Appendix P

 

Miscellaneous Letters

 


Reader's Notes:

 


Registered U.S. Mail #R 756 488 761

Return Receipt Requested

                                          c/o general delivery

                                          San Rafael

                                          California state

                                          zip code exempt (DMM 122.32)

 

                                          December 29, 1993

 

Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice

Hon. Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice

Hon. John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice

Hon. Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice

Hon. Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice

Hon. Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice

Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice

Hon. Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice

Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice

Supreme Court of the United States

One First Street, Northeast

Washington, District of Columbia

 

Subject:  NOTICE AND DEMAND TO CEASE AND DESIST

 

Dear Honorable Justices:

 

      Notice is hereby formally served upon you, both individually and severally, that conclusive evidence now available to me proves that the so-called 14th amendment to the Constitution for the United States of America was never properly approved and adopted.  I am under a legal and moral obligation to intervene on behalf of the many millions of Americans whose status has been unlawfully subsumed under federal jurisdiction, because this was done without either their knowledge or their informed consent.

 

      As required by Title 28, United States Code, Section 453 (Oaths of justices and judges), you have solemnly sworn (or affirmed) that you would administer justice without respect to persons, and faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all duties incumbent upon you as Justices of the U. S. Supreme Court under the Constitution and laws of the United States, so help you God (see revision at 104 Stat. 5124).

 

      Please take formal notice that it is quite simply impossible for you, or for any other public officials anywhere in America, to perform your solemn duties under this oath (or affirmation), if the weight of material evidence should prove that the exact provisions of that Constitution are still in doubt.  Your oath (or affirmation) is a binding contract which I hereby seek to enforce, according to the dictates of my conscience, my Creator, and the supreme Law of the Land, as lawfully amended.

 

      Pursuant to the Guarantee Clause (4:4) and to the opinion of the California Court of Appeal in Steiner v. Darby et al., 88 Cal.App.2d 481, 199 P.2d 429 (1948: the year of my birth as a Sovereign natural born Free Citizen of one of the United States), it is not only my Right, but also my Duty, to inform you that the weight of material and historical evidence proves that the so‑called 14th amendment is not now, nor has it ever been, a lawful provision in the Constitution for the United States of America.  This proposed amendment failed to be ratified in accordance with the requirements of Article 5 of the Constitution.  At the very least, the evidence which I now lay before you consists of the following public records and other documents:

 

      State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d. 936, 941 (1975)

      Dyett v. Turner, 439 P.2d 266, 270 (1968)

      28 Tulane Law Review 22

      11 South Carolina Law Quarterly 484

      House Congressional Record, June 13, 1967, p. 15641 et seq.

 

      Because the available evidence indicates to me that all Federal and State judicial officers, without exception, have taken solemn oaths (or affirmations) which disagree with the Constitution for the United States of America as lawfully amended, I am now left entirely without any unbiased judicial forum in which to seek review and declaratory relief in the matter of the following federal questions:

 

(1)   The constitutional qualifications for election to the offices of President, Senator, and Representative retain the meaning they had when the Constitution was first drafted (see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393-633 (1856)).

 

(2)   There is still no constitutional authority for the status of a "citizen of the United States", unlike the proper status of a "Citizen of one of the States United" (see 1:2:2, 1:3:3, 2:1:5, and People v. De La Guerra, 40 Cal. 311 (1870): the term "United States" here means "States united";  see also Hooven & Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945)).

 

(3)   There is still no constitutional provision prohibiting anyone from questioning the validity of the public debt, and freedom of speech is still guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.

 

(4)   All provisions in Federal law are necessarily null and void, to the extent that they make reference, either implicitly or explicitly, to any section(s) of the failed 14th amendment.

 

(5)   All provisions in State constitutions and statutes are likewise null and void, to the extent that they make reference to any section(s) of the failed 14th amendment (e.g. see the attached letter to the California State Lands Commission, to which all recipients fell silent).

 

 

DEMAND TO CEASE AND DESIST

 

      Therefore, by virtue of the superior authority which is vested in me by my Creator, as a direct consequence of my natural birth as a qualified member of the Sovereign People, "by whom and for whom all government exists and acts" (see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)), and on behalf of each and every member of the Sovereignty known and lawfully identified as "We, the People of the United States" of America (see Preamble), I hereby demand and do hereby order you to Cease and Desist from any and all of the following official acts on your part:

 

(1)   any and all official oaths or affirmations which are predicated in any way on the lawful ratification of the so‑called 14th amendment;

 

(2)   any and all judicial decisions or determinations which are predicated in any way on the lawful ratification of the so‑called 14th amendment, including but not limited to:

 

(a)   decisions or determinations which construe in any way the rights, responsibilities, privileges, immunities, and liabilities of "citizens of the United States" as that term is used in any and all Acts of Congress and administrative rules and regulations promulgated by any employees of the Executive Branch of the Federal government (e.g. 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1(c));

 

(b)   decisions or determinations which attempt in any way to enforce the administration of the individual income tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code upon the People of the 50 Union States, or upon their private property (see Treasury Decision 2313 and Brushaber's pleadings);

 

(c)   decisions or determinations which uphold in any way the validity of the public debt of the Federal and State governments, acting in whatever capacity and through whatever agency, lawfully delegated or not (see 1:6:2);

 

(d)   decisions or determinations which recognize in any way the lawful existence of a "State within a state", with particular reference to the political body defined by the population of "citizens of the United States" who may inhabit the 50 Union States at any given moment, however those terms may be defined (see 4:3:1 and the case law interpreting the Buck Act, 4 U.S.C. 105-113).

 

      Until such time as you demonstrate officially that each and every one of you has executed a solemn oath which agrees with the Constitution for the United States of America as lawfully amended, I will take the absence of such an oath to mean that you are individually and severally biased in your understanding of the Constitution and that you are, therefore, unqualified to rule on these matters and hereby recused from doing so.

 

      The burden of proof is now upon you to authenticate the Constitution which you agree to uphold, now and at all times in the future, using established principles of Law and the published rules of evidence.

 

      I realize that this NOTICE AND DEMAND TO CEASE AND DESIST may constitute an historically unprecedented act on my part, as an individual California Citizen who enjoys neither elected nor appointed authority of any kind at this moment in time.  Nevertheless, this act is necessitated by the fact that there is presently not one single judge, magistrate, or commissioner anywhere in America whose oath of office is not colored by faulty (non-existent) provisions in the federal Constitution which they are sworn to uphold.

 

      I realize also that this Notice and Demand must be general in nature and in substance, because of the far-reaching consequences which issue from the facts and Law which impugn federal "adoption" of the so-called 14th amendment.  It is not my purpose here to anticipate, nor to delineate, each and every such consequence.  Better minds than I should hesitate to assume such a weighty task by themselves.

 

      Therefore, for the time being, I will leave it to you, and to the capable expertise on your respective staffs, to find and recommend the course of action which will best execute this Demand with maximum justice, liberty, and domestic tranquility.  These are, after all, the stated goals of our chosen form of government in the united States of America (see Preamble).

 

      Furthermore, I do explicitly reserve my unalienable Right to take whatever steps I deem necessary and proper to correct, at any time, a government which has now drifted so far off course, it hardly resembles the constitutional Republic it was designed to be (see also Declaration of Independence (1776)).

 

      Thank you very much for your attention, and for your consideration.

 

 

Respectfully submitted,

 

Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris

 

California Citizen, on behalf of the

People of the united States of America

 

All Rights Reserved AT LAW

 

 

NOTICE TO PRINCIPALS IS NOTICE TO AGENTS.

NOTICE TO AGENTS IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPALS.

 


copies:           Marin County Grand Jury, San Rafael

                  Bill Clinton, President

                  Pete Wilson, Governor of California

                  Barbara Boxer, U.S. Senator

                  Dianne Feinstein, U.S. Senator

                  Lynn Woolsey, U.S. Representative

                  Janet Reno, Attorney General

                  Drew S. Days, III, Solicitor General

                  William K. Suter, Supreme Court Clerk

                  Frank D. Wagner, Reporter of Decisions

                  Alfred Wong, Marshal

                  Shelley L. Dowling, Librarian

 

attachment:       letter to California State Lands Commission

 

enclosures        (under separate cover to Librarian supra):

 

                  The Federal Zone, hard-copy second edition

                  The Federal Zone, electronic fourth edition

                  Chapter 11, from upcoming fifth edition

 

 

California All-Purpose Acknowledgement

 

 

CALIFORNIA STATE/REPUBLIC       )

                                )

COUNTY OF MARIN                 )

 

 

      On this twenty-ninth (29th) day of December, 1993, Anno Domini, before me personally appeared Paul Andrew Mitchell, personally known to me (or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the Person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the same in His authorized capacity, and that by His signature on this instrument the Person, or the entity upon behalf of which the Person acted, executed the instrument.  Purpose of Notary Public is for identification only, and not for entrance into any foreign jurisdiction.

 

WITNESS my hand and official seal.

 

 

 

_____________________________________

Notary Public

 


C E R T I F I C A T E   O F   S E R V I C E   B Y   M A I L

 

 

      It is hereby certified that service of this LETTER has been made on interested parties by mailing one copy thereof, on this twenty-ninth (29th) day of December, 1993, in a sealed envelope with postage prepaid, properly addressed to them as follows:

 

 

Registered U.S. Mail #R 756 488 761

Return Receipt Requested of:

 

Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice

Supreme Court of the United States

One First Street, Northeast

Washington, District of Columbia

 

 

Copies via first class U.S. mail to:

 

Hon. Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice

Hon. John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice

Hon. Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice

Hon. Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice

Hon. Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice

Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice

Hon. Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice

Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice

Supreme Court of the United States

One First Street, Northeast

Washington, District of Columbia

 

 

Dated:  December 29, 1993

 

 

 

 

__________________________________________________________________________

Paul Andrew Mitchell, Citizen/Principal, by Special Appearance, in Propria Persona, proceeding Sui Juris, with Assistance, Special, "Without Prejudice" to any of my unalienable Rights.

 


                                                                                                                c/o general delivery

                                          San Rafael

                                          California state

                                          Postal Zone 94901/tdc

 

                                          September 10, 1993

Ray Feyereisen

c/o general delivery

Houston, Texas state

Postal Zone 77253/tdc

 

Dear Ray:

 

      I did some more research today, to explore some of the cases which support the position that one can be a State Citizen without necessarily being a citizen of the United States.  You already knew about Crosse;  here are the relevant paragraphs:

 

            Both before and after the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, it has not been necessary for a person to be a citizen of the United States in order to be a citizen of his state.  United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1875);  Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73-74, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873);  and see Short v. State, 80 Md. 392, 401-402, 31 A. 322 (1895).  See also Spear, State Citizenship, 16 Albany L.J. 24 (1877). ...

 

            [B]ut we find nothing in Reum [City of Minneapolis v. Reum, 56 F. 576, 581 (8th Cir. 1893)] or any other case which requires that a citizen of a state must also be a citizen of the United States, if no question of federal rights or jurisdiction is involved.  As the authorities referred to in the first portion of this opinion evidence, the law is to the contrary.

 

[emphasis added]

 

Corpus Juris is another source of authorities which support this position:

 

      So a person may be a citizen of a particular state and not a citizen of the United States46 ....

 

[11 C.J., Sec. 3, p. 777]

 

Footnote 46 lists the following cases:

 

      Harding v. Standard Oil Co., 182 Fed. 421

      McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320

      State v. Fowler, 41 La. Ann. 380, 6 S. 602

 

      The reference librarian at the Marin County Law Library and I searched in vain for McDonel v. State;  they're going to put their special legal beagle on that search.  Here's what Harding said:

 

In the Constitution and laws of the United States the term ["citizenship"] is generally, if not always, used in a political sense to designate one who has the rights and privileges of a citizen of a state or of the United States.  Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 7 Sup. Ct. 656, 30 L.Ed. 766.  A person may be a citizen of a state but not of the United States;  as, an alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen, and who is by local law entitled to vote in the state of his residence, and there exercise all other local functions of local citizenship, such as holding office, right to poor relief, etc., but who is not a citizen of the United States.  Taney, C.J., in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 405, 15 L.Ed. 691;  Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 74, 21 L.Ed. 394.

 

[Harding v. Standard Oil Co. et. al.]

[182 Fed. 421 (1910), emphasis added]

 

I really love the pertinent quote from State v. Fowler, which was decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1889:

 

      A person who is a citizen of the United States is necessarily a citizen of the particular state in which he resides.  But a person may be a citizen of a particular state and not a citizen of the United States.  To hold otherwise would be to deny to the state the highest exercise of its sovereignty, -- the right to declare who are its citizens.  The sovereignty of the citizens of a republic has its highest assertion in representative government, and is constituted in its political order in the representation of persons, and not of classes or of interests.

 

[State ex rel. Leche v. Fowler]

[41 La. Ann. 380, 6 S. 602 (1889)]

[emphasis added]

 

The Crosse court cites Short v. State, which came to essentially the same conclusion in the following long passage:

 

      And then, as to the objection that this local law is repugnant to that clause in the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution which declares that "no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," it is sufficient to say that the interpretation of that clause by the supreme court in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, is a complete answer to this objection.  There is a distinction, says Justice Miller, between citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a state.

 

[Short v. State, 80 Md. 392, 401-402]

[31 A. 322 (1895)]

 

      The Crosse court cites Short v. State, but I could find in the latter decision no statements which took the exact position we are seeking;  nevertheless, it does cite the Slaughterhouse Cases and also Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130.  In the Bradwell case, Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the court, says:

 

The protection designed by that clause, as has been repeatedly held, has no application to a citizen of the state whose laws are complained of.

 

[emphasis added]

 

      Also, I think I have already mentioned this book, but it's worth mentioning again.  See if you can get your hands on a copy of A Treatise on Citizenship by Birth and by Naturalization, by Alexander Porter Morse, Boston:  Little, Brown, and Company, 1881.  Buried near the end of this voluminous treatise is a section entitled "State Citizenship -- Its Existence".  In addition to the big cases like Dred Scott, Slaughterhouse and Cruikshank, he mentions the following in his footnotes:

 

      Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C.C. 371

      Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591

      Donovan v. Pitcher, 53 Ala. 411

      Cully v. Baltimore, etc., R.R. Co., 1 Hughes 536

      Prentiss v. Brennan, 2 Blatchf. 162

      Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. Ct. App. 267

      Reilly v. Lamar, 2 Cranch 344

 

He also writes, "That there is a state citizenship, see Registry Act of California of 1865-1866, sect. 11."  I pulled it; check it out.

 

      So, you thought you were caught up with all your work, did you?

 

      Carry on, and peace be with you.

 

 

Sincerely yours,

 

/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder

 

Account for Better Citizenship

 


                                                                                                                                c/o general delivery

                                                San Rafael

                                                California state

                                                zip code exempt

 

                                                July 29, 1993

Albert N. Baxter

c/o general delivery

Rancho Palos Verdes, California state

Postal Zone 90274/tdc

 

Dear Al:

 

      I am in receipt of a copy of your letter from attorney William A. Cohan, dated June 21, 1993.  In this letter, Mr. Cohan wrote the following to you:

 

      The "non-resident alien" position has been repeatedly rejected by the courts;  your assertion of that position undermines your credibility.

 

In the margin, you wrote the following in long hand:

 

      "Guess we made fools of ourselves.  Al B"

 

      Although I do not have the time to write as thorough a response as I wish I could, I do have enough time to make a few careful remarks about these statements.  Please consider the electronic fourth edition of The Federal Zone as a necessary supplement to the rest of this letter;  it is not yet available in hard copy.

 

      First of all, I do not believe that your assertion of the "nonresident alien" position undermines your credibility.  It may undermine your credibility in the eyes of Mr. Cohan, but it certainly does not undermine your credibility in my eyes, nor in the eyes of those who have studied and carefully documented the meaning of State Citizenship as that term was used and intended to be understood by the framers of the U.S. Constitution.  Even IRS documents admit that you are an alien if you are not a citizen of the United States.  Simple logic is all that is necessary to explain away the "alien" half of the problem, but there is much more proof, as you know.

 

      I have recently made a crucial discovery in the writings of attorney Roger Foster.  Foster was a Yale lecturer and recognized expert in federal jurisprudence at the time the so-called 16th Amendment was declared "ratified".  The second edition of his treatise on the federal income tax of 1913 states, in unequivocal language, that the tax was levied in Alaska, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Philippine Islands;  the 48 States are not even mentioned (see Chapter 3 in The Federal Zone).  In and of itself, this documentary evidence is important proof of the territorial extent of the 1913 federal income tax.

 

      What is even more stunning is the comparable section from the first edition of Foster's treatise.  In this section, he rambles on about the lack of court precedent authorizing Congress to tax bond interest that is payable to nonresident aliens by domestic corporations.  Because he makes repeated use of the term "United States", a term which we now know to have multiple different meanings in law, this section is almost always vague about the exact territorial extent of the 1913 Act.  There is, however, one place where he tips his hand by utilizing the term "Union" in a  territorial sense.  In other words, the first edition of Foster's treatise considers the "Union of several States" to be the territorial reach of the 1913 Act, but in the second edition this whole section is replaced with a much smaller section which limits that reach to Alaska, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands.  Therefore, Foster has admitted, in writing, that his first edition was in error about the territorial extent of the 1913 federal income tax!  Read it for yourself and see if you agree with me.

 

      It is not entirely correct to state that the "non-resident alien" position has been repeatedly rejected by the courts.  Such a statement overlooks the obvious fact that the Brushaber decision is still standing case law in America.  As you must already know, this ruling was issued by the United States Supreme Court.  None of the cases cited in Mr. Conklin's essay, "The Citizenship Argument Bites the Dust in the Courts", was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.  Moreover, most of those lower court cases remain unpublished, unlike the long list of Supreme Court decisions which have carefully considered the meaning of Citizenship (e.g. Cruikshank, Dred Scott, Slaughter-House Cases, to name a few of the key ones).  Why?

 

      Treasury Decision 2313 also remains as a standing decision of the U.S. Treasury Department.  There was only one Plaintiff in the Brushaber case;  that Plaintiff was Mr. Frank R. Brushaber who was "a citizen of the State of New York and a resident of the Borough of Brooklyn, in the City of New York", by his own admissions.  To assert anything else about his status is to assume facts that were not in evidence.  If he had been a native of France, according to federal government propaganda, then where was his green card?  The courts issued their decisions on the basis of facts that were in evidence.  Therefore, there was and still is no basis in fact, or in law, for the Secretary of the Treasury in 1916 to extend the Brushaber decision to those who were not parties to that action.  It is conclusive, therefore, that Frank R. Brushaber was the "nonresident alien" to which Treasury Decision 2313 refers.

 

      Quite apart from the technical issues involved in understanding and explaining Treasury Decision 2313, I would like to dedicate the remainder of my remarks here to a discussion of the importance of the U.S. Constitution.  If my research has established anything, it is that the U.S. Constitution has explicitly recognized State Citizenship from the beginning, even if there was no definition of State Citizenship as such in that document.  If the Constitution is perpetual, then so is the status of State Citizenship which it recognizes (see Texas v. White), until and unless each and every reference to State Citizens is lawfully amended so as to alter the original meaning of those provisions.  The intent of any law is the law, and this principle applies as well to the Constitution itself (the supreme Law).

 

You will find explicit references to State Citizens throughout the U.S. Constitution (see 1:2:2, 1:3:3, 2:1:5, 3:2:1, 4:2:1).  In my opinion, three of the most important references are found in the qualifications for election to the offices of U.S. Senator, Representative, and President.  Since these provisions have never been amended, their meaning remains the same as it was on the day the Constitution became the supreme Law in America.  Anyone who argues something different about the construction of these provisions is woefully, and maybe even dangerously, ignorant of the basic principles of constitutional law in our country (see Dred Scott v. Sandford in particular, a decision which is "infamous" to me only because it was such an authoritative and irrefutable mirror on the legal acceptability of chattel slavery at that point in American history).

 

      Prior to the 1866 Civil Rights Act, there was simply no such thing as a "citizen of the United States" (see Ex parte Knowles, which is still standing case law in the California Republic).  If you can find the time to wade into the huge body of case law which interpreted the so-called 14th Amendment, you will find some jurists who credit that amendment with finally settling the definition of "citizen of the United States" (see Field's dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases for a good example of this position).  On the other hand, the pertinent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have never ruled that a ratified 14th Amendment ever abolished the status of State Citizenship;  the amendment itself even stipulates that federal citizens are also "citizens ... of the State wherein they reside", giving some jurists reason to conclude that federal citizens were intended to be State Citizens too, as long as they resided within one of the Union States.

 

      To my knowledge, I am the first published author to call attention to the lower-case "c" in this class of State citizens;  the weight of subsequent history has shown that they remain second-class citizens, even when they "reside" within one of the Union States, because  the Bill of Rights has at best a limited application to them when they do.  We must credit The Informer for pointing out additional evidence in Section 2 of the 14th Amendment:  "[W]hen the right to vote ... is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State ... and citizens of the United States ...."  This section is here referring to two different classes of people.

 

      The Cruikshank case is perhaps the most lucid example of standing High Court case law for ruling that "[W]e have in our political system a government of the United States and a government of each of the several States.  Each of these governments is distinct from the others, and each has citizens of its own ...."  This means that, even if the so-called 14th Amendment had been properly approved and adopted, the status of State Citizen remains an integral part of the U.S. Constitution, so integral in fact, that the highest elective offices in our land must be occupied by People who enjoy and exhibit this status before occupying those offices.  Remember also that the Cruikshank case was decided after the alleged ratification of the 14th Amendment and after the pivotal Slaughter-House Cases.  The failed ratification of this amendment lends even greater clarity to logic of Cruikshank, namely, that federal citizens are aliens with respect to the Union States, and State Citizens are likewise aliens with respect to the District of Columbia.

 

      The Constitution also plays a crucial role in determining whether or not a proposed amendment is ever elevated to the status of a ratified amendment.  Hiding in the huge body of case law which has interpreted the so-called 14th Amendment, there are two pivotal decisions of the Utah Supreme Court which actually struck down the ratification of that amendment (see State v. Phillips and Dyett v. Turner).  The facts on which that Court relied were assembled and published in the Congressional Record;  courts must take judicial notice of the Congressional Record.  The U.S. Supreme Court has never actually ruled on the ratification of the 14th Amendment and has been prevented from doing so by treasonous behavior (see 28 Tulane Law Review 22, and 11 South Carolina Law  Quarterly 484).

 

      Thus, the undeniable preponderance of historical evidence now proves that the Utah Supreme Court was correct in striking down the 14th Amendment.  I invite you to review the shocking and sordid history of its "passage" by studying carefully the details recited in the Dyett decision.  The bottom line is that the federal government has been exercising unlawful dominion ever since the Civil War, and the failed ratification of the so-called 14th Amendment is just one among several historical facts which constitute conclusive evidence of this unlawful dominion.  The so-called 16th Amendment is another excellent example of this unlawful dominion.

 

      By holding, as the Utah Supreme Court has done, that the 14th Amendment was never properly approved and adopted, we are still entirely justified in taking the U.S. Supreme Court's view in Cruikshank, namely, that each governmental jurisdiction has citizens of its own.  This view is supported by the decision in Colgate v. Harvey, which ruled that the 14th Amendment did not create a national citizenship (the italics implying that the amendment was simply declaratory of existing federal law, which federal law was the 1866 Civil Rights Act).  Simply stated, California has its Citizens;  Oregon has its Citizens;  Utah has its Citizens;  ... and the District of Columbia has its citizens (51 governmental jurisdictions in all).

 

      Notice that I have been careful to spell State Citizen with an UPPER-CASE "C", and federal citizen with a lower-case "c".  I do so primarily because authentic copies of the U.S. Constitution do evidence this convention;  those authentic copies also maintain a similar distinction between "Person" and "person".  Prior to the 14th Amendment, "Person" was consistently spelled with an UPPER-CASE "P" (see the qualifications for Senator, Representative and President, where the term "No Person" is repeated).  Formal English also recognizes an important difference between Proper Nouns and common nouns.  Did you ever attend a baseball game that was won by the chicago cubs (or the cHICAGO cUBS)?

 

      Al, I invite you to take a closer look at the underlying rationale for the "nonresident alien" position which I have endorsed and explained in my book The Federal Zone, whether or not you choose to utilize it in any future litigation.  There is simply too much in the way of undeniable factual evidence and relevant constitutional history for me to be dissuaded by this or that unpublished decision by lower federal courts.  I doubt very much that Mr. Cohan would have us believe that federal and State courts are always correct, and that their decisions are never overturned.  I have read some of these lower court decisions, and I find them to be riddled with errors.

 

      Specifically, any court in America which henceforth issues decisions that are predicated upon the lawful ratification of the so-called 14th and 16th Amendments is plainly in error (see People v. Boxer).  Any licensed attorney in America who bases his advice to clients (or prospects) on such rebuttable presumptions might justifiably be applauded for seeking the path of least resistance, with the complete approval of his clients;  but attorneys and clients together should also seriously reconsider just how dedicated they really are to upholding and defending the Constitution for the United States of America, as compared to other priorities that can and do take precedence under the pressures of day-to-day practice.  I say this only because the published evidence available to me shows that licensed attorneys in America are expected to place the court first, public policy second, and the client third in order of importance;  the Constitution isn't even mentioned!

 

      It is high time that we return to basic issues of constitutional Law.  If we don't, then we shall surely lose the Constitution forever.  It is quite simply impossible for public officials anywhere in America to perform their solemn duty to uphold and defend the U.S. Constitution, if the weight of material evidence should prove that the exact provisions of that Constitution are still in doubt.  This was the major issue that was addressed in the case of People v. Boxer;  copies of the pleadings and affidavits were shipped to Mr. Cohan several months ago, without any response from him.

 

      I don't mean to be rude or disrespectful to any licensed attorneys when I suggest that they too should be obliged to take the same solemn oath, if they have not already done so.  The constitutional provisions which cite State Citizens have never been in any serious doubt, even if our decision to defend this status is fraught with much additional peril, above and beyond the peril we might endure by resisting this or that tax assessment by the collection agency of a foreign banking cartel.  If the Constitution is perpetual, then so is the Sovereign State Citizenship which that Constitution has recognized from the beginning, with or without the so-called 14th Amendment.

 

      Let the judges in question come forward to explain why their recent decisions were "unpublished".  I am all ears.

 

      The road less traveled may be the surest path to our destination, and to our destiny as a free People.

 

 

Sincerely yours,

 

/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder

 

Account for Better Citizenship

 

enclosures

 

copies:  William A. Cohan

         John Voss, N.C.B.A.

         Richard McDonald

 


                                                                                                                                c/o general delivery

                                                San Rafael

                                                California state

                                                zip code exempt

                                                (DMM 122.32)

 

                                                July 20, 1993

James R. Frey

Staff Counsel

State Lands Commission

c/o general delivery

Sacramento, California state

 

Dear Mr. Frey:

 

      We do very much appreciate the consideration you showed in answering our inquiry concerning California Government Code Sections 126 and 127.

 

      We are happy to learn that the files in question are available for public inspection and copying, by appointment.  We understand that the index is actually a file cabinet, with files on individual facilities.

 

      As you may already know, many California State Citizens are actively involved in private research and political action to help solve the horrendous federal debt.  Our research led us to Government Code Section 126, in particular, because it makes explicit reference to Section 4 of the so-called 14th Amendment:

 

(c)   The United States must in writing have requested the state to cede concurrent criminal jurisdiction within such land and subject to each and all of the conditions and reservations in this section and in Section 4 of Article XIV of the Constitution prescribed.

 

[California Government Code, Sec. 126]

[emphasis added]

 

      I use the language "so-called" because the evidence now available to us proves that the 14th Amendment was never properly approved and adopted.  In the year 1968, the Utah Supreme Court detailed the shocking and sordid history of the failed ratification in the case of Dyett v. Turner, 439 P.2d 266, 272.  In the year 1975, the Utah Supreme Court again struck down the ratification of the 14th Amendment with the following language:

 

      I cannot believe that any court, in full possession of its faculties, could honestly hold that the amendment was properly approved and adopted.

 

[State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936, 941]

 

To our knowledge, these two cases are still standing because the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to rule specifically on the validity of the steps taken to "ratify" the so-called 14th Amendment.

 

                The House Congressional Record for June 13, 1967, contains some of the essential documentation on which the Utah Supreme Court relied to prove that the so-called 14th Amendment was never ratified into law (see page 15641 et seq.).  For example, it itemizes all States which voted against the proposed amendment, and the precise dates when their Legislatures did so.

 

      Additional historical evidence can be found in the following law review articles:  28 Tulane Law Review 22 and 11 South Carolina Law Quarterly 484.  Even though one of these articles was written by a man who advocated racial discrimination, a policy with which I strongly disagree, his facts are very consistent with the historical record as recited by these other authorities.

 

      Faced with this clear preponderance of historical evidence and standing court authorities, we are not only justified in taking the position that the 14th Amendment was never ratified, we are also justified in challenging all State statutes which make reference to non-existent provisions in the U.S. Constitution.

 

      This train of evidence and logic leads us, then, to subsection (f) of California Government Code Section 126:

 

(f)   "Land held by the United States", as used in this section means:  (1) lands acquired in fee by purchase or condemnation,  (2) lands owned by the United States that are included in the military reservation by presidential proclamation or act of Congress,  (3) leaseholds acquired by the United States over private lands or state-owned lands, and  (4) any other lands owned by the United States including, but not limited to, public domain lands which are held for a public purpose.

 

[emphasis added]

 

We have taken specific note of subsection (f)(1), which omits any mention of the "United States", whereas subsections (f)(2) thru (f)(4) do make explicit mention of the "United States".  Using the rule of statutory construction known as inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (see Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition), we are entitled to infer that "United States" was omitted from subsection (f)(1) because it was intended to be omitted.

 

      Accordingly, Section 126(f) could be interpreted to mean that "Land held by the United States" means any lands acquired in fee by purchase or condemnation, whether or not said lands were acquired in fee by the federal government.  In other words, if private real estate in California were acquired in a "fee simple" transaction, as recorded by the appropriate County Recorder, does the "United States" thereby hold any legal interest in such private land by virtue of California Government Code Section 126?

 

      Now for the crux of the problem.  We now know that the Federal Reserve System is a private banking cartel (see Lewis v. United States, 680 F.2d 1239 (1982)).  This cartel pays the federal Bureau of Engraving and Printing a total of $230 to print 10,000 Federal Reserve Notes, regardless of denomination, and thereby obtains from Congress a pledge of collateral equal to the face value of those notes.  Thus, if the Federal Reserve orders 10,000 notes in denominations of $100 each, it obtains from Congress a lien on collateral equal to $1,000,000, for a total down payment of $230.  That's what I call leverage!  What's the collateral?

 

      Do the Federal Reserve banks thereby obtain any right, title or interest in California lands "acquired in fee by purchase or condemnation" pursuant to California Government Code Section 126?

 

      Are these lands anywhere identified as collateral for the Treasury bonds which the Federal Reserve purchased with money and credit which it created out of thin air, via bookkeeping entries?

 

      These are questions which should be important to all private Citizens and to all government employees everywhere in America, because the Federal Reserve has become one of the largest single "United States" creditors by purchasing Treasury bonds without lawful consideration.  Moreover, the failed ratification of the so-called 14th Amendment frees all of us, private Citizens and government employees alike, to question the validity of this public debt, because Section 4 of that failed amendment reads:

 

      The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.

 

[emphasis added]

 

      Quite obviously, if the so-called 14th Amendment was never properly approved and adopted, then it follows that there is no Constitutional prohibition which bars any of us from questioning the validity of the public debt of the United States.

 

      I will look forward to your timely and considerate response.  Please utilize the above mailing location exactly as shown in any and all future correspondence.  Believe it or not, we now have credible proof that the unqualified use of zip codes and/or two-letter federal abbreviations (e.g. "CA") also attaches California State Citizens to the spiralling federal debt.

 

      Mr. Frey, things are just not as they appear on the surface.

 

      Thank you very much for your honesty and your consideration, at this most difficult time in our brief history as a nation.

 

 

Sincerely yours,

 

/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder

 

Account for Better Citizenship

 

copies:  Charles Warren, Executive Officer

         Leo T. McCarthy, Lieutenant Governor

         Gray Davis, Controller

         Thomas W. Hayes, Director of Finance

         Pete Wilson, Governor

 


                                                                                                                                c/o general delivery

                                                San Rafael

                                                California state

                                                zip code exempt

                                                (DMM 122.32)

 

                                                July 5, 1993

Gregory Dahl

c/o general delivery

Eugene, Oregon state

Postal Zone 97401/tdc

 

Dear Greg:

 

      Thanks very much for your letter dated 24 June 1993, and for purchasing a copy of The Federal Zone.  Because I shipped your book immediately after opening your envelope at the post office, I hadn't allowed myself time to read your letter before doing so.  On the last page, your mentioned enclosing $25 for the book, and $15 to show your support of my efforts and your appreciation for my time.  Thanks very much.  I now take those amounts to mean that you originally wanted the electronic edition of The Federal Zone, which is enclosed with this letter.  It was obviously my mistake.  With your immense computer knowledge, I would very much value your suggestions for expediting the dissemination of this shareware.

 

      On the subject of race, you may be surprised to hear that I agree completely with your statement that my analysis of the 14th Amendment will be construed as a contention that whites have different rights than others.  That is exactly the situation you will find throughout federal law;  read Title 42, Sections 1981 thru 1983, and there you will find that Congress still maintains a clear legal distinction between whites and other races.  But then you went on to say that I will be called a racist.  Well, I haven't been called racist yet, not even by any of my black friends, but I guess there is always a first time.  Thus far, I haven't had any difficulty explaining to people that federal law is maintaining racist distinctions, and has done so ever since the infamous Dred Scott decision.  My position is quite simple:  all races are eligible to be Sovereign State Citizens, without exception.

 

      Federal law would have us believe that blacks and other non-white races are only eligible to be "citizens of the United States", but the California Supreme Court ruled in 1855 that there is no such thing as a "citizen of the United States", and this decision has never been overruled.   The federal government must rely, therefore, on the so-called 14th Amendment to force this fiction on certain classes, e.g. those with Social Security numbers.  Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court has twice struck down this amendment, and neither of these decisions has ever been overruled!  Do you see the pattern?  I call it unlawful dominion.

 

      I actually enjoy discussions which turn to the subject of racial discrimination.  It is a great opportunity to expose people to the "intent of the post-Civil War reformers", as you call them.  You have only to look at Section 4 of the so-called 14th Amendment to appreciate what I mean:  "the validity of the public debt shall not be questioned."  This is the real intent of the 14th Amendment, to make it appear lawful for the federal government to exercise dominion over all Americans and to relegate them to second-class subject status (i.e. "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States").

 

      Once you are in this subject class, then the federal government can compel your specific performance to discharge the interest on the massive federal debt which has now accumulated.  Of course, much of that debt was created by the sale of Treasury bonds which were "purchased" by Federal Reserve banks with money and credit which they created out of thin air.  As such, these bond contracts are unconscionable because they were not purchased with real consideration.  As I have written in the latest edition of my book:

 

      The vivid pattern that has now painfully emerged is that "citizens of the United States", as defined in federal tax law, are the intended victims of a new statutory slavery that was predicted by the infamous Hazard Circular soon after the Civil War began.  These statutory slaves are now burdened with a bogus federal debt which is spiralling out of control.  The White House budget office recently invented a new kind of "generational accounting" so as to project a tax load of seventy-one percent on future generations of these "citizens of the United States".  It is our duty to ensure that this statutory slavery is soon gone with the wind, just like its grisly and ill-fated predecessor.

 

      Greg, this is a bank conspiracy we are dealing with here, and it is clouded by waves and waves of smoke, mirrors, and dense propaganda.  I don't think the 71% projection is idle speculation.  Many informed people throughout the country realize now that it is only a matter of months before the interest alone on the federal debt will exceed all federal income tax receipts.  I confirmed this in my first petition to Congress, dated December of 1990.  Now, the authors of Bankruptcy 1995 are saying the exact same thing.

 

      The basic issue with which most Americans are still not quite prepared, intellectually, emotionally, or financially, is the specter of default by the "United States".  The media are certainly not courageous enough to grapple with this issue head-on.  If the banks obtained Treasury bonds without consideration, then I say their bonds should be repudiated, not the bonds which have been purchased ultimately with the labor of Americans like you and me.  This labor is something which has real value, unlike bank credit which is created out of thin air.  They used to use pen and ink, then typewriters, now computers.  The mechanism is the same;  it's called "bookkeeping".  These same banks have become rich beyond imagination by this swindle.  I have not hesitated to say that it is the greatest fiscal fraud that has ever been perpetrated upon any people at any time in the history of the world, and nobody has yet disagreed with that statement!

 

      After reading everything I could get my hands on, and doing a lot of original research myself, I came to several important conclusions, one of which is that the Constitution for the United States of America is, and still should be, the supreme Law of the Land.  This Constitution has recognized a Sovereign class of Common-Law State Citizens from the beginning.  The case law also says that the Union created by this Constitution is perpetual.  That means the Citizenship which it recognizes is also perpetual, and cannot be altered or destroyed by the Congress or any of its agents.  "Congress cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised."  Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189.  This is the Law.

 

      If I have done anything significant, I believe it was to prove that the Internal Revenue Code was written deliberately to refer to Union State Citizens as "nonresident aliens", among other reasons to give Americans a reason to avoid such a label.  After all, who wants to be known as an "alien"?  The government had to leave some tracks, and we picked up the trail right out of the parking lot:  the Brushaber decision, the first big case to reach the Supreme Court after the so-called 16th Amendment was declared ratified, and Treasury Decision 2313, in which the government decided that Frank R. Brushaber was a "nonresident alien".

 

      It is important to understand that Brushaber did not go into federal district court claiming to be a "nonresident alien";  he went into federal court claiming to be a citizen of the State of New York and a resident of the Borough of Brooklyn, in the City of New York.  It was the government which applied this label to people who claimed the status of State Citizens.  In conjunction with the Brushaber decision, you should also study the earlier Pollock decision, which struck down a federal income tax because it was not apportioned.  The apportionment restriction was operative because the Plaintiff, Charles Pollock, was a Massachusetts State Citizen (not a citizen of the United States).  As a Union State Citizen, Pollock was immune to federal direct taxation unless it was apportioned, and it was just not apportioned, period.  The Pollock Court also told Congress that if they wanted to levy such a tax on people like Charles Pollock, they would have to amend the Constitution to remove the apportionment restriction, and therein is one of the essential historical roots of the so-called 16th Amendment.

 

      I am very sorry to hear about your bicycle accident.  I hope you have recovered completely.  I was also not aware that you now have children;  that changes everything, as far as political activism is concerned.  I would not have done many of the things I have done, like suing Barbara Boxer in the California Supreme Court, if I had a wife and children of my own;  the risks are just too great.

 

      Thanks again for writing such a thoughtful and detailed letter.  I feel privileged to be its recipient.

 

 

Sincerely yours,

 

/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder

 

Account for Better Citizenship

 

enclosure:  The Federal Zone, fourth edition

 


                                                                                                                                c/o general delivery

                                                San Rafael

                                                California state

                                                zip code exempt

                                                (DMM 122.32)

 

                                                June 29, 1993

Dale Peters

c/o general delivery

San Jose, California state

Postal Zone 95157/tdc

 

Dear Dale:

 

      Thanks very much for your detailed and enlightening letter, dated June 25, 1993.  Before writing this letter to you, I have had several conversations about your letter with Dr. John C. Alden, and we both feel that your discussion of California Government Code Section 126 is extremely important.

 

      You began your discussion of Section 126 by recommending that I incorporate in a future edition of The Federal Zone an expose of this particular statute.  Your recommendation suggests to me that you may not have read all the way through Chapter 11, in which I discuss, in broad strokes, sovereignty and the limits of exclusive federal jurisdiction.  Please understand that the book was written for all Americans, in the federal zone and in the State Zone, and for this reason I deliberately wanted to avoid getting too bogged down in the statutes of any particular Union State.  The fourth edition is now over 600 pages in length.

 

      A major point of law, of course, is the status of the so‑called 14th Amendment.  Again, in Chapter 11 of the fourth edition, I have made reference to the two Utah Supreme Court cases which struck down the 14th Amendment.  If you haven't already reviewed these cases, I strongly recommend that you do so, as soon as possible.  The detailed historical facts are covered quite well in the earlier of the two  --  Dyett v. Turner.  I gave a lecture based in part on a recitation of this case, and John Alden later said I had failed to notice that the audience was actually on the edges of their seats;  that's how powerfully the Utah Court recites the relevant history.  If you are going to enter this debate as an acknowledged expert, then you must know this history in detail.

 

      In light of State v. Phillips and Dyett v. Turner, I would not hesitate to challenge the constitutionality of Section 126(c) of the California Government Code, on obvious grounds that a State statute cannot be valid if it makes reference to a non‑existent provision in the U.S. Constitution.  Even the 1879 California Constitution, which has never been approved by Congress as "republican" in form and the effective date of which has actually been repealed, cites the U.S. Constitution as the supreme Law of the Land.

 

      I have been trying my best to broadcast the importance of Section 4 of the so-called 14th Amendment, whenever and wherever possible.  Even if it had been properly ratified, there is a mountain of case law which has held that a ratified 14th Amendment had no effect whatsoever on the status of Common-Law State Citizens of the Union States.  See, for example, the cases cited in Appendix Y of The Federal Zone, fourth edition. By logical extension of these holdings, I would argue that a ratified 14th Amendment, in and of itself, had no effect whatsoever on the rights, titles and interests of such Citizens.

 

      The Federal government, however, does now take the position that the 14th Amendment had the effect of converting all Americans into federal citizens who are, by definition, subject to the jurisdiction of the "United States".  It can be shown that this has been a fraudulent conversion.  Richard McDonald and his colleagues have recently gone so far as to file cross-complaints against State Judges in L.A. County for violating the Genocide Treaty because the judges in question have obviously discriminated against State Citizens in criminal proceedings;  this is a very interesting development to monitor carefully.

 

      Another factor to consider in your reasoning is the specific group of people who are explicitly prevented from questioning the validity of the public debt by virtue of Section 4 of the so‑called 14th Amendment.  Treating the U.S. Constitution as a binding contract, it is not difficult to prove that such a prohibition, even if part of a lawfully adopted amendment, creates no restrictions on those who are not "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States", in other words, not subject to the terms and conditions of this binding constitutional contract.  Employees of the State or federal governments, and/or federal citizens who are, by definition, subject to the jurisdiction of the "United States", are both subject to this provision.  Notice how the oath of office specifically binds Senators and Representatives to uphold and defend this contract.

 

      However, if my research proves anything, it proves that Sovereign natural born free State Citizens are not subject to the jurisdiction of the "United States", unless they render themselves subject by entering into a valid voluntary contract with the "United States".  For this reason alone, they would not be subject in any way to Section 4 of the so-called 14th Amendment, nor could the titles to their property be clouded lawfully by any third-party debt or obligation to which they had not given their full consent.  The California Civil Code is very relevant here, because it defines the criteria by which consent is neither real or free ("apparent consent is neither real nor free when ....").

 

      The "United States" is not authorized to obtain controlling interest in Sovereign State Citizens, such that it can compel our specific performance to any third-party debt or obligation, particularly if that debt or obligation is unconscionable by reason of federal government bonds which were purchased with Federal Reserve credit created out of thin air via bookkeeping entries.  Moreover, the 1849 California Constitution has specific provisions prohibiting the paper of any bank to circulate as money (see Article IV, Sections 34 and 35).

 

      I would even go so far as to say that all bank mortgages are similarly unconscionable if the banks in question obtained title conveyances in return for credit similarly manufactured out of thin air.  We are obviously dealing here with a very big fraud.  See my chapters entitled "Is It Voluntary?" and "The Fundamental Law" for a general discussion of the Federal Reserve's role in all of this.  Howard Freeman's discussion of the privilege of limited liability is very relevant here:  the discharge of debts with FRN's is treated by the Federal government as a privilege, the exercise of which to convey real property actually clouds titles, precisely in the manner you speculate.

 

      Now, I want to discuss a point of statutory construction.  Your thesis is supported by one of two competing interpretations of subsection (f) of Section 126.  Note, in particular, where it states that:

 

      "Land held by the United States", as used in this section means:  (1) lands acquired in fee by purchase or condemnation ....

 

      When I first read this wording, I interpreted it to mean "lands acquired by the United States in fee".  This interpretation is supported by the language of subsection (e), where it states:

 

      Jurisdiction ceded pursuant to this section continues only so long as the land continues to belong to the United States ....

 

[emphasis added]

 

Nevertheless, apply the rule of statutory construction known as inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (i.e., the explicit mention of one thing is the explicit exclusion of all other things not mentioned).  In all other enumerated sections of subsection (f), Government Code 126 refers to "lands owned by the United States", "leaseholds acquired by the United States", and "any other lands owned by the United States".  Note that subsection (1) does NOT say "lands acquired by the United States in fee";  it says "lands acquired in fee", lending powerful support to your thesis.

 

      If you acquire a copy of the videotape which was filmed of my interview with Greg Meadows of the L.A. Lawman, you will note that I specifically mention the use of federal land as collateral for the bogus federal debt.  I do not, as yet, have the statutory proof that Congress actually pledged all this land as collateral, but John Nelson claims to have done so.  You should get copies of his work, if you can.  Unfortunately, my copies of his work are packed up in storage, or I would enclose a copy for your review.  I raise this point because it is imperative that we isolate the exact mechanism whereby the Federal Reserve claims to have obtained controlling interest in real property deeds acquired under "fee simple" transactions, as opposed to allodial transactions.  Without this evidence, your ideas amount to nothing more than exciting, but unsubstantiated speculation.

 

      Notice also that Government Code 126 specifically refers to "cession of concurrent criminal jurisdiction to United States on lands held by general government."  Are you implying that I should interpret this to mean that a State Citizen's failure to pay his "fair share" of debt interest to the Federal Reserve should be treated as a crime, particularly if his real property was acquired in a "fee simple" transaction?  The issue here is not just semantic.  Why does the heading of the statute refer to "concurrent criminal jurisdiction"?  In this vein, you should carefully review Internal Revenue Code Section 7851(a)(6)(A), which gives force and effect to Subtitle F of the IRC if and only if the Title is enacted into law.  Subtitle F, as you may already know, contains all the enforcement provisions of the IRC, and it is crucial for you to understand that Title 26 has never been enacted into positive law (see inside covers of any of the volumes of United States Code titles 1 thru 50).

 

      So, where is the crime, if federal income taxes are truly "voluntary"?  It has to be voluntary for State Citizens whose incomes derive from sources outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the "United States", among many other reasons because Congress simply lacks the authority to compel such Citizens to discharge interest on the bogus federal debt.   The 9th and 10th Amendments are right on point here.  The use of excise taxes, like taxing the sale of gasoline, creates a voluntary choice for the buyer which in no way compels the buyer to enter the transaction;  he can always use his bicycle or walk.

 

      Thanks again for your terrific letter.  Keep up the good work, and let me know if you have any additional material on this statute.  If you don't already have a copy, try to get your hands on the study entitled Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the States;  it contains over 700 case citations, all extremely relevant to the core issue here, namely, what is meant by the exercise of "exclusive Legislation"?  On this, I took specific note of a decision under Government Code 126 which found that "as to such federal territory Congress had combined powers of a general and a state government."  Inside the federal zone, Congress has combined powers of a general and a state government;  outside the federal zone and inside the 50 States, Congress only has the powers of a general government, and is otherwise constrained by specific prohibitions found in the constitutional contract to which ALL government employees are subject.  Of course, the pertinent restriction with which I am primarily concerned is the absence of apportionment provisions anywhere in the Internal Revenue Code;  as I have documented in some detail in my book, their absence is proof to me that the IRC's income tax provisions are confined to the federal zone, and to citizens of that zone.  Otherwise, there is a blatant violation of the U.S. Constitution.

 

      To date, nobody has been able to refute my thesis, except to catapult garbage like rumors that Frank Brushaber was a fiduciary for others who were the real stockholders (which rumor originated at the Free Enterprise Society, to my great surprise).  This latter rumor is easily disproven by the very first sentence in the Brushaber decision!  Another garbage rumor is that there were other parties to the Brushaber decision (this again from the Free Enterprise Society).  As of the second and subsequent editions of The Federal Zone, I have successfully dismissed the French immigrant propaganda.  In combination with Brushaber's original pleadings, which anyone can order from the federal court in New York, Treasury Decision 2313 is explosive and irrefutable in its implications.  The next time you're in the law library, pull the Pollock case too, and you will discover that he too was a State Citizen (of Massachusetts) who was, by definition, protected from direct taxation by the apportionment provisions in the U.S. Constitution.  In light of all the evidence which proves that the 16th Amendment was never lawfully ratified, the importance of the Pollock case cannot be overstated.

 

      As you must know all too well by now, the tax law in America is a masterpiece of deception.  In one sense, I really have to hand it to its creators.  Unfortunately for them, we have caught up with their fraud, and now their every move is being watched intensely.

 

                "We have in our political system a government of the United States and a government of each of the several states.  Each of these governments is distinct from the others, and each has citizens of its own ...."  You can't be faulted for relying upon decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, and I say that on the authority of this very same Supreme Court!

 

 

Sincerely yours,

 

/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder

 

Account for Better Citizenship

 

 

enclosures

 


                                                                                                                                c/o general delivery

                                                San Rafael

                                                California state

                                                zip code exempt

                                                (DMM 122.32)

 

                                                June 27, 1993

Stanley Waugh

Nevada Citizen

c/o general delivery

Reno, Nevada state

Postal Zone 89504/tdc

 

Dear Mr. Waugh:

 

      Thank you for your thoughtful letter dated 21 June 1993.  I am writing primarily to respond to your statement:

 

      "Based on this historical documentation, I wonder if you are not making too much ado about citizen v.. Citizen and United States v.. united States.  Punctuation apparently is not crucial."

 

As you know, there are lots of historical documents which evidence the word "citizen".  You included copies of a North Dakota document, and the Treaty of Peace between the United States and King George III.  These are not the documents which count, however.

 

      The documents which count (in my opinion), and the documents with which I am chiefly concerned, are the Constitution for the United States of America (because it is the supreme Law of the Land), the Internal Revenue Code (because it is the subject of my book), and the Code of Federal Regulations for Title 26 (which are the promulgated rules for interpreting the Internal Revenue Code).

 

      Now, if you have studied statistics, what I am about to say will be entirely familiar to you.  If you have not studied statistics, continue reading very carefully.  If I flip a coin, what is the probability ("P") of heads?  You will answer "one in two", and that is the right answer.  How do we calculate the value of P in mathematical terms?  It's very simple.  P equals one divided by the quantity two raised to the power of one, i.e. 1/(21).  We raise two to the power of one because there are two outcomes to a "trial" (a head or a tail), and we conduct only one trial, i.e. we flip the coin only once.  The probability P equals 0.50.

 

      Now, continuing along with this approach, what is the probability of getting heads twice in a row?  You will answer "one in four", and that is the right answer again.  How do we calculate the value of P in mathematical terms?  P now equals one divided by the quantity two raised to the power of two, i.e. 1/(22).  We raise two to the power of two because there are two outcomes to a "trial", and we conduct two trials, i.e. we flip the coin twice.  The probability P equals 0.250.  Continuing along with this sequence, you can compute for yourself that the probability of three heads in a row is 0.125, and so on.

 

                What does this have to do with "citizens" and "Citizens", you ask?  Plenty, and here's why.  In formal English, a letter of the alphabet is either upper-case or lower-case;  there is no in-between.  It's kind of like "heads" and "tails";  the coin is not allowed to land on its side.  So, for every occurrence of this term in law, we will observe either lower-case "c" or UPPER-CASE "C", and nothing in-between.

 

      The rules of grammar and punctuation require that the first letter of the first word in any sentence be UPPER-CASE, like the "T" in the word "The" at the beginning of this sentence.  You will also very often see UPPER-CASE letters used in words that are found in titles and paragraph headings, for example, the phrase "see Chapter 29:  American Citizenship for more details" might be found in some book or section of law.  The UPPER-CASE "C" is used because it is proper to do so in such situations.

 

      Now, the crux of the matter is to observe whether lower-case or UPPER-CASE is used when there is no other rule requiring UPPER-CASE.  For example, you might encounter the phrase:  "If you are a citizen of the United States ...."  In this phrase, the term "citizen" is not the first word of a sentence, nor is it part of a title or heading;  therefore, it can go either way.  It can be either lower-case "citizen" or UPPER-CASE "Citizen", just like the coin flip.

 

      If you read through the Internal Revenue Code and observe all occurrences of "citizen", I believe you will find that the only uses of "Citizen" are found in the first word of sentences and in paragraph headings.  In all other instances, where it can go either way (without the influence of some other grammar rule), you will find only "citizen" or "citizens" and not "Citizen" or "Citizens".

 

      Just how many instances of "Citizen" are there, where it can go either way?  I have observed none of the latter.  I strongly encourage you to conduct your own investigation of this count.  How many instances of "citizen" are there, where it can go either way?  100?  200?  Even if there were only 10, what is the probability P that every one of them would randomly fall into lower-case?  Using our formula from above, the value of P is 1/(210), right?  2 to the power of 10 is 1,024, therefore P equals 1/1024, or roughly one in a thousand.

 

      Now try to compute the value of P when there are 100 trials (coin flips) which can go either way.  You may need a computer to perform this calculation, but you already know that the value of P in this instance is an extremely small number.  In other words, the probability that 100 random occurrences of "citizen" will all evidence a lower-case "c" in the IRC and the CFR is practically an impossibility.

 

      There must be another explanation for this consistent pattern, other than chance.  I argue that the explanation is design:  the evidence of consistent lower-case "c" in "citizen of the United States" is conclusive proof of a deliberate design and intent to maintain the same spelling throughout the IRC and the CFR.  Remember, we are not counting those occurrences of "Citizen" in paragraph headings and in the first word of a sentence, where grammar requires that UPPER-CASE "C" be utilized.

 

                So much for the mathematical proof.  I agree that it is informative to compare other historical and legal documents, as you have done.  I have done such a comparison with the organic California Constitution of 1849.  There, you will find references to "citizen of the United States".  So, what gives?  Is this a reference to a "federal citizen" or is this a reference to a "State Citizen", or is this a reference to neither?  I have found the answer to this question in two authorities, Ex parte Knowles and People v. De La Guerra (see enclosed).  Both of these cases, decided by the California Supreme Court, agreed that the term referred to a Citizen of one of the Union States and that, strictly speaking, there was no such thing as a "citizen of the United States", at least not before the so-called 14th Amendment, and certainly not before the Civil Rights Act of 1866.

 

      I have concluded from this research that these courts did not observe the UPPER/lower-case convention;  they preferred instead to distinguish the two classes of citizenship by using terminology such as "citizen of a State" and "citizen of the United States", because the U.S. Constitution does make a distinction between the government of the several "States", on the one hand, and the government of the "United States", on the other hand.  The court records appear to indicate that judges were not always sensitive to the ambiguity and multiple meanings that attach to the term "United States".  Of course, the Hooven case, and Black's Law Dictionary since Hooven, constitute conclusive proof that the term "United States" is definitely ambiguous and for this reason the term "united States" is a unique way to identify the Union States.

 

      Nevertheless, I contend that the Framers of the Constitution did observe the UPPER/lower-case convention, and so did the authors of the IRC and CFR.  Specifically, in authenticated copies of the U.S. Constitution you will find consistent references to "Citizen" and "Citizens", for example, in the constitutional qualifications for President, Senator and Representative.  These provisions have never been lawfully amended and, for this reason alone, the original meaning and intent of these provisions is decisive (see "the proper construction and common understanding" in Ex parte Knowles, a very crucial authority in this debate).

 

      To add further fuel to the fire, I have located unofficial copies of the U.S. Constitution which utilized lower-case "c" in the qualifications for President, Senator and Representative.  Moreover, similar results obtain from the use of "Person" and "person";  prior to the so-called 14th Amendment, the U.S. Constitution utilized "Person", as in "free Persons" (see 1:2:3).  Are you a "free Person", or are you a 14th Amendment "person"?

 

      The voluminous research now assembled by Richard McDonald proves, beyond any shadow of doubt, that there is an enormous difference between the two statuses.  Since the Slaughter House Cases, the Supreme Court has consistently cited them as the seminal authority for the fact that there are two classes of citizenship, which correspond to the two governmental jurisdictions:  federal and State.  There are State Citizens and there are federal citizens.  I am strongly urging that we now observe this UPPER/lower case convention, in order to be clear about which class we are referring to in written English.  In spoken English, we can be clear by maintaining the distinction between "State Citizens" and "federal citizens", and by avoiding any other substitutes or synonyms for these terms.  Of course, there are those people (some of whom are undercover agents) who prefer to confuse and obfuscate this crucial distinction by using ambiguous, undefined language and by attempting to argue that there has always been just one class of citizenship in America.  I think it is fair to say that this latter argument is simply not supported by the relevant legal history.

 

      I am tempted to digress into a response to your mention of the Free Enterprise Society and Wayne Bentson.  Let me just say that Wayne has had an advance copy of The Federal Zone, fourth edition, for several weeks now, and he has fallen silent.  I prefer to let the enclosed materials speak for themselves.

 

      I hope this letter and its enclosures have addressed most, if not all, of the concerns you expressed in your thoughtful letter.

 

      Thanks for writing.

 

 

Sincerely yours,

 

/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder

 

Account for Better Citizenship

 

enclosures

 

P.S.  How does Wayne Bentson explain T.D. 2313?

      It's crucial, wouldn't you agree?

 


MEMO

 

TO:         Trusted Colleagues

 

FROM:       Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder

            Account for Better Citizenship

 

DATE:       November 4, 1992

 

SUBJECT:    Trusts, Foreign and Domestic

 

 

      I have recently taken a keen interest in practical applications of The Federal Zone to trust creation and administration.  In particular, I now believe I have enough evidence to prove that the correct distinction between foreign and domestic corporations is equally applicable to trusts.  The purpose of this memo is to share some of this evidence with you, in order to challenge your thinking on this subject and possibly to open new possibilities for trust creation and administration.

 

      Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, is a good place to begin.  In this dictionary, we find the following important definitions:

 

      Foreign situs trust.  A trust which owes its existence to foreign law.  It is treated for tax purposes as a non‑resident alien individual.

 

[emphasis added]

 

      Foreign trust.  A trust created and administered under foreign law.

 

Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, defines "foreign state" very clearly, as follows:

 

      The several United States*** are considered "foreign" to each other except as regards their relations as common members of the Union.

 

[emphasis added]

 

I have added three asterisks ("***") after "United States" in order to emphasize that the "United States" in this context refers to the 50 States of the Union.

 

      Now examine the definition of "foreign estate or trust" in the definitions section of the Internal Revenue Code, as follows:

 

      Foreign Estate or Trust. -- The terms "foreign estate" and "foreign trust" mean an estate or trust, as the case may be, the income of which, from sources without the United States which is not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States, is not includible in gross income under subtitle A.

 

[IRC 7701(a)(31)]

 

Do a bit of grammatical reconstruction, so as to eliminate the references to "foreign estate", and you get the following:

 

      The term "foreign trust" means a trust, the income of which is not includible in gross income under subtitle A.  The income of a foreign trust is not includible in gross income when it derives from sources which are without the "United States" and which are not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the "United States".

 

      Recall the definition of "foreign situs trust" from Black's supra.  Now compare the IRC definition of "foreign trust" with the IRC definition of "gross income" for nonresident alien individuals.  Notice the component criteria of gross income for a nonresident alien individual, and their close similarity to the same criteria for foreign trusts:

 

      In the case of a nonresident alien individual, except where the context clearly indicates otherwise, gross income includes only ‑‑

 

(1)   gross income which is derived from sources within the United States and which is not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States, and

 

(2)   gross income which is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States.

 

[IRC 872(a), emphasis added]

 

It is crucial to remember that the term "United States", as used in these sections of the IRC, means the federal zone, i.e., the territory over which Congress has exclusive legislative authority.  Income which is derived from sources without the "United States" is not included in gross income for nonresident aliens.  Likewise, income which is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business without the "United States" is not included in gross income for nonresident aliens.  Therefore, I have proven that the following rule has identical application to nonresident aliens and foreign trusts:

 

      Income is excludible from the computation of "gross income" if it derives from sources which are without the "United States" and which are not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the "United States".

 

      Now, let's dig a little deeper in order to determine if this finding is supported by other sections of the IRC.  Find the heading "foreign trusts" in the Topical Index of the IRC as published by Commerce Clearinghouse.  There you will find references to "situs" at 402(c) and 404(a)(4).  Read these sections carefully:

 

Taxability of Beneficiary of Certain Foreign Situs Trusts. ‑‑  For purposes of subsections (a) and (b), a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing trust which would qualify for exemption from tax under section 501(a) except for the fact that it is a trust created or organized outside the United States shall be treated as if it were a trust exempt from tax under section 501(a).

 

[IRC 402(c), emphasis added]

 

      Trusts Created or Organized Outside the United States. ‑‑  If a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing trust would qualify for exemption under section 501(a) except for the fact that it is a trust created or organized outside the United States, contributions to such a trust by an employer which is a resident, or corporation, or other entity of the United States, shall be deductible under the preceding paragraphs.

 

[IRC 404(a)(4), emphasis added]

 

It is a well established principle of law that the 50 States are "foreign" with respect to each other, just as the federal zone is "foreign" with respect to each of them (In re Merriam's Estate, 36 NE 505 (1894)).  The status of being foreign is the same as "belonging to" or being "attached to" another state or another jurisdiction.  The proper legal distinction between the terms "foreign" and "domestic" is best seen in Black's definitions of foreign and domestic corporations, as follows:

 

      Foreign corporation.  A corporation doing business in one state though chartered or incorporated in another state is a foreign corporation as to the first state, and, as such, is required to consent to certain conditions and restrictions in order to do business in such first state.

 

      Domestic corporation.  When a corporation is organized and chartered in a particular state, it is considered a domestic corporation of that state.

 

[emphasis added]

 

      In light of all the above, I now contend that untold numbers of trusts have been created on the basis of a belief that they are domestic trusts when, in fact, they are foreign trusts, as the terms "domestic" and "foreign" are defined in the IRC and in the law dictionaries.  The Internal Revenue Code was written under authority granted to Congress for the exercise of exclusive legislative jurisdiction over the federal zone.  Accordingly, the 50 States and their respective laws are actually foreign with respect to the federal zone.  The 10th Amendment makes it very clear that powers not specifically delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited to the States by the Constitution, are reserved to the States or to the people.  A common-law trust situated in California exercises rights which are reserved to the people, because California is a common-law State and because the U.S. Constitution specifically reserves such rights to the people.

 


                                                                                                                                c/o general delivery

                                                San Rafael

                                                California state

                                                Postal Zone 94901/tdc

 

                                                February 15, 1993

Dagny Sharon

Attorney-at-Law

c/o general delivery

Tustin, California state

Postal Zone 92680/tdc

 

Dear Dagny:

 

      I appreciated the opportunity to make your acquaintance at the Libertarian Party Convention in Sunnyvale this past weekend.  I also regret that we didn't have a chance to spend more time together.  Your videotape is quite original and light-hearted;  I hope it brings you much success.

 

      Had we found a way to spend more time talking with each other, there is one important matter which I would definitely have wanted you to consider more carefully.  During our conversation in the bar, while I was eating lunch, you implied that one of your goals is to work towards a "democracy" for America.  Whether you intended it this way or not, such a goal directly contradicts Article 4, Section 4 of the Constitution for the United States of America, to wit:

 

      Section 4.  The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government ....

 

      What exactly is a "Republican Form" of government?  It is one in which the powers of sovereignty are vested in the people and exercised by the people.  Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, makes this very clear:

 

      Republican government.  One in which the powers of sovereignty are vested in the people and are exercised by the people, either directly, or through representatives chosen by the people, to whom those powers are specially delegated.  In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 11 S.Ct. 573, 35 L.Ed. 219;  Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 22 L.Ed. 627.

 

      Both the California State Constitution and the U.S. Constitution state that the latter shall be the supreme Law of the land.  In the U.S. Constitution, Article 6, Clause 2 states:

 

      This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;  and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;  and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

 

At the turn of the century, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a series of controversial cases now known as The Insular Cases.  These cases were predicated, in part, on the principle that the Constitution for the United States as such does not extend beyond the boundaries of the States which are united by and under it.  Accordingly, this principle set a crucial precedent whereby Congress was free to establish a legislative democracy within the federal zone, instead of a constitutional republic.

 

      The federal zone is the area over which Congress exercises exclusive legislative jurisdiction;  it encompasses the District of Columbia and such areas as Guam and the Virgin Islands.  Even more important is the fact that this exclusive legislative jurisdiction extends to all persons who are subject to it, regardless of where they may reside.  As such, the status of "citizen of the United States" (also known as "U.S. citizen") causes one to be subject to the letter of all municipal statutes, rules and regulations which Congress enacts under this exclusive legislative authority.  The constitutional definition of this second class of citizens is alleged to be the so-called 14th Amendment.  However, two standing decisions of the Utah Supreme Court have struck down the ratification of this amendment.  Coupled with all the evidence which that Court utilized to arrive at these decisions, we have therein good cause to conclude that the so-called 14th Amendment is null and void for fraud and duress.  My book The Federal Zone discusses the so-called 14th Amendment as follows:

 

      Not only did this so-called "amendment" fail to specify which meaning of the term "United States" was being used;  like the 16th Amendment, it also failed to be ratified, this time by 15 of the 37 States which existed in 1868.  The House Congressional Record for June 13, 1967, contains all the documentation you need to prove that the so-called 14th Amendment was never ratified into law (see page 15641 et seq.).  For example, it itemizes all States which voted against the proposed amendment, and the precise dates when their Legislatures did so.  "I cannot believe that any court, in full possession of its faculties, could honestly hold that the amendment was properly approved and adopted." State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d. 936, 941 (1975).  The Utah Supreme Court has detailed the shocking and sordid history of the 14th Amendment's "adoption" in the case of Dyett v. Turner, 439 P.2d 266, 272 (1968).

 

      With this background knowledge firmly in hand, it is easy to explain why the federal government would reiterate the theme of "democracy" and "democratic institutions" over and over in its media propaganda.  It is now obvious that such programming has been entirely successful;  witness the large percentage of "Libertarians" who make repeated reference to their political goal of "democracy" for America.  Perhaps without knowing it, they are participating in the slow but steady demise of the nation symbolized by the Stars and Stripes, "the Republic for which it stands, one Nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."  The Insular Cases made it possible for America to become divisible into a constitutional republic and a legislative democracy.  It is the strategy of "divide and conquer", being applied once again with much success, this time to our very own homeland.

 

      I hope I have given you a few things to think about.

 

 

Sincerely yours,

 

/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder

 

Account for Better Citizenship

 

enclosures:       People v. Boxer pleadings

"Citizen is a Term of Municipal Law"

 

copy:             Jerry Collette

 


                                                                                                                                c/o general delivery

                                                San Rafael

                                                California state

                                                Postal Zone 94901/tdc

 

                                                February 7, 1993

John Voss, Director

N.C.B.A.

c/o general delivery

Longmont, Colorado

Postal Zone 80502/tdc

 

Dear John:

 

      Thanks so much for all the materials which you recently sent, with a copy of your letter to Mitchell Beals.  Time permitting, I do intend to do a thorough analysis of the written opinions.  I am very disappointed, but not surprised, that the appellate decisions were "not for publication".  I took all the decisions to the law library yesterday, but simply ran out of time.  Enclosed are the preliminary results of that one afternoon at the library.  Nevertheless, a distinct pattern is emerging already.

 

 

Item #1:    28 U.S.C. 297.  Assignment of judges to courts of the freely associated compact states

 

      This statute was part of the comprehensive "Judicial Improvements Act" submitted to  Congress by Peter F. Rodino, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives.  It went into law on November 19, 1988 (P.L. 100-702, copy attached).  Notice that subsection (a) refers to "the freely associated compact states" and to "the laws of the respective compact state".  In and of themselves, these references are significant because I was unable to find any discussion of the legislative history for this specific statute;  the material cited in U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News skipped any mention of it.  The statute is also too recent for any case law to have developed, and much too recent for the term "freely associated compact states" to appear in Words and Phrases, C.J.S., or Am Jur, although "compact" has several meanings in Black's Law Dictionary.

 

      What makes this term even more significant is the reference to it that is found in subsection (b), to wit:

 

      The Congress consents the acceptance and retention by any judge so authorized of reimbursement from the countries referred to in subsection (a) ....

 

[emphasis added]

 

I am going on memory now, but I do seem to recall a key exception to the definition of "state" once found in Title 28.  The exception was to another provision of Title 28 which utilized the term "State court".  I think this exception has since been removed by subsequent amendment, but the pre-amendment version clearly implied that the meaning of "state" as found in the standard definition was different from the meaning of "state" as intended by the term "State court" (hence the need for the "exception" clause).  Therefore, the standard definition implied a federal state, not a Union State.

 

      In section 297 supra, we are faced with a choice between two conflicting and mutually incompatible interpretations of the term "freely associated compact states".  If these states are Union States, then the "compact" may well be the U.S. Constitution and Congress has admitted openly that Union States are the "countries referred to in subsection (a)".  If these states are other nations in the family of nations (e.g. China, Japan), then the "countries" referred to in subsection (a) are these other nations, and I can only speculate about the "compact" to which Section 297 refers.  Could it be the U.N. charter?  If not, what else could it be?  some international treaty?  I wonder if there is a way to inquire of the House Judiciary Committee without tipping our own hands and giving the Committee a reason to obfuscate the real answer.  Or, what about the Library of Congress, or Congressional Research Service?  I wouldn't put too much faith into the CRS, in light of the hack job they continue to do on "Frequently Asked Questions about Federal Income Taxes".

 

      This little tidbit is highly significant when placed in the larger context of all the research now assembled into the electronic version of The Federal Zone, third edition (disk enclosed).  In particular, my interpretation of the distinction between "foreign" and "domestic" is amply supported by the definitions in Black's Sixth Edition, and especially by the Supreme Court decision to uphold the New York Court's decision of In re Merriam's Estate, 36 NE 505 (1894).  Black's definitions of foreign and domestic corporations, in my opinion, leave little room for doubt about the correct distinction here.  Black's defines "foreign state" very clearly, as follows:

 

      The several United States*** are considered "foreign" to each other except as regards their relations as common members of the Union. ... [O]ne state of the Union is foreign to another.

 

[emphasis added]

 

 

Item #2:    U.S. Code Service, Lawyers Edition, Interpretive Notes

 

      In light of the pivotal importance of this distinction between "foreign" and "domestic", it was revealing to discover the nearly total absence of case law on this question in the U.S.C.S. Lawyers Edition (where you would expect a plethora of citations).  In the main body of U.S.C.S. dealing with the IRC definitions in 7701, there is only one reference to "foreign estate" (a revenue ruling) and there are only two references to "domestic building and loan association" (a revenue ruling and a district court ruling).  What is even more revealing is the case of U.S. v. Bardina, the one and only citation to the IRC definition of "United States", to wit:

 

      Even though 26 USCS 7701(a)(9) defines "United States" as including only United States and District of Columbia, Puerto Rico is considered as being within United States for purposes of 6-year statute of limitations on tax crimes; ....

 

[emphasis added]

 

Notice the blatant tautology (again).  Notice also that this interpretation flatly contradicts the actual IRC definition:

 

(9)   United States. -- The term "United States" when used in a geographical sense includes only the States and the District of Columbia.

 

[IRC 7701(a)(9), emphasis added]

 

The term "States" is very different from the term "United States".  And, of course, the corresponding definition of "State" makes absolutely no mention of any Union States:

 

(10)  State. -- The term "State" shall be construed to include the District of Columbia, where such construction is necessary to carry out provisions of this title.

 

[IRC 7701(a)(10)]

 

      Moving on to the Cumulative Supplement for the U.S.C.S. Lawyers Edition, we find a similar pattern.  Here, we find one revenue ruling concerning a "foreign estate", and four citations to "resident and nonresident alien", two of which are "TC Memos", one of which is a "Private Letter Ruling", and one of which is a "Revenue Ruling".  These are not exactly sterling authorities!  One of these citations concerned a former official of a foreign government that was overthrown while he was in the "United States" under diplomatic passport.  Another concerned a "US citizen who obtained a US passport before moving to a foreign country".  Another concerned a spouse's election to be treated as a resident alien under IRC 7701(b).  The last citation is worth investigating:

 

      Status of trust as foreign trust turns upon whether trust is comparable to nonresident alien individual;  trust established and administered under laws of foreign country whose trustee is a foreign entity and whose corpus is located in a foreign country is nonforeign trust even though trust is grantor trust and its income is taxable to grantor who is United States citizen.  Rev Rul 87-61, 1987-2 CB 219.

 

[emphasis added]

 

      It would be revealing to examine the details about the trust in question, i.e., what was the "foreign country" under the laws of which the trust was established and administered.  If it was a Union State, we have a bingo.  Who or what was the "foreign entity" trustee?  Where exactly was the "corpus" located?  Notice the term "nonforeign";  I presume this means "domestic", based on the IRC definition of "foreign" at 7701(a)(5) (i.e., not domestic).  Finally, notice that there is a "grantor" who is a "United States citizen";  this status appears to be the only mention of any nexus with the federal zone (if any).

 

 

Item #3:    United States Code Annotated (U.S.C.A.)

 

      Again, an identical pattern is found in the annotated version of the United States Codes.  Here, we do find an interesting exception to the general rule for the federal zone, i.e., a Guam corporation is "foreign" for federal income tax purposes:

 

      Guam is not a "territory" within meaning of this section defining domestic corporation as one created or organized in United States or under laws of United States or of any state or territory, and Guam is considered a possession so that its corporations are foreign for federal income tax purposes.  Sayre & Co. v. Riddell, C.A. Guam, 1968, 395 F.2d 407.

 

      Notice how carefully they skirt the general issue of exclusive legislative jurisdiction by ruling that Guam is a "possession", and "possessions" were not mentioned in the IRC's definition of "domestic" at that time ("or Territory" was deleted in 1977).  In other words, in 1968 the definition of "domestic" mentioned "United States", and "any State or Territory".  Since Guam was found to be a "possession" and not the "United States", not a "State" and not a "Territory", it was not domestic and therefore foreign.  This is a fascinating little intricacy in this semantic jungle.

 

      The only other citation of any interest is the 1944 case which interpreted the meaning of "includes".  I consider this decision to be erroneous, for reasons which I explain in detail in Chapter 12 of The Federal Zone, third edition.  Specifically, in formal English, a noun is either a person, a place, or a thing.  The IRC specifically defines a trust to be a "person" as opposed to a "place" or a "thing" (see IRC 7701(a)(1)).  The clarification of "includes" at IRC 7701(c) specifically states that this term shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of term defined;  notice that "persons" and "places" are conspicuously absent from this clarification of "includes".  Therefore, a "trust" cannot be a thing otherwise within the definition of "transferee" because a trust is a person, by definition, and a "transferee" is not a person because it is not mentioned in the IRC definition of "person".  I know this may sound strained, but the IRC definition of "person" clearly embraces only an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation;  moreover, there is ample evidence that the IRC does obey strictly the rules of formal English grammar.

 

      That's it!  Now, don't you get the feeling, as I do, that they are trying their best to avoid these crucial distinctions between "foreign" and "domestic"?  In light of the clarity which is found in Black's definitions of foreign and domestic corporations, I would be hard pressed to demonstrate a clear and consistent pattern among these sparse authorities, many of which are not even courts.  John, I am forced to conclude that some (if not all) of these cases were contrived, and that a thorough set of consistent Court authorities is very conspicuous for its absence.

 

 

Item #4:    McKinley v. United States of America, S.D. Ohio, 1992

 

      Time permitting, I will try my best to analyze the unpublished cases which you generously provided to me.  For now, I will take a brief look at McKinley because it will be published, and because there is so little in this decision which is relevant to The Federal Zone, i.e.:

 

                The Court takes judicial notice that while Ohio is a sovereign state, it is nevertheless part of the United States and Ohio residents are also residents of the United States and are subject to taxation.  The Court finds the plaintiffs to be residents of the United States and not non-resident aliens.

 

[emphasis added]

 

      I guess this Court failed to read Hooven or the corresponding definitions of "United States" in Black's.  More importantly, this decision flatly contradicts the definition of "United States" at IRC 7701(a)(9).  Sure, Ohio is part of the "United States" if "United States" means the several States of the Union.  However, the IRC says that "United States" (when used in a geographical sense) includes only the District of Columbia and the States, and "State" shall be construed to include the District of Columbia (and nothing else)!  Since singular and plural are interchangeable (per Title 1), since "include" is not found in the clarification of "includes" and "including" at 7701(c), and since 7701(c) mentions only "things" and not "persons" or "places", we are entirely justified in arguing that the term "United States" at 7701(a)(9) omits any mention of the Union States because they were intended to be omitted.  The rules of statutory construction support this inference, as do the changes to 7701(a)(9) & (10) that resulted from the Alaska and Hawaii Omnibus Acts:  Alaska and Hawaii were removed from the IRC definition of "State" when they joined the Union (of freely associated compact states).  So, as pro bono judge of the Sovereign Electrical Circuit of Justice, I hereby reverse the holding in McKinley v. United States of America and remand with instructions to take explicit judicial notice of the legislative history of IRC 7701(a)(9), in addition to the well established rules of statutory construction (see Sutherland, for example).

 

 

Item #5:    Notes on Decisions re: 1:6:2 and Null and Void Lloyd

 

      These cases are either favorable or neutral.  Lloyd, you are a sitting duck.  Notice also the careful IRC distinction between "Secretary of the Treasury" and "Secretary" at 7701(a)(11).  At first glance, this is bad news for our 7401 challenge, but closer examination reveals the following:

 

      (A)   In General. -- The term "or his delegate" --

 

(i)   when used with reference to the Secretary of the Treasury, means any officer, employee, or agency of the Treasury Department duly authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury directly, or indirectly by one or more redelegations of authority, to perform the function mentioned or described in the context;

 

      Even though IRC 7401 utilizes the term "Secretary", which means the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate, the term "or his delegate" means an officer, employee or agency duly authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury either directly, or indirectly by one or more redelegations of authority.  In other words, Lloyd Bentsen must be in the loop, either directly, or indirectly by one or more redelegations of authority.  So, it looks as if Null and Void Lloyd remains in a heap'a trouble;  his colorable acts will spread through the Treasury Department like a computer virus, infecting everything they touch.  We should get an expert on delegation of authority to see what, if any, redelegations originated from Nicholas Brady and whether they remain valid and in force after Bentsen's reign began.

 

      Enough for now.  I know you have nothing else to do but read these technicalities.  The devil is always in the details.

 

 

Sincerely yours,

 

/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder

 

Account for Better Citizenship

 

enclosures

 

copy:  Mitchell Beals

       (great first name)

 


                                                                                                                                c/o general delivery

                                                San Rafael

                                                California state

                                                Postal Zone 94901/tdc

 

                                                February 8, 1993

John Voss, Director

N.C.B.A.

c/o general delivery

Longmont, Colorado

Postal Zone 80502/tdc

 

Dear John:

 

      In my letter to you of February 7, my memory failed me when I referred to Title 28;  the correct reference was Title 8 (I got one number right).  I tracked it down today for you, because I am convinced that one of the "unpublished" cases which you recently sent to me is completely wrong for ruling that Union States are not "foreign countries" for purposes of the IRC.  Enclosed is stunning proof of my position from American Jurisprudence.  I picked up the trail in Ballentine's Law Dictionary, Third Edition, where it defines "sovereign state" as follows:

 

      In the United States, each state constitutes a discrete and independent sovereignty, and consequently the laws of one state do not operate of their own force in any other state.  16 AmJur J2d, "Conflict of Laws", Section 4.

 

[Ballentine's Law Dictionary, Third Edition]

 

      I had to go hunting for the corresponding section in Am Jur, because the reference to Section 4 is a typographical error.  I found what I was looking for at Section 2 instead.  The key is to understand that the IRC is a "municipal law" as far as income taxation is concerned (see Conclusions in The Federal Zone):

 

      "... [T]he several states ... are otherwise, at least so far as private international law is concerned, in the same relation as foreign countries13.  The great majority of questions of private international law are therefore subject to the same rules when they arise between two states of the Union as when they arise between two foreign countries,  and in the ensuing pages the words "state," "nation," and "country" are used synonymously and interchangeably, there being no intention to distinguish between the several states of the Union and foreign countries by the use of varying terminology.

 

[16 Am Jur 2d, "Conflict of Laws", Section 2]

 

Notice, in particular, the comment in footnote 11:

 

In the sense of public international law, the several states of the Union are neither foreign to the United States nor are they foreign to each other, but such is not the case in the field of private international law.  Robinson v. Norato, 71 RI 256, 43 A2d 467, 162 ALR 362.

 

Not to be outdone, Black's Sixth Edition chimed in with the following similar message:

 

      The term "foreign state," as used in a statement of the rule that the laws of foreign nations should be proved in a certain manner, should be construed to mean all nations and states other than that in which the action is brought;  and hence one state of the Union is foreign to another, in the sense of that rule.

 

[Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition]

 

      Further stunning proof of The Federal Zone thesis is found in the Immigration and Nationality Act (see attached), where Congress slipped by including a key exception in its statutory definition of "State" at 8 USC 1101(a)(36).  Prior to an amendment in 1987, this definition included the language "(except as used in section 310(a) of title III [8 USCS Section 1421(a)])".  At that time, Section 1421(a) of Title 8 referred to courts "in any State" and "all courts of record in any State".  I failed to pull the current text of 1421(a), but the current 1101(a)(36) removed the exception clause!  I would bet that 1421(a) now has a special definition for the term "State", because 1421(a) must be talking about courts of the Union States.  For corroboration, I have enclosed a page from the California State Constitution (1879), wherein California Superior Courts are given clear original jurisdiction to naturalize and "to issue papers therefor".

 

 

Sincerely yours,

 

/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder

 

Account for Better Citizenship

 

enclosures:  photocopies of evidence

 


                                                                                                                                c/o general delivery

                                                San Rafael

                                                California state

                                                Postal Zone 94901/tdc

 

                                                February 1, 1993

Rich Pralle, CFS

R D P & Associates

c/o general delivery

Santa Rosa, California state

Postal Zone 95404/tdc

 

Dear Rich:

 

      I may have misunderstood something which you said about the Internal Revenue Code.  Am I correct in remembering you say that IRC 6672 concerned "withholding agents"?  When I returned home, I looked up this section:

 

      Section 6672.     Failure to Collect and Pay Over Tax,

                        or Attempt to Evade or Defeat Tax

 

      (a)   General Rule. -- Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for and paid over.  No penalty shall be imposed under section 6653 or part II of subchapter A of chapter 68 for any offense to which this section is applicable.

 

[IRC 6672, emphasis added]

 

As you can see, there is no explicit mention of "withholding agents" in IRC 6672.  The section to which I was referring in our conversation was IRC 7701(a)(16):

 

      (16)  Withholding Agent. -- The term "withholding agent" means any person required to deduct and withhold any tax under the provisions of section 1441, 1442, 1443, or 1461.

 

[IRC 7701(a)(16), emphasis added]

 

      Sections 1441, 1442 and 1443 are too long to reproduce here.  Their headings provide some indication of their contents:

 

      Section 1441.  Withholding of Tax on Nonresident Aliens

 

      Section 1442.  Withholding of Tax on Foreign Corporations

 

      Section 1443.  Foreign Tax-Exempt Organizations

 

      The following is the entire text of IRC 1461.  This section is important because it specifically makes "withholding agents" liable for the taxes they deduct and withhold:

 

                Section 1461.  Liability for Withheld Tax

 

      Every person required to deduct and withhold any tax under this chapter is hereby made liable for such tax and is hereby indemnified against the claims and demands of any person for the amount of any payments made in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.

 

[IRC 1461, emphasis added]

 

      In other words, the persons from whom they withhold are not liable for the taxes which they withhold.  That is to say, nonresident aliens are not liable for the taxes that are withheld from the dividends they receive from stock issued by domestic corporations (see Treasury Decision 2313).

 

      So, we can link 1461 and 6672 because withholding agents are liable for the taxes they deduct and withhold, i.e., they are required to collect and pay over the tax imposed by 1461 (combining the language of 6672 and 1461);  if they don't pay the taxes they deduct and withhold, then they would be liable to the penalty defined in 6672.

 

      Our research indicates that "withholding agents" are the only ones who are specifically made liable by the IRC for the payment of income taxes.  If you can find another IRC section which specifically makes anyone else liable for the payment of income taxes, I would appreciate getting the exact citation from you.

 

      On another subject, I have several serious problems with the T.A.G. flyer entitled "Are You Really Liable?"  One excerpt from this flyer reads:

 

      Section 7701(a)(1) defines the term person as:

 

"The term 'person' shall be construed to mean and include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation."

 

      Well now, that certainly seems easy enough and section 7701(a)(1) makes no mention of the term "U.S. Individual".  Now, look at section 7701(a)(30):

 

            "The term 'United States person' means -

            (A)   a citizen or resident of the United States,

            (B)   a domestic partnership,

            (C)   a domestic corporation, and

            (D)   any estate or trust ...."

 

      There is no mention of the term "U.S. Citizen";  "Individual", or "U.S. Individual".

 

      ...

 

      Assuming the term "U.S." means United States, then the 1040 would be for a "United States Individual", the 1120 for a "United States Corporation".

 

                In my opinion, this sequence of logic is misleading.  The flyer assumes that the term "U.S. means United States".  Fair enough.  If it doesn't mean "United States", the flyer does not tell us what else it might mean.  So, for purposes of this analysis, the term "U.S." means "United States".

 

      However, the flyer also states that there is no mention of the term "U.S. Citizen".  This is technically correct, because the IRC never utilizes a capital "C" when it refers to "citizens of the United States" or "United States citizens" (except when a capital "C" is required in the first word of a sentence or heading).  But, this is also misleading, because the same flyer quotes section 7701(a)(30) which does mention "citizen or resident of the United States", i.e., "citizen of the United States" or "resident of the United States".

 

      The flyer also states that there is no mention of the term "Individual" or "U.S. Individual".  Again, this is technically correct, because the IRC utilizes the lower-case "i" when it refers to individuals.  But, for similar reasons, the flyer is misleading because "citizens of the United States" and "residents of the United States" are among the "individuals" to whom the IRC refers.  This is so because "person" means and includes an "individual";  it also means and includes a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation.  Therefore, an "individual" is a person in the same way that a horse is an animal;  moreover, using permissible substitution, the term "United States person" means and includes a "U.S. individual".  The "U.S. individuals" to whom the IRC refers are the "citizens of the United States" and "residents of the United States".  This can be confirmed at 26 CFR 1.1-1 et seq.

 

      For similar reasons, I also consider the following excerpt of the flyer to be misleading and erroneous:

 

      At section 6011, when required by regulations prescribed by the Secretary any person made liable for any tax imposed by this title ... shall make a return.  Did the Secretary prescribe by regulations that a citizen of the United States was liable for filing?  No, of course not.

 

[emphasis added]

 

Here's the corresponding section of the CFR:

 

      1.6011-1    General requirement of return, statement, or list.

 

(a)   General rule.     Every person subject to any tax, or required to collect any tax, under Subtitle A of the Code, shall make such returns or statements as are required by the regulations in this chapter.  The return or statement shall include therein the information required by the applicable regulations or forms.

 

 

Another important regulation is the following:

 

1.6012-1    Individuals required to make returns of income.

 

      (a)   Individual citizen or resident --

 

(1)   In general.  Except as provided in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, an income tax return must be filed by every individual ... for each taxable year beginning after December 31, 1972, during which he received $750 or more of gross income, if such individual is:

 

(i)   A citizen of the United States, whether residing at home or abroad,

 

(ii)  A resident of the United States even though not a citizen thereof ....

 

      So, I think the T.A.G. flyer is entirely wrong when it states that "of course" the Secretary has "not" prescribed by regulations that a citizen of the United States was liable for filing.  I have just proven that the Secretary has prescribed regulations which require a "citizen of the United States" to make an income tax return, provided that his "gross income" exceeds the specified dollar threshold.  The computation of gross income for nonresident aliens is defined at IRC 872(a);  in most situations, that computation results in a gross income of zero.  Frank Brushaber's "gross income" was not zero because he received a dividend from a "U.S. corporation", namely, the Union Pacific Railroad Company.  It was a U.S. corporation because it was incorporated by Congress.

 

      Finally, I realize that the California voter registration form does say "For U.S. Citizens Only" in red letters across the top of the form.  However, the affidavit on that registration form is the statement that matters:

 

 

                  READ THIS STATEMENT AND WARNING PRIOR TO SIGNING

 

      I am a citizen of the United States and will be at least 18 years of age at the time of the next election.  I am not imprisoned or on parole for the conviction of a felony.  I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the information on this affidavit is true and correct.

 

WARNING

 

      Perjury is punishable by imprisonment in state prison for two, three or four years.  Section 126 Penal Code

 

[emphasis in original]

 

      I contend that the "citizen of the United States" to which this form refers is the same "citizen of the United States" to which the Internal Revenue Code refers, to which the Code of Federal Regulations refers, and to which the so-called Fourteenth Amendment refers.  If you are interested, we have now located two Utah Supreme Court cases which struck down the so-called Fourteenth Amendment.  The language of Section 1 of that amendment is almost identical to the definition of "citizen" that is found in 26 CFR 1.1-1(c).  Given that the so-called Fourteenth Amendment was never properly approved and adopted, the earliest definition of "citizen of the United States" that we have been able to find in law is found in the 1866 Civil Rights Act.

 

      Thanks for your consideration.

 

 

Sincerely yours,

 

/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder

 

Account for Better Citizenship

 

copy:  Rleen Joy

       Don Fletcher

 


                                                                                                                                c/o general delivery

                                                San Rafael, California

                                                Postal Zone 94901/tdc

 

                                                December 22, 1992

Andrew Melechinsky

Constitutional Revival

c/o general delivery

Enfield, Connecticut

Postal Zone 06083/tdc

 

Dear Andy:

 

      Thanks very much for your unsigned note, postmarked December 16, 1992.  In response to my previous question concerning 1:8:17 in the U.S. Constitution, you wrote the following:

 

      Answer.  It is self evident that no state or any other governing body is authorized to make laws for the District of Columbia or other enclaves which belong to the United States.  It should be obvious that this provision of the Constitution was designed to make Congress the equivalent to the Enfield Town Council or the Podunk Board of Selectmen for the purpose of governing those areas.

 

[my emphasis]

 

      I couldn't agree more with your answer.  In fact, it is uncanny how close our thinking is on this question.  In my research and writings, I often refer to Congress as "City Hall" for the federal zone.  In other words, if Congress wants to pass a "dog leash" law for D.C., it is authorized to do so by 1:8:17 in the Constitution.  This dog leash law would apply only inside D.C., and nowhere else, right?

 

      Now, let's use a similar example, only this time let's incorporate a tax in our example.  Let's say that Congress wants to tax the sale of dog leashes inside D.C.  This is an excise tax, right?  Congress is empowered to levy excise taxes, right?  But, here's the rub:  must the tax rate be uniform throughout the 50 States?

 

      Wait a minute, you ask, the question of uniformity only applies to federal excises levied inside the 50 States.  This tax on the sale of dog leashes only applies inside the District of Columbia.  The 50 States are irrelevant to the application of this tax and, therefore, the issue of uniformity is also irrelevant, is it not?  Such an excise tax need not be uniform throughout the 50 States, because it has no application anywhere inside the 50 States.  It is a "municipal" tax.  No State or any other governing body is authorized to levy such a tax inside D.C., just as Congress is not authorized to levy such a tax outside D.C. and inside the 50 States.

 

      The key court decision on this question is Downes v. Bidwell, which is one of The Insular Cases, as they are called.  You might also read the several articles which appeared in the Harvard Law Review on these cases.  I have enclosed a memo which I wrote some time ago on exclusive authority as applied to direct taxes.

 

                You also wrote that "it takes a wild imagination to visualize the District of Columbia as a second 'United States'.  Even if it was, it would still be subject to the constraints of the Bill of Rights."  Let's postpone correspondence on the Bill of Rights until you and I can clarify our respective positions on federal taxing authority, OK?  In this context, the key question is this:  are federal municipal taxes subject to the uniformity and apportionment rules found in the Constitution?  My answer is this:  no, because those restrictions only apply to federal laws which are levied inside the 50 States.  One of the Supreme Court's best statements on this dual or heterogeneous attribute of federal laws is the following excerpt from the Hooven case:

 

            ... [T]he United States** may acquire territory by conquest or by treaty, and may govern it through the exercise of the power of Congress conferred by Section 3 of Article IV of the Constitution ....

 

            In exercising this power, Congress is not subject to the same constitutional limitations, as when it is legislating for the United States***. ... And in general the guaranties [sic] of the Constitution, save as they are limitations upon the exercise of executive and legislative power when exerted for or over our insular possessions, extend to them only as Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power over territory belonging to the United States**, has made those guaranties [sic] applicable.

 

[Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945)]

[emphasis added]

 

      Now, let's imagine, just for the sake of argument, that the income tax provisions in the Internal Revenue Code are municipal statutes, which are "not subject to the same constitutional limitations" which apply when Congress "is legislating for the [50] United States" of America.  You will notice that the IRC's petroleum taxes are uniform throughout the 50 States, and in those provisions the term "State" is defined to include the 50 States.  However, when it comes to the graduated income tax, the term "State" is defined to include only the District of Columbia (and none of the 50 States).  Isn't this odd?  Not really, when you realize that the graduated income tax is, indeed, a municipal statute which is unaffected by the uniformity and apportionment restrictions in the Constitution, for the reasons discussed above.

 

      Last but not least, we have in America a government of the "United States" and a government of each of the several States;  each has citizens of its own.  Therefore, we have State Citizens, and we have federal citizens (also known as "citizens of the United States").  See the Slaughter House Cases for the seminal authority on this dual citizenship.  Now, the exercise of State Citizenship is an unalienable right, endowed by the Creator (see the Declaration of Independence).  But, and this is important, even crucial to the issue of taxation, federal citizenship is a statutory privilege, the exercise of which can be taxed with an excise tax without uniformity throughout the 50 States.  The term "citizen of the United States" was first expressed in law by the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  Some people say that it was put into the Constitution by the so-called 14th Amendment, but we have now located two (2) Utah Supreme Court cases which found that the Amendment was not properly ratified.  Therefore, the status of "United States citizen" is at best the creation of Congressional legislation -- endowed by Congress and NOT by the Creator.

 

      So, think of federal citizens as citizens of the federal zone.  The taxation of their incomes is a municipal excise tax, just like the tax on dog leashes discussed above.  The "income" is not the subject of the tax;  the subject of the tax is the exercise of the statutory privilege known as federal citizenship (also known as "U.S. citizenship").  The "income" is simply the measure of the tax.

 

      I hope I have made some sense out of the jungle of legal jargon and double-talk which gets in the way of clear thinking on this subject.  Admittedly, the whole situation is made immensely complicated by the deliberate vagueness and confusion which were incorporated into the Internal Revenue Code  and its regulations in the CFR.  But, I am confident we have now proven that the graduated income tax provisions of the IRC are municipal statutes which apply only to the federal zone (e.g. federal employees) and to the citizens of that zone, no matter where they might "reside".  In fact, to be a "resident" of California, strictly speaking, means that one is a federal citizen who resides outside the federal zone and inside California.  Technically speaking, a State Citizen does not "reside" in the State of his domicile.

 

      I would appreciate getting your written comments on all the above.  In the meantime, thanks for your continuing work to benefit the Freedom Movement in America today.

 

 

Sincerely yours,

 

/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder

 

Account for Better Citizenship

 


                                                                                                                                c/o general delivery

                                                San Rafael, California

                                                Postal Zone 94901/tdc

                                                November 4, 1992

Karl Loren, Author

c/o general delivery

Burbank, California state

Postal Zone 91504/tdc

 

Dear Karl:

 

      Thank you for the complimentary copy of Verity, Volume 2, Number 10, dated November 1, 1992.  Although I do not care to get embroiled in the trust controversy described in this issue of Verity, your newsletter does contain the following paragraphs which, in my humble opinion, contain serious errors.  Numbers in [brackets] are my paragraph numbers, for ease of reference:

 

[1]   We in the United States tax U.S. Citizens on their income whether they live in the U.S. or in a foreign country.  We tax those U.S. Citizens, regardless of residence, on their income whether they received it from within the United States or from outside the United States.

 

[2]   We even go so far as to tax aliens who reside within the United States ‑‑ on their income from either within the U.S. or outside the U.S.

 

[3]   A U.S. Supreme Court case [Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924)] requires the U.S. Citizen abroad to pay taxes in the U.S.

 

[4]   The Supreme court ruled in this case that the United States has the power to tax its citizens on their worldwide income solely by reason of their citizenship.

 

[5]   "No other major country in the world taxes its nonresident citizens on their foreign-source incomes at all" according to Marshall J. Langer, Professor of Law, Miami University, author of Practical International Tax Planning.  There is even a tax law that makes it illegal to change your U.S. citizenship for the purpose of avoiding taxes!  [citing IRC Section 877(a)]

 

[6]   We even go so far as to tax nonresident aliens who reside outside the U.S., but who receive income FROM within the United States. [citing IRC Sections 871(a) and 871(b)]

 

[7]   But, the IRS certainly does not try to collect income taxes from a nonresident alien who receives his ONLY income from sources without the United States.

 

[8]   It would be ludicrous to even pause to consider the possibility of the United States claiming tax jurisdiction over a nonresident alien earning income from a non-US Source!

 

I am somewhat chagrinned to be writing this letter in the first place, because you purchased The Federal Zone some months ago, and your written communications to me seemed to imply that you understood, and agreed with, the book.  The above quoted paragraphs from Verity, dated November 1, 1992, now leave me wondering just how much of The Federal Zone you actually read and understood.  Let me proceed with an analysis of your statements, paragraph-by-paragraph:

 

[1]         The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and the regulations which promulgate that Code (26 CFR) do not impose federal income taxes on "U.S. Citizens".  The regulations at 26 CFR 1.1‑1(b) and (c) state that income tax liability is imposed on the worldwide income of "citizens of the United States" and "residents of the United States".  In English, there is a world of difference between a proper noun and a common noun.  Proper nouns are capitalized;  common nouns are not.  If you think this distinction is irrelevant or merely academic, then it is now incumbent upon you to carry the burden of finding and demonstrating one single reference to "U.S. Citizens" in the IRC and its regulations.  References to "Citizen" or "Citizens" in the first word of a sentence, or in paragraph headings, do not count, because formal English requires that terms in such grammatical positions be capitalized.

 

            Moreover, the Hooven case quoted and discussed in The Federal Zone proves that the term "United States" has at least three different meanings in law.  This fact is supported by the same meanings which are found in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition.  The late John Knox once confided to me that the Solicitor General in De Lima v. Bidwell actually argued that the term "United States" has at least five (5) different meanings in the Constitution.  I am also told that James Madison anticipated the ambiguity found in the term "United States", and documented this ambiguity in his notes on the Constitutional Convention.  These notes were reportedly published in 1840, but to date I have been unsuccessful in locating a copy of these notes.  Your paragraph [1] is ambiguous for failing to define precisely which of these several meanings you are utilizing.  This is crucial because you make the all-important distinction between income derived from sources within the "United States" and income derived from sources without the "United States".  A precise definition of "United States" is therefore pivotal to any and all discussions of federal tax law.

 

            Moreover, the 50 States are considered to be "foreign countries" with respect to the "United States", for purposes of federal taxation, because the regulations clearly define the "United States" to be the territory over which the federal government has exclusive rights.  This is the very same term that is found in 1:8:17 in the Constitution and for this reason "exclusive" is also a pivotal term.  The 50 States of the Union retain all rights not reserved by the people and not explicitly enumerated for the federal government by the Constitution (see the 9th and 10th Amendments for proof).

 

 

[2]         Again, this paragraph fails to provide a precise definition of "United States".  Moreover, it makes reference to "aliens" who "reside within the United States".  If you study IRC 7701(b)(1)(B) very carefully, you will discover that an "alien" is an individual who is not a "citizen of the United States" and a "nonresident" is an individual who is not a "resident of the United States (within the meaning of subparagraph (A)".  IRC 7701(b)(1)(A) is important because it defines the three tests which distinguish "resident aliens" from "nonresident aliens".  These three tests are the only ways in which an "alien" can be a "resident alien".  Therefore, these three tests define "residence" for purposes of federal income taxation.  See also IRS Publication 519:  "For tax purposes, an alien is an individual who is not a U.S. citizen."  Therefore, a State Citizen who is not also a federal citizen is an alien for federal tax purposes.  Your paragraph [2] is vague and therefore void.

 

 

[3]         Again, you make reference to a "U.S. Citizen".  See discussion of paragraph [1] above.

 

 

[4]         Now you make reference to the "United States", "its citizens" and "their citizenship".  Oddly, this paragraph is grammatically and legally correct, because the Congress does have exclusive legislative jurisdiction over its own federal citizens, no matter where on planet Earth they may "reside".  The enclosed materials go into great depth to explain the distinction between federal citizens and State Citizens, so I won't belabor this distinction here.  It is important to realize that the distinction between these two classes of citizenship is as important and fundamental as the distinction between the State and federal governments.  See the Cruikshank case, K. Tashiro v. Jordan, and Ex parte Knowles for proof.  The Slaughter House Cases are the seminal decisions in this area.  If you fail to educate yourself about this important legal history, you will continue to propagate the kind of confusion which is evident in Verity for November 1, 1992.

 

 

[5]         Here again you are back on track, but it is not clear whether you are back on track knowingly and intentionally, or not.  Congress has authority to tax its own federal citizens, wherever they reside and wherever the source of their income.  Therefore, "resident citizens" and "nonresident citizens" are treated the same in federal tax law because the worldwide income of both groups is taxed.  Your paragraph [5] does make a grievous error, however, by stating that the tax law makes it illegal to change your "U.S. citizenship" for the purpose of avoiding taxes.  Your paragraph [5] then cites IRC 877(a).  This is not what Section 877(a) says, nor is expatriation made illegal by any subparagraphs of Section 877.  Read them!  IRC 877 merely discusses the rules which shall govern federal tax liability when expatriation occurs.  It does not outlaw expatriation!

 

 

[6]         This paragraph is also correct on its face, but it too suffers for lacking a precise definition of "United States" and "U.S."  Sections 871(a) and 871(b) are governed by the statutory definition of "United States" that is found at IRC 7701(a)(9).  This definition, in turn, is governed by the statutory definition of "State" that is found at IRC 7701(a)(10).  IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO TAKE CAREFUL NOTE OF THE EXACT WORDING OF 7701(a)(10):

 

            The term "State" shall be construed to include the District of Columbia, where such construction is necessary to carry out the provisions of this title.

 

[emphasis added]

 

            Now, it is true that the terms "includes" and "including" are qualified by IRC 7701(c), but notice that "include" is not qualified by IRC 7701(c).  This may seem like nit-picking, but the published rules of statutory construction do apply here.  Specifically, the rule of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of one is the exclusion of others) states that an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or excluded from a statutory definition was intended to be omitted or excluded.  The term "include" is excluded from 7701(c).  The term "California" is excluded from 7701(a)(10).  Therefore, all by itself, this rule of statutory construction allows us to infer that "include" is not expansive and "California" is excluded from the statutory definition of "State" found at 7701(a)(10).

 

            There are other rules of statutory construction which produce the same result, e.g., ejusdem generis (the federal zone and the 50 States are not in the same general class of entities because the 50 States are members of the Union, while the areas within the federal zone are not).  Now the burden is upon you to prove otherwise.  Don't forget that any doubt must be resolved in favor of those upon whom the tax is sought to be laid;  the Supreme Court has said so, more than once!

 

 

[7]         The IRS most certainly does try to collect income taxes from nonresident aliens who receive their ONLY income from sources without the "United States".  For purposes of income taxation, the "United States" as defined in the IRC is no larger than the territory over which Congress exercises exclusive legislative authority, i.e., the federal zone.  If you study Treasury Decision 2313 carefully, you will come to discover that Frank Brushaber was classified by the Treasury Department as a nonresident alien.  His court documents prove that he claimed to be a State Citizen who lived and worked in New York City.  Therefore, State Citizens who are not also federal citizens are "nonresident aliens" as far as federal income taxes are concerned.  How many millions of Americans have been victimized by the deliberate and criminal confusion which has been fostered by vague and ambiguous terms in the IRC?  I say at least 100 million, counting all those who have paid income taxes and passed away since 1913.

 

 

[8]         It certainly is ludicrous for the "United States" to claim tax jurisdiction over nonresident aliens who earn income from "non-US" sources, but IT makes this claim all the time.  By IT I mean the authority granted to Congress by 1:8:17 and 4:3:2 in the U.S. Constitution, which authority MUST be lawfully delegated to the Internal Revenue Service (a private mercantile organization which collects interest payments for the Federal Reserve banks).

 

            The evidence is overwhelming that Congress simply does not have exclusive legislative authority over the 50 States.  The study entitled "Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within the States" makes this case over and over and over.  At last count, this study cites more than 700 federal and state court cases which all found the same thing:  Congress does not enjoy exclusive legislative jurisdiction inside the boundaries of the 50 States until and unless a State Legislature cedes its sovereign jurisdiction to Congress, and does so for a specific parcel of land (called an "enclave").

 

            At this point in the game, Karl, you can no longer claim ignorance of this massive body of case law.  Congress cannot impose a direct tax on State Citizens unless that tax is duly apportioned.  The earnings of State Citizens are exempt from taxation by the fundamental law.  The apportionment rule is found in the fundamental law, but there are no apportionment provisions anywhere in the Internal Revenue Code.  The burden is now upon you to prove otherwise!