owe
    their origin  and procedure  largely to  the  civil  law,
    which prevailed in Italy and along the north coast of the
    Mediterranean, where  naval commerce  was originally most
    active, and  where, after the fall of the Western Empire,
    the merchants  and  traders  by  sea  brought  about  the
    establishment of  a court  of  consuls  in  each  of  the
    principal maritime  cities to  hear causes arising out of
    maritime commerce  and property.   The  judges  of  these
    consular courts  were chosen on Christmas of each year by
    the chief  merchants, and  they enforced  and applied  to
    controversies the  customs of  the sea,  whose origin  is
    long anterior  to the  civil law  itself.   These  courts
    gradually developed  and extended  their jurisdiction  as
    maritime commerce  became more  profitable and important,
    until ultimately,  in most states, they were merged into,
    and became known as, courts of admiralty.

      [3]  B. In  England.   The admiralty  is a  court  of
    ancient origin,  traceable back  in English jurisprudence
    to the  reign of  Edward I, and exercising a jurisdiction
    coeval  and   coextensive  with  that  of  other  foreign
    maritime courts;   indeed, by some authorities it is said
    to have  existed long before that time.  But owing to the
    hostility  which,   from   historic   causes,   gradually
    developed  in   England  against   the  civil   law,  the
    jurisdiction of  admiralty was  there greatly  restricted
    and limited,  both by  statute and  by decisions  of  the
    common-law courts  interpreting the  same.  A reaction in
    favor of  the  admiralty  courts  has  now  taken  place,
    however, and  by acts  of parliament  they have  regained
    much  of  their  lost  jurisdiction,  and  have  acquired
    jurisdiction over  all claims  for damages  done  by  any
    ship, whether on land or water.

      [4] C. In the United States.  It is now well settled,
    after much  controversy, that  the  jurisdiction  of  the
    courts of  admiralty in  the United States is not limited
    to that  of the  English admiralty  at the  time  of  the
    Revolution, but  is derived  from the early usages of the
    statutes and the federal laws and decisions.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 26 of 40


   The history related above hardly does justice to the continued
English-American battle  over imposition  of admiralty law which,
as the  article suggests,  is in  the nature  of Roman Civil Law,
British feudal  law, or simply Civil Law, whereby legislative and
administrative  bodies   are  ultimate  authorities  without  any
reference to an independent judicial body.  This kind of rule had
the effect  of setting  English Barons  against King John I, with
the results  being the Magna Charta, signed in 1215, and in 1640,
the Popular  Rebellion which  ended Star  Chambers and convoluted
ecclesiastical courts  under Charles  I.   American founders were
fully aware of the effects of admiralty or Civil Law -- the vice-
admiralty courts  of George  III were largely responsible for the
Revolution.     Thus,  the   "saving  to   suitors"  clause   was
incorporated in the Judicial Act of 1789.

   However, in the period following the Civil War, Congress found
admiralty rule convenient and, as the geographical United States,
under Congress'  alleged  Article  IV  legislative  jurisdiction,
became an  increasingly powerful  influence, admiralty  rule  was
extended.   First,  as  already  noted  from  The  United  States
Government Manual  of 1995/96,  circuit courts  were  changed  to
courts of  appeal by  Act of  March 3,  1891, then  United States
District Courts  were reorganized and set by Act of March 3, 1911
(Sixty-First Congress,  Sess. III,  Chap. 231,  pp. 1087, et seq.
[Public No.  475]).   The nature of United States District Courts
is  revealed  in the  Act at  9:  "The district courts, as courts
of admiralty and as courts of equity ...."

   In other words, the district courts of the United States, from
the Act of March 3, 1911 on, if not before, have never really had
a  Common   Law  character  in  federal  territories,  and  their
legitimate relationship  to and  within the several States has at
best been  at arm's  length and  shaky, where  the real  party of
interest is  the geographical  United States (federal government)
under Congress' Article IV legislative jurisdiction, exclusive of
Article I  delegated authorities.   However, within federal areas
or territories,  as described  in  the Buck Act at 4 U.S.C. 4(e),
and  the  first part of  18 U.S.C. 7(3), the same limitation does
not apply, as disclosed at 11 of Corpus Juris supra, p. 1251:

      [11]  7.   Territorial  courts.    Although   admiralty
    jurisdiction can  be exercised  in the  states  in  those
    courts only  which are  established in  pursuance of  the
    third article  of the  constitution, the  same limitation
    does not extend to the territories, and congress may vest
    admiralty jurisdiction in courts created by a territorial
    legislature as  well as  in territorial courts created by
    act of  congress, and it has exercised this power in both
    instances.   [In re Cooper, 143 U.S. 472, 12 Sec. 453, 36
    L.Ed 232;   The  City of  Panama, 101  U.S. 453, 25 L.Ed.
    1061;   American Insurance  Co. v.  356 Bales  of  Cotton
    supra ....]


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 27 of 40


   To say that United States district courts didn't have a Common
Law character isn't precisely correct.  In diversity suits at law
or in  equity, or  suits  covered  by  other  provisions  of  the
"arising  under"   clause,  they  appear  to  have  had  a  "law"
character.   However, in 1938, via Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
the U.S.  Supreme Court  declared  that  there  is  no  longer  a
national or  general Common Law.  Today, they operate exclusively
under "Special  maritime  and  territorial  jurisdiction  of  the
United  States,"  as  defined   at  18   U.S.C. sec. 7(3),  under
admiralty/civil law  rules, which  are contrary to the Common Law
indigenous to  the several  States.   In  fact,  court  decisions
disclose  that   they  have  only  admiralty  and  vice-admiralty
capacities  and,  in  effect,  they  either  accommodate  private
international law or they serve as administrative law courts (see
5 U.S.C. sec, 701 et seq.).   The  U.S. Supreme Court is the only
remaining United  States court  which  has  a  true  Article  III
judicial character  and, under  Rule 17.1  of the  Supreme  Court
Rules, has original jurisdiction over actions at law.

   The fine  line  determining applicability  of the Article III,
2, Clause 1 "arising under" clause is the real party of interest.
So long  as an  agent or  agency of  the United  States  (federal
government) is  carrying out  an Article I delegated power within
the several States, courts of the United States have jurisdiction
by way  of the "arising under" clause, whether as the complaining
party or defendant.  However, if an agent or agency of the United
States  operates   under   Congress'   article   IV   legislative
jurisdiction, which  is  exclusive  to  the  geographical  United
States (read  "the  federal  zone"),  or  to  the  United  States
(federal government), which is a foreign corporation with respect
to the  several States, the "arising under" clause does not apply
because the  act is  perpetrated under  color of  law.   In other
words, the  "Act of Congress" which is locally applicable only in
the  District   of  Columbia,   Puerto  Rico,   etc.,  does   not
legitimately reach  the several States or the population of State
Citizens inhabiting those several States.

   For  example,   in  Dan   Meador's  Public  Notice  Memorandum
pertaining to the character of the "Internal Revenue Service" and
proper application  of the  Internal Revenue  Code (which to date
has been  published as  legal notice  in Oklahoma,  Nebraska  and
Montana newspapers), He demonstrated that IRS is an agency of the
Department of the Treasury, Puerto Rico (Congress never created a
Bureau of  Internal Revenue,  predecessor of  IRS), and  that  no
taxing statute  in the Internal Revenue Code is applicable to the
several States,  save as  pertains to  import duties  on alcohol,
tobacco, and  firearms  in  Subtitle  E,  and  certain  items  in
Subtitle D  of the  Internal Revenue  code (i.e. Windfall Profits
Tax on  off-shore and  imported petroleum).   In  the event  that
officers  and  agents  who  allege  to  represent  United  States
(federal government)  laws and  interests prove  to be  operating
under color  of law within the several States, then United States
judicial authority  cannot spare  them from accountability in the
framework of laws and courts of the several States.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 28 of 40


   Suppose a  soldier stationed  at Ft.  Sill robbed  a store  or
murdered someone  in Lawton,  Oklahoma.   The fact  that he is in
United States  military service and might have even used an Army-
issued gun  does not  affect the  law he  broke, or the sovereign
territorial authority  which originates there, and is responsible
for enforcing  the law.  In other words, immunity travels only so
far as  legislative jurisdiction  and the  precise limit  of  any
given law.  Under Congress' Article I delegated authority, agents
and officers  of the United States have certain legitimate duties
which reach  the several  States, but  under Congress' Article IV
authority in  the  geographical,  self-interested  United  States
(federal zone),  the cloak  of immunity is shed at borders of the
several States,  except on federal enclaves which have been ceded
by legislatures  of the  States to  the  United  States  (federal
government) for constitutional purposes only.

   This distinction  between United  States "arising  under"  and
admiralty jurisdiction  is territorial  in  nature,  particularly
when admiralty  jurisdiction  is  exercised  under  authority  of
Article  IV  in  the  geographical  United  States  and  when  it
represents United  States (federal  government) interests outside
of Congress'  role as the Article I legislative body for national
government.   Even then,  this authority must comply with the law
of legislative  jurisdiction.   If this is not the case, then the
limitations of  the Tenth  Amendment and  of  the  Separation  of
Powers Doctrine are of no effect.


     Part IV:  Statute Application Determined by Regulation

   The  Administrative  Procedures Act,  located at  5 U.S.C. 552
et seq.,  and  the  Federal Register  Act,  located at  44 U.S.C.
1501 et  seq., provide the means for determining what statutes in
any given Act of Congress are applicable where.  If a statute has
general  application,   then  the  agency  head  responsible  for
carrying out  whatever duties  the statute prescribes is required
to promulgate  regulations disclosing  the who, what, when, where
and how,  and  have  the  regulation  published  in  the  Federal
Register, if  it has general application.  If regulations are not
published in  the Federal  Register, they  have at  best  limited
application.  The controlling statute in the Federal Register Act
is 44 U.S.C. 1505(a):

      1505. Documents to be published in Federal Register.

      (a) Proclamations  and  Executive  Orders;    documents
    having general applicability and legal effect;  documents
    required to be published by Congress.

      There shall be published in the Federal Register --

        (1) Presidential  proclamations and Executive orders,
        except those  not having  general  applicability  and
        legal  effect   or  effective  only  against  Federal
        agencies or  persons in  their capacity  as officers,
        agents, or employees thereof;

        (2)  documents  or  classes  of  documents  that  the
        President  may  determine  from  time  to  time  have
        general applicability and legal effect;  and

        (3) documents  or classes  of documents  that may  be
        required so to be published by Act of Congress.


      For  the  purposes  of this chapter  [44 U.S.C. 1501 et
    seq.] every  document or order which prescribes a penalty
    has general applicability and legal effect.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 29 of 40


   At 44 U.S.C. 1507,  the provision  is made that, "The contents
of the  Federal Register shall be judicially noticed ...", and at
1510,  which  establishes  the  Code  of Federal  Regulations, it
provides at  subsection (e) that, "The codified documents [in the
Code of Federal Regulations] of the several agencies published in
the supplemental  edition of  the Federal  Register ...  shall be
prima facie evidence of the text of the documents and of the fact
that they are in effect on and after the date of publication."

   In other  words, where  the several  States  and  the  general
population are concerned, a statute created by Act of Congress is
somewhat like  a hot air balloon that will not get off the ground
until someone  pumps hot  air into  it (as  if it  does not  have
enough hot  air already).  Regulations are to statutes as hot air
is to the balloon.  As stated  in 1505(a)(1),  if regulations for
any given  statute aren't  published  in  the  Federal  Register,
application is  limited to  Federal agencies or persons acting in
their capacity  as officers,  agents,  or  employees  of  Federal
agencies.

   Provisions of 44 U.S.C.1505(a) are restated at 1 CFR 5.2:

         5.2  Documents  required  to  be  filed  for  public
    inspection and published.

      The following  documents are  required to  be filed for
    public inspection with the Office of the Federal Register
    and published in the Federal Register:

      (a) Presidential  proclamations and Executive orders in
    the numbered  series, and  each other  document that  the
    President  submits   for  publication  or  orders  to  be
    published.

      (b) Each  document or class of documents required to be
    published by act of Congress.

      (c) Each  document  having  general  applicability  and
    legal effect.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 30 of 40


   Citations of authority requirements are as follows:

      21.40 General requirements:  Authority citations.

      Each section in a document subject to codification must
    include, or  be covered  by, a  complete citation  of the
    authority under which the section is issued, including --

      (a) General or specific authority delegated by statute;
    and

      (b) Executive  delegations, if  any, necessary  to link
    the statutory authority to the issuing agency.


      21.41 Agency responsibility.

      (a) Each issuing agency is responsible for the accuracy
    and integrity  of  the  citations  of  authority  in  the
    documents it issues.

      (b)  Each  issuing  agency  shall  formally  amend  the
    citations  of  authority  in  its  codified  material  to
    reflect any changes thereto.


   The character  of Federal  statutory law,  and  the  need  for
regulations, have  been addressed  time and  again  by  the  U.S.
Supreme Court  and Circuit Courts of Appeal.  Many of the clearer
statements relate to application of the Internal Revenue Code, as
in California Bankers Association v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974),
26, 94 S.Ct. 1494, 1500, 39 L.Ed.2d 812:

      Because it  has a  bearing on  our treatment of some of
    the issues  raised by  the parties, we think it important
    to note  that the  Act's  civil  and  criminal  penalties
    attach only  upon violation of regulations promulgated by
    the Secretary;   if the Secretary were to do nothing, the
    Act itself would impose no penalties on anyone.


   In Foley  Brothers v.  Filardo, 336  U.S. 281 (1949), the high
court said,  "It is  a well established principle of law that all
federal  legislation   applies  only   within   the   territorial
jurisdiction of  the  United  States  unless  a  contrary  intent
appears."   In order  for a  contrary intent  to be  facilitated,
delegations of  authority and  implementing regulations  must  be
published in  the Federal Register, and/or any given statute must
clearly articulate application.

   Fortunately, there  is a  reasonably easy  way to discern what
statutes in  the United  States Code  have general application to
the several  States and  to the  population at  large.   This  is
through the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, which begins
on page  751 of  the 1995  Index Volume  to the  Code of  Federal
Regulations.  Its authority is located at 1 CFR 8.5(a):

      (a) Parallel tables of statutory authorities and rules.
    In the Code of Federal Regulations Index or at some other
    place as  the Director  of the Federal Register considers
    appropriate, numerical  lists  of  all  sections  of  the
    current edition of the United States Code (except section
    301 of  title 5)  which are  cited by issuing agencies as
    rule-making authority for currently effective regulations
    in the  Code of  Federal Regulations.  The lists shall be
    arranged in  the order  of the titles and sections of the
    United  States   Code  with  parallel  citations  to  the
    pertinent  titles  and  parts  of  the  Code  of  Federal
    Regulations.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 31 of 40


   This handy  finding aid  lists United  States Code statutes by
title and  section  in  the  left-hand  column,  if  implementing
regulations have  been published  in the  Federal  Register,  and
applicable regulations  by title  and  part,  in  the  right-hand
column.     If  the  statute  doesn't  appear,  it  doesn't  have
implementing regulations which have been published in the Federal
Register,  signifying  that,   in   accordance  with   44  U.S.C.
1505(a)(1) provisions,  the statute is applicable only to Federal
agencies, or  the officers,  agents,  and  employees  of  Federal
agencies.   If the statute number does appear and a regulation is
cited, the regulation must be consulted to determine application.

   Where the  instant matter  is concerned, the table immediately
resolves the matter of territorial jurisdiction for United States
District Courts:   there  are no  implementing regulations for 18
U.S.C. 7 & 3231.   The absence  of implementing  regulations  for
these  two  statutes  confirms  that  the  special  maritime  and
territorial authority  of the  United States  District Court does
not reach into the several States and to the population at large;
the authority  applies only  on federal  enclaves which have been
ceded to  the United  States for  constitutional purposes, and as
the  second  paragraph  of 3231 specifies,  the laws and judicial
authority of  the several  States are  superior and govern within
areas of  the States  which are  not within federal enclaves that
have been  ceded to  Congress by  the legislatures of the several
States.

   Further, there  are no  implementing regulations for 28 U.S.C.
631-639,  the  Federal  Magistrate Act.   That is  to say,  these
glorified national  park rangers in black robes, known as federal
magistrate judges,  have  no  authority  within  in  the  several
States.   Therefore, the  United States  District Courts  have no
authority within in the several States, per the following:

      Powers and  duties  were  coextensive  with  limits  of
    judicial district  in which  he was  appointed.    United
    States v.  Harden, 10  F 802  (D.C. N.C.,  1881);  United
    States v. Stern, 177 F 479 (D.C. Pa., 1910).


   Where  matters   pertaining  to  alleged  offenses  under  the
Internal Revenue  Code are  concerned, there  are no implementing
regulations   to  support   26  U.S.C. 7402,   which   prescribes
jurisdiction for  United States  District Courts.   This confirms
proofs in  Meador's Public  Notice Memorandum  which  demonstrate
that there  are no  implementing regulations for Internal Revenue
Code statutes  prescribing  taxing,  assessment,  and  collection
authority, save as relates to import duties on distilled spirits,
etc., itemized  in Subtitle  E of the Internal Revenue Code, with
the general  authority being  27 CFR,  Part 70,  which  is  under
Bureau  of  Alcohol,  Tobacco  and  Firearms  ("BATF")  exclusive
administration.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 32 of 40


   Matters  relating  to  United  States  securities,  etc.,  are
commonly at  issue in  federal prosecutions,  so it  is useful to
briefly  examine   underlying  the   authorities.      The   U.S.
Constitution,  at Article  I, Sec. 8, Clause  1,  provides,  "The
Congress shall  have Power  [1:8:5] to  coin Money [and] regulate
the  Value  thereof," and  at 10,  Clause 1, stipulates that, "No
State shall  ... coin  Money;   emit Bills  of Credit;   make any
Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts ...."

   Since these  provisions have  never been  amended or repealed,
underlying authorities  for  current  United  States  credit  and
monetary systems should be examined for application:

      12 U.S.C. 226.  "Federal Reserve Act"   NO REGULATION
      12 U.S.C. 227.  "Banking Act of 1933"   NO REGULATION
      12 U.S.C. 228.  "Banking Act of 1935"   NO REGULATION


   There are  no regulations applicable to the several States for
the Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. 1861 et seq.

   Use of the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules is probably
easiest to  demonstrate by  analysis of an actual case issued via
the Department  of Justice  and/or a  United States Attorney.  In
order to  do this, we will use United States of America v. Kenney
F. Moore,  Colleen Moore,  and Wayne  Gunwall, 96 CR-082C, United
States District  Court for  the Northern  District  of  Oklahoma,
Tulsa, under  stamped impressions  of Neal Kirkpatrick, Assistant
U.S. Attorney, and Fred White, grand jury foreperson.

   The same people were charged in 95 CR-129C in the fall of 1995
by the  same Assistant  U.S. Attorneys, with Mr. White serving as
grand jury  foreperson.  The case was assigned to the same judge.
However, the grand jury foreperson was presented with some of the
same information  included in  this memorandum,  and subsequently
the Moores  and Mr.  Gunwall filed  criminal  complaints  against
federal government principals, sending complaints and evidence to
the United  States District Court in care of the court Clerk, and
to the  Oklahoma Attorney  General, W.  A. Drew  Edmondson.   The
complaint was received by the Clerk of the United States District
Court  on   Friday,  Nov.   17,  then   Assistant  U.S.  Attorney
Kirkpatrick entered  a motion  to dismiss charges on Monday, Nov.
20.

   Grand jury  indictment against the Moores and Mr. Gunwall were
allegedly issued  again on  May 15,  1996, with  a "SUMMONS  IN A
CRIMINAL CASE"  (96-CR-082-C) issued  July  5,  1996,  under  the
semblance of a signature for Phil Lombardi, allegedly the issuing
officer of some undisclosed rank and horsepower.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 33 of 40


   This case  is interesting  for a  number of reasons, and would
not be included in this memorandum except that federal government
insiders have chosen to scandalize the Moores and Mr. Gunwall via
statewide Oklahoma  media.   One of  the crucial  points is  that
after receiving  summons for  Dr. and  Mrs. Moore (the Government
sent the  Gunwall summons  to the  Moores  and  Moore  papers  to
Gunwall),  Mr.  Gunwall  drove  from  Ponca  City  to  Tulsa  and
attempted to  secure copies  of relevant material from the office
of the  United States  District Court  clerk.   But, the file was
unavailable, allegedly  still at  an old  office that wasn't open
that particular  day.  Yet, the information was made available to
Oklahoma print  and broadcast  media,  and  principals  from  the
United States  federal government  and  the  office  of  Oklahoma
Attorney General Edmondson fueled media reporting with comments.

   It would  be difficult  to inflict  much more  injury  on  the
Moores and  Mr. Gunwall  than federal  government officials  have
already choreographed.   The  question of  the  moment,  however,
concerns charges issued against Dr. & Mrs. Moore and Mr. Gunwall:
What authority lies behind them?

   Government charges  rest on  four statutes,  presented here in
the order  in which  they appear on the face of the alleged grand
jury indictment:   18  U.S.C. 371:   Conspiracy;   26 U.S.C. 
7212(a):   Interfering with  Administration of  Internal  Revenue
Laws;  18 U.S.C. 1341:  Mail Fraud;  and 18 U.S.C. 2:  Aiding
and Abetting.

   By consulting  the Parallel  Table of  Authorities  and  Rules
supra, it  is found  that there  are no  implementing regulations
extending general application authority to the several States and
the population  at large  for any  of these statutes.  Therefore,
the statutes are applicable only to agencies of the United States
and  to  officers,  agents,  and employees thereof, per 44 U.S.C.
1505(a), cited above.

   The only  charge which  might be of some concern would be mail
fraud,  because  Congress  is obligated under Article I, 8 of the
U.S. Constitution  with providing  mail services  for the several
States.   However, manipulation  of the Postal Service was one of
the first  congressional initiatives  which,  for  all  practical
purposes, has moved the whole of United States federal government
under Congress'  Article IV  legislative jurisdiction  within the
federal zone  (the geographical  "United States").  This was done
via Act  of Congress by the Thirty-Seventh Congress, Session III,
Chapter 71  (1863).   Sections 22  & 23  of this  Act distinguish
between "domestic"  mail within  the federal zone and "drop" mail
elsewhere.

   Today, the  United States  Postal  Service,  a  United  States
federal government  corporation, handles  "domestic" mail  in the
federal zone  (the District  of Columbia, Puerto Rico, etc.), and
"non-domestic"  mail   delivered  in   the  several   States  and
elsewhere.    Regulatory   application   of  18   U.S.C. sec. 341
demonstrates  the   paradox  for   the  United   States   federal
government:   even though  Congress is charged under Article I of
the U.S.  Constitution with  responsibility for  maintaining mail
service within  the several  States, alleged Article IV authority
to govern  the federal  zone  in  any  fashion  not  specifically
prohibited  by   the  U.S.  Constitution  confers  absolutely  no
authority in,  and with  respect to, the several States which are
parties to  the U.S. Constitution.  Therefore, where Congress has
elected to  incorporate the  United States  Postal Service  under
Article IV  authority, statutes  prescribing penalties  for  mail
fraud, etc.,  are not  applicable  to,  or  enforceable  in,  the
several States.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 34 of 40


                 Part V:  Summary and Conclusion

   Through the  1930's, evolution  of the corporate United States
federal  government,   under   Congress'   alleged   Article   IV
legislative  jurisdiction   in  the   federal  zone   (i.e.   the
geographical, self-interested  United States), was referred to as
"corporatism".   Presently, the  U.S. Supreme  Court and  various
other courts  use the  term "cooperative  federalism" to refer to
the de  facto  arrangement  between  the  United  States  federal
government and  the governments of the several States (the latter
operating under  the presumption  that they are federal "States",
rather than  independent  republics  subject  only  to  Congress'
Article I  delegated authority).   This  diabolical scheme,  from
control of  production and distribution of goods and services, to
the mathematically  impossible social welfare system and criminal
enforcement, is  premised on  the notion  that  all  activity  is
commercial in  nature.   The effect  has been to treat the entire
nation as  a seamless garment which is under Congress' Article IV
exclusive legislative jurisdiction, rather than as a patchwork of
fifty independent  republics which  are subject only to Congress'
Article I delegated constitutional authority.

   Thankfully, in  the last few years, the U.S. Supreme Court has
provided footing which affords the possibility of correction.  In
New York  v. United  States  supra,  the  high  Court  reiterated
principles framed  by the  Tenth Amendment  and the Separation of
Powers Doctrine:   so  far as  the several  States are concerned,
Congress can exercise only those powers specifically delegated by
the U.S.  Constitution, and officers of the several States cannot
accommodate a  United States  (federal government) power which is
not delegated  without first securing a Constitutional amendment.
Unrestricted application of the commerce clause has been taken to
task in Lopez and other such cases which are cited in Lopez.

   Unfortunately, judicially correcting the problem isn't as easy
as it  should be.   Through the years, the U.S. Supreme Court has
occasionally conveyed  a message  by way  of decisions,  or  more
appropriately, non-decisions.   The  maxim has  been  articulated
when the  Court has  been presented  with evidences  such as  the
failed ratifications  of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Amendments:
ratification  of   amendments  is  a  political,  rather  than  a
judicial, matter.

   If we read history properly, the nation's high Court attempted
to hold  the line  prior to  acquiescence in Julliard (1884), and
again resisted socialistic New Deal legislation until yielding in
Erie Railroad  (1938).   The choice in both cases appears to have
been  pragmatic,   yielding  constitutional   principles  to  the
political tide,  further enhancing  the probability and prospects
of a hidden oligarchy in America.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 35 of 40


   In  light   of  the  current  pervasive  circumstance,  it  is
necessary to  revisit  first  causes  in  order  to  address  the
situation.   As set  forth in Part I of this Memorandum, American
Founders proclaimed  that the  "laws of  Nature and Nature's God"
govern nations and Men, and that all Men are endowed with certain
unalienable  Rights   by  their  Creator.    This  foundation  is
acknowledged in the preambles to state and federal constitutions:
the sovereign  American People,  by way  of their  constitutions,
have granted  only certain,  specifically  enumerated  powers  to
their state and federal governments.

   In New  York v.  United States  supra, the  U.S. Supreme Court
addressed the  matter of  authority.  In the American system, the
question isn't  what power  governments  should  have,  but  what
powers have  actually been  delegated.   The high  Court  further
concluded that  public servants  who usurp  powers which  are not
delegated invariably  do so  for self-serving ends.  The problem,
of course, is accountability.

   As the development history presented in the Becraft memorandum
demonstrates, the  several States  preceded the  "United States".
The original  thirteen colonies secured independence from English
rule, and  each thereby established sovereignty as an independent
nation.   The confederation  which they  maintained following the
Revolution was,  at best,  weak, having precious little authority
over the  several new  States.   This arrangement  threatened the
harmony, and  even the  survival, of  that Confederation.   These
difficulties spawned  the Constitutional Convention in 1787, with
the first  States convening  under the U.S. Constitution and with
the  U.S.   Constitution  vesting   the  United  States  (federal
government) with  only the  authority necessary  to carry out its
expressly delegated  responsibilities.   However, the  People and
the several  States did  not surrender  any more  power than  was
delegated;   they retained  that which  they  did  not  delegate,
including sovereignty  over the territories within the respective
States of the Union.

   Thomas Jefferson,  responding to  the Alien and Sedition Acts,
addressed this  very problem,  and the  proper order of things in
the American system of government, in the Kentucky Resolutions:


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 36 of 40


      8th. Resolved,  That  a  committee  of  conference  and
    correspondence be  appointed, who shall have in charge to
    communicate the preceding resolutions to the Legislatures
    of  the  several  States;    to  assure  them  that  this
    commonwealth  continues  in  the  same  esteem  of  their
    friendship and  union which  it has  manifested from  the
    moment at  which a common danger first suggested a common
    union;   that it  considers union, for specified national
    purposes, and  particularly to  those specified  in their
    late federal  compact,  to  be  friendly  to  the  peace,
    happiness  and  prosperity  of  all  the  States:    that
    faithful to  that compact,  according to the plain intent
    and meaning  in which it was understood and acceded to by
    the several  parties, it  is sincerely  anxious  for  its
    preservation:   that it  does also  believe, that to take
    from the  States all  the powers  of self-government  and
    transfer them  to a  general and consolidated government,
    without   regard   to   the   special   delegations   and
    reservations solemnly  agreed to  in that compact, is not
    for the  peace, happiness and prosperity of these States;
    and that therefore this commonwealth is determined, as it
    doubts not  its co-States  are, to submit to undelegated,
    and consequently  unlimited powers  in no man, or body of
    men on earth:  that in cases of an abuse of the delegated
    powers, the  members of  the  general  government,  being
    chosen by the people, a change by the people would be the
    constitutional remedy;   but,  where powers  are  assumed
    which have not been delegated, a nullification of the act
    is the  rightful remedy:   that every State has a natural
    right in  cases not  within the  compact -- to nullify of
    their own  authority all  assumptions of  power by others
    within their limits:  that without this right, they would
    be under  the  domination,  absolute  and  unlimited,  of
    whosoever might exercise this right of judgment for them:
    that nevertheless,  this commonwealth,  from  motives  of
    regard and  respect for  its  co-States,  has  wished  to
    communicate with  them on  the subject:   that  with them
    alone it  is proper  to  communicate,  they  alone  being
    parties to the compact, and solely authorized to judge in
    the  last  resort  of  the  powers  exercised  under  it,
    Congress being  not a  party, but  merely the creature of
    the compact,  and subject  as to its assumptions of power
    to the final judgment of those by whom, and for whose use
    itself and  its powers  were all  created  and  modified:
    That if  the acts  before specified  should stand,  these
    conclusions would  flow from  them;    that  the  general
    government may  place any  act they  thing proper  on the
    list  of   crimes,  and   punish  it  themselves  whether
    enumerated or  not  enumerated  by  the  constitution  as
    cognizable  by   them:     that  they  may  transfer  its
    cognizance to the President, or any other person, who may
    himself be  the accuser,  counsel, judge  and jury, whose
    suspicions may  be the  evidence, his order the sentence,
    his officer  the executioner,  and his  breast  the  sole
    record of  the transaction:   that  a very  numerous  and
    valuable description  of the  inhabitants of these States
    being, by  this precedent,  reduced, as  outlaws, to  the
    absolute dominion  of one  man, and  the barrier  of  the
    Constitution thus  swept away from us all, no rampart now
    remains against the passions and the powers of a majority
    in Congress  to protect from a like exportation, or other
    more grievous  punishment, the minority of the same body,
    the legislatures,  judges, governors  and counsellors  of
    the States,  nor their  other peaceable  inhabitants, who
    may venture  to reclaim  the  constitutional  rights  and
    liberties of  the States and the people, or who for other
    causes, good  or bad,  may be  obnoxious to the views, or
    marked by  the suspicions of the President, or be thought
    dangerous to  his or  their election, or other interests,
    public or personal ....


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 37 of 40


   Jefferson's argument  is as  valid in  1996 as it was in 1798:
Congress and  the other  branches of  federal government  are not
parties to  the U.S. Constitution;  they are products of it.  The
U.S.  Constitution   vests  Congress   with   certain   delegated
authorities under  Article I,  and nothing  more.  Within its own
borders, State  authority is  antecedent to  that of  the  United
States and,  as parties  to the  U.S. Constitution,  the  several
States have  both the  right and  responsibility to correct their
agent, the  United States  (federal  government),  when  ambition
seeks to  abuse or  expand the  powers which have been delegated.
Of  more   immediate  importance  where  the  instant  matter  is
concerned, those  who  exceed  the  law,  whether  in  the  State
governments or  in the  United States  (federal government),  are
accountable to the Law of the Land, and ultimately, to the People
of the Land, within the several States.  Operation under color of
law is  outlaw and  criminal, and  accountability must be in Law.
Judges, magistrates, attorneys for the Department of Justice, and
other enforcement  people do  not have  immunity when they exceed
the law as it is written.

   This  memorandum  conclusively  demonstrates  jurisdiction  of
United  States   District  Courts   within  the  several  States.
Implicitly, authority  of the  Department of  Justice, and of the
United States  (federal government) enforcement agencies attached
to that  Department, is  concurrent with  that of  United  States
District Courts, because the lawful authority of any given agency
extends only  so far  as  the  legislative  jurisdiction  of  the
government it serves.  All legislation is territorial in nature.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 38 of 40


                          VERIFICATION

   Under penalties  of perjury, per 28 U.S.C. 1746(1), I hereby
attest that,  to the  best of  My current information, knowledge,
understanding, and belief, all matters of law and fact as set out
above  are   true  and  correct,  materially  complete,  and  not
misleading, so help Me God.


Executed on August 13, 1996


/s/ Sheila Wallen
________________________________
Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris
Citizen of Arizona state


/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
_________________________________
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness,
Counselor at Law, Counsel of Record


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 39 of 40


                        PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Sheila  Terese,  Wallen,  Sui  Juris,  hereby  certify,  under

penalty of  perjury, under  the laws  of  the  United  States  of

America, without the "United States," that I am at least 18 years

of age,  a Citizen  of one  of the  United States of America, and

that I personally served the following document(s):

                        MEMORANDUM OF LAW
                   IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE TO
               CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
                      [i.e. There is none.]
           Rules 301, 302:  Federal Rules of Evidence
          Rule 54:  Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first

class United  States Mail,  with  postage  prepaid  and  properly

addressed to the following:


Office of the United States Attorney
110 South Church Avenue, Suite 8310
Tucson [85701]
ARIZONA STATE

Attorney General
Department of Justice
10th and Constitution, N.W.
Washington
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Solicitor General
Department of Justice
10th and Constitution, N.W.
Washington
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA


Executed on:  _____________________________

/s/ Sheila Wallen
__________________________________________
Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris
Citizen of Arizona state

All Rights Reserved without Prejudice


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 40 of 40


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U.S.A. v. Wallen