UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic] Appeal No. 07-2017
John S. Williamson, APPELLANTS’ INFORMAL
Nancy L. Williamson, OPENING BRIEF
John G. Williamson,
David A. Williamson,
Garrett J. Williamson, and
NOTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS
If you proceed on appeal In Propria Persona, the court will accept a properly completed Form A-12 in lieu of a formal brief.
This form is intended to guide you in presenting your appellate issues and arguments to the court.
If you need more space, additional pages may be attached.
A short statement of each issue presented for review should precede your argument.
Citations to legal authority may also be included.
This brief should fully set forth all of the arguments that you wish the court to consider in connection with this case.
New issues raised for the first time on appeal generally will not be considered.
An appeal is not a retrial but rather a review of the proceedings in the district court.
A copy of the completed form must be served on all opposing counsel and on all unrepresented parties and a proper certificate of service furnished to this court.
A form certificate is attached.
APPELLANTS’ INFORMAL OPENING BRIEF
1. Statement of the Case.
(This should be a brief summary of the proceedings in the district court(s).)
(a) Case was brought by an Assistant U.S. Attorney under signature of U.S. Attorney David C. Iglesias for Plaintiff UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic]. However, David C. Iglesias lacked proper credentials to occupy that office, such as the required SENATE CONFIRMATION and full compliance with the McDade Act, and at this time he is out of office. See 28 U.S.C. 530B.
(b) Attorneys for the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) lacked powers of attorney legally to represent the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic]. Both Delaware corporations chartered by that name have now been revoked by the Delaware Secretary of State.
(c) Appellee alleged authority under Title 26, U.S. Code, sections 7402 and 7403. Both sections expressly confer original jurisdiction upon the District Courts of the United States (“DCUS”) NOT upon the United States District Courts (“USDC”). Therefore, the USDC below lacked original jurisdiction even to hear this action, in the first instance. See also the exception at IRC 7402(e) discussed infra.
(d) Appellants timely and properly challenged jurisdiction from the beginning and continuously thereafter, they never waived jurisdiction at any time.
(e) DOJ’s Attorney, Waymon G. DuBose, Jr., changed the alleged Plaintiff’s name three (3) times within the first 3 pages of the COMPLAINT. Doc #1, pgs. 1, 2, 3.
(f) The USDC refused to recognize Appellants’ timely and proper jury demands, thereby violating their fundamental Rights, under the Seventh Amendment and also under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”): the right of trial by jury shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.
(g) The UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic] lacked capacity and legal standing to sue or to be sued as such. Congress has never conferred legal standing upon any such entity. Compare the federal statutes at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1345 and 1346, which expressly confer standing upon the “United States” and not upon the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, or upon any grammatical or typographical permutation of the latter. The 50 States of the Union are quite adequately represented legally by their respective State Attorneys General. Compare also 28 U.S.C. 547.
(h) In Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), the U.S. Supreme Court told Congress that it may not re-define any terms used in the Constitution for the United States of America. The term “United States of America” occurs in several places e.g. in the Preamble and: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America” at Article II, Section 1, Clause 1. That office is arguably THE most important federal office anywhere in America.
2. Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review.
(a) Lack of jurisdiction under Title 26, U.S. Code, sections 7402 and 7403, for the United States District Court (“USDC”) to hear the action in the first instance. See IRC §§ 7402 and 7403, in chief, because the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) and Title 26 of the U.S. Code are not one and the same: all sections of the IRC have been enacted into positive law by Act of Congress; Title 26 has not been enacted into positive law, however. See 1 U.S.C. 101 in this context.
(b) Appellants timely demanded a jury trial, but Judge Black ignored their jury demands. See Docs #2, 11, 32.
(c) The USDC is a “territorial” tribunal that lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. The USDC only has jurisdiction under IRC 7402(e) to quiet title to private property, provided that a valid lien against that property has been perfected in favor of the “United States”. The “United States” did not commence the instant action, however. See 28 U.S.C. 1345 (“United States as plaintiff”).
(d) Appellants are New Mexico State Citizens NOT federal citizens and NOT resident aliens. Subtitle A of the IRC is “municipal” law nominally applicable to federal citizens and resident aliens and, as such it is only applicable to Appellants insofar as the IRC defines all State Citizens as nonresident aliens with respect to the municipal jurisdiction of the United States (federal government). See Treasury Decision (“T.D.”) 2313: plaintiff Frank R. Brushaber was a Citizen of New York State, and the Union Pacific Railroad Company was the domestic corporation -- chartered by Act of Congress -- in the case on which that T.D. was based: Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
(e) Appellee also alleges that Appellants owe some “kind of tax 1040” but neglects and refuses to exhibit any statute or regulation making New Mexico State Citizens specifically “liable” for a tax upon earnings from occupations of common right. In this context, see 42 U.S.C. 1986 (neglect to prevent or refusal to prevent).
(f) Appellee either neglected or refused to enter into evidence a valid NOTICE OF ASSESSMENT AND DEMAND FOR PAYMENT as a condition precedent to filing a Notice of Federal Tax Lien against Appellants. The Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”) is very clear where it repeatedly requires a valid ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATE before any tax collections may commence. As of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (“RRA98”), the IRM now has legal force and effect: IRS officers and employees can now be disciplined or terminated for violating any provision of that IRM.
(g) Appellee neglected or refused to place into evidence any valid ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATES. IRS Forms 4340 offered by Appellee are computer printouts allegedly “certified” by an “administrative technician” who was not a competent witness to any prior ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATES. Said Forms 4340 do not comply with the statutes and regulations requiring proper ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATES: for example, they are not “certified” under penalties of perjury as required by IRC 6065. Therefore, all of Appellee’s alleged “liens” are now fraudulent for lacking conditions precedent. See also 28 U.S.C. 1746 and Appellee’s Exhibits attached to COMPLAINT, Doc. # 1.
3. Statement of Issues:
A. First Issue: Lack of jurisdiction. The remaining parts of IRC §§ 7402 and 7403 expressly confer original jurisdiction upon the District Court of the United States (“DCUS”), NOT upon the United States District Court (“USDC”).
Argument and Authorities:
(1) Statutes conferring original jurisdiction upon all federal district courts must be strictly construed. See 36 C.J.S. 55: Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442 (1942); City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat. Bank of the City of New York, 314 U.S. 63 (1941); and 36 C.J.S. 4‑5: Carroll et al. v. U.S., 354 U.S. 394 (1957).
(2) There are differences between the USDC and the DCUS. The USDC is a territorial tribunal and does NOT have personal jurisdiction over New Mexico State Citizens. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922), a standing U.S. Supreme Court decision. See also another important and controlling decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Mookini v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201 (1938) (“the term District Courts of the United States in its historic and proper sense”).
(3) In pari materia and strictly construed, as it should be, the federal statute at 18 U.S.C. 3231 expressly confers original jurisdiction over federal offenses upon the DCUS, which are Article III constitutional courts. A constitutional court is a legal prerequisite whenever the United States appears as a Proper Party Plaintiff invoking the judicial Power of the United States. See also the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, in this context: “No persons shall … be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
(4) United States District Courts (“USDC”) are decidedly territorial tribunals typically proceeding in legislative mode. See also American Insurance v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511, 7 L.Ed. 242 (1828) -- the seminal opinion on this all important distinction, written by then Chief Justice John Marshall -- arguably one of the most brilliant jurists ever to sit upon the Supreme Court.
(5) DOJ have now instituted the unconstitutional practice of prosecuting civil and criminal cases on behalf of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, evidently in order to avoid the implications of the Arising Under Clause, which mandates an Article III constitutional court whenever the “United States” is the Party Plaintiff i.e. “Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party”. See Williams v. U.S., 289 U.S. 553 (1933), in which the high Court erred by defining “Party” in that Clause to mean Plaintiff but not Defendant! In Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856), the term “Party” embraces both Plaintiffs and Defendants. The federal statutes at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1345 and 1346 confer legal standing upon the “United States” to sue and be sued, respectively, not upon the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic]. The only statute in all of Title 28 where the term “United States of America” occurs is 28 U.S.C. 1746, and there it occurs in correct contradistinction to the “United States”.
B. Second Issue: Appellants are NOT “taxpayers” as alleged by Appellee. Appellants challenged Appellee to place into evidence in the USDC all proof supporting that allegation. Appellee neglected and refused to exhibit evidence that Appellants are actually (and honestly) “taxpayers” as that term is defined at IRC 7701(a)(14). The lower court neglected and/or refused to order DOJ’s attorneys to exhibit proof of that unproven and unsubstantiated allegation, which assumes facts not in evidence in the official record now before this honorable Circuit Court.
Argument and Authorities:
(1) Appellee’s INITIAL COMPLAINT also “presumes” that the Appellants are either “federal citizens” or “resident aliens”, or that Appellants hold a federal office of some kind, neither of which is the TRUTH of the matter.
(2) The USDC neglected or refused to recognize these controlling class distinctions. See, in particular, the regulation at 26 CFR 1.1-1(b), which attempted to create a specific liability for all federal citizens and all resident aliens, but without a corresponding federal statute that created a specific liability for taxes imposed by IRC subtitle A. Neither class is mentioned anywhere at IRC § 1.
(3) The Declaratory Judgments Act at 28 U.S.C. 2201 bars all federal courts from declaring any Proper Party to be a “taxpayer”, or a “non-taxpayer”, specifically because that statute bars all federal courts from issuing declaratory judgments whenever the subject matter is federal taxes: “... except with respect to Federal taxes other than actions brought under section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.” Note the absence of any reference to “26 U.S.C.” in the latter Act.
(4) The federal statute at IRC section 7428 concerns artificial, juristic entities that are exempt from tax under IRC section 501(c)(3) etc. Under no circumstances do any New Mexico State Citizens qualify as such tax exempt “organizations”.
(5) In this context, Appellants are not embraced by the term “U.S. Individual” either. See the title of IRS Form 1040. By applying a process of elimination, it is easy to demonstrate that “U.S. Individuals” are the living, breathing variant of “United States persons”: simply combine the two definitions at IRC §§ 7701(a)(1) and 7701(a)(30). Properly construed, therefore, IRS Form 1040 is a return of taxes on the taxable income of all U.S. Individuals, not a return of taxes on the income of all individuals! The mystery of “kind of tax 1040” is now solved. Furthermore, after learning this, State Citizens who are not also federal citizens cannot sign IRS Form 1040 “under penalties of perjury” without committing the crime of perjury! See IRC 6065. Perjury is a felony federal offense: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621 thru 1623.
(6) As Citizens of New Mexico State, none of the Appellants is a partnership, corporation or trust either. If anything, their collective property rights necessarily qualify as “foreign estates” as that term is defined at IRC 7701(a)(31)(A) (the income of all foreign estates is not includible in “gross income” under IRC subtitle A, if that income derives from sources without (outside) the federal zone, and if that income is not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within (inside) the federal zone!) Cf. “The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue” authored by the Private Attorney General served infra.
C. Third Issue: No federal statute or duly promulgated regulation(s) exist, or have been placed into evidence in the USDC, authorizing any “kind of tax 1040” and making State Citizens specifically “liable” for any taxes upon their earnings from occupations of common right.
Argument and Authorities:
(1) In Appellants’ first interrogatories to Appellee, Appellants asked Appellee to cite the statute (item 1) and to cite the regulation (item 2) imposing "kind of tax 1040" upon New Mexico State Citizens engaged in occupations of common Right. DOJ’s Attorney, Waymon G. DuBose, Jr., responded by stating: "Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory to the extent that it is overbroad, vague, ambiguous, unintelligible, and unduly burdensome." See Appellants’ Exhibit AA, AB attached to Doc # 91 and others.
(2) The U.S. Supreme Court held in California Bankers Assn. v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), that without a regulation, the statute in question could not be violated. Numerous federal district courts have ruled that, for purposes of federal income taxation in particular, the regulations govern in the final analysis. See 26 CFR.
(3) "[A]n administrative agency may not create a criminal offense or any liability not sanctioned by the lawmaking authority, especially a liability for a tax or inspection fee." Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 4 L.Ed.2d 127, 80 S.Ct. 144 (1959). That decision is monumentally important here.
(4) The latter decision by the U.S. Supreme Court is also particularly controlling in the instant case, specifically because there is no known Statute at Large that created a specific liability for any taxes imposed by IRC subtitle A.
(5) EVEN IF it were a de jure service or bureau within the U.S. Department of the Treasury -- which it decidedly is NOT -- the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) would still not have any authority to create a specific tax liability by means of regulations published in the Federal Register. To do so without a corresponding federal statute necessarily implicates all IRS officers and employees in multiple violations of the federal criminal statutes at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3 and 912. Title 18 of the U.S. Code has been enacted into positive law by Act of Congress.
(6) Furthermore, the federal statute at 31 U.S.C. 333 expressly prohibits impersonation of the “Department of the Treasury”. Federal regulations and published decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit have disclosed the existence of a second “Department of the Treasury” domiciled in San Juan, Puerto Rico. See Used Tire International, Inc. v. Manual Díaz-Saldaña, First Circuit court docket number 97‑2348, September 11, 1998 (the appellant in that appeal was Manuel Díaz-Saldaña as Secretary of the Treasury [sic]); and also 27 CFR 26.11 defining “Revenue Agent”, “Secretary” and “Secretary or his delegate” as offices in Puerto Rico. Here too, compare 5 U.S.C. 551(1)(C) (governments of the federal Territories are not “agencies” for purposes of the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act). The term “individual” in the Privacy Act is defined to embrace only federal citizens and resident aliens! As such, the federal Privacy Act is also federal municipal law, just like subtitle A.
D. Fourth Issue: Appellee has not met all conditions precedent to placing any tax “liens” upon the Appellants’ real or personal property. Without all required conditions precedent having been satisfied, the INITIAL COMPLAINT was a blatant abuse of legal process for purposes of extortion under color of federal laws, retaliation against federal witnesses who have already prevailed against the IRS in prior litigation and, consequently, economic terrorism by officers and employees of the IRS and also by officers, employees and agents of the DOJ who brought the instant case in bad faith and with fraudulent motives. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512, 1513 and 1951, all of which are RICO “predicate acts” itemized at 18 U.S.C. 1961.
Argument and Authorities:
(1) Because conditions precedent have not been met and validly fulfilled, officers, employees and agents of the DOJ are in violation of IRC 7214(A) (1) thru (9) -- but only if the latter subsections have ever legally taken effect.
(2) Because IRS officers and employees are not “officers or employees of the United States” as the latter term occurs at IRC 7214, the former are not embraced by that section; DOJ’s officers and employees are necessarily embraced by that section, however. In this context, see 28 CFR 0.70(b), which expressly deprives DOJ of any right legally to represent IRS personnel in cases concerning the misconduct of IRS personnel (“except … proceedings pertaining to misconduct of Internal Revenue Service personnel”). The term “personnel” in that federal regulation embraces both officers and employees of the IRS.
(3) Government and all of its agents are presumed to have knowledge of the Law and, in this case, its alleged agents have purposefully conspired to extort money and real property from Appellants under color of Law, and also under color of unconstitutional statutes and regulations including but not limited to IRC subtitles A and F, and the Act of June 25, 1948, aka 28 U.S.C. as subsequently amended.
(4) Specifically, to be valid in the first instance, all ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATES must be dated and signed under penalties of perjury by a duly authorized Assessment Officer, pursuant to IRC 6065, 26 CFR 301.6203-1, Brafman v. U.S., 384 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1967), pertinent provisions of the Internal Revenue Manual and the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998. Anybody can sit down at a computer terminal, print hard copies of electronic records stored on that computer, and then “certify” that s/he did so. However, such conduct hardly satisfies the strict requirements imposed by the latter authorities, particularly as regards the legal meanings of “date of assessment”, “method of assessment”, “certificate”, “supporting records” and “summary record”. See Brafman supra.
(5) The alleged Notices of Federal Tax Lien (“NFTL”) are particularly egregious in light of the above authorities: each such NFTL uses the terms “assessed” and “assessment” four (4) different times. However, neither the IRS nor the DOJ has produced any valid ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATES that satisfy all of the above requirements and correspond to the dates and amounts showing on the NFTLs placed into evidence in the USDC below. If a tax return is not valid without the taxpayer’s signature under penalties of perjury, then an “assessment” is not valid either without an Assessment Officer’s signature under penalties of perjury.
E. Fifth Issue: The IRS is NOT a de jure service, bureau, office or other subdivision of the United States Department of the Treasury. See specific language used at 31 U.S.C. 333.
(1) Title 31 U.S.C. in toto is incorporated herein by reference, as if set forth fully here. The IRS is not mentioned in any of the organic statutes i.e. which “organized” the U.S. Department of the Treasury. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 301-313.
(2) The only mention of the IRS anywhere in 31 U.S.C. §§ 301‑313 supra is an authorization for the President to appoint an Assistant General Counsel in the U.S. Department of the Treasury to be the Chief Counsel for the IRS. See 31 U.S.C. 301(f)(2). As far as powers of attorney are concerned, the chain of command begins with Congress, flows to the President of the United States of America, and then to the IRS Chief Counsel, and NOT to the U.S. Department of Justice.
(3) In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979), at footnote 23 the U.S. Supreme Court quietly admitted that no organic Act could be found for the IRS, after they searched for such an Act all the way back to the Civil War.
(4) All federal courts are legally obligated to take mandatory judicial notice of all Acts of Congress. Title 31 of the U.S. Code has been enacted into positive law by Act of Congress. See 1 U.S.C. 101 in this context (defines “Act of Congress”).
(5) All inferior federal courts, such as this U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, are likewise bound by all standing decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.
F. Sixth Issue: All federal statutes that fall within subtitle F of the IRC have never really taken effect, notably sections 7401, 7402 and 7403, as cited in the first paragraph on page 1 of the INITIAL COMPLAINT.
(2) All sections allegedly authorizing “collections” and enforcement of taxes imposed by Title 26 of the U.S. Code fall within subtitle F. For example, the authority to promulgate implementing regulations also falls within subtitle F! If subtitle F never took effect, then all of the implementing regulations necessarily fail too. See 26 CFR 1.1-1(b): that regulation purportedly implements IRC § 1.
(3) Because IRC 7851 also falls within subtitle F, this recursive “self-reference” necessarily renders that section also null and void for vagueness. When did section 7851 go into effect, if “this title” means Title 26 of the U.S. Code? Answer: it never did! The necessary, if not obvious implication here is that all of IRC subtitle F must be unconstitutional because the statute defining when subtitle F “shall take effect” is likewise void for vagueness and therefore unconstitutional. “Shall” is always mandatory in federal laws. When shall subtitle F take effect? Answer: it shall take effect when it takes effect, but not before then! Confer at reductio ad absurdum in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition.
(4) Federal judges generally apply the wrong test for vagueness whenever they have been presented with the obvious problems created by IRC 7851(a)(6)(A), because they are men and women of UNcommon intelligence (or should be, anyway).
(5) The correct test for vagueness, as given to us by the U.S. Supreme Court, is that men and women of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the meaning and differ as to the application of a vague federal statute. See Connally et al. v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). As such, vague statutes violate the first essential of due process of law. Connally supra.
(6) Whenever any federal statute is void for vagueness, it is unconstitutional as such; and, its unconstitutionality dates from the moment of enactment, not from the decision so branding the statute in question. See 16 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 177 (unconstitutionality dates from the time of its enactment, and not merely from the date of the decision so branding it).
G. Seventh Issue: Appellants are neither tax protesters nor illegal tax protesters (“ITP”). The RRA98 expressly prohibits IRS officers and employees from designating taxpayers as “illegal tax protesters” or any similar designation. This prohibition is not codified anywhere in Title 26 of the U.S. Code, however. See “Notes” under 26 U.S.C. 6651, to wit:
Pub. L. 105–206, title III, § 3707, July 22, 1998, 112 Stat. 778, provided that:
“(a) Prohibition. — The officers and employees of the Internal Revenue Service —
“(1) shall not designate taxpayers as illegal tax protesters (or any similar designation); and
“(2) in the case of any such designation made on or before the date of the enactment of this Act [July 22, 1998] —
“(A) shall remove such designation from the individual master file; and
“(B) shall disregard any such designation not located in the individual master file.
“(b) Designation of Nonfilers Allowed. — An officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service may designate any appropriate taxpayer as a nonfiler, but shall remove such designation once the taxpayer has filed income tax returns for 2 consecutive taxable years and paid all taxes shown on such returns.
“(c) Effective Date. — The provisions of this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act [July 22, 1998], except that the removal of any designation under subsection (a)(2)(A) shall not be required to begin before January 1, 1999.”
(1) Because this Tenth Circuit already has independently “labeled” all Appellants as “tax protesters”, clearly violating the spirit if not the letter of RRA98’s prohibition above, Appellants are thus informed and now believe that the federal judiciary were given advance “notice” -- from the lower district court and from elsewhere -- that the instant appeal is to be “trashed” in the same manner as all of Appellants’ other pleadings were obviously “trashed” in that lower court.
(2) Despite having all four (4) required credentials, two of which exhibit his signature on a solemn Oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, U.S. District Judge Bruce D. Black exhibited extreme bias against all Appellants in the lower USDC by summarily “denying” each and every one of Appellants’ motions, in spite of their obvious merits, and in spite of the validity of the arguments made in those motions.
(3) Strictly speaking, the term “illegal” cannot modify the noun “protesters” because to do so would constitute a violation of the First Amendment in the Bill of Rights, one of the most magnificent constitutional provisions ever written.
(4) Accordingly, for the term “illegal tax protester” to survive this obvious constitutional challenge, the adjective “illegal” must modify the noun “tax”. An illegal tax protester is, therefore, someone who is protesting an illegal tax. Such an act of protest is protected by the First Amendment; it cannot be a crime; and, it cannot warrant fines, penalties, forfeitures, prejudice or discrimination of any kind, particularly when due process of law is mandatory upon all federal courts.
(5) Protest is also expressly recognized as such by the Uniform Commercial Code: the phrases “under protest” and “without prejudice” are sufficient to reserve all of one’s fundamental Rights at law. See U.C.C. 1-308 (formerly at U.C.C. 1-207). By the way, the federal U.C.C. is also federal municipal law. See 77 Stat. 630, P.L. 88‑243, December 30, 1963 (one month after President John F. Kennedy was murdered in Dallas, Texas). The language “all rights reserved” is sufficient and widely utilized now in film credits and book title pages.
(6) The IRS appears to be circumventing the above ITP prohibition in several ways. One of these is to continue publishing at the IRS Internet website copies and citations to court decisions which have designated litigants in civil and criminal cases as “tax protesters” and as “illegal tax protesters”, despite the clear exception intended by Congress in the Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201.
(7) Arguably one of the most notorious examples of these obviously defamatory designations is found in U.S. v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619 (1990). In that opinion, this Circuit Court excoriated noted author and attorney Jeffrey A. Dickstein for what it termed his "past reputation for hijacking judicial proceedings onto his tax protester bandwagon." [emphases added] This statement is doubly ironic, because federal cases are commenced by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA in the USDC evidently to bypass the judicial Power of the United States and to substitute instead a legislative tribunal convened ultra vires and coram non judice.
(8) Jeffrey A. Dickstein, of course, is the author of an excellent book on federal income taxation entitled "Judicial Tyranny and Your Income Tax." Such a book is entirely within Dickstein’s fundamental Rights to write, to publish, and to enter into evidence on behalf of his litigation clients. Dickstein’s book is listed in the Bibliography of “The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue” authored by the Private Attorney General served infra. We all know something is terribly wrong with courts whenever they go out of their way to criticize severely any published author who chooses to exercise and enjoy his freedom of speech.
(1) Appellants properly and timely petitioned this Tenth Circuit Court for an ORDER staying execution of the appealed “orders” attaching Appellants’ property.
(2) Because this Tenth Circuit Court saw fit not to grant the Appellants’ motion for stay, on March 14, 2007, Internal Revenue Agents, supported by U.S. Marshals and Bernalillo County Sheriff's deputies, raided the property, effectively destroying the Williamson Appellants’ livelihood and effectively destroying a thirty-one (31) year old business. See also Midwest Haulers v. Brady, 128 F.2d 496 (6th Cir. 1942); and Long v.United States, 148 F.Supp. 758 (1957).
(3) Appellant John G. Williamson, David A. Williamson, John S. and Nancy L. Williamson and their two dogs and one cat were dispossessed from their homes.
(4) John G. Williamson was assaulted with deadly weapons, handcuffed and made to sit on the ground in the cold without his coat, causing him severe traumatic stress. And severe traumatic stress from having a deadly weapon pointed at him.
(5) This raid on the property has also caused severe traumatic stress upon the remainder of the Williamson Appellants and their pet animals.
(6) Because this Tenth Circuit Court saw fit not to grant the Appellants’ motion for stay, the damages caused by said raid on their property have escalated far beyond any discomfort to the government that would have been caused by granting the stay. Now it is incumbent upon this Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, a constitutional Article III Court, to make right a grievous wrong. Now the damages specified in the Appellants’ COUNTER CLAIM, filed in the lower DCUS, have been increased hundreds fold. Irreparable damage has been done to the good names, reputations, health and livelihood of the Williamson Appellants.
(7) This raid on the property has locked the Williamson Appellants away from tools, equipment and materials needed to complete projects already contracted, causing many Citizens who depend upon the Williamson Appellants a great amount of grief and suffering, by having to find some another water well contractor to serve their water system needs. Federal court personnel are obviously unaware of the rural Citizens’ dependence upon their water wells as their only supply of water.
(8) The Bernalillo County Sheriff's deputies failed in their sworn duty to protect the Rights and property of the Citizens of that County. This has caused the law enforcement personnel of that County to lose the respect of the Citizens of the County. Many other Citizens are aware of what happened on March 14th 2007 at the Williamson Appellants’ property. Bernalillo County Sheriff Darien White was previously informed, in writing, of the bogus nature of the “orders” under appeal, yet he did nothing to prevent this tragedy.
(9) U.S. Marshal Kent Halverson stated to Appellant John G. Williamson that "28 U.S.C. section 1691 had been revised and orders of the court no longer required the seal of the court and the signature of the Clerk of the Court", which was a bald-faced lie. The Williamson Appellants know better than to be "suckered" in by such falsehoods. This is just one small example of the greater government "disease" (cancer) of lying to the Citizens of this country. See legal determination letter attached as Exhibit 2.
(10) The Williamson Appellants’ property was properly posted with conspicuous NO TRESPASSING signs explaining the bogus nature of the "order" in question.
(11) The U.S. Marshals, deputies and agents did not have proper WARRANT(s) of any kind in their possession. Their only paperwork were copies of the appealed “order of sale”, which has already been shown to be bogus.
(13) The AFFIDAVIT of Appellant John G. Williamson is attached as Exhibit 1.
If so, what law do you want applied?
(b) 28 U.S.C. 1691: To be valid, all court orders must bear the seal of the court and the signature of the clerk of court.
(d) Pub. L. 105–206, title III, § 3707, July 22, 1998, 112 Stat. 778: Appellants are NOT "tax protestors” or “illegal tax protestors"; they are protesting an illegal exaction being enforced -- now at gunpoint -- under the guise of a lawful tax.
5. Did the district court incorrectly decide the facts?
If so, what facts?
(a) That valid ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATE(s) are not in evidence before any Federal District Courts.
(b) That valid NOTICE OF ASSESSMENT AND DEMAND FOR PAYMENT(s) are not in evidence before any Federal District Courts.
6. Did the district court fail to consider important grounds for relief?
If so, what grounds?
(a) Appellee failed to support its allegation that "kind of tax 1040" is a tax owed by any Appellants.
(b) Appellee failed to support its allegation that Appellants were/are "taxpayers".
(c) Appellee failed to prove that all conditions precedent had been met prior to commencing any tax “collections” and prior to commencing this action.
7. Do you feel that there are any other reasons why the district court’s judgment was wrong?
If so, what?
(b) Judge Bruce D. Black refused to recognize that statutes conferring original jurisdiction upon all Federal District Courts must be strictly construed.
(c) Judge Bruce D. Black was prejudiced against Defendants by a presumption that they were/are "tax protestors” or “illegal tax protestors," and he refused to consider Defendants’ proper and timely rebuttal of that presumption.
8. What action do you want this court to take in your case?
(a) Certify to the Chief Justice the need to assign a properly credentialed Article III federal judge to fill the now vacant District Court of the United States for the Judicial District of New Mexico -- an Article III constitutional Court; and, remand this action to that constitutional court for trial by jury to decide the Appellants’ COUNTER CLAIM, which properly alleged actual damages inflicted to date upon all Appellants. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 293, 296 and 461(b) (compensation may not, under Section 1 of Article III of the U.S. Constitution, be diminished); IRC §§ 7426 and 7433; and Civil RICO at 18 U.S.C. 1964(a).
(b) In the alternative, Mr. and Mrs. John S. Williamson have now requested the First Judicial District Court of New Mexico State to issue a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (“TRO”) against David C. Iglesias et al. in the case of Williamson et al. v. Iglesias et al., case #D-101-CV-2006-02874. Pursuant to the holdings in Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990), that New Mexico State Court also enjoys original jurisdiction of Civil RICO actions commenced under 18 U.S.C. 1964. If the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court cannot or will not assign a duly appointed Article III judge to the vacant DCUS, for whatever reason, the best available remedy for Appellants is for this Circuit Court to order the instant case transferred to the First Judicial District Court in Santa Fe County, for further proceedings e.g. a jury trial in that court of competent jurisdiction.
9. Do you think the court should hear oral argument in this case?
If so, why?
(a) Oral argument will help to clarify the issues, arguments and authorities in this action.
(b) Oral argument would give the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic] an opportunity to appear and defend its INITIAL COMPLAINT in light of all of the well founded objections which Appellants have raised to date, both here and in the lower courts.
(c) Oral argument would give Ms. Gretchen M. Wolfinger one last opportunity to place into evidence certified proof that each and every one of the Appellants is a “taxpayer” as that term is defined in the Internal Revenue Code, and to demonstrate the statute(s) and regulation(s) -- if any -- expressly authorizing the specific tax(es) identified by the nomenclature “kind of tax 1040” [sic].
Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1746(1), we declare under penalties of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the United States (federal government) that all of the foregoing is true and correct, according to the best of our current knowledge and abilities.
Dated: March 19, 2007
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on March 19, 2007, I sent a copy of:
APPELLANTS’ INFORMAL OPENING BRIEF
Elizabeth Shumaker, Clerk (5x)
United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit
The Byron White U.S. Courthouse
1823 Stout Street
Gretchen M. Wolfinger Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
U.S. Department of Justice Private Attorney General
Appellate Section c/o 501 West Broadway #A-332
P.O. Box 502 San Diego 92101
Washington 20044 CALIFORNIA, USA
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Office of the U.S. Attorney U.S. Department of Justice
P.O. Box 607 Tax Division
Albuquerque 87103 717 North Harwood, Suite 400
NEW MEXICO, USA Dallas 75201
Dr. Harriet Smith Windsor
Secretary of State
State of Delaware
401 Federal Street
which are the last known addresses, by United States mail or courier.
Date: March 19, 2007
Signatures: [on original]
p.s. Although not listed anywhere above, the following Exhibits were also attached:
Exhibit 3: NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR PROOF OF AUTHORITY (March 15, 2007 A.D.)
Exhibit 4: email from Tenth Circuit clerks to Appellant John S. Williamson
Exhibit 5: photocopy of 42 U.S.C. 1986 from Cornell University’s Internet website
Exhibit 6: photocopy of 18 U.S.C. 912 from Cornell University’s Internet website
Exhibit 7: photocopy of 18 U.S.C. 1001 from Cornell University’s Internet website
Exhibit 8: photocopy of 18 U.S.C. 1341 from Cornell University’s Internet website
Exhibit 9: photocopy of 18 U.S.C. 1961 from Cornell University’s Internet website