Appendix P
Miscellaneous Letters
Reader's Notes:
Registered U.S. Mail #R 756 488 761
Return Receipt Requested
c/o
general delivery
San
Rafael
California
state
zip
code exempt (DMM 122.32)
December
29, 1993
Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice
Hon. Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice
Hon. John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice
Hon. Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice
Hon. Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice
Hon. Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice
Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice
Hon. Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice
Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice
Supreme Court of the United States
One First Street, Northeast
Washington, District of Columbia
Subject: NOTICE AND DEMAND TO CEASE AND DESIST
Dear Honorable Justices:
Notice is
hereby formally served upon you, both individually and severally, that
conclusive evidence now available to me proves that the so-called 14th
amendment to the Constitution for the United States of America was never
properly approved and adopted. I am
under a legal and moral obligation to intervene on behalf of the many millions
of Americans whose status has been unlawfully subsumed under federal
jurisdiction, because this was done without either their knowledge or their
informed consent.
As required
by Title 28, United States Code, Section 453 (Oaths of justices and judges),
you have solemnly sworn (or affirmed) that you would administer justice without
respect to persons, and faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all
duties incumbent upon you as Justices of the U. S. Supreme Court under the
Constitution and laws of the United States, so help you God (see revision
at 104 Stat. 5124).
Please take
formal notice that it is quite simply impossible for you, or for any other public officials anywhere in America, to perform your
solemn duties under this oath (or affirmation), if the weight of material
evidence should prove that the exact provisions of that Constitution are still
in doubt. Your oath (or affirmation) is
a binding contract which I hereby seek to enforce, according to the
dictates of my conscience, my Creator, and the supreme Law of the Land, as lawfully amended.
Pursuant to
the Guarantee Clause (4:4) and to the opinion of the California Court of Appeal
in Steiner v. Darby et al., 88
Cal.App.2d 481, 199 P.2d 429 (1948: the year of my birth as a Sovereign natural
born Free Citizen of one of the United States), it is not only my Right, but also my Duty,
to inform you that the weight of material and historical evidence proves that
the so‑called 14th amendment is not now, nor has it ever been, a lawful
provision in the Constitution for the United States of America. This proposed amendment failed to be
ratified in accordance with the requirements of Article 5 of the
Constitution. At the very least, the
evidence which I now lay before you consists of the following public records
and other documents:
State v.
Phillips, 540 P.2d. 936, 941 (1975)
Dyett v.
Turner, 439 P.2d 266, 270 (1968)
28 Tulane
Law Review 22
11 South
Carolina Law Quarterly 484
House
Congressional Record, June 13, 1967, p. 15641 et seq.
Because the
available evidence indicates to me that all Federal and State judicial
officers, without exception, have taken solemn oaths (or affirmations)
which disagree with the Constitution for the United States of America as lawfully amended, I am now left
entirely without any unbiased judicial forum in which to seek review and
declaratory relief in the matter of the following federal questions:
(1) The constitutional qualifications for
election to the offices of President, Senator, and Representative retain the
meaning they had when the Constitution was first drafted (see Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 19 How. 393-633 (1856)).
(2) There is still
no constitutional authority for the status of a "citizen of the
United States", unlike the proper status of a "Citizen of one
of the States United" (see 1:2:2, 1:3:3, 2:1:5, and People v. De La
Guerra, 40 Cal. 311 (1870): the term "United States" here means
"States united"; see also Hooven
& Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945)).
(3) There is still
no constitutional provision prohibiting anyone from questioning the validity of the public debt, and freedom of speech
is still guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights.
(4) All provisions in Federal law are necessarily
null and void, to the extent that they make reference, either implicitly or
explicitly, to any section(s) of the failed 14th amendment.
(5) All provisions in State constitutions and
statutes are likewise null and void, to the extent that they make reference to
any section(s) of the failed 14th amendment (e.g. see the attached letter to the California State Lands
Commission, to which all recipients fell silent).
Therefore, by
virtue of the superior authority which is vested in me by my Creator, as a
direct consequence of my natural birth as a qualified member of the Sovereign
People, "by whom and for whom all government exists and acts" (see Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)), and on behalf of each and every
member of the Sovereignty known and lawfully identified as "We, the People
of the United States" of America (see Preamble), I hereby demand and do hereby order you to Cease and Desist from
any and all of the following official acts on your part:
(1) any and all official oaths or affirmations
which are predicated in any way on
the lawful ratification of the so‑called 14th amendment;
(2) any and all judicial decisions or
determinations which are predicated in
any way on the lawful ratification of the so‑called 14th amendment,
including but not limited to:
(a) decisions or determinations which construe in any way the rights, responsibilities,
privileges, immunities, and liabilities of "citizens of the United
States" as that term is used in any and all Acts of Congress and
administrative rules and regulations promulgated by any employees of the
Executive Branch of the Federal government (e.g.
26 C.F.R. 1.1-1(c));
(b) decisions or determinations which attempt in any way to enforce the administration
of the individual income tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code upon the
People of the 50 Union States, or upon their private property (see Treasury
Decision 2313 and Brushaber's pleadings);
(c) decisions or determinations which uphold in any way the validity of the public
debt of the Federal and State governments, acting in whatever capacity and
through whatever agency, lawfully delegated or not (see 1:6:2);
(d) decisions or determinations which recognize in any way the lawful existence of a
"State within a state", with particular reference to the political
body defined by the population of "citizens of the United
States" who may inhabit the 50 Union States at any given moment, however
those terms may be defined (see 4:3:1 and the case law interpreting the Buck
Act, 4 U.S.C. 105-113).
Until such
time as you demonstrate officially that each and every one of you has executed
a solemn oath which agrees with the Constitution for the United States
of America as lawfully amended, I will take the absence of such an oath
to mean that you are individually and severally biased in your
understanding of the Constitution and that you
are, therefore, unqualified to rule on these matters and hereby recused from
doing so.
The burden of
proof is now upon you to authenticate the Constitution which you agree to
uphold, now and at all times in the future, using established principles of Law
and the published rules of evidence.
I realize
that this NOTICE AND DEMAND TO CEASE AND
DESIST may constitute an historically unprecedented act on my part, as an
individual California Citizen who enjoys neither elected nor appointed
authority of any kind at this moment in time.
Nevertheless, this act is necessitated by the fact that there is
presently not one single judge, magistrate, or commissioner anywhere in America whose oath of office
is not colored by faulty (non-existent) provisions in the federal Constitution
which they are sworn to uphold.
I realize
also that this Notice and Demand must be general in nature and in substance,
because of the far-reaching consequences which issue from the facts and Law
which impugn federal "adoption" of the so-called 14th amendment. It is not my purpose here to anticipate, nor
to delineate, each and every such consequence.
Better minds than I should hesitate to assume such a weighty task by
themselves.
Therefore,
for the time being, I will leave it to you, and to the capable expertise on
your respective staffs, to find and recommend the course of action which will
best execute this Demand with maximum justice, liberty, and domestic
tranquility. These are, after all, the
stated goals of our chosen form of government in the united States of America
(see Preamble).
Furthermore,
I do explicitly reserve my unalienable Right to take whatever steps I deem
necessary and proper to correct, at any time, a government which has now
drifted so far off course, it hardly resembles the constitutional Republic it
was designed to be (see also Declaration of Independence (1776)).
Thank you
very much for your attention, and for your consideration.
Respectfully submitted,
Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris
California Citizen, on behalf of the
People of the united States of America
All Rights Reserved AT LAW
NOTICE TO PRINCIPALS IS NOTICE TO
AGENTS.
NOTICE TO AGENTS IS NOTICE TO
PRINCIPALS.
copies: Marin
County Grand Jury, San Rafael
Bill
Clinton, President
Pete
Wilson, Governor of California
Barbara
Boxer, U.S. Senator
Dianne
Feinstein, U.S. Senator
Lynn
Woolsey, U.S. Representative
Janet
Reno, Attorney General
Drew
S. Days, III, Solicitor General
William
K. Suter, Supreme Court Clerk
Frank
D. Wagner, Reporter of Decisions
Alfred
Wong, Marshal
Shelley
L. Dowling, Librarian
attachment: letter
to California State Lands Commission
enclosures (under
separate cover to Librarian supra):
The
Federal Zone, hard-copy second edition
The
Federal Zone, electronic fourth edition
Chapter
11, from upcoming fifth edition
California All-Purpose Acknowledgement
CALIFORNIA
STATE/REPUBLIC )
)
COUNTY OF
MARIN )
On this
twenty-ninth (29th) day of December, 1993,
Anno Domini, before me personally appeared Paul Andrew Mitchell, personally
known to me (or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the
Person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me
that he executed the same in His authorized capacity, and that by His signature
on this instrument the Person, or the entity upon behalf of which the Person
acted, executed the instrument. Purpose
of Notary Public is for identification only, and not for entrance into
any foreign jurisdiction.
WITNESS my hand and official seal.
_____________________________________
Notary Public
C E R T I F I C A T E O F
S E R V I C E B Y M A I L
It is hereby
certified that service of this LETTER has
been made on interested parties by mailing one copy thereof, on this
twenty-ninth (29th) day of December, 1993, in a sealed envelope with postage
prepaid, properly addressed to them as follows:
Registered U.S. Mail #R 756 488 761
Return Receipt Requested of:
Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice
Supreme Court of the United States
One First Street, Northeast
Washington, District of Columbia
Copies via first class U.S. mail to:
Hon. Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice
Hon. John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice
Hon. Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice
Hon. Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice
Hon. Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice
Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice
Hon. Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice
Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice
Supreme Court of the United States
One First Street, Northeast
Washington, District of Columbia
Dated: December
29, 1993
__________________________________________________________________________
Paul Andrew
Mitchell, Citizen/Principal, by Special
Appearance, in Propria Persona,
proceeding Sui Juris, with
Assistance, Special, "Without Prejudice" to any of my unalienable
Rights.
c/o general delivery
San
Rafael
California
state
Postal Zone 94901/tdc
September
10, 1993
Ray Feyereisen
c/o general delivery
Houston, Texas state
Postal Zone 77253/tdc
Dear Ray:
I did some
more research today, to explore some of the cases which support the position that
one can be a State Citizen without necessarily being a citizen of the United
States. You already knew about Crosse; here are the relevant paragraphs:
Both
before and after the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, it has
not been necessary for a person to be a citizen of the United States in
order to be a citizen of his state.
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1875); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36, 73-74, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873); and see
Short v. State, 80 Md. 392, 401-402, 31 A. 322 (1895). See also Spear, State Citizenship, 16 Albany
L.J. 24 (1877). ...
[B]ut we find nothing in Reum
[City of Minneapolis v. Reum, 56 F. 576, 581 (8th Cir. 1893)] or any other case
which requires that a citizen of a state
must also be a citizen of the United States, if no question of federal rights
or jurisdiction is involved. As the
authorities referred to in the first portion of this opinion evidence, the law
is to the contrary.
[emphasis added]
Corpus Juris is another
source of authorities which support this position:
So a person may be a citizen of a
particular state and not a citizen of the United States46 ....
[11 C.J., Sec. 3, p. 777]
Footnote 46 lists
the following cases:
Harding v. Standard Oil Co., 182 Fed. 421
McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320
State v. Fowler, 41 La. Ann. 380, 6 S. 602
The reference
librarian at the Marin County Law Library and I searched in vain for McDonel v.
State; they're going to put their special
legal beagle on that search. Here's
what Harding said:
In the Constitution and laws of the
United States the term ["citizenship"] is generally, if not always,
used in a political sense to designate one who has the rights and privileges of
a citizen of a state or of the
United States. Baldwin v. Franks,
120 U.S. 678, 7 Sup. Ct. 656, 30 L.Ed. 766.
A person may be a citizen of a
state but not of the United States;
as, an alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen, and who
is by local law entitled to vote in the state of his residence, and there
exercise all other local functions of local citizenship, such as holding
office, right to poor relief, etc., but who is not a citizen of the United
States. Taney, C.J., in Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 19 How. 405, 15 L.Ed. 691;
Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 74, 21 L.Ed. 394.
[Harding v. Standard Oil Co. et. al.]
[182 Fed. 421 (1910), emphasis added]
I really love the pertinent quote from State v.
Fowler, which was decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1889:
A person who is a citizen of the United
States is necessarily a citizen of the particular state in which he
resides. But a person may be a citizen of a particular state and not a citizen
of the United States. To hold otherwise
would be to deny to the state the highest exercise of its sovereignty, -- the
right to declare who are its citizens.
The sovereignty of the citizens of a republic has its highest assertion
in representative government, and is constituted in its political order in the
representation of persons, and not of classes or of interests.
[State ex rel. Leche
v. Fowler]
[41 La. Ann. 380, 6 S. 602 (1889)]
[emphasis added]
The Crosse court cites Short v. State,
which came to essentially the same conclusion in the following long passage:
And then, as to the objection that this
local law is repugnant to that clause in the fourteenth amendment of the
federal constitution which declares that "no state shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States," it is sufficient to say that the interpretation of that clause by the supreme court in the
Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, is a complete answer to this objection. There is a distinction, says
Justice Miller, between citizenship
of the United States and citizenship of a state.
[Short v. State, 80 Md. 392, 401-402]
[31 A. 322 (1895)]
The Crosse
court cites Short v. State, but I could find in the latter decision no statements
which took the exact position we are seeking;
nevertheless, it does cite the Slaughterhouse Cases and also Bradwell
v. State, 16 Wall. 130. In the Bradwell
case, Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the court, says:
The protection designed by that
clause, as has been repeatedly held, has
no application to a citizen of the state whose laws are complained of.
[emphasis added]
Also, I think
I have already mentioned this book, but it's worth mentioning again. See if you can get your hands on a copy of A
Treatise on Citizenship by Birth and by Naturalization, by Alexander Porter
Morse, Boston: Little, Brown, and
Company, 1881. Buried near the end of
this voluminous treatise is a section entitled "State Citizenship -- Its
Existence". In addition to the big
cases like Dred Scott, Slaughterhouse and Cruikshank, he
mentions the following in his footnotes:
Corfield v.
Coryell, 4 Wash. C.C. 371
Conner v.
Elliott, 18 How. 591
Donovan v.
Pitcher, 53 Ala. 411
Cully v.
Baltimore, etc., R.R. Co., 1 Hughes 536
Prentiss v.
Brennan, 2 Blatchf. 162
Frasher v.
State, 3 Tex. Ct. App. 267
Reilly v.
Lamar, 2 Cranch 344
He also writes, "That there is a state citizenship,
see Registry Act of California of 1865-1866, sect. 11." I pulled it; check it out.
So, you
thought you were caught up with all your work, did you?
Carry on, and
peace be with you.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder
Account for Better Citizenship
c/o general delivery
San
Rafael
California
state
zip
code exempt
July
29, 1993
Albert N. Baxter
c/o general delivery
Rancho Palos Verdes, California state
Postal Zone 90274/tdc
Dear Al:
I am in
receipt of a copy of your letter from attorney William A. Cohan, dated June 21,
1993. In this letter, Mr. Cohan wrote
the following to you:
The "non-resident alien"
position has been repeatedly rejected by the courts; your assertion of that position undermines your credibility.
In the margin, you wrote the following
in long hand:
"Guess
we made fools of ourselves. Al B"
Although I do
not have the time to write as thorough a response as I wish I could, I do have
enough time to make a few careful remarks about these statements. Please consider the electronic fourth
edition of The Federal Zone as a necessary supplement to the rest of
this letter; it is not yet available in
hard copy.
First of all,
I do not believe that your assertion of the "nonresident alien"
position undermines your credibility.
It may undermine your credibility in the eyes of Mr. Cohan, but it
certainly does not undermine your credibility in my eyes, nor in the eyes of
those who have studied and carefully documented the meaning of State
Citizenship as that term was used and intended to be understood by the framers
of the U.S. Constitution. Even IRS
documents admit that you are an alien if you are not a citizen of the United States. Simple logic is all that is necessary to explain away the
"alien" half of the problem, but there is much more proof, as you know.
I have
recently made a crucial discovery in the writings of attorney Roger
Foster. Foster was a Yale lecturer and
recognized expert in federal jurisprudence at the time the so-called 16th
Amendment was declared "ratified".
The second edition of his
treatise on the federal income tax of 1913 states, in unequivocal language,
that the tax was levied in Alaska, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and
the Philippine Islands; the 48 States
are not even mentioned (see Chapter 3 in The Federal Zone). In and of itself, this documentary evidence
is important proof of the territorial extent of the 1913 federal income tax.
What is even
more stunning is the comparable section from the first edition of Foster's treatise. In this section, he rambles on about the lack of court precedent
authorizing Congress to tax bond interest that is payable to nonresident aliens
by domestic corporations. Because he
makes repeated use of the term "United States", a term which we now
know to have multiple different
meanings in law, this section is almost always vague about the exact
territorial extent of the 1913 Act.
There is, however, one place where he tips his hand by utilizing the
term "Union" in a territorial
sense. In other words, the first edition of Foster's treatise
considers the "Union of several States" to be the territorial reach
of the 1913 Act, but in the second
edition this whole section is replaced with a much smaller section which limits that reach to Alaska, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands. Therefore, Foster has admitted, in writing,
that his first edition was in error about the territorial extent of the
1913 federal income tax! Read it for
yourself and see if you agree with me.
It is not
entirely correct to state that the "non-resident alien" position has
been repeatedly rejected by the courts.
Such a statement overlooks the obvious fact that the Brushaber
decision is still standing case law
in America. As you must already know,
this ruling was issued by the United States Supreme Court. None of the cases cited in Mr. Conklin's
essay, "The Citizenship Argument Bites the Dust in the Courts", was
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Moreover, most of those lower court cases remain unpublished, unlike the
long list of Supreme Court decisions which have carefully considered the
meaning of Citizenship (e.g. Cruikshank,
Dred Scott, Slaughter-House Cases, to name a few of the key
ones). Why?
Treasury
Decision 2313 also remains as a standing decision of the U.S. Treasury Department. There was only one Plaintiff in the Brushaber
case; that Plaintiff was Mr. Frank R.
Brushaber who was "a citizen of the State of New York and a resident of
the Borough of Brooklyn, in the City of New York", by his own admissions. To
assert anything else about his status is to assume facts that were not in
evidence. If he had been a native
of France, according to federal government propaganda, then where was his green
card? The courts issued their decisions
on the basis of facts that were in
evidence. Therefore, there was and
still is no basis in fact, or in law, for the Secretary of the Treasury in 1916
to extend the Brushaber decision to those who were not parties to that
action. It is conclusive, therefore,
that Frank R. Brushaber was the "nonresident alien" to which Treasury
Decision 2313 refers.
Quite apart
from the technical issues involved in understanding and explaining Treasury
Decision 2313, I would like to dedicate the remainder of my remarks here to a
discussion of the importance of the U.S. Constitution. If my research has established anything, it
is that the U.S. Constitution has explicitly recognized State Citizenship
from the beginning, even if there was no definition
of State Citizenship as such in that document. If the Constitution is perpetual, then so is the status of State Citizenship
which it recognizes (see Texas v. White), until and unless each and
every reference to State Citizens is lawfully amended so as to alter the
original meaning of those provisions.
The intent of any law is the
law, and this principle applies as well to the Constitution itself (the supreme Law).
You will find explicit references to
State Citizens throughout the U.S. Constitution (see 1:2:2, 1:3:3,
2:1:5, 3:2:1, 4:2:1). In my opinion,
three of the most important references are found in the qualifications for
election to the offices of U.S. Senator, Representative, and President. Since these provisions have never been
amended, their meaning remains the same as it was on the day the Constitution
became the supreme Law in America.
Anyone who argues something different about the construction of these
provisions is woefully, and maybe even dangerously, ignorant of the basic
principles of constitutional law in our country (see Dred Scott v. Sandford
in particular, a decision which is "infamous" to me only because it was such an
authoritative and irrefutable mirror on the legal acceptability of chattel
slavery at that point in American history).
Prior to the
1866 Civil Rights Act, there was simply no such thing as a "citizen
of the United States" (see Ex parte Knowles, which is still
standing case law in the California Republic).
If you can find the time to wade into the huge body of case law which
interpreted the so-called 14th Amendment, you will find some jurists who credit
that amendment with finally settling the definition of "citizen of
the United States" (see Field's dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases
for a good example of this position).
On the other hand, the pertinent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have never ruled that a ratified 14th
Amendment ever abolished the status
of State Citizenship; the
amendment itself even stipulates that federal citizens are also "citizens
... of the State wherein they reside", giving some jurists reason to
conclude that federal citizens were intended to be State Citizens too,
as long as they resided within one of the Union States.
To my
knowledge, I am the first published author to call attention to the lower-case
"c" in this class of State citizens; the weight of subsequent history has shown that they remain second-class citizens, even when
they "reside" within one of the Union States, because the Bill of Rights has at best a limited
application to them when they do. We
must credit The Informer for pointing out additional evidence in Section 2 of
the 14th Amendment: "[W]hen the
right to vote ... is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State ... and citizens
of the United States ...."
This section is here referring to two different classes of people.
The Cruikshank
case is perhaps the most lucid example of standing High Court case law for
ruling that "[W]e have in our political system a government of the United
States and a government of each of the several States. Each of these governments is distinct from
the others, and each has citizens of
its own ...." This means
that, even if the so-called 14th
Amendment had been properly approved and adopted, the status of State Citizen
remains an integral part of the U.S.
Constitution, so integral in fact,
that the highest elective offices in our land must be occupied by People
who enjoy and exhibit this status before
occupying those offices. Remember also
that the Cruikshank case was decided after
the alleged ratification of the 14th Amendment and after the pivotal Slaughter-House Cases. The failed ratification of this amendment
lends even greater clarity to logic of Cruikshank, namely, that federal citizens
are aliens with respect to the Union States, and State Citizens are likewise
aliens with respect to the District of Columbia.
The
Constitution also plays a crucial role in determining whether or not a proposed amendment is ever elevated to
the status of a ratified
amendment. Hiding in the huge body of
case law which has interpreted the so-called 14th Amendment, there are two
pivotal decisions of the Utah Supreme Court which actually struck down the
ratification of that amendment (see State v. Phillips and Dyett v.
Turner). The facts on which that
Court relied were assembled and published in the Congressional Record; courts must take judicial notice of the Congressional
Record. The U.S. Supreme Court has
never actually ruled on the ratification of the 14th Amendment and has been prevented from doing so by treasonous
behavior (see 28 Tulane Law Review 22, and 11 South Carolina Law Quarterly 484).
Thus, the
undeniable preponderance of historical evidence now proves that the Utah
Supreme Court was correct in striking down the 14th Amendment. I invite you to review the shocking and
sordid history of its "passage" by studying carefully the details
recited in the Dyett decision.
The bottom line is that the federal government has been exercising unlawful dominion ever since the Civil
War, and the failed ratification of the so-called 14th Amendment is just one
among several historical facts which constitute conclusive evidence of this
unlawful dominion. The so-called 16th
Amendment is another excellent example of this unlawful dominion.
By holding,
as the Utah Supreme Court has done, that the 14th Amendment was never properly
approved and adopted, we are still entirely justified in taking the U.S.
Supreme Court's view in Cruikshank, namely, that each governmental jurisdiction has citizens of its own. This view is supported by the decision in Colgate
v. Harvey, which ruled that the 14th Amendment did not create a national citizenship (the italics implying that the amendment was simply declaratory of existing federal law, which federal law
was the 1866 Civil Rights Act). Simply
stated, California has its Citizens;
Oregon has its Citizens; Utah
has its Citizens; ... and the District
of Columbia has its citizens (51 governmental jurisdictions in all).
Notice that I
have been careful to spell State Citizen with an UPPER-CASE "C", and
federal citizen with a lower-case "c". I do so primarily because authentic copies of the U.S.
Constitution do evidence this convention;
those authentic copies also maintain a similar distinction between
"Person" and "person".
Prior to the 14th Amendment, "Person" was consistently spelled
with an UPPER-CASE "P" (see the qualifications for Senator,
Representative and President, where the term "No Person" is
repeated). Formal English also
recognizes an important difference between Proper Nouns and common nouns. Did you ever attend a baseball game that was
won by the chicago cubs (or the cHICAGO cUBS)?
Al, I invite
you to take a closer look at the underlying rationale for the "nonresident
alien" position which I have endorsed and explained in my book The
Federal Zone, whether or not you choose to utilize it in any future
litigation. There is simply too much in
the way of undeniable factual evidence and relevant constitutional history for
me to be dissuaded by this or that unpublished decision by lower federal
courts. I doubt very much that Mr.
Cohan would have us believe that federal and State courts are always correct,
and that their decisions are never overturned.
I have read some of these lower court decisions, and I find them to be
riddled with errors.
Specifically,
any court in America which henceforth issues decisions that are predicated upon
the lawful ratification of the so-called 14th and 16th Amendments is plainly in
error (see People v. Boxer). Any
licensed attorney in America who bases his advice to clients (or prospects) on
such rebuttable presumptions might justifiably be applauded for seeking the
path of least resistance, with the complete approval of his clients; but attorneys and clients together should
also seriously reconsider just how dedicated they really are to upholding and
defending the Constitution for the United States of America, as compared to
other priorities that can and do take precedence under the pressures of
day-to-day practice. I say this only
because the published evidence available to me shows that licensed attorneys in
America are expected to place the court first, public policy second, and the
client third in order of importance;
the Constitution isn't even mentioned!
It is high
time that we return to basic issues of constitutional Law. If we don't, then we shall surely lose the
Constitution forever. It is quite simply impossible for public
officials anywhere in America to perform their solemn duty to uphold and defend
the U.S. Constitution, if the weight of material evidence should prove that the
exact provisions of that Constitution are still in doubt. This was the major issue that was addressed
in the case of People v. Boxer;
copies of the pleadings and affidavits were shipped to Mr. Cohan several
months ago, without any response from him.
I don't mean
to be rude or disrespectful to any licensed attorneys when I suggest that they
too should be obliged to take the same solemn oath, if they have not already
done so. The constitutional provisions
which cite State Citizens have never been in any serious doubt, even if
our decision to defend this status is fraught with much additional peril, above
and beyond the peril we might endure by resisting this or that tax assessment
by the collection agency of a foreign banking cartel. If the Constitution is perpetual, then so is the Sovereign State Citizenship
which that Constitution has recognized from the beginning, with or without
the so-called 14th Amendment.
Let the
judges in question come forward to explain why their recent decisions were
"unpublished". I am all ears.
The road less
traveled may be the surest path to our destination, and to our destiny as a
free People.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder
Account for Better Citizenship
enclosures
copies: William
A. Cohan
John
Voss, N.C.B.A.
Richard
McDonald
c/o general delivery
San
Rafael
California
state
zip
code exempt
(DMM
122.32)
July 20, 1993
James R. Frey
Staff Counsel
State Lands Commission
c/o general delivery
Sacramento, California state
Dear Mr. Frey:
We do very
much appreciate the consideration you showed in answering our inquiry
concerning California Government Code Sections 126 and 127.
We are happy
to learn that the files in question are available for public inspection and
copying, by appointment. We understand
that the index is actually a file cabinet, with files on individual facilities.
As you may
already know, many California State Citizens are actively involved in private
research and political action to help solve the horrendous federal debt. Our research led us to Government Code
Section 126, in particular, because it makes explicit reference to Section 4 of
the so-called 14th Amendment:
(c) The United States must in writing have
requested the state to cede concurrent criminal jurisdiction within such land
and subject to each and all of the conditions and reservations in this section
and in Section 4 of Article XIV of the
Constitution prescribed.
[California Government Code, Sec. 126]
[emphasis added]
I use the
language "so-called" because the evidence now available to us proves
that the 14th Amendment was never properly approved and adopted. In the year 1968, the Utah Supreme Court
detailed the shocking and sordid history of the failed ratification in the case
of Dyett v. Turner, 439 P.2d 266, 272.
In the year 1975, the Utah Supreme Court again struck down the
ratification of the 14th Amendment with the following language:
I cannot believe that any court, in full
possession of its faculties, could honestly hold that the amendment was
properly approved and adopted.
[State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936, 941]
To our knowledge, these two cases are still
standing because the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to rule specifically on the
validity of the steps taken to "ratify" the so-called 14th Amendment.
The House Congressional Record for June 13, 1967,
contains some of the essential documentation on which the Utah Supreme Court
relied to prove that the so-called 14th Amendment was never ratified into law
(see page 15641 et seq.). For example, it itemizes all States which
voted against the proposed amendment, and the precise dates when their
Legislatures did so.
Additional
historical evidence can be found in the following law review articles: 28 Tulane Law Review 22 and 11 South
Carolina Law Quarterly 484. Even
though one of these articles was written by a man who advocated racial
discrimination, a policy with which I strongly disagree, his facts are very
consistent with the historical record as recited by these other authorities.
Faced with
this clear preponderance of historical evidence and standing court authorities,
we are not only justified in taking the position that the 14th Amendment was
never ratified, we are also justified in challenging all State statutes which
make reference to non-existent
provisions in the U.S. Constitution.
This train of
evidence and logic leads us, then, to subsection (f) of California Government
Code Section 126:
(f) "Land held by the United States",
as used in this section means: (1) lands acquired in fee by purchase or
condemnation, (2) lands owned by
the United States that are included in the military reservation by presidential
proclamation or act of Congress, (3)
leaseholds acquired by the United States over private lands or state-owned
lands, and (4) any other lands owned by
the United States including, but not limited to, public domain lands which are
held for a public purpose.
[emphasis added]
We have taken specific note of
subsection (f)(1), which omits any mention of the "United States",
whereas subsections (f)(2) thru (f)(4) do make explicit mention of the
"United States". Using the
rule of statutory construction known as inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius (see Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth
Edition), we are entitled to infer that "United States" was omitted
from subsection (f)(1) because it was intended
to be omitted.
Accordingly, Section
126(f) could be interpreted to mean that "Land held by the United
States" means any lands acquired
in fee by purchase or condemnation, whether
or not said lands were acquired in fee by the federal government. In other words, if private real estate in
California were acquired in a "fee simple" transaction, as recorded
by the appropriate County Recorder, does the "United States" thereby
hold any legal interest in such private land by virtue of California Government
Code Section 126?
Now for the
crux of the problem. We now know that
the Federal Reserve System is a private banking cartel (see Lewis v. United
States, 680 F.2d 1239 (1982)). This
cartel pays the federal Bureau of Engraving and Printing a total of $230 to print
10,000 Federal Reserve Notes, regardless of denomination, and thereby
obtains from Congress a pledge of collateral equal to the face value of
those notes. Thus, if the Federal
Reserve orders 10,000 notes in denominations of $100 each, it obtains from
Congress a lien on collateral equal to $1,000,000, for a total down payment of
$230. That's what I call leverage! What's the collateral?
Do the Federal Reserve banks thereby
obtain any right, title or interest in California lands "acquired in fee
by purchase or condemnation" pursuant to California Government Code
Section 126?
Are these lands anywhere identified as
collateral for the Treasury bonds which the Federal Reserve purchased with
money and credit which it created out of thin air, via bookkeeping entries?
These are
questions which should be important to all private Citizens and to all
government employees everywhere in America, because the Federal Reserve has
become one of the largest single "United States" creditors by
purchasing Treasury bonds without lawful consideration. Moreover, the failed ratification of the
so-called 14th Amendment frees all of us, private Citizens and government
employees alike, to question the validity of this public debt, because Section
4 of that failed amendment reads:
The
validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall
not be questioned.
[emphasis added]
Quite obviously,
if the so-called 14th Amendment was never properly approved and adopted, then
it follows that there is no Constitutional prohibition which bars any of us from questioning the validity
of the public debt of the United States.
I will look
forward to your timely and considerate response. Please utilize the above mailing location exactly as shown in any and all future correspondence. Believe it or not, we now have credible
proof that the unqualified use of zip codes and/or two-letter federal
abbreviations (e.g. "CA")
also attaches California State Citizens to the spiralling federal debt.
Mr. Frey,
things are just not as they appear on the surface.
Thank you
very much for your honesty and your consideration, at this most difficult time
in our brief history as a nation.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder
Account for Better Citizenship
copies: Charles
Warren, Executive Officer
Leo T.
McCarthy, Lieutenant Governor
Gray
Davis, Controller
Thomas
W. Hayes, Director of Finance
Pete
Wilson, Governor
c/o general delivery
San
Rafael
California
state
zip
code exempt
(DMM
122.32)
July
5, 1993
Gregory Dahl
c/o general delivery
Eugene, Oregon state
Postal Zone 97401/tdc
Dear Greg:
Thanks very
much for your letter dated 24 June 1993, and for purchasing a copy of The
Federal Zone. Because I shipped
your book immediately after opening your envelope at the post office, I hadn't
allowed myself time to read your letter before doing so. On the last page, your mentioned enclosing
$25 for the book, and $15 to show your support of my efforts and your
appreciation for my time. Thanks very
much. I now take those amounts to mean
that you originally wanted the electronic
edition of The Federal Zone, which is enclosed with this letter. It was obviously my mistake. With your immense computer knowledge, I
would very much value your suggestions for expediting the dissemination of this
shareware.
On the subject
of race, you may be surprised to hear that I agree completely with your
statement that my analysis of the 14th
Amendment will be construed as a contention that whites have different rights
than others. That is exactly the
situation you will find throughout federal law; read Title 42, Sections 1981 thru 1983, and there you will find
that Congress still maintains a clear
legal distinction between whites and other races. But then you went on to say that I will be called a racist.
Well, I haven't been called racist yet, not even by any of my black
friends, but I guess there is always a first time. Thus far, I haven't had any difficulty explaining to people that federal
law is maintaining racist distinctions, and has done so ever since the
infamous Dred Scott decision. My
position is quite simple: all races are
eligible to be Sovereign State Citizens, without exception.
Federal law
would have us believe that blacks and other non-white races are only eligible
to be "citizens of the United States", but the California
Supreme Court ruled in 1855 that there
is no such thing as a "citizen of the United States", and this
decision has never been overruled. The
federal government must rely,
therefore, on the so-called 14th Amendment to force this fiction on certain
classes, e.g. those with Social
Security numbers. Nevertheless, the
Utah Supreme Court has twice struck down this amendment, and neither of these
decisions has ever been overruled! Do
you see the pattern? I call it unlawful
dominion.
I actually
enjoy discussions which turn to the subject of racial discrimination. It is a great opportunity to expose people
to the "intent of the post-Civil War reformers", as you call them. You have only to look at Section 4 of the
so-called 14th Amendment to appreciate what I mean: "the validity of the public debt shall not be
questioned." This is the real intent of the 14th Amendment, to
make it appear lawful for the federal government to exercise dominion over all
Americans and to relegate them to second-class subject status (i.e. "subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States").
Once you are
in this subject class, then the
federal government can compel your specific performance to discharge the
interest on the massive federal debt which has now accumulated. Of course, much of that debt was created by
the sale of Treasury bonds which were "purchased" by Federal Reserve
banks with money and credit which they created out of thin air. As such, these bond contracts are unconscionable because they were not
purchased with real consideration. As I
have written in the latest edition of my book:
The vivid pattern that has now painfully
emerged is that "citizens of the United States", as defined in
federal tax law, are the intended victims of a new statutory slavery that was
predicted by the infamous Hazard Circular soon after the Civil War began. These statutory slaves are now burdened with
a bogus federal debt which is spiralling out of control. The White House budget office recently
invented a new kind of "generational accounting" so as to project a
tax load of seventy-one percent on future generations of these
"citizens of the United States".
It is our duty to ensure that this statutory slavery is soon gone with
the wind, just like its grisly and ill-fated predecessor.
Greg, this is
a bank conspiracy we are dealing with here, and it is clouded by waves and
waves of smoke, mirrors, and dense propaganda.
I don't think the 71% projection is idle speculation. Many informed people throughout the country realize
now that it is only a matter of months before the interest alone on the federal
debt will exceed all federal income tax receipts. I confirmed this in my first petition to Congress, dated December
of 1990. Now, the authors of Bankruptcy
1995 are saying the exact same thing.
The basic
issue with which most Americans are still not quite prepared, intellectually,
emotionally, or financially, is the specter of default by the "United
States". The media are certainly
not courageous enough to grapple with this issue head-on. If the banks obtained Treasury bonds without
consideration, then I say their bonds
should be repudiated, not the bonds which have been purchased ultimately with
the labor of Americans like you and me.
This labor is something which has real value, unlike bank credit which
is created out of thin air. They used
to use pen and ink, then typewriters, now computers. The mechanism is the same;
it's called "bookkeeping".
These same banks have become rich beyond imagination by this swindle. I have not hesitated to say that it is the
greatest fiscal fraud that has ever been perpetrated upon any people at any
time in the history of the world, and nobody
has yet disagreed with that statement!
After reading
everything I could get my hands on, and doing a lot of original research
myself, I came to several important conclusions, one of which is that the
Constitution for the United States of America is, and still should be, the supreme Law of the
Land. This Constitution has recognized
a Sovereign class of Common-Law State Citizens from the beginning. The case law also says that the Union
created by this Constitution is perpetual.
That means the Citizenship which it recognizes is also perpetual,
and cannot be altered or destroyed by the Congress or any of its agents. "Congress cannot by legislation alter
the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and
within whose limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised." Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S.
189. This is the Law.
If I have
done anything significant, I believe it was to prove that the Internal Revenue
Code was written deliberately to refer to Union State Citizens as
"nonresident aliens", among other reasons to give Americans a reason
to avoid such a label. After all, who wants to be known as an
"alien"? The government had
to leave some tracks, and we picked up the trail right out of the parking lot: the Brushaber decision, the first big
case to reach the Supreme Court after the so-called 16th Amendment was declared
ratified, and Treasury Decision 2313, in which the government decided
that Frank R. Brushaber was a "nonresident alien".
It is
important to understand that Brushaber did not go into federal district court
claiming to be a "nonresident alien"; he went into federal court claiming to be a citizen of the State
of New York and a resident of the Borough of Brooklyn, in the City of New
York. It was the government
which applied this label to people who claimed the status of State
Citizens. In conjunction with the Brushaber
decision, you should also study the earlier Pollock decision, which
struck down a federal income tax because it was not apportioned. The apportionment restriction was operative
because the Plaintiff, Charles Pollock, was a Massachusetts State Citizen (not
a citizen of the United States). As a
Union State Citizen, Pollock was immune to federal direct taxation unless it
was apportioned, and it was just not apportioned, period. The Pollock Court also told Congress
that if they wanted to levy such a tax on people like Charles Pollock, they
would have to amend the Constitution to remove the apportionment restriction,
and therein is one of the essential historical roots of the so-called 16th
Amendment.
I am very
sorry to hear about your bicycle accident.
I hope you have recovered completely.
I was also not aware that you now have children; that changes everything, as far as political
activism is concerned. I would not have
done many of the things I have done, like suing Barbara Boxer in the California
Supreme Court, if I had a wife and children of my own; the risks are just too great.
Thanks again
for writing such a thoughtful and detailed letter. I feel privileged to be its recipient.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder
Account for Better Citizenship
enclosure: The
Federal Zone, fourth edition
c/o general delivery
San
Rafael
California
state
zip
code exempt
(DMM
122.32)
June
29, 1993
Dale Peters
c/o general delivery
San Jose, California state
Postal Zone 95157/tdc
Dear Dale:
Thanks very
much for your detailed and enlightening letter, dated June 25, 1993. Before writing this letter to you, I have
had several conversations about your letter with Dr. John C. Alden, and we both
feel that your discussion of California Government Code Section 126 is
extremely important.
You began
your discussion of Section 126 by recommending that I incorporate in a future
edition of The Federal Zone an expose of this particular statute. Your recommendation suggests to me that you
may not have read all the way through Chapter 11, in which I discuss, in broad
strokes, sovereignty and the limits of exclusive federal jurisdiction. Please understand that the book was written
for all Americans, in the federal zone and
in the State Zone, and for this reason I deliberately wanted to avoid getting
too bogged down in the statutes of any particular Union State. The fourth edition is now over 600 pages in
length.
A major point
of law, of course, is the status of the so‑called 14th Amendment. Again, in Chapter 11 of the fourth edition,
I have made reference to the two Utah Supreme Court cases which struck down the
14th Amendment. If you haven't already
reviewed these cases, I strongly recommend that you do so, as soon as
possible. The detailed historical facts
are covered quite well in the earlier of the two -- Dyett v. Turner. I gave a lecture based in part on a
recitation of this case, and John Alden later said I had failed to notice that
the audience was actually on the edges of their seats; that's how powerfully the Utah Court recites
the relevant history. If you are going
to enter this debate as an acknowledged expert, then you must know this
history in detail.
In light of State
v. Phillips and Dyett v. Turner, I would not hesitate to challenge
the constitutionality of Section 126(c) of the California Government Code, on
obvious grounds that a State statute cannot be valid if it makes reference to a
non‑existent provision in the U.S. Constitution. Even the 1879 California Constitution, which
has never been approved by Congress as "republican" in form and the
effective date of which has actually been repealed, cites the U.S. Constitution
as the supreme Law of the Land.
I have been
trying my best to broadcast the importance of Section 4 of the so-called 14th
Amendment, whenever and wherever possible.
Even if it had been properly ratified,
there is a mountain of case law which has held that a ratified 14th Amendment
had no effect whatsoever on the status of Common-Law State Citizens of
the Union States. See, for example, the
cases cited in Appendix Y of The Federal Zone, fourth edition. By
logical extension of these holdings, I would argue that a ratified 14th
Amendment, in and of itself, had no effect whatsoever on the rights, titles and
interests of such Citizens.
The Federal
government, however, does now take the position that the 14th Amendment had the
effect of converting all Americans
into federal citizens who are, by definition, subject to the
jurisdiction of the "United States".
It can be shown that this has been a fraudulent conversion. Richard McDonald and his colleagues have
recently gone so far as to file cross-complaints against State Judges in L.A.
County for violating the Genocide Treaty because the judges in question have
obviously discriminated against State Citizens in criminal
proceedings; this is a very interesting
development to monitor carefully.
Another
factor to consider in your reasoning is the specific group of people who
are explicitly prevented from questioning the validity of the public debt by
virtue of Section 4 of the so‑called 14th Amendment. Treating the U.S. Constitution as a binding
contract, it is not difficult to prove that such a prohibition, even if part of
a lawfully adopted amendment, creates no restrictions on those who are not
"subject to the jurisdiction of the United States", in other words,
not subject to the terms and conditions of this binding constitutional
contract. Employees of the State or
federal governments, and/or federal citizens who are, by definition,
subject to the jurisdiction of the "United States", are both subject to
this provision. Notice how the oath of
office specifically binds Senators and Representatives to uphold and defend
this contract.
However, if
my research proves anything, it proves that Sovereign natural born free State Citizens
are not subject to the jurisdiction of the "United States",
unless they render themselves subject by entering into a valid voluntary
contract with the "United States".
For this reason alone, they would not be subject in any way to Section 4
of the so-called 14th Amendment, nor could the titles to their property be
clouded lawfully by any third-party debt or obligation to which they had not
given their full consent. The
California Civil Code is very relevant here, because it defines the criteria by
which consent is neither real or free ("apparent consent is neither real nor free when ....").
The
"United States" is not authorized to obtain controlling interest in
Sovereign State Citizens, such that it can compel our specific
performance to any third-party debt
or obligation, particularly if that debt or obligation is unconscionable by
reason of federal government bonds which were purchased with Federal Reserve
credit created out of thin air via bookkeeping entries. Moreover, the 1849 California Constitution
has specific provisions prohibiting the paper of any bank to circulate as money
(see Article IV, Sections 34 and 35).
I would even
go so far as to say that all bank mortgages are similarly unconscionable if the
banks in question obtained title conveyances in return for credit similarly
manufactured out of thin air. We are
obviously dealing here with a very big fraud.
See my chapters entitled "Is It Voluntary?" and "The
Fundamental Law" for a general discussion of the Federal Reserve's role in
all of this. Howard Freeman's
discussion of the privilege of limited liability is very relevant here: the discharge of debts with FRN's is treated
by the Federal government as a privilege, the exercise of which to convey real
property actually clouds titles, precisely in the manner you speculate.
Now, I want
to discuss a point of statutory construction.
Your thesis is supported by one of two competing interpretations of
subsection (f) of Section 126. Note, in
particular, where it states that:
"Land held by the United
States", as used in this section means:
(1) lands acquired in fee by purchase or condemnation ....
When I first
read this wording, I interpreted it to mean "lands acquired by the United
States in fee". This
interpretation is supported by the language of subsection (e), where it states:
Jurisdiction ceded pursuant to this
section continues only so long as the land continues to belong to the United
States ....
[emphasis added]
Nevertheless, apply the rule of
statutory construction known as inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius (i.e.,
the explicit mention of one thing is the explicit exclusion of all other things
not mentioned). In all other enumerated
sections of subsection (f), Government Code 126 refers to "lands owned by the United States",
"leaseholds acquired by the United
States", and "any other lands owned by the United States".
Note that subsection (1) does NOT say "lands acquired by the United States in fee"; it says "lands acquired in fee",
lending powerful support to your thesis.
If you acquire
a copy of the videotape which was filmed of my interview with Greg Meadows of
the L.A. Lawman, you will note that I specifically mention the use of
federal land as collateral for the bogus federal debt. I do not, as yet, have the statutory proof that
Congress actually pledged all this land as collateral, but John Nelson claims
to have done so. You should get copies
of his work, if you can. Unfortunately,
my copies of his work are packed up in storage, or I would enclose a copy for
your review. I raise this point because
it is imperative that we isolate the exact mechanism whereby the Federal
Reserve claims to have obtained
controlling interest in real property deeds acquired under "fee
simple" transactions, as opposed to allodial transactions. Without this evidence, your ideas amount to
nothing more than exciting, but unsubstantiated speculation.
Notice also
that Government Code 126 specifically refers to "cession of concurrent criminal jurisdiction to United States
on lands held by general government."
Are you implying that I should interpret this to mean that a State Citizen's
failure to pay his "fair share" of debt interest to the Federal
Reserve should be treated as a crime, particularly if his real property was
acquired in a "fee simple" transaction? The issue here is not just semantic. Why does the heading of the statute refer to "concurrent criminal jurisdiction"? In this vein, you should carefully review
Internal Revenue Code Section 7851(a)(6)(A), which gives force and effect to
Subtitle F of the IRC if and only if the Title is enacted into
law. Subtitle F, as you may already
know, contains all the enforcement provisions of the IRC, and it is
crucial for you to understand that Title 26 has never been enacted into
positive law (see inside covers of any
of the volumes of United States Code titles 1 thru 50).
So, where is
the crime, if federal income taxes are truly "voluntary"? It has to be voluntary for State Citizens
whose incomes derive from sources outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the
"United States", among many other reasons because Congress simply
lacks the authority to compel such Citizens to discharge interest on the
bogus federal debt. The 9th and 10th
Amendments are right on point here. The
use of excise taxes, like taxing the sale of gasoline, creates a voluntary
choice for the buyer which in no way compels the buyer to enter the
transaction; he can always use his
bicycle or walk.
Thanks again
for your terrific letter. Keep up the
good work, and let me know if you have any additional material on this
statute. If you don't already have a
copy, try to get your hands on the study entitled Jurisdiction over Federal
Areas within the States; it
contains over 700 case citations, all extremely relevant to the core issue
here, namely, what is meant by the exercise of "exclusive
Legislation"? On this, I took
specific note of a decision under Government Code 126 which found that "as
to such federal territory Congress had combined powers of a general and a state
government." Inside the federal
zone, Congress has combined powers of a general and a state government; outside the federal zone and inside the 50
States, Congress only has the powers of a general government, and is otherwise
constrained by specific prohibitions found in the constitutional contract to
which ALL government employees are subject.
Of course, the pertinent restriction with which I am primarily concerned
is the absence of apportionment provisions anywhere in the Internal
Revenue Code; as I have documented in
some detail in my book, their absence is proof to me that the IRC's income tax
provisions are confined to the federal zone, and to citizens of that
zone. Otherwise, there is a blatant
violation of the U.S. Constitution.
To date,
nobody has been able to refute my thesis, except to catapult garbage like
rumors that Frank Brushaber was a fiduciary for others who were the real
stockholders (which rumor originated at the Free Enterprise Society, to my
great surprise). This latter rumor is
easily disproven by the very first sentence in the Brushaber decision! Another garbage rumor is that there were
other parties to the Brushaber decision (this again from the Free
Enterprise Society). As of the second
and subsequent editions of The Federal Zone, I have successfully
dismissed the French immigrant propaganda.
In combination with Brushaber's original pleadings, which anyone can
order from the federal court in New York, Treasury Decision 2313 is explosive
and irrefutable in its implications.
The next time you're in the law library, pull the Pollock case
too, and you will discover that he too was a State Citizen (of
Massachusetts) who was, by definition, protected from direct taxation by the apportionment
provisions in the U.S. Constitution. In
light of all the evidence which proves that the 16th Amendment was never
lawfully ratified, the importance of the Pollock case cannot be
overstated.
As you must
know all too well by now, the tax law in America is a masterpiece of
deception. In one sense, I really have
to hand it to its creators.
Unfortunately for them, we have caught up with their fraud, and now
their every move is being watched intensely.
"We have in our political system a government of
the United States and a government of each of the several states. Each of these governments is distinct from
the others, and each has citizens of its own ...." You can't be faulted for relying upon
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, and I say that on the authority of this
very same Supreme Court!
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder
Account for Better Citizenship
enclosures
c/o general delivery
San
Rafael
California
state
zip
code exempt
(DMM 122.32)
June
27, 1993
Stanley Waugh
Nevada Citizen
c/o general delivery
Reno, Nevada state
Postal Zone 89504/tdc
Dear Mr. Waugh:
Thank you for
your thoughtful letter dated 21 June 1993.
I am writing primarily to respond to your statement:
"Based on this historical
documentation, I wonder if you are not making too much ado about citizen v..
Citizen and United States v.. united States.
Punctuation apparently is not crucial."
As you know, there are lots of
historical documents which evidence the word "citizen". You included copies of a North Dakota
document, and the Treaty of Peace between the United States and King George
III. These are not the documents which
count, however.
The documents
which count (in my opinion), and the
documents with which I am chiefly concerned, are the Constitution for the
United States of America (because it is the supreme Law of the Land), the
Internal Revenue Code (because it is the subject of my book), and the Code of
Federal Regulations for Title 26 (which are the promulgated rules for
interpreting the Internal Revenue Code).
Now, if you
have studied statistics, what I am about to say will be entirely familiar to
you. If you have not studied
statistics, continue reading very carefully.
If I flip a coin, what is the probability ("P") of heads? You will answer "one in two", and
that is the right answer. How do we
calculate the value of P in mathematical terms? It's very simple. P
equals one divided by the quantity two raised to the power of one, i.e. 1/(21). We raise two to the power of one because
there are two outcomes to a "trial" (a head or a tail), and we
conduct only one trial, i.e. we flip
the coin only once. The probability P
equals 0.50.
Now,
continuing along with this approach, what is the probability of getting heads
twice in a row? You will answer
"one in four", and that is the right answer again. How do we calculate the value of P in
mathematical terms? P now equals one
divided by the quantity two raised to the power of two, i.e. 1/(22). We
raise two to the power of two because there are two outcomes to a
"trial", and we conduct two trials, i.e. we flip the coin twice.
The probability P equals 0.250.
Continuing along with this sequence, you can compute for yourself that
the probability of three heads in a row is 0.125, and so on.
What does this have to do with "citizens" and
"Citizens", you ask? Plenty,
and here's why. In formal English, a
letter of the alphabet is either upper-case or lower-case; there is no in-between. It's kind of like "heads" and
"tails"; the coin is not
allowed to land on its side. So, for
every occurrence of this term in law, we will observe either lower-case
"c" or UPPER-CASE "C", and nothing in-between.
The rules of
grammar and punctuation require that the first letter of the first word in any
sentence be UPPER-CASE, like the "T" in the word "The" at
the beginning of this sentence. You
will also very often see UPPER-CASE letters used in words that are found in
titles and paragraph headings, for example, the phrase "see Chapter
29: American Citizenship for more
details" might be found in some book or section of law. The UPPER-CASE "C" is used because
it is proper to do so in such situations.
Now, the crux
of the matter is to observe whether lower-case or UPPER-CASE is used when there is no other rule requiring
UPPER-CASE. For example, you might
encounter the phrase: "If you are
a citizen of the United States ...."
In this phrase, the term "citizen" is not the first word of a
sentence, nor is it part of a title or heading; therefore, it can go either way.
It can be either lower-case "citizen" or UPPER-CASE
"Citizen", just like the coin flip.
If you read
through the Internal Revenue Code and observe all occurrences of
"citizen", I believe you will find that the only uses of
"Citizen" are found in the first word of sentences and in paragraph
headings. In all other instances,
where it can go either way (without the influence of some other grammar rule),
you will find only "citizen" or "citizens" and not
"Citizen" or "Citizens".
Just how many
instances of "Citizen" are there, where it can go either way? I have observed none of the latter. I
strongly encourage you to conduct your own investigation of this count. How many instances of "citizen"
are there, where it can go either way?
100? 200? Even if there were only 10, what is the
probability P that every one of them would randomly fall into lower-case? Using our formula from above, the value of P
is 1/(210), right? 2 to the
power of 10 is 1,024, therefore P equals 1/1024, or roughly one in a thousand.
Now try to
compute the value of P when there are 100 trials (coin flips) which can go
either way. You may need a computer to
perform this calculation, but you already know that the value of P in this
instance is an extremely small number.
In other words, the probability that 100 random occurrences of
"citizen" will all evidence a lower-case "c" in the IRC and
the CFR is practically an impossibility.
There must be
another explanation for this consistent pattern, other than chance. I argue that the explanation is design: the evidence of consistent lower-case "c" in
"citizen of the United States" is conclusive proof of a deliberate
design and intent to maintain the same spelling throughout the IRC and the
CFR. Remember, we are not counting
those occurrences of "Citizen" in paragraph headings and in the first
word of a sentence, where grammar requires that UPPER-CASE "C" be utilized.
So much for the mathematical proof. I agree that it is informative to compare
other historical and legal documents, as you have done. I have done such a comparison with the
organic California Constitution of 1849.
There, you will find references to "citizen of the United
States". So, what gives? Is this a reference to a "federal
citizen" or is this a reference to a "State Citizen", or is this
a reference to neither? I have found
the answer to this question in two authorities, Ex parte Knowles and People
v. De La Guerra (see enclosed).
Both of these cases, decided by the California Supreme Court, agreed
that the term referred to a Citizen of one of the Union States and that,
strictly speaking, there was no such thing as a "citizen of the United
States", at least not before the so-called 14th Amendment, and certainly
not before the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
I have
concluded from this research that these courts did not observe the
UPPER/lower-case convention; they
preferred instead to distinguish the two classes of citizenship by using
terminology such as "citizen of a State" and "citizen of the
United States", because the U.S. Constitution does make a distinction
between the government of the several "States", on the one hand, and
the government of the "United States", on the other hand. The court records appear to indicate that
judges were not always sensitive to the ambiguity and multiple meanings that
attach to the term "United States".
Of course, the Hooven case, and Black's Law Dictionary
since Hooven, constitute conclusive proof that the term "United
States" is definitely ambiguous and for this reason the term "united
States" is a unique way to identify the Union States.
Nevertheless,
I contend that the Framers of the Constitution did observe the UPPER/lower-case
convention, and so did the authors of the IRC and CFR. Specifically, in authenticated copies of the
U.S. Constitution you will find consistent references to "Citizen"
and "Citizens", for example, in the constitutional qualifications for
President, Senator and Representative.
These provisions have never been lawfully amended and, for this reason
alone, the original meaning and intent of these provisions is decisive (see
"the proper construction and common understanding" in Ex parte
Knowles, a very crucial authority in this debate).
To add
further fuel to the fire, I have located unofficial copies of the U.S.
Constitution which utilized lower-case "c" in the qualifications for
President, Senator and Representative.
Moreover, similar results obtain from the use of "Person" and
"person"; prior to the
so-called 14th Amendment, the U.S. Constitution utilized "Person", as
in "free Persons" (see 1:2:3).
Are you a "free Person", or are you a 14th Amendment
"person"?
The
voluminous research now assembled by Richard McDonald proves, beyond any shadow
of doubt, that there is an enormous difference between the two statuses. Since the Slaughter House Cases, the
Supreme Court has consistently cited them as the seminal authority for the fact that there are two classes of
citizenship, which correspond to the two governmental jurisdictions: federal and State. There are State Citizens and there are federal citizens. I am strongly urging that we now observe
this UPPER/lower case convention, in order to be clear about which class we are
referring to in written English. In
spoken English, we can be clear by maintaining the distinction between
"State Citizens" and "federal citizens", and by avoiding
any other substitutes or synonyms for these terms. Of course, there are those people (some of whom are undercover
agents) who prefer to confuse and obfuscate this crucial distinction by using
ambiguous, undefined language and by attempting to argue that there has always
been just one class of citizenship in America.
I think it is fair to say that this latter argument is simply not
supported by the relevant legal history.
I am tempted
to digress into a response to your mention of the Free Enterprise Society and
Wayne Bentson. Let me just say that
Wayne has had an advance copy of The Federal Zone, fourth edition, for
several weeks now, and he has fallen silent.
I prefer to let the enclosed materials speak for themselves.
I hope this
letter and its enclosures have addressed most, if not all, of the concerns you
expressed in your thoughtful letter.
Thanks for
writing.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder
Account for Better Citizenship
enclosures
P.S. How does
Wayne Bentson explain T.D. 2313?
It's
crucial, wouldn't you agree?
MEMO
TO: Trusted
Colleagues
FROM: Paul
Andrew Mitchell, Founder
Account
for Better Citizenship
DATE: November
4, 1992
SUBJECT: Trusts,
Foreign and Domestic
I have
recently taken a keen interest in practical applications of The Federal Zone
to trust creation and administration.
In particular, I now believe I have enough evidence to prove that the
correct distinction between foreign and domestic corporations is equally
applicable to trusts. The purpose of
this memo is to share some of this evidence with you, in order to challenge your
thinking on this subject and possibly to open new possibilities for trust
creation and administration.
Black's
Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, is a good place to begin. In this dictionary, we find the following
important definitions:
Foreign
situs trust. A trust which owes its
existence to foreign law. It is treated for tax purposes as a non‑resident
alien individual.
[emphasis added]
Foreign
trust. A trust created and
administered under foreign law.
Black's Law Dictionary,
Sixth Edition, defines "foreign state" very clearly, as follows:
The
several United States*** are considered "foreign" to each other
except as regards their relations as common members of the Union.
[emphasis added]
I have added three asterisks ("***") after
"United States" in order to emphasize that the "United
States" in this context refers to the 50 States of the Union.
Now examine
the definition of "foreign estate or trust" in the definitions
section of the Internal Revenue Code, as follows:
Foreign Estate or Trust. -- The terms
"foreign estate" and "foreign trust" mean an estate or
trust, as the case may be, the income of which, from sources without the United
States which is not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business
within the United States, is not includible in gross income under subtitle A.
[IRC 7701(a)(31)]
Do a bit of grammatical
reconstruction, so as to eliminate the references to "foreign
estate", and you get the following:
The term "foreign trust" means a
trust, the income of which is not
includible in gross income under subtitle A. The income of a foreign trust is not includible in gross income
when it derives from sources which are
without the "United States" and
which are not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business
within the "United States".
Recall the
definition of "foreign situs trust" from Black's supra.
Now compare the IRC definition of "foreign trust" with the IRC
definition of "gross income" for nonresident alien individuals. Notice the component criteria of gross
income for a nonresident alien individual, and their close similarity to the
same criteria for foreign trusts:
In the case of a nonresident alien
individual, except where the context clearly indicates otherwise, gross income includes only ‑‑
(1) gross income which is derived from sources within the United States and
which is not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business
within the United States, and
(2) gross income which is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within
the United States.
[IRC 872(a), emphasis added]
It is crucial to remember that the
term "United States", as used in these
sections of the IRC, means the federal zone, i.e., the territory over which Congress has exclusive legislative
authority. Income which is derived from
sources without the "United States" is not included in gross
income for nonresident aliens.
Likewise, income which is effectively connected with the conduct of a
trade or business without the "United States" is not included
in gross income for nonresident aliens.
Therefore, I have proven that the following rule has identical
application to nonresident aliens and foreign trusts:
Income is excludible
from the computation of "gross income" if it derives from sources
which are without the "United States" and which are not
effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the
"United States".
Now, let's dig
a little deeper in order to determine if this finding is supported by other
sections of the IRC. Find the heading
"foreign trusts" in the Topical Index of the IRC as published by
Commerce Clearinghouse. There you will
find references to "situs" at 402(c) and 404(a)(4). Read these sections carefully:
Taxability of Beneficiary of Certain
Foreign Situs Trusts. ‑‑
For purposes of subsections (a) and (b), a stock bonus, pension, or
profit-sharing trust which would qualify for exemption from tax under section
501(a) except for the fact that it is a
trust created or organized outside the United States shall be treated as if it were a trust
exempt from tax under section 501(a).
[IRC 402(c), emphasis added]
Trusts Created or Organized Outside the
United States. ‑‑ If a stock bonus, pension, or
profit-sharing trust would qualify for exemption under section 501(a) except
for the fact that it is a trust
created or organized outside the United States, contributions to such a trust by an employer which is a resident, or
corporation, or other entity of the United States, shall be deductible
under the preceding paragraphs.
[IRC 404(a)(4), emphasis added]
It is a well established principle of law that the 50
States are "foreign" with
respect to each other, just as the federal zone is "foreign" with respect to each of them (In re
Merriam's Estate, 36 NE 505 (1894)).
The status of being foreign is the same as "belonging to" or
being "attached to" another state or another jurisdiction. The proper legal distinction between the
terms "foreign" and "domestic" is best seen in Black's
definitions of foreign and domestic corporations, as follows:
Foreign
corporation. A corporation doing business in one state though chartered or incorporated
in another state is a foreign corporation as to the first state, and, as
such, is required to consent to certain conditions and restrictions in order to
do business in such first state.
Domestic
corporation. When a corporation is organized and chartered in a particular state, it
is considered a domestic corporation of that state.
[emphasis added]
In light of
all the above, I now contend that untold numbers of trusts have been created on
the basis of a belief that they are domestic trusts when, in fact, they are
foreign trusts, as the terms "domestic" and "foreign" are
defined in the IRC and in the law dictionaries. The Internal Revenue Code was written under authority granted to Congress
for the exercise of exclusive legislative jurisdiction over the federal
zone. Accordingly, the 50 States and
their respective laws are actually foreign
with respect to the federal zone. The
10th Amendment makes it very clear that powers not specifically delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited to the States by the
Constitution, are reserved to the States or to the people. A common-law trust situated in California
exercises rights which are reserved to the people, because California is a common-law
State and because the U.S. Constitution specifically reserves such rights to
the people.
c/o general delivery
San
Rafael
California
state
Postal
Zone 94901/tdc
February
15, 1993
Dagny Sharon
Attorney-at-Law
c/o general delivery
Tustin, California state
Postal Zone 92680/tdc
Dear Dagny:
I appreciated
the opportunity to make your acquaintance at the Libertarian Party Convention
in Sunnyvale this past weekend. I also
regret that we didn't have a chance to spend more time together. Your videotape is quite original and
light-hearted; I hope it brings you
much success.
Had we found
a way to spend more time talking with each other, there is one important matter
which I would definitely have wanted you to consider more carefully. During our conversation in the bar, while I
was eating lunch, you implied that one of your goals is to work towards a
"democracy" for America.
Whether you intended it this way or not, such a goal directly
contradicts Article 4, Section 4 of the Constitution for the United States of
America, to wit:
Section
4. The United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government ....
What exactly
is a "Republican Form" of government? It is one in which the powers of sovereignty are vested in the
people and exercised by the
people. Black's Law Dictionary,
Sixth Edition, makes this very clear:
Republican
government. One in which the powers of sovereignty are vested in the
people and are exercised by the people, either directly, or through
representatives chosen by the people, to whom those powers are specially
delegated. In re Duncan, 139
U.S. 449, 11 S.Ct. 573, 35 L.Ed. 219; Minor
v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 22 L.Ed. 627.
Both the California
State Constitution and the U.S. Constitution state that the latter shall be the
supreme Law of the land. In the U.S.
Constitution, Article 6, Clause 2 states:
This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
At the turn of the century, the U.S.
Supreme Court issued a series of controversial cases now known as The Insular
Cases. These cases were predicated, in
part, on the principle that the Constitution for the United States as such does not extend beyond the
boundaries of the States which are united by and under it. Accordingly, this principle set a crucial
precedent whereby Congress was free to establish a legislative democracy
within the federal zone, instead of a constitutional republic.
The federal
zone is the area over which Congress exercises exclusive legislative
jurisdiction; it encompasses the
District of Columbia and such areas as Guam and the Virgin Islands. Even more important is the fact that this exclusive legislative jurisdiction
extends to all persons who are subject to it, regardless of where they may
reside. As such, the status of "citizen
of the United States" (also known as "U.S. citizen")
causes one to be subject to the letter of all municipal statutes, rules and regulations which Congress enacts
under this exclusive legislative authority.
The constitutional definition of this second class of citizens is
alleged to be the so-called 14th Amendment.
However, two standing decisions of the Utah Supreme Court have struck
down the ratification of this amendment.
Coupled with all the evidence which that Court utilized to arrive at
these decisions, we have therein good cause to conclude that the so-called 14th
Amendment is null and void for fraud and duress. My book The Federal Zone discusses the so-called 14th
Amendment as follows:
Not only did this so-called
"amendment" fail to specify which meaning of the term "United
States" was being used; like the
16th Amendment, it also failed to be ratified, this time by 15 of the 37 States
which existed in 1868. The House
Congressional Record for June 13, 1967, contains all the documentation you
need to prove that the so-called 14th Amendment was never ratified into law
(see page 15641 et seq.). For example, it itemizes all States which
voted against the proposed amendment, and the precise dates when their
Legislatures did so. "I cannot
believe that any court, in full possession of its faculties, could honestly
hold that the amendment was properly approved and adopted." State v.
Phillips, 540 P.2d. 936, 941 (1975).
The Utah Supreme Court has detailed the shocking and sordid history of
the 14th Amendment's "adoption" in the case of Dyett v. Turner,
439 P.2d 266, 272 (1968).
With this
background knowledge firmly in hand, it is easy to explain why the federal
government would reiterate the theme of "democracy" and
"democratic institutions" over and over in its media propaganda. It is now obvious that such programming has
been entirely successful; witness the
large percentage of "Libertarians" who make repeated reference to
their political goal of "democracy" for America. Perhaps without knowing it, they are
participating in the slow but steady demise of the nation symbolized by the
Stars and Stripes, "the Republic for which it stands, one Nation, under
God, indivisible, with liberty and
justice for all." The Insular
Cases made it possible for America to become divisible into a constitutional republic and a legislative
democracy. It is the strategy of
"divide and conquer", being applied once again with much success,
this time to our very own homeland.
I hope I have
given you a few things to think about.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder
Account for Better Citizenship
enclosures: People
v. Boxer pleadings
"Citizen is a Term of Municipal Law"
copy: Jerry
Collette
c/o general delivery
San
Rafael
California
state
Postal
Zone 94901/tdc
February
7, 1993
John Voss, Director
N.C.B.A.
c/o general delivery
Longmont, Colorado
Postal Zone 80502/tdc
Dear John:
Thanks so
much for all the materials which you recently sent, with a copy of your letter
to Mitchell Beals. Time permitting, I
do intend to do a thorough analysis of the written opinions. I am very disappointed, but not surprised,
that the appellate decisions were "not for publication". I took all the decisions to the law library
yesterday, but simply ran out of time.
Enclosed are the preliminary results of that one afternoon at the
library. Nevertheless, a distinct
pattern is emerging already.
Item #1: 28 U.S.C. 297. Assignment of judges to courts of the freely associated compact states
This statute
was part of the comprehensive "Judicial Improvements Act" submitted
to Congress by Peter F. Rodino, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives. It went into law on November 19, 1988 (P.L.
100-702, copy attached). Notice that
subsection (a) refers to "the freely associated compact states" and
to "the laws of the respective compact state". In and of themselves, these references are
significant because I was unable to find any discussion of the legislative
history for this specific statute; the
material cited in U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News skipped any mention of
it. The statute is also too recent for
any case law to have developed, and much too recent for the term "freely
associated compact states" to appear in Words and Phrases, C.J.S.,
or Am Jur, although "compact" has several meanings in Black's
Law Dictionary.
What makes
this term even more significant is the reference to it that is found in
subsection (b), to wit:
The Congress consents the acceptance and
retention by any judge so authorized of reimbursement from the countries referred to in subsection (a)
....
[emphasis added]
I am going on memory now, but I do
seem to recall a key exception to the definition of "state" once
found in Title 28. The exception was to
another provision of Title 28 which utilized the term "State
court". I think this exception has
since been removed by subsequent amendment, but the pre-amendment version
clearly implied that the meaning of "state" as found in the standard
definition was different from the meaning of "state" as
intended by the term "State court" (hence the need for the
"exception" clause).
Therefore, the standard definition implied a federal state, not a Union
State.
In section
297 supra, we are faced with a choice
between two conflicting and mutually incompatible interpretations of the term
"freely associated compact states".
If these states are Union States, then the "compact" may well
be the U.S. Constitution and Congress has admitted openly that Union States are
the "countries referred to in subsection (a)". If these states are other nations in the
family of nations (e.g. China,
Japan), then the "countries" referred to in subsection (a) are these
other nations, and I can only speculate about the "compact" to which
Section 297 refers. Could it be the
U.N. charter? If not, what else could
it be? some international treaty? I wonder if there is a way to inquire of the
House Judiciary Committee without tipping our own hands and giving the
Committee a reason to obfuscate the real answer. Or, what about the Library of Congress, or Congressional Research
Service? I wouldn't put too much faith
into the CRS, in light of the hack job they continue to do on "Frequently
Asked Questions about Federal Income Taxes".
This little
tidbit is highly significant when placed in the larger context of all the
research now assembled into the electronic version of The Federal Zone,
third edition (disk enclosed). In
particular, my interpretation of the distinction between "foreign"
and "domestic" is amply supported by the definitions in Black's
Sixth Edition, and especially by the Supreme Court decision to uphold the New
York Court's decision of In re Merriam's Estate, 36 NE 505 (1894). Black's definitions of foreign and
domestic corporations, in my opinion, leave little room for doubt about the
correct distinction here. Black's
defines "foreign state" very clearly, as follows:
The
several United States*** are considered "foreign" to each other
except as regards their relations as common members of the Union. ... [O]ne
state of the Union is foreign to
another.
[emphasis added]
Item #2: U.S.
Code Service, Lawyers Edition, Interpretive Notes
In light of
the pivotal importance of this distinction between "foreign" and
"domestic", it was revealing to discover the nearly total absence of
case law on this question in the U.S.C.S. Lawyers Edition (where you would
expect a plethora of citations). In the
main body of U.S.C.S. dealing with the IRC definitions in 7701, there is only
one reference to "foreign estate" (a revenue ruling) and there are
only two references to "domestic building and loan association" (a
revenue ruling and a district court ruling).
What is even more revealing is the case of U.S. v. Bardina, the
one and only citation to the IRC definition of "United States", to
wit:
Even though 26 USCS 7701(a)(9) defines
"United States" as
including only United States and
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico is considered as being within United States
for purposes of 6-year statute of limitations on tax crimes; ....
[emphasis added]
Notice the blatant tautology (again). Notice also that this interpretation flatly
contradicts the actual IRC definition:
(9) United States. -- The term "United
States" when used in a geographical sense includes only the States and the District of Columbia.
[IRC 7701(a)(9), emphasis added]
The term "States" is very different from the
term "United States". And, of
course, the corresponding definition of "State" makes absolutely no
mention of any Union States:
(10) State. -- The term "State" shall be construed to include the District of Columbia, where such construction is necessary to carry out provisions of this title.
[IRC 7701(a)(10)]
Moving on to
the Cumulative Supplement for the U.S.C.S. Lawyers Edition, we find a similar
pattern. Here, we find one revenue
ruling concerning a "foreign estate", and four citations to
"resident and nonresident alien", two of which are "TC
Memos", one of which is a "Private Letter Ruling", and one of
which is a "Revenue Ruling".
These are not exactly sterling authorities! One of these citations concerned a former official of a foreign
government that was overthrown while he was in the "United States"
under diplomatic passport. Another
concerned a "US citizen who obtained a US passport before moving to a foreign
country". Another concerned a
spouse's election to be treated as a resident alien under IRC 7701(b). The last citation is worth investigating:
Status
of trust as foreign trust turns upon whether trust is comparable to nonresident
alien individual; trust established
and administered under laws of foreign country whose trustee is a foreign
entity and whose corpus is located in a foreign country is nonforeign trust
even though trust is grantor trust and its income is taxable to grantor who is United States citizen. Rev Rul 87-61, 1987-2 CB 219.
[emphasis added]
It would be
revealing to examine the details about the trust in question, i.e., what was the "foreign
country" under the laws of which the trust was established and
administered. If it was a Union State,
we have a bingo. Who or what was the "foreign
entity" trustee? Where exactly was
the "corpus" located? Notice
the term "nonforeign"; I
presume this means "domestic", based on the IRC definition of
"foreign" at 7701(a)(5) (i.e.,
not domestic). Finally, notice that
there is a "grantor" who is a "United States citizen"; this status appears to be the only mention
of any nexus with the federal zone (if any).
Item #3: United
States Code Annotated (U.S.C.A.)
Again, an
identical pattern is found in the annotated version of the United States Codes. Here, we do find an interesting exception to
the general rule for the federal zone, i.e.,
a Guam corporation is "foreign" for federal income tax purposes:
Guam is not a "territory" within
meaning of this section defining domestic corporation as one created or
organized in United States or under laws of United States or of any state or
territory, and Guam is considered a possession so that its corporations are
foreign for federal income tax purposes.
Sayre & Co. v. Riddell, C.A. Guam, 1968, 395 F.2d 407.
Notice how
carefully they skirt the general issue of exclusive legislative jurisdiction by
ruling that Guam is a "possession", and "possessions" were
not mentioned in the IRC's definition of "domestic" at that time
("or Territory" was deleted in 1977). In other words, in 1968 the definition of "domestic"
mentioned "United States", and "any State or Territory". Since Guam was found to be a
"possession" and not the
"United States", not a
"State" and not a
"Territory", it was not domestic and therefore foreign. This is a fascinating little intricacy in
this semantic jungle.
The only
other citation of any interest is the 1944 case which interpreted the meaning
of "includes". I consider this
decision to be erroneous, for reasons which I explain in detail in Chapter 12
of The Federal Zone, third edition.
Specifically, in formal English, a noun is either a person, a place, or
a thing. The IRC specifically defines a
trust to be a "person" as opposed to a "place" or a
"thing" (see IRC 7701(a)(1)).
The clarification of "includes" at IRC 7701(c) specifically
states that this term shall not be deemed to exclude other things
otherwise within the meaning of term defined;
notice that "persons" and "places" are conspicuously
absent from this clarification of "includes". Therefore, a "trust" cannot be a thing otherwise within the definition of
"transferee" because a trust is a person, by definition, and a
"transferee" is not a person because it is not mentioned in the IRC
definition of "person". I
know this may sound strained, but the IRC definition of "person"
clearly embraces only an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association,
company or corporation; moreover, there
is ample evidence that the IRC does obey strictly the rules of formal English
grammar.
That's
it! Now, don't you get the feeling, as
I do, that they are trying their best to avoid these crucial distinctions
between "foreign" and "domestic"? In light of the clarity which is found in Black's
definitions of foreign and domestic corporations, I would be hard pressed to
demonstrate a clear and consistent pattern among these sparse authorities, many
of which are not even courts. John, I
am forced to conclude that some (if not all) of these cases were contrived, and
that a thorough set of consistent Court authorities is very conspicuous for its
absence.
Item #4: McKinley
v. United States of America, S.D. Ohio, 1992
Time
permitting, I will try my best to analyze the unpublished cases which you
generously provided to me. For now, I
will take a brief look at McKinley
because it will be published, and because there is so little in this decision
which is relevant to The Federal Zone, i.e.:
The Court takes judicial notice that while Ohio is a sovereign state, it is
nevertheless part of the United States and Ohio residents are also residents of
the United States and are subject to taxation. The Court finds the plaintiffs to be residents of the United
States and not non-resident aliens.
[emphasis added]
I guess this
Court failed to read Hooven or the corresponding definitions of
"United States" in Black's.
More importantly, this decision flatly contradicts the definition of
"United States" at IRC 7701(a)(9).
Sure, Ohio is part of the "United States" if "United
States" means the several States of the Union. However, the IRC says that "United States" (when used
in a geographical sense) includes only
the District of Columbia and the States, and "State" shall be
construed to include the District of Columbia (and nothing else)! Since singular and plural are
interchangeable (per Title 1), since "include" is not found in the
clarification of "includes" and "including"
at 7701(c), and since 7701(c) mentions only "things" and not
"persons" or "places", we are entirely justified in arguing
that the term "United States" at 7701(a)(9) omits any mention of the
Union States because they were intended
to be omitted. The rules of statutory
construction support this inference, as do the changes to 7701(a)(9) & (10)
that resulted from the Alaska and Hawaii Omnibus Acts: Alaska and Hawaii were removed from the IRC definition of "State" when they
joined the Union (of freely associated compact states). So, as pro
bono judge of the Sovereign Electrical Circuit of Justice, I hereby reverse
the holding in McKinley v. United States of America and remand with
instructions to take explicit judicial notice of the legislative history of IRC
7701(a)(9), in addition to the well established rules of statutory construction
(see Sutherland, for example).
Item #5: Notes
on Decisions re: 1:6:2 and Null and Void Lloyd
These cases
are either favorable or neutral. Lloyd,
you are a sitting duck. Notice also the
careful IRC distinction between "Secretary of the Treasury" and
"Secretary" at 7701(a)(11).
At first glance, this is bad news for our 7401 challenge, but closer
examination reveals the following:
(A) In General. -- The term "or his
delegate" --
(i) when used with reference to the Secretary of the
Treasury, means any officer, employee, or agency of the Treasury Department
duly authorized by the Secretary of the
Treasury directly, or indirectly by one or more redelegations of authority,
to perform the function mentioned or described in the context;
Even though
IRC 7401 utilizes the term "Secretary", which means the Secretary of
the Treasury or his delegate, the term "or his delegate" means an
officer, employee or agency duly authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury
either directly, or indirectly by one or more redelegations of authority. In other words, Lloyd Bentsen must be in the
loop, either directly, or indirectly by one or more redelegations of
authority. So, it looks as if Null and
Void Lloyd remains in a heap'a trouble;
his colorable acts will spread through the Treasury Department like a
computer virus, infecting everything they touch. We should get an expert on delegation of authority to see what,
if any, redelegations originated from Nicholas Brady and whether they remain
valid and in force after Bentsen's reign began.
Enough for
now. I know you have nothing else to do
but read these technicalities. The
devil is always in the details.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder
Account for Better Citizenship
enclosures
copy: Mitchell
Beals
(great
first name)
c/o general delivery
San
Rafael
California
state
Postal
Zone 94901/tdc
February
8, 1993
John Voss, Director
N.C.B.A.
c/o general delivery
Longmont, Colorado
Postal Zone 80502/tdc
Dear John:
In my letter
to you of February 7, my memory failed me when I referred to Title 28; the correct reference was Title 8 (I got one
number right). I tracked it down today
for you, because I am convinced that one of the "unpublished" cases
which you recently sent to me is completely wrong for ruling that Union States
are not "foreign countries" for purposes of the IRC. Enclosed is stunning proof of my position
from American Jurisprudence. I
picked up the trail in Ballentine's Law Dictionary, Third Edition, where
it defines "sovereign state" as follows:
In the United States, each state
constitutes a discrete and independent sovereignty, and consequently the laws
of one state do not operate of their own force in any other state. 16 AmJur J2d, "Conflict of Laws",
Section 4.
[Ballentine's Law Dictionary, Third Edition]
I had to go
hunting for the corresponding section in Am Jur, because the reference
to Section 4 is a typographical error.
I found what I was looking for at Section 2 instead. The key is to understand that the IRC is a
"municipal law" as far as income taxation is concerned (see
Conclusions in The Federal Zone):
"... [T]he several states ... are otherwise, at least so far as private
international law is concerned, in the
same relation as foreign countries13. The great
majority of questions of private international law are therefore subject to the
same rules when they arise between two states of the Union as when they arise
between two foreign countries, and in the ensuing pages the words "state,"
"nation," and "country" are used
synonymously and interchangeably, there being no intention to distinguish
between the several states of the Union and foreign countries by the use of
varying terminology.
[16 Am Jur 2d, "Conflict of Laws",
Section 2]
Notice, in
particular, the comment in footnote 11:
In the sense of public international
law, the several states of the Union are neither foreign to the United States
nor are they foreign to each other, but
such is not the case in the field of private international law. Robinson v. Norato, 71 RI 256, 43 A2d
467, 162 ALR 362.
Not to be outdone, Black's Sixth Edition chimed
in with the following similar message:
The term "foreign state," as used in a statement of the rule that the
laws of foreign nations should be proved in a certain manner, should be construed to mean all nations and states other than that in which the action is brought; and hence one state of the Union is foreign to another, in the sense of that rule.
[Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth
Edition]
Further
stunning proof of The Federal Zone thesis is found in the Immigration
and Nationality Act (see attached), where Congress slipped by including a key
exception in its statutory definition of "State" at 8 USC
1101(a)(36). Prior to an amendment in
1987, this definition included the language "(except as used in section
310(a) of title III [8 USCS Section 1421(a)])". At that time, Section 1421(a) of Title 8 referred to courts
"in any State" and "all courts of record in any
State". I failed to pull the current text of 1421(a), but the current
1101(a)(36) removed the exception clause!
I would bet that 1421(a) now has a special definition for the term
"State", because 1421(a) must be talking about courts of the Union
States. For corroboration, I have
enclosed a page from the California State Constitution (1879), wherein
California Superior Courts are given clear original jurisdiction to naturalize
and "to issue papers therefor".
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder
Account for Better Citizenship
enclosures:
photocopies of evidence
c/o general delivery
San
Rafael
California
state
Postal
Zone 94901/tdc
February
1, 1993
Rich Pralle, CFS
R D P & Associates
c/o general delivery
Santa Rosa, California state
Postal Zone 95404/tdc
Dear Rich:
I may have
misunderstood something which you said about the Internal Revenue Code. Am I correct in remembering you say that IRC
6672 concerned "withholding agents"?
When I returned home, I looked up this section:
Section 6672. Failure to Collect and Pay Over Tax,
or
Attempt to Evade or Defeat Tax
(a) General
Rule. -- Any person required to collect,
truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this title who
willfully fails to collect such tax,
or truthfully account for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat
any such tax or the payment thereof, shall,
in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded,
or not collected, or not accounted for and paid over. No penalty shall be imposed under section 6653 or part II of
subchapter A of chapter 68 for any offense to which this section is applicable.
[IRC 6672, emphasis added]
As you can see, there is no explicit mention of
"withholding agents" in IRC 6672.
The section to which I was referring in our conversation was IRC
7701(a)(16):
(16)
Withholding Agent. -- The term "withholding agent" means any
person required to deduct and withhold any tax under the provisions of section 1441, 1442, 1443, or 1461.
[IRC 7701(a)(16), emphasis added]
Sections
1441, 1442 and 1443 are too long to reproduce here. Their headings provide some indication of their contents:
Section
1441. Withholding of Tax on Nonresident
Aliens
Section
1442. Withholding of Tax on Foreign
Corporations
Section
1443. Foreign Tax-Exempt Organizations
The following
is the entire text of IRC 1461. This
section is important because it specifically makes "withholding
agents" liable for the taxes they deduct and withhold:
Section
1461. Liability for Withheld Tax
Every
person required to deduct and withhold any tax under this chapter is hereby
made liable for such tax and is hereby indemnified against the claims and
demands of any person for the amount of any payments made in accordance with
the provisions of this chapter.
[IRC 1461, emphasis added]
In other
words, the persons from whom they withhold are not liable for the taxes
which they withhold. That is to say,
nonresident aliens are not liable for the taxes that are withheld from
the dividends they receive from stock issued by domestic corporations (see
Treasury Decision 2313).
So, we can
link 1461 and 6672 because withholding agents are liable for the taxes
they deduct and withhold, i.e., they
are required to collect and pay over the tax imposed by 1461 (combining the
language of 6672 and 1461); if they don't
pay the taxes they deduct and withhold, then they would be liable to the
penalty defined in 6672.
Our research
indicates that "withholding agents" are the only ones who are specifically
made liable by the IRC for the payment of income taxes. If you can find another IRC section which specifically makes anyone else liable
for the payment of income taxes, I would appreciate getting the exact citation
from you.
On another
subject, I have several serious problems with the T.A.G. flyer entitled "Are
You Really Liable?" One excerpt
from this flyer reads:
Section
7701(a)(1) defines the term person as:
"The term 'person' shall be construed to mean and include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation."
Well now, that certainly seems easy enough
and section 7701(a)(1) makes no mention of the term "U.S.
Individual". Now, look at section
7701(a)(30):
"The
term 'United States person' means -
(A) a citizen or resident of the United States,
(B) a domestic partnership,
(C) a domestic corporation, and
(D) any estate or trust ...."
There is no mention of the term "U.S.
Citizen"; "Individual",
or "U.S. Individual".
...
Assuming the term "U.S." means
United States, then the 1040 would be for a "United States
Individual", the 1120 for a "United States Corporation".
In my opinion, this sequence of logic is
misleading. The flyer assumes that the
term "U.S. means United States".
Fair enough. If it doesn't mean
"United States", the flyer does not tell us what else it might
mean. So, for purposes of this
analysis, the term "U.S." means "United States".
However, the
flyer also states that there is no mention of the term "U.S.
Citizen". This is technically
correct, because the IRC never utilizes a capital "C" when it refers
to "citizens of the United States" or "United States citizens"
(except when a capital "C" is required in the first word of a
sentence or heading). But, this is also
misleading, because the same flyer quotes section 7701(a)(30) which does mention "citizen or resident
of the United States", i.e.,
"citizen of the United States" or "resident of the United
States".
The flyer
also states that there is no mention of the term "Individual" or
"U.S. Individual". Again, this
is technically correct, because the IRC utilizes the lower-case "i"
when it refers to individuals. But, for
similar reasons, the flyer is misleading because "citizens of the United
States" and "residents of the United States" are among the
"individuals" to whom the IRC refers. This is so because "person" means and includes an
"individual"; it also means
and includes a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or
corporation. Therefore, an "individual" is a person in the same way that a
horse is an animal; moreover, using
permissible substitution, the term "United States person" means and
includes a "U.S. individual".
The "U.S. individuals" to whom the IRC refers are the
"citizens of the United States" and "residents of the United
States". This can be confirmed at
26 CFR 1.1-1 et seq.
For similar
reasons, I also consider the following excerpt of the flyer to be misleading
and erroneous:
At section 6011, when required by
regulations prescribed by the Secretary any person made liable for any
tax imposed by this title ... shall make a return. Did the Secretary
prescribe by regulations that a citizen of the United States was liable for
filing? No, of course not.
[emphasis added]
Here's the corresponding section of
the CFR:
1.6011-1 General requirement of return, statement, or
list.
(a) General
rule. Every person subject to any tax, or required to collect any tax,
under Subtitle A of the Code, shall make
such returns or statements as are required by the regulations in this chapter. The return or statement shall include
therein the information required by the applicable regulations or forms.
Another important regulation is the
following:
1.6012-1 Individuals required to make returns of income.
(a) Individual citizen or resident --
(1) In
general. Except as provided in
subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, an
income tax return must be filed by every individual ... for each taxable
year beginning after December 31, 1972, during which he received $750 or more
of gross income, if such individual is:
(i) A
citizen of the United States, whether residing at home or abroad,
(ii) A
resident of the United States even though not a citizen thereof ....
So, I think
the T.A.G. flyer is entirely wrong when it states that "of course"
the Secretary has "not" prescribed by regulations that a citizen of
the United States was liable for filing.
I have just proven that the Secretary has prescribed regulations which
require a "citizen of the United States" to make an income tax
return, provided that his "gross income" exceeds the specified dollar
threshold. The computation of gross
income for nonresident aliens is defined at IRC 872(a); in most situations, that computation results
in a gross income of zero. Frank
Brushaber's "gross income" was not zero because he received a
dividend from a "U.S. corporation", namely, the Union Pacific
Railroad Company. It was a U.S.
corporation because it was incorporated by Congress.
Finally, I
realize that the California voter registration form does say "For U.S.
Citizens Only" in red letters across the top of the form. However, the affidavit on that
registration form is the statement that matters:
READ THIS STATEMENT AND WARNING PRIOR TO
SIGNING
I
am a citizen of the United States and will be at least 18 years of age at
the time of the next election. I am not
imprisoned or on parole for the conviction of a felony. I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that
the information on this affidavit is true and correct.
Perjury is punishable by imprisonment in
state prison for two, three or four years.
Section 126 Penal Code
[emphasis in original]
I contend
that the "citizen of the United States" to which this form refers is
the same "citizen of the United States" to which the Internal Revenue
Code refers, to which the Code of Federal Regulations refers, and to which the
so-called Fourteenth Amendment refers.
If you are interested, we have now located two Utah Supreme Court cases
which struck down the so-called Fourteenth Amendment. The language of Section 1 of that amendment is almost identical
to the definition of "citizen" that is found in 26 CFR 1.1-1(c). Given that the so-called Fourteenth
Amendment was never properly approved and adopted, the earliest definition of
"citizen of the United States" that we have been able to find in law
is found in the 1866 Civil Rights Act.
Thanks for
your consideration.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder
Account for Better Citizenship
copy: Rleen Joy
Don
Fletcher
c/o general delivery
San
Rafael, California
Postal
Zone 94901/tdc
December
22, 1992
Andrew Melechinsky
Constitutional Revival
c/o general delivery
Enfield, Connecticut
Postal Zone 06083/tdc
Dear Andy:
Thanks very
much for your unsigned note, postmarked December 16, 1992. In response to my previous question
concerning 1:8:17 in the U.S. Constitution, you wrote the following:
Answer.
It is self evident that no state or any other governing body is
authorized to make laws for the District of Columbia or other enclaves which
belong to the United States. It should
be obvious that this provision of the Constitution was designed to make
Congress the equivalent to the Enfield Town Council or the Podunk Board of
Selectmen for the purpose of governing those areas.
[my emphasis]
I couldn't
agree more with your answer. In fact,
it is uncanny how close our thinking is on this question. In my research and writings, I often refer
to Congress as "City Hall" for the federal zone. In other words, if Congress wants to pass a
"dog leash" law for D.C., it is authorized to do so by 1:8:17 in the
Constitution. This dog leash law would
apply only inside D.C., and nowhere
else, right?
Now, let's
use a similar example, only this time let's incorporate a tax in our
example. Let's say that Congress wants
to tax the sale of dog leashes inside D.C.
This is an excise tax, right?
Congress is empowered to levy excise taxes, right? But, here's the rub: must the tax rate be uniform throughout the 50 States?
Wait a
minute, you ask, the question of uniformity only applies to federal excises
levied inside the 50 States. This tax
on the sale of dog leashes only applies inside the District of Columbia. The 50 States are irrelevant to the
application of this tax and, therefore, the issue of uniformity is also
irrelevant, is it not? Such an excise
tax need not be uniform throughout the 50 States, because it has no application
anywhere inside the 50 States. It is a "municipal"
tax. No State or any other governing
body is authorized to levy such a tax inside
D.C., just as Congress is not authorized to levy such a tax outside D.C. and inside the 50 States.
The key court
decision on this question is Downes v. Bidwell, which is one of The
Insular Cases, as they are called. You
might also read the several articles which appeared in the Harvard Law
Review on these cases. I have
enclosed a memo which I wrote some time ago on exclusive authority as
applied to direct taxes.
You also wrote that "it takes a wild imagination to
visualize the District of Columbia as a second 'United States'. Even if it was, it would still be subject to
the constraints of the Bill of Rights."
Let's postpone correspondence on the Bill of Rights until you and I can
clarify our respective positions on federal taxing authority, OK? In this context, the key question is
this: are federal municipal taxes subject to the uniformity and apportionment rules
found in the Constitution? My answer is
this: no, because those restrictions
only apply to federal laws which are levied inside the 50 States. One of the Supreme Court's best statements
on this dual or heterogeneous attribute of federal laws is the following
excerpt from the Hooven case:
... [T]he United States** may
acquire territory by conquest or by treaty, and may govern it through the
exercise of the power of Congress conferred by Section 3 of Article IV of the
Constitution ....
In exercising this power, Congress is not subject to the same
constitutional limitations, as when it is legislating for the United States***.
... And in general the guaranties [sic]
of the Constitution, save as they
are limitations upon the exercise of executive and legislative power when
exerted for or over our insular possessions, extend to them only as Congress, in the exercise of its legislative
power over territory belonging to the United States**, has made those guaranties [sic]
applicable.
[Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652
(1945)]
[emphasis added]
Now, let's
imagine, just for the sake of argument, that the income tax provisions in the Internal Revenue Code are municipal statutes, which are "not
subject to the same constitutional limitations" which apply when Congress
"is legislating for the [50] United States" of America. You will notice that the IRC's petroleum
taxes are uniform throughout the 50 States, and in those provisions the term
"State" is defined to include the 50 States. However, when it comes to the graduated
income tax, the term "State" is defined to include only the District
of Columbia (and none of the 50 States). Isn't this odd? Not
really, when you realize that the graduated income tax is, indeed, a municipal
statute which is unaffected by the uniformity and apportionment restrictions in
the Constitution, for the reasons discussed above.
Last but not
least, we have in America a government of the "United States" and a
government of each of the several States;
each has citizens of its own.
Therefore, we have State Citizens, and we have federal citizens
(also known as "citizens of the United States"). See the Slaughter House Cases for the
seminal authority on this dual citizenship.
Now, the exercise of State Citizenship is an unalienable right,
endowed by the Creator (see the Declaration of Independence). But, and this is important, even crucial to
the issue of taxation, federal citizenship is a statutory privilege, the
exercise of which can be taxed with an excise tax without uniformity
throughout the 50 States. The term
"citizen of the United States" was first expressed in law by
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Some
people say that it was put into the Constitution by the so-called 14th
Amendment, but we have now located two (2) Utah Supreme Court cases which found
that the Amendment was not properly ratified.
Therefore, the status of "United States citizen" is at best the creation of Congressional
legislation -- endowed by Congress and NOT by the Creator.
So, think of
federal citizens as citizens of the federal zone. The taxation of their incomes is a municipal
excise tax, just like the tax on dog leashes discussed above. The "income" is not the subject of
the tax; the subject of the tax is the
exercise of the statutory privilege known as federal citizenship (also
known as "U.S. citizenship").
The "income" is simply the measure of the tax.
I hope I have
made some sense out of the jungle of legal jargon and double-talk which gets in
the way of clear thinking on this subject.
Admittedly, the whole situation is made immensely complicated by the
deliberate vagueness and confusion which were incorporated into the Internal
Revenue Code and its regulations in the
CFR. But, I am confident we have now
proven that the graduated income tax provisions of the IRC are municipal
statutes which apply only to the federal zone (e.g. federal employees) and to the citizens of that zone, no
matter where they might "reside".
In fact, to be a "resident" of California, strictly speaking,
means that one is a federal citizen who resides outside the federal zone
and inside California. Technically
speaking, a State Citizen does not "reside" in the State of
his domicile.
I would
appreciate getting your written comments on all the above. In the meantime, thanks for your continuing
work to benefit the Freedom Movement in America today.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder
Account for Better Citizenship
c/o general delivery
San
Rafael, California
Postal
Zone 94901/tdc
November
4, 1992
Karl Loren, Author
c/o general delivery
Burbank, California state
Postal Zone 91504/tdc
Dear Karl:
Thank you for
the complimentary copy of Verity, Volume 2, Number 10, dated November 1,
1992. Although I do not care to get
embroiled in the trust controversy described in this issue of Verity,
your newsletter does contain the following paragraphs which, in my humble
opinion, contain serious errors.
Numbers in [brackets] are my paragraph numbers, for ease of reference:
[1] We in the United States tax U.S.
Citizens on their income whether they live in the U.S. or in a foreign country.
We tax those U.S. Citizens,
regardless of residence, on their income whether they received it from within
the United States or from outside
the United States.
[2] We even go so far as to tax aliens who reside
within the United States ‑‑
on their income from either within the U.S.
or outside the U.S.
[3] A U.S. Supreme Court case [Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924)]
requires the U.S. Citizen abroad to
pay taxes in the U.S.
[4] The Supreme court ruled in this case that the
United States has the power to tax its citizens on their worldwide income solely by reason of their citizenship.
[5] "No other major country in the world
taxes its nonresident citizens on their
foreign-source incomes at all" according to Marshall J. Langer, Professor
of Law, Miami University, author of Practical
International Tax Planning. There
is even a tax law that makes it illegal to change your U.S. citizenship for the purpose
of avoiding taxes! [citing IRC Section
877(a)]
[6] We even go so far as to tax nonresident aliens who reside outside
the U.S., but who receive income
FROM within the United States.
[citing IRC Sections 871(a) and 871(b)]
[7] But, the IRS certainly does not try to
collect income taxes from a nonresident alien who receives his ONLY income from
sources without the United States.
[8] It would be ludicrous to even pause to
consider the possibility of the United
States claiming tax jurisdiction over a nonresident alien earning income from a non-US Source!
I am somewhat chagrinned to be writing
this letter in the first place, because you purchased The Federal Zone
some months ago, and your written communications to me seemed to imply that you
understood, and agreed with, the book.
The above quoted paragraphs from Verity, dated November 1, 1992,
now leave me wondering just how much of The Federal Zone you actually
read and understood. Let me proceed
with an analysis of your statements, paragraph-by-paragraph:
[1] The
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and the regulations which promulgate that Code (26
CFR) do not impose federal income taxes on "U.S. Citizens". The regulations at 26 CFR 1.1‑1(b) and
(c) state that income tax liability is imposed on the worldwide income of
"citizens of the United States" and "residents of
the United States". In English,
there is a world of difference
between a proper noun and a common noun.
Proper nouns are capitalized;
common nouns are not. If you
think this distinction is irrelevant or merely academic, then it is now
incumbent upon you to carry the burden of finding and demonstrating one single reference to "U.S. Citizens"
in the IRC and its regulations.
References to "Citizen" or "Citizens"
in the first word of a sentence, or in paragraph headings, do not count,
because formal English requires that terms in such grammatical positions be
capitalized.
Moreover, the Hooven case
quoted and discussed in The Federal Zone proves that the term
"United States" has at least three different meanings in law. This fact is supported by the same meanings
which are found in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition. The late John Knox once confided to me that
the Solicitor General in De Lima v. Bidwell actually argued that the
term "United States" has at least five (5) different meanings in the
Constitution. I am also told that James
Madison anticipated the ambiguity found in the term "United States",
and documented this ambiguity in his notes on the Constitutional
Convention. These notes were reportedly
published in 1840, but to date I have been unsuccessful in locating a copy of
these notes. Your paragraph [1] is
ambiguous for failing to define precisely which of these several meanings you
are utilizing. This is crucial because
you make the all-important distinction between income derived from sources within the "United States" and
income derived from sources without
the "United States". A
precise definition of "United States" is therefore pivotal to any and
all discussions of federal tax law.
Moreover, the 50 States are
considered to be "foreign countries" with respect to the "United
States", for purposes of federal taxation, because the regulations clearly
define the "United States" to be the territory over which the federal
government has exclusive rights.
This is the very same term that is found in 1:8:17 in the Constitution
and for this reason "exclusive" is also a pivotal term. The 50 States of the Union retain all rights
not reserved by the people and not explicitly enumerated for the federal
government by the Constitution (see the 9th and 10th Amendments for proof).
[2] Again, this paragraph fails to provide
a precise definition of "United States". Moreover, it makes reference to "aliens" who
"reside within the United States".
If you study IRC 7701(b)(1)(B) very carefully, you will discover that an
"alien" is an individual who is not a "citizen of the
United States" and a "nonresident" is an individual who is not a
"resident of the United States (within the meaning of subparagraph (A)". IRC 7701(b)(1)(A) is important because it
defines the three tests which distinguish "resident aliens" from
"nonresident aliens". These
three tests are the only ways in which an "alien" can be a
"resident alien". Therefore,
these three tests define "residence" for purposes of federal income
taxation. See also IRS Publication
519: "For tax purposes, an alien
is an individual who is not a U.S. citizen." Therefore, a State Citizen who is not also a federal citizen
is an alien for federal tax purposes.
Your paragraph [2] is vague and therefore void.
[3] Again, you make reference to a
"U.S. Citizen". See
discussion of paragraph [1] above.
[4] Now you make reference to the
"United States", "its citizens" and
"their citizenship". Oddly,
this paragraph is grammatically and legally correct, because the Congress does
have exclusive legislative jurisdiction over its own federal citizens,
no matter where on planet Earth they may "reside". The enclosed materials go into great depth
to explain the distinction between federal citizens and State Citizens,
so I won't belabor this distinction here.
It is important to realize that the distinction between these two
classes of citizenship is as important and fundamental as the distinction between
the State and federal governments. See
the Cruikshank case, K. Tashiro v. Jordan, and Ex parte
Knowles for proof. The Slaughter House Cases are the seminal
decisions in this area. If you fail to
educate yourself about this important legal history, you will continue to
propagate the kind of confusion which is evident in Verity for November
1, 1992.
[5] Here again you are back on track, but
it is not clear whether you are back on track knowingly and intentionally,
or not. Congress has authority to tax
its own federal citizens, wherever they reside and wherever the source
of their income. Therefore,
"resident citizens" and "nonresident citizens"
are treated the same in federal tax law because the worldwide income of both groups is taxed. Your paragraph [5] does make a grievous
error, however, by stating that the tax law makes it illegal to change your
"U.S. citizenship" for the purpose of avoiding taxes. Your paragraph [5] then cites IRC
877(a). This is not what Section 877(a)
says, nor is expatriation made illegal by any subparagraphs of Section
877. Read them! IRC 877 merely discusses the rules which
shall govern federal tax liability when expatriation occurs. It does not outlaw expatriation!
[6] This paragraph is also correct on its
face, but it too suffers for lacking a precise definition of "United
States" and "U.S."
Sections 871(a) and 871(b) are governed by the statutory definition of
"United States" that is found at IRC 7701(a)(9). This definition, in turn, is governed by the
statutory definition of "State" that is found at IRC
7701(a)(10). IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO
TAKE CAREFUL NOTE OF THE EXACT WORDING OF 7701(a)(10):
The term "State" shall be
construed to include the District of
Columbia, where such construction is necessary to carry out the provisions
of this title.
[emphasis added]
Now, it is true that the terms
"includes" and "including" are qualified by
IRC 7701(c), but notice that "include" is not qualified by IRC
7701(c). This may seem like nit-picking,
but the published rules of statutory construction do apply here. Specifically, the rule of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius
(the inclusion of one is the exclusion of others) states that an
irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or excluded from a
statutory definition was intended to be omitted or excluded. The term "include" is excluded
from 7701(c). The term
"California" is excluded from 7701(a)(10). Therefore, all by itself, this rule of
statutory construction allows us to infer that "include" is not
expansive and "California" is excluded from the statutory
definition of "State" found at 7701(a)(10).
There are other rules of statutory
construction which produce the same result, e.g.,
ejusdem generis (the federal zone and
the 50 States are not in the same general class of entities because the 50
States are members of the Union, while the areas within the federal zone are
not). Now the burden is upon you to
prove otherwise. Don't forget that any
doubt must be resolved in favor of those upon whom the tax is sought to be
laid; the Supreme Court has said so,
more than once!
[7] The IRS most certainly does try to collect income taxes from
nonresident aliens who receive their ONLY income from sources without the
"United States". For purposes
of income taxation, the "United States" as defined in the IRC is no
larger than the territory over which Congress exercises exclusive legislative
authority, i.e., the federal
zone. If you study Treasury Decision
2313 carefully, you will come to discover that Frank Brushaber was classified by
the Treasury Department as a nonresident alien. His court documents prove that he claimed to be a State Citizen
who lived and worked in New York City.
Therefore, State Citizens who are not also federal citizens
are "nonresident aliens" as far as federal income taxes are
concerned. How many millions of
Americans have been victimized by the deliberate and criminal confusion which
has been fostered by vague and ambiguous terms in the IRC? I say at least 100 million, counting all
those who have paid income taxes and passed away since 1913.
[8] It certainly is ludicrous for the "United States" to claim tax
jurisdiction over nonresident aliens who earn income from "non-US"
sources, but IT makes this claim all the time.
By IT I mean the authority granted to Congress by 1:8:17 and 4:3:2 in
the U.S. Constitution, which authority MUST be lawfully delegated to the
Internal Revenue Service (a private mercantile organization which collects
interest payments for the Federal Reserve banks).
The evidence is overwhelming that
Congress simply does not have exclusive legislative authority over the 50
States. The study entitled
"Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within the States" makes this case over
and over and over. At last count, this
study cites more than 700 federal and state court cases which all found the
same thing: Congress does not enjoy
exclusive legislative jurisdiction inside the boundaries of the 50 States until
and unless a State Legislature cedes its sovereign jurisdiction to
Congress, and does so for a specific parcel of land (called an
"enclave").
At this point in the game, Karl, you
can no longer claim ignorance of this massive body of case law. Congress cannot impose a direct tax on State
Citizens unless that tax is duly apportioned. The earnings of State Citizens are exempt from taxation by
the fundamental law. The apportionment
rule is found in the fundamental law, but there are no apportionment provisions
anywhere in the Internal Revenue Code.
The burden is now upon you to prove otherwise!