c/o general delivery
                                        San Rafael
                                        California Republic
                                        zip code exempt
                                        (DMM 122.32)

                                        July 29, 1993

Dear Al:

I am in receipt of a copy of your letter from attorney William A.
Cohan, dated  June 21, 1993.  In this letter, Mr. Cohan wrote the
following to you:

     The  "non-resident   alien"  position  has  been  repeatedly
     rejected by  the courts;   your  assertion of  that position
     undermines your credibility.

In the margin, you wrote the following in long hand:

     "Guess we made fools of ourselves.  Al B"

Although I  do not  have the time to write as thorough a response
as I  wish I  could, I  do have enough time to make a few careful
remarks about  these statements.   Please consider the electronic
fourth edition  of The  Federal Zone as a necessary supplement to
the rest of this letter;  it is not yet available in hard copy.

First of  all, I  do not  believe  that  your  assertion  of  the
"nonresident alien" position undermines your credibility.  It may
undermine your  credibility in  the eyes  of Mr.  Cohan,  but  it
certainly does  not undermine your credibility in my eyes, nor in
the eyes  of those  who have studied and carefully documented the
meaning of  State Citizenship  as that term was used and intended
to be  understood by  the framers of the U.S. Constitution.  Even
IRS documents  admit that  you are  an alien  if you  are  not  a
citizen of  the United  States.   Simple logic  is  all  that  is
necessary to  explain away  the "alien"  half of the problem, but
there is much more proof, as you know.

I have  recently made  a crucial  discovery in  the  writings  of
attorney Roger Foster.  Foster was a Yale lecturer and recognized
expert in  federal jurisprudence  at the  time the so-called 16th
Amendment was  declared "ratified".   The  second edition  of his
treatise on the federal income tax of 1913 states, in unequivocal
language, that  the tax  was levied  in Alaska,  the District  of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Philippine Islands;  the 48 States
are not  even mentioned  (see Chapter 3 in The Federal Zone).  In
and of  itself, this  documentary evidence  is important proof of
the territorial extent of the 1913 federal income tax.

What is  even more  stunning is  the comparable  section from the
first edition  of Foster's treatise.  In this section, he rambles
on about  the lack of court precedent authorizing Congress to tax
bond interest  that is  payable to nonresident aliens by domestic
corporations.   Because he makes repeated use of the term "United
States", a  term which  we now  know to  have multiple  different
meanings in  law, this  section is  almost always vague about the
exact territorial extent of the 1913 Act.  There is, however, one
place where  he tips  his hand by utilizing the term "Union" in a
territorial sense.  In other words, the first edition of Foster's
treatise considers  the "Union  of  several  States"  to  be  the
territorial reach of the 1913 Act, but in the second edition this
whole section  is replaced  with a  much  smaller  section  which
limits that  reach to  Alaska, the  District of  Columbia, Puerto
Rico and the Philippine Islands.  Therefore, Foster has admitted,
in writing,  that his  first  edition  was  in  error  about  the
territorial extent  of the  1913 federal income tax!  Read it for
yourself and see if you agree with me.

It is not entirely correct to state that the "non-resident alien"
position has  been repeatedly  rejected by  the courts.   Such  a
statement overlooks  the obvious fact that the Brushaber decision
is still standing case law in America.  As you must already know,
this ruling  was issued by the United States Supreme Court.  None
of the  cases cited  in Mr.  Conklin's  essay,  "The  Citizenship
Argument Bites  the Dust  in the Courts", was decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court.   Moreover, most of those lower court cases remain
unpublished, unlike  the long  list of  Supreme  Court  decisions
which have  carefully considered the meaning of Citizenship (e.g.
Cruikshank, Dred  Scott, Slaughter-House  Cases, to name a few of
the key ones).  Why?

Treasury Decision 2313 also remains as a standing decision of the
U.S. Treasury  Department.   There was  only one Plaintiff in the
Brushaber case;   that  Plaintiff was  Mr. Frank R. Brushaber who
was "a  citizen of  the State  of New  York and a resident of the
Borough of  Brooklyn, in  the City  of  New  York",  by  his  own
admissions.   To assert  anything else  about his  status  is  to
assume facts  that were not in evidence.  If he had been a native
of France, according to federal government propaganda, then where
was his  green card?   The  courts issued  their decisions on the
basis of  facts that  were in evidence.  Therefore, there was and
still is  no basis  in fact,  or in law, for the Secretary of the
Treasury in  1916 to  extend the  Brushaber decision to those who
were not  parties to  that action.   It is conclusive, therefore,
that Frank  R. Brushaber  was the  "nonresident alien"  to  which
Treasury Decision 2313 refers.

Quite apart  from the  technical issues involved in understanding
and explaining  Treasury Decision  2313, I would like to dedicate
the  remainder  of  my  remarks  here  to  a  discussion  of  the
importance  of  the  U.S.  Constitution.    If  my  research  has
established anything,  it  is  that  the  U.S.  Constitution  has
explicitly recognized  State Citizenship from the beginning, even
if there  was no  definition of State Citizenship as such in that
document.   If the  Constitution is  perpetual, then  so  is  the
status of  State Citizenship  which it  recognizes (see  Texas v.
White), until  and unless  each  and  every  reference  to  State
Citizens is  lawfully amended so as to alter the original meaning
of those  provisions.  The intent of any law is the law, and this
principle applies as well to the Constitution itself (the supreme

You will  find explicit  references to  State Citizens throughout
the U.S.  Constitution (see  1:2:2, 1:3:3,  2:1:5, 3:2:1, 4:2:1).
In my  opinion, three  of the most important references are found
in the  qualifications  for  election  to  the  offices  of  U.S.
Senator, Representative,  and President.   Since these provisions
have never been amended, their meaning remains the same as it was
on the  day the  Constitution became  the supreme Law in America.
Anyone who  argues something  different about the construction of
these  provisions   is  woefully,  and  maybe  even  dangerously,
ignorant of  the basic  principles of  constitutional law  in our
country (see  Dred Scott  v. Sandford  in particular,  a decision
which  is   "infamous"  to   me  only  because  it  was  such  an
authoritative and  irrefutable mirror  on the legal acceptability
of chattel slavery at that point in American history).

Prior to  the 1866  Civil Rights  Act, there  was simply  no such
thing as  a "citizen of the United States" (see Ex parte Knowles,
which is still standing case law in the California Republic).  If
you can  find the  time to  wade into  the huge  body of case law
which interpreted  the so-called  14th Amendment,  you will  find
some jurists  who credit that amendment with finally settling the
definition of "citizen of the United States" (see Field's dissent
in  the   Slaughter-House  Cases  for  a  good  example  of  this
position).   On the  other hand, the pertinent U.S. Supreme Court
decisions have  never ruled  that a  ratified 14th Amendment ever
abolished the  status of State Citizenship;  the amendment itself
even stipulates  that federal  citizens are also "citizens ... of
the State  wherein they  reside", giving  some jurists  reason to
conclude that federal citizens were intended to be State Citizens
too, as long as they resided within one of the Union States.

To my  knowledge,  I  am  the  first  published  author  to  call
attention to  the lower-case "c" in this class of State citizens;
the weight  of subsequent  history has  shown  that  they  remain
second-class citizens,  even when they "reside" within one of the
Union States,  because   the Bill of Rights has at best a limited
application to  them when  they do.   We must credit The Informer
for pointing  out additional  evidence in  Section 2  of the 14th
Amendment:  "[W]hen the right to vote ... is denied to any of the
male inhabitants  of such  State ...  and citizens  of the United
States ...."   This  section is  here referring  to two different
classes of people.

The Cruikshank case is perhaps the most lucid example of standing
High Court  case law  for ruling that "[W]e have in our political
system a government of the United States and a government of each
of the  several States.   Each  of these  governments is distinct
from the  others, and  each has  citizens of  its own ...."  This
means that,  even  if  the  so-called  14th  Amendment  had  been
properly approved  and  adopted,  the  status  of  State  Citizen
remains an integral part of the U.S. Constitution, so integral in
fact, that  the highest  elective offices  in our  land  must  be
occupied by  People who  enjoy and  exhibit  this  status  before
occupying those  offices.  Remember also that the Cruikshank case
was decided  after the alleged ratification of the 14th Amendment
and  after   the  pivotal  Slaughter-House  Cases.    The  failed
ratification of  this amendment  lends even  greater  clarity  to
logic of  Cruikshank, namely,  that federal  citizens are  aliens
with respect to the Union States, and State Citizens are likewise
aliens with respect to the District of Columbia.

The Constitution also plays a crucial role in determining whether
or not  a proposed  amendment is ever elevated to the status of a
ratified amendment.   Hiding  in the  huge body of case law which
has interpreted  the so-called  14th  Amendment,  there  are  two
pivotal decisions of the Utah Supreme Court which actually struck
down the  ratification of  that amendment  (see State v. Phillips
and Dyett  v. Turner).  The facts on which that Court relied were
assembled and published in the Congressional Record;  courts must
take judicial  notice of  the Congressional  Record.    The  U.S.
Supreme Court has never actually ruled on the ratification of the
14th Amendment and has been prevented from doing so by treasonous
behavior (see  28 Tulane Law Review 22, and 11 South Carolina Law
Quarterly 484).

Thus, the  undeniable preponderance  of historical  evidence  now
proves that  the Utah  Supreme Court was correct in striking down
the 14th  Amendment.   I invite  you to  review the  shocking and
sordid history of its "passage" by studying carefully the details
recited in  the Dyett  decision.   The bottom  line is  that  the
federal government  has been  exercising unlawful  dominion  ever
since the Civil War, and the failed ratification of the so-called
14th Amendment  is just  one among several historical facts which
constitute conclusive  evidence of  this unlawful  dominion.  The
so-called 16th  Amendment is  another excellent  example of  this
unlawful dominion.

By holding,  as the  Utah Supreme  Court has  done, that the 14th
Amendment was  never properly  approved and adopted, we are still
entirely justified  in taking  the U.S.  Supreme Court's  view in
Cruikshank,  namely,  that  each  governmental  jurisdiction  has
citizens of  its own.   This view is supported by the decision in
Colgate v.  Harvey, which  ruled that  the 14th Amendment did not
create a  national citizenship  (the italics  implying  that  the
amendment was  simply declaratory  of existing federal law, which
federal law  was the  1866 Civil  Rights Act).    Simply  stated,
California has  its Citizens;  Oregon has its Citizens;  Utah has
its Citizens;   ... and the District of Columbia has its citizens
(51 governmental jurisdictions in all).

Notice that  I have  been careful  to spell State Citizen with an
UPPER-CASE "C",  and federal citizen with a lower-case "c".  I do
so primarily because authentic copies of the U.S. Constitution do
evidence this convention;  those authentic copies also maintain a
similar distinction  between "Person" and "person".  Prior to the
14th Amendment,  "Person" was consistently spelled with an UPPER-
CASE "P"  (see the qualifications for Senator, Representative and
President, where  the term  "No Person"  is  repeated).    Formal
English also  recognizes an  important difference  between Proper
Nouns and common nouns.  Did you ever attend a baseball game that
was won by the chicago cubs (or the cHICAGO cUBS)?

Al, I  invite you  to  take  a  closer  look  at  the  underlying
rationale for  the "nonresident  alien"  position  which  I  have
endorsed and  explained in  my book  The Federal Zone, whether or
not you  choose to utilize it in any future litigation.  There is
simply too  much in  the way  of undeniable  factual evidence and
relevant constitutional history for me to be dissuaded by this or
that unpublished  decision by lower federal courts.  I doubt very
much that  Mr. Cohan would have us believe that federal and State
courts are  always correct,  and that  their decisions  are never
overturned.  I have read some of these lower court decisions, and
I find them to be riddled with errors.

Specifically,  any  court  in  America  which  henceforth  issues
decisions that are predicated upon the lawful ratification of the
so-called 14th  and 16th  Amendments is  plainly  in  error  (see
People v. Boxer).  Any licensed attorney in America who bases his
advice to  clients (or prospects) on such rebuttable presumptions
might justifiably  be applauded  for seeking  the path  of  least
resistance, with  the complete  approval of  his  clients;    but
attorneys and  clients together  should also seriously reconsider
just how dedicated they really are to upholding and defending the
Constitution for  the United  States of  America, as  compared to
other priorities  that can  and  do  take  precedence  under  the
pressures of  day-to-day practice.   I  say this only because the
published evidence  available to me shows that licensed attorneys
in America  are expected  to place the court first, public policy
second, and  the client  third  in  order  of  importance;    the
Constitution isn't even mentioned!

It is  high time that we return to basic issues of constitutional
Law.   If we  don't, then  we shall  surely lose the Constitution
forever.   It is  quite simply  impossible for  public  officials
anywhere in  America to  perform their  solemn duty to uphold and
defend the  U.S. Constitution, if the weight of material evidence
should prove  that the  exact provisions of that Constitution are
still in  doubt.   This was the major issue that was addressed in
the  case  of People v. Boxer;    copies  of  the  pleadings  and
affidavits were  shipped to Mr. Cohan several months ago, without
any response from him.

I don't  mean  to  be  rude  or  disrespectful  to  any  licensed
attorneys when  I suggest that they too should be obliged to take
the same  solemn oath,  if they  have not  already done  so.  The
constitutional provisions  which cite  State Citizens  have never
been in  any serious  doubt, even  if our decision to defend this
status is  fraught with  much additional  peril, above and beyond
the  peril  we  might  endure  by  resisting  this  or  that  tax
assessment by  the collection agency of a foreign banking cartel.
If the  Constitution is perpetual, then so is the Sovereign State
Citizenship which  that  Constitution  has  recognized  from  the
beginning, with or without the so-called 14th Amendment.

Let the  judges in  question come  forward to  explain why  their
recent decisions were "unpublished".  I am all ears.

The road less traveled may be the surest path to our destination,
and to our destiny as a free People.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell

Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Private Attorney General


copies:  William A. Cohan, Esq.
         John Voss, N.C.B.A.
         Richard McDonald

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