Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

Private Attorney General

c/o Forwarding Agent

501 West Broadway #A-332

San Diego 92101



In Propria Persona


All Rights Reserved

without Prejudice





United States Court of Appeals


Tenth Circuit



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic],  )  Appeal Docket No. 07-2017

                                 )  Civil No. 04-CV-0885 BB/WDS

          Plaintiff/Appellee,    )

     v.                          )


John S. Williamson et al.,       )


          Defendants/Appellants. )



United States                    )  INTERVENOR’S REPLY TO

ex relatione                     )  BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Paul Andrew Mitchell,            )

                                 )  28 U.S.C. 2403(a);

          Intervenor.            )  18 U.S.C. 1964(a).




Internal Revenue Service,        )


          Respondent.            )



COMES NOW the United States (hereinafter “Intervenor”) ex relatione Paul Andrew Mitchell, Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, Private Attorney General, Criminal Investigator and Federal Witness (hereinafter “Relator”), to reply formally to the pleading signed by Gretchen M. Wolfinger entitled BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEE.



Intervenor begins by demonstrating Ms. Gretchen M. Wolfinger’s many fundamental errors, sentence-by-sentence, as follows:


The government brought this suit to reduce to judgment federal income tax assessments against appellants John S. Williamson and Nancy L. Williamson (collectively, the Williamsons) for various tax years between 1985 and 1998 and to foreclose federal tax liens against real property located at 31 Ben Road and 24 Dinah Road in Edgewood, Bernalillo County, New Mexico (the Ben Road and Dinah Road properties, respectively).


The “government” did not bring this suit.  The U.S. Department of Justice has no powers of attorney legally to represent any one of the 50 States of the Union, nor all of them collectively.  28 U.S.C. 547.  The 50 States of the Union are already quite adequately represented legally by their respective State Attorneys General.  28 U.S.C. 530B.

Moreover, in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), the Supreme Court prohibited Congress from re-defining any terms used in the Constitution for the United States of America (“U.S. Constitution”).  At 28 U.S.C. 1746, both “United States” and “United States of America” occur in correct contradistinction to each other (inside one is outside the others).  28 U.S.C. 1746 is the only statute in all of Title 28 where the term “United States of America” occurs as such.

The UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic] did incorporate twice as such in the State of Delaware, but certified evidence now before this Court shows that both foreign corporations have been revoked by the Delaware Secretary of State.  Neither foreign corporation was ever registered with the New Mexico Secretary of State either!  (See “Certificate”!)

Even if one or the other were not revoked, DOJ would still not have any powers of attorney legally to represent a foreign Delaware corporation.  Congress never appropriated funds for DOJ to do so.

Finally, Congress has never incorporated either the “United States” or the “United States of Americaas such.  See U.S. v. Cooper Corporation, 312 U.S. 600 (1941).  It appears that Chief Justice John Marshall was responsible for fabricating the myth that “The United States of America” are a corporation.  See Dixon v. The United States, 1 Marsh. Dec. 177, 181 (1811).  However, without citing any actual legislative authority for that proposition, Marshall’s statement is merely dictum that was later cited in Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856), at the definitions of “Union” and “United States of America”.  In any event, Dixon has been overruled by Cooper supra because Dixon was decided by a Circuit Court in a case on which C.J. Marshall presided.

There are no “income tax assessments” in evidence in this case, and there are no “tax liens” in evidence in this case either.

Both claims assume facts not in evidence.

In order to be valid in the first instance, all ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATES must be dated and signed under penalties of perjury by a duly authorized Assessment Officer, pursuant to IRC 6065, 26 CFR 301.6203-1, Brafman v. U.S., 384 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1967), and pertinent provisions of the Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”) rendered enforceable by the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (“RRA98”).

The term “certificate” necessarily mandates verification or certification “under penalties of perjury” as required by IRC 6065!

In particular, the IRM mandates proper ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATES before any tax collections may commence.  Cf. “Certificate” in any good law dictionary (implies a writing or written document).

And, as of the RRA98, all IRS personnel can now be disciplined or terminated for violating any provision of the IRM.


The District Court had jurisdiction under Sections 7402 and 7403 of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.) (I.R.C.) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1340 and 1345.


This statement is erroneous and misleading on several counts.  First of all, there are two (2) different classes of Federal District Courts as the latter term occurs in the Miscellaneous Provisions of the Act of June 25, 1948, to wit: District Courts of the United States (“DCUS”) originate in Article III of the U.S. Constitution, and the United States District Courts (“USDC”) originate in Article IV.

Statutes conferring original jurisdiction on all Federal District Courts must be strictly construed.  On this one basis, then, the term “District Court” is vague and misleading because it fails to identify the one or the other class of “district” courts on which Congress has variously conferred original jurisdiction since the year 1789 A.D.  Cf. 15 U.S.C. 1121, 60 Stat. 440 (conferring original jurisdiction upon the district and territorial courts of the United States).

IRC section 7403 mentions only the DCUS, and does not mention the USDC anywhere in that statute.  Therefore, the USDC for the District of New Mexico did not enjoy any original jurisdiction under IRC 7403.

On the other hand, IRC 7402 mentions both the DCUS and the USDC.  For purposes of this case, the only provision in section 7402 that even mentions the USDC is subsection 7402(e), to wit:


(e) To quiet title


The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction of any action brought by the United States to quiet title to property if the title claimed by the United States to such property was derived from enforcement of a lien under this title.


This particular subsection is definitive and dispositive in the instant appeal, for all of the following reasons:


(a)           the instant action was not brought by the “United States” (federal government);  it was brought by an entity with an obviously improper name in violation of FRCP Rule 10 which requires Parties to be identified by their proper names;

(b)           because the United States did not bring the instant action, it did not and could not have claimed title to any property without first serving a proper SUMMONS and COMPLAINT making that claim;  a proper SUMMONS was never issued by the USDC;

(c)           title to property did not derive from enforcement of any liens “under this title”, chiefly because no valid lien(s) had ever been perfected, and “this title” (Title 26) was never enacted into positive law by any Act of Congress.


To drive the latter points home, see also IRC 7851(a)(6)(A), by which all provisions within IRC subtitle F shall take effect on the day after the date of enactment of “this title”.  IRC sections 7402 and 7403 both fall within subtitle F (remember “F” for enForcement).


The statute at 28 U.S.C. 1340 is also relevant in this context:


The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress providing for internal revenue, or revenue from imports or tonnage except matters within the jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade.


[emphases added]


Here we see that Congress has used the umbrella term “district courts” implying that both classes of Federal District Courts are included.  Assuming for the moment that 26 U.S.C. 7402 is an “Act of Congress”, as the latter term occurs at 1 U.S.C. 101, the points above already prove that the instant civil action did not and could not arise under that Act, for the reasons already stated.

The Arising Under Clause is discussed in further detail below.

Moreover, of even greater importance is the massive amount of evidence proving that IRC subtitle A is federal municipal law.  The term “internal” means municipal!  Therefore, “internal revenue” must refer to revenue derived from some internal, municipal statute(s).

As Appellants have already demonstrated, several times, there is no Statute at Large which created a specific liability for any federal income taxes imposed by subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code.

The “liability” provision was fabricated by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) in the Code of Federal Regulations at 26 CFR 1.1-1(b).

Even if the IRS were a de jure service, bureau, office or other subdivision of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (the one in D.C.), which they are NOT, the IRS would still not have any authority to create a tax liability by means of regulations published in the Federal Register.  On this fundamental point, see Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87 (1959) and the clear, explanatory abstract found in the 1962 Edition of American Jurisprudence, to wit:


In application of the principles that the power of an administrative agency to make rules does not extend to the power to make legislation and that a regulation which is beyond the power of the agency to make is invalid, it has been held that an administrative agency may not create a criminal offense or any liability not sanctioned by the lawmaking authority, and specifically a liability for a tax [citing Acker supra] or inspection fee.


[2 Am Jur 2d, p. 129, emphases added]


There are three (3) key points being made in that excellent abstract:


(1)           the power of an administrative agency to make rules does not extend to the power to make legislation;


(2)           a regulation which is beyond the power of the agency to make is invalid;  and,


(3)           an administrative agency may not create a criminal offense or any liability not sanctioned by the lawmaking authority, and specifically a liability for a tax.


28 U.S.C. 1340 also makes a clear reference to “matters within the jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade”.  This reference is extremely useful, in this context, because the statute establishing that Court expressly identifies Article III as its true constitutional origin.  Quoting 28 U.S.C. 251(a):


(a)  The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, nine judges who shall constitute a court of record to be known as the United States Court of International Trade. Not more than five of such judges shall be from the same political party. The court is a court established under article III of the Constitution of the United States.


By comparison, however, the statute establishing the USDC within the United States of America does not identify its constitutional origin.  See 28 U.S.C. 132.  For this reason, we are justified, and entitled, to rely upon standing decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court to supply the missing information.  Thus, in American Insurance v. 356 Bales of Cotton (1828) and Balzac v. Porto Rico (1921), the origin of the USDC was clearly and expressly identified as the Territory Clause at Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 (“4:3:2”).  As such, the USDCs are Territorial Tribunals, not Constitutional Courts.

It is also not difficult to prove that the term “Court” is really not even appropriate to identify any USDC.  The authority at Article I, Section 8, Clause 9 confers upon Congress the power to “constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court”.  The term “Court” is not even used in that Clause.  The only Clause which authorizes Congress to establish “Courts” is Article III, Section 1, Clause 1, to wit:


The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.


[emphases added]


Therefore, we have just proved that the USDCs are not even “Courts”!

Moving right along, the statute at 28 U.S.C. 1345 is another very important way in which Ms. Wolfinger’s statement defeats itself.  Unlike the named Plaintiff “UNITED STATES OF AMERICA”, Congress has conferred legal standing upon the “United States” –- the proper name for the federal government -- to appear as a proper Party Plaintiff:

Section 1345.  United States as plaintiff


Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress.


[emphases added]


The constitutional origin of this latter authority is the Arising Under Clause in the U.S. Constitution, which clearly states:


Section 2.  The judicial Power shall extend to ... Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party ....

[emphases added]


Note that Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 above properly identifies the “United States” (federal government) as the proper Party with standing to sue or, be sued.  Bouvier’s Law Dictionary is instructive here because it is the best single authority for defining the meanings of all terms used in the U.S. Constitution.  In Bouvier’s, the keyword “Party” is defined to embrace both plaintiffs and defendants:


PARTY, practice, contracts.  When applied to practice, by party is understood either the plaintiff or defendant.

[emphases added]


At this point, Intervenor incorporates the Press Release entitled “Private Attorney General Cracks Title 28 of the United States Code,” and a related essay, by reference to the following Internet URLs, hard copies of which are also attached for convenience:


In light of all the above, it is now painfully obvious to this Intervenor, “United States” ex rel., that a widespread conspiracy has evolved within DOJ to deprive civil litigants of due process of law, specifically by substituting an improper “UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” for “United States” as the proper Party Plaintiff in such cases, in order to avoid the implications of the Arising Under Clause supra.

Instead of suing properly on behalf of the “United States”, DOJ instead substitutes “UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” evidently to maintain the illusion -- and fraud -- that legislative tribunals are “courts of competent jurisdiction” that may lawfully conduct summary proceedings in all such cases but without Article III guarantees.

Although this may be difficult for many to believe, Intervenor’s NOTICE OF INTERVENTION incorporates a very pivotal PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI in U.S. Supreme Court docket number #03-5070 and, in the latter PETITION Justice Brennan is correctly quoted as follows:


In Marathon supra, Justice Brennan for the plurality reasoned that Congress could create legislative courts without Article III protections in only three limited settings:  (1) territorial courts, (2) courts martial, and (3) courts deciding disputes involving public rights that Congress created in the first instance.  Thus, by treating the 50 States as federal Territories and by creating federal citizenship as a municipal franchise, Congress could effectively “broadcast” into those States a legislative court that routinely proceeds without Article III protections!  See the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat. 27-30, April 9, 1866 A.D.  In the legislative USDC, those protections are options, not mandates, particularly when the extension statutes supra are also routinely ignored.


There you have it, in a nutshell:  Justice Brennan has let the cat out of the bag by arguing, but without proving, that all federal territories, and all public rights created by Congress, both justify “creation of federal courts without Article III guarantees”.

That is a gross oxymoron, if ever there was one.

We just proved that Federal District Courts can only be established under Article III;  and, Federal Territorial Tribunals can only be established under Articles I and IV.  Moreover, the Supreme Court has already held that the constitutional origin of the USDC is the Territory Clause, thus rendering each USDC a Territorial Tribunal.

The other leg with no “standing” is Brennan’s fallacious claim that a “public right” that is created by Congress can also justify the systematic deprivation of any and all Article III guarantees.  Here see 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B)!  This error is yet another manifestation of what Relator has correctly called the Downes Doctrine [sic]: briefly, that Doctrine merely assumes the following two propositions in error:


(1)           the Constitution of the United States, as such, does not extend beyond the limits of the States that are united by and under it;  and,


(2)           the guarantees of that Constitution extend into the federal zone only as Congress makes those guarantees applicable, by enacting federal statutes to that end.


However, putting the lie to Brennan, and to every other decision based in whole or in part upon the Downes Doctrine as summarized above, Congress expressly extended the U.S. Constitution into the District of Columbia in 1871, and then again into all Federal Territories, even future Federal Territories, in 1873.

A third “Extension Statute”, as Relator prefers to call these Acts, can be found at 48 U.S.C. 1561, where Congress expressly extended certain constitutional guarantees into the Virgin Islands.  Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 559 (1989).  It is apparent that even Congress was ignorant of its prior Acts of 1871 and 1873, or section 1561 supra would not have been necessary in the first place!


The far-reaching implications of these three Extension Statutes need not be fully documented here.  Suffice it to say that sacred guarantees such as those embodied in the Bill of Rights have been enforceable mandates upon all federal courts, at least since 1871, even if a controversy arose under federal municipal statutes.

Put simply, the Bill of Rights and all other constitutional guarantees apply to the entire Internal Revenue Code, no exceptions.

And now, for a point that will surely shiver the timbers of many black-robed impostors.  Now that we have proven that federal municipal laws are also subject to the U.S. Constitution as properly amended, this Circuit Court will please take careful note of two provisions expressly requiring that all federal direct taxes must be apportioned within the 50 States of the Union.  See 1:2:3 and 1:9:4.

If one penny of a federal direct tax is imposed upon D.C. and then collected from D.C., that tax is unconstitutional by definition, because it is thereby NOT apportioned among the 50 States of the Union as required by those two important provisions in the Constitution.

Accordingly, insofar as 26 CFR 1.1-1 attempts to “hijack” the Downes Doctrine by dispensing with such constitutional guarantees for federal citizens and resident aliens, the direct taxes it attempts to impose upon those two classes are necessarily unconstitutional.

Federal citizenship is a municipal franchise domiciled in D.C.!  Resident aliens are, by definition, subject to federal municipal laws.  Therefore, a direct tax imposed by federal municipal laws is unconstitutional per force the very moment it attempts to collect one penny ($0.01) of such a tax from the private earnings of those two classes of people whenever they labor in occupations of common right!

This brings us to the situation facing State Citizens like all named Appellants in this case.  The only way Congress can impose such a direct tax upon any Citizens of ONE OF the United States of America (50 States) is to apportion that direct tax in accordance with the well established rules for doing so.  Just as there can be no voting Representatives from anywhere inside the federal zone who are seated in the House of Representatives, there can be no direct taxes upon any State Citizens unless those direct taxes are also proportional to their Representatives seated in that House.  1:2:3!  1:9:4!!

No taxation without representation, remember?

This brings us, finally, to the notorious subterfuge entitled the “Sixteenth Amendment” [sic].  Suffice it here to say that Relator has already sued U.S. Senator Barbara Boxer in the California Supreme Court, in the case of People v. Boxer, docket number #S-030016.  That case was a petition for writ of mandamus to compel Boxer to witness the mass of material evidence which the People have assembled to impugn the ratification of that so-called “amendment”.

When Boxer fell totally silent (twice), she rendered the People’s verified evidence the “truth of the case”.  Therefore, pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, this Court must honestly face the fact that the so-called Sixteenth amendment was never ratified according to the requirements of Article V, the only way it could have become Law.

The consequences are obvious, or should be obvious;  and, those far-reaching consequences were the whole reason why Relator authored the book entitled “The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue” in the year 1992.  That book was subsequently entered into evidence in multiple State and federal court cases, without rebuttals!

That book was also the Primary Exhibit in the case of Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al. supra.  When that case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, all 129 named Defendants either fell totally silent, or their 48 UNlicensed attorneys formally waived their clients’ right to answer.  Such silence activates estoppel.  Carmine v. Bowen.  And, such silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading.  U.S. v. Tweel.

At a most opportune moment in that litigation, Relator wrote a one-word letter to Chief Justice William Rehnquist.  That letter said:


William H. Rehnquist passed away, not long after that momentous word!


Intervenor United States ex rel. Paul Andrew Mitchell B.A., M.S., Private Attorney General, now expressly incorporates by reference the REPLY BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANTS as filed and served concurrently with this INTERVENOR’S REPLY TO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, as if the former were set forth fully here.

Intervenor wishes to take this opportunity to compliment Appellants for the courage and tenacity they have demonstrated in the face of an ugly and premeditated extortion racket, and protection racket, which now appear to pervade all 50 States of the Union.

Their REPLY BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANTS is a masterful tour de force of cases and codes that were deliberately rendered vague and difficult to understand, solely to confuse the American People into coughing up their hard-earned pay, evidently to enrich corrupt foreign banks and to finance their horrendously painful serial wars ever since 1913.


Chiefly, the United States has a statutory right to intervene, and it has now effectively intervened pursuant to the federal statute at 28 U.S.C. 2403(a) and pertinent Rules of Court.

For all of the reasons elaborated in detail above and in all other pleadings filed to date by the United States ex rel. Paul Andrew Mitchell subsequent to its timely and proper intervention, the attorneys’ alleged OPPOSITION and BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEE should be ignored, if not also stricken, by this honorable Court of Appeals.

On the merits, this Court should also ORDER the Office of Circuit Clerk to certify to the Office of the United States Attorney General all of Intervenor’s challenges to the constitutionality of certain Acts of Congress previously enumerated in pleadings filed or otherwise lodged to date by Intervenor, and by Appellants, at any stage and at any level in these proceedings.

This Court should also now schedule a proper presentation of law and evidence, if such evidence is otherwise admissible in this case, supporting arguments for and against the constitutionality of said Acts of Congress thus properly challenged to date in this appeal.

No such presentation will be entirely complete or final, until such time as the Williamsons are guaranteed an opportunity to have their day in Court and present their arguments to a lawfully convened civil jury of their peers, and not merely a panel of federal citizens assembled under provisions of the Jury Selection and Service Act.

The Seventh Amendment is the supreme Law of the Land inside the federal zone and inside the State zone!  Cf. also FRCP Rule 38.

Thank you again for your continuing professional consideration.


I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).  See Supremacy Clause (Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the United States are all the supreme Law of the Land).


Dated:   June 5, 2007 A.D.


Signed:  /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell


Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Private Attorney General

         All Rights Reserved without Prejudice


I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that I am at least 18 years of age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I personally served the following document(s):




28 U.S.C. 2403(a); 18 U.S.C. 1964(a)


by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to the following:


Clerk of Court (5x)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

1823 Stout Street

Denver 80257



Mr. and Mrs. John S. Williamson

1277 Historic Route 66 East

Tijeras 87059



Mr. John Gregory Williamson

c/o Mr. and Mrs. John S. Williamson supra


Mr. David Andrew Williamson

c/o Mr. and Mrs. John S. Williamson supra


Mr. Garrett James Williamson

824 Adams Street, N.E.

Albuquerque 87110



Ms. Deborah Kruhm

P.O. Box 23899

Santa Fe 87502


Ms. Gretchen M. Wolfinger

U.S. Department of Justice

Appellate Section

P.O. Box 502

Washington 20044



Office of Chief Counsel

Internal Revenue Service

c/o U.S. Department of the Treasury

1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington 20220




Courtesy copies:


Office of the U.S. Attorney

P.O. Box 607

Albuquerque 87103



U.S. Department of Justice

Tax Division

717 North Harwood, Suite 400

Dallas 75201



Dr. Harriet Smith Windsor

Secretary of State

State of Delaware

401 Federal Street

Dover 19901




[See USPS Publication #221 for addressing instructions.]



Dated:   June 5, 2007 A.D.



Signed:  /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell


Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Private Attorney General

         All Rights Reserved without Prejudice