William Michael Kemp, Sui Juris
c/o General Delivery
Gadsden, Alabama state
zip code exempt

In Propria Persona
Under Protest, Necessity,
and by Special Visitation

all rights reserved

                         [ D R A F T]


STATE OF ALABAMA,               ) Case No. ______________________
                                ) Circuit Case No. CC-95-1083-DWS
          Plaintiff,            ) Appellate Case No. ____________
     v.                         ) NOTICE OF TREATY VIOLATIONS:
                                ) Tenth Amendment;  Universal
WILLIAM MICHAEL KEMP [sic],     ) Declaration of Human Rights;
                                ) International Covenant on Civil
          Defendant.            ) and Political Rights;  and
                                ) Supremacy Clause:
________________________________) de novo

COMES NOW  William Michael,  Kemp, Sui  Juris, Citizen of Alabama

state and  Defendant in  the above  entitled action  (hereinafter

"Defendant"),  to   provide  formal   Notice  to  all  interested

party(s), and  to demand  mandatory judicial  by  this  honorable

Court, pursuant  to the  Tenth Amendment  in the Constitution for

the United  States of  America, as  lawfully amended (hereinafter

"U.S.  Constitution"),  of  United  States  (federal  government)

treaty violations  in the  instant case.   Said treaty violations

must be  addressed by  Alabama state,  pursuant to  the  explicit

Reservation of  legal Rights which Congress specifically attached

to  the   Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  and  to  the

International Covenant  on Civil  and  Political  Rights.    Said

treaties are  rendered supreme  Law of this Land, pursuant to the

Supremacy Clause in the U.S. Constitution.

            Notice of Treaty Violations:  Page 1 of 9

     Defendant asserts  His fundamental  Rights, both substantive

and procedural,  to Notice  and Hearing  in a  federal  court  of

competent jurisdiction  to adjudicate  the role  of United States

(federal government) officers, employees, and agents in providing

financial and  other assistance  to the  Etowah County  Drug Task

Force.     Defendant  herein  alleges  systematic  violations  of

fundamental  Rights   by  said   Task  Force,   under  color   of

unconstitutional federal practices and procedures.

     To this  end, Defendant attempted to remove the instant case

into the  District Court  of the United States ("DCUS"), in order

to obtain  appropriate relief  specifically  including,  but  not

limited  to,   ORDERS  compelling  the  production  of  documents

properly requested  under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")

and enjoining  the improper  withholding of  same.   The  federal

court of  original jurisdiction to issue said ORDERS is the DCUS.

See 5  U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B);   American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales

of Cotton,  1 Pet.  511 (1828), 7 L.Ed 242;  Balzac v. Porto Rico

[sic], 42  S.Ct. 343,  258 U.S.  298 at  312, 66 L.Ed 627 (1921).

Compare also 18 U.S.C. 1964(a) with 1964(c).

     Two international human rights treaties have been enacted by

Congress,  pursuant   to  the  Supremacy  Clause  and  the  Tenth

Amendment,  specifically   to  guarantee   the   enforcement   of

fundamental human Rights on behalf of Defendant, who is a Citizen

of Alabama  state and  not also  a citizen  of the  United States

("federal citizen").   See  Gardina v.  Board of  Registrars, 160

Ala. 155,  48 S.  788, 791  (1909).   For purposes of the instant

case, the most salient of these fundamental Rights is Defendant's

unalienable  guarantee  to  due  process  of  law  in  courts  of

competent jurisdiction.

            Notice of Treaty Violations:  Page 2 of 9

     Said treaties  are unique,  in many  ways, for  having  been

enacted with  explicit reservations  of Rights  by Congress.  The

most salient  of these  reserved Rights  grants legal standing to

localities to compel United States (federal government) obedience

to said  treaties, in  the event  that the United States (federal

government)  should   fail  to   perform  its   legal  and  moral

obligations under  same.  Given the express legislative intent of

the reservation  of legal  standing for  localities, there  is no

question but that Congress meant to embrace the several States of

the Union  in its  definition of  the term  "locality."   Alabama

state is  such a member of the Union of several States, united by

and under the U.S. Constitution.

     Defendant sought to obtain judicial review of the historical

role of  the United  States (federal government) in the provision

of financial  and other  assistance  to  Etowah  County,  Alabama

state, which  is a  political subdivision  of  Alabama  state  (a

"locality").   Defendant's plan  to obtain  such review included,

among other  things, one  or more  FOIA requests  to  obtain  the

financial records  of the Etowah County Drug Task Force, which is

a local administrative agency responsible to receive and disperse

financial and  other assistance  provided by  the  United  States

(federal government),  under auspices  of the  United States Drug

Enforcement Administration ("DEA").

            Notice of Treaty Violations:  Page 3 of 9

     The  federal   court  of  original  jurisdiction  to  compel

production of  documents properly  requested under  FOIA  is  the

District  Court  of  the  United  States  ("DCUS"),  a  court  of

competent jurisdiction  within the  territorial boundaries of the

several states  of the Union, pursuant to Article III in the U.S.

Constitution.  However, when Defendant applied to said DCUS for a

Warrant  of  Removal  of  the  instant  case,  for  the  purposes

discussed above,  Defendant was  denied a  hearing by  a  federal

judge who  was competent  and qualified to preside in said court.

See 28 U.S.C. 1441 et seq.

     More  to   the  point,   Article  III  guarantees  that  the

compensation of  federal judges  shall not  be diminished  during

their term  in office.   See  Article III,  Section 1.   The term

"shall" as  used therein has a mandatory meaning.  Said provision

has also  been interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court to mean that

the compensation  of  federal  judges  cannot  be  diminished  by

federal  income   taxes,  notwithstanding   the  so-called   16th

amendment to  the U.S.  Constitution.  See also 28 U.S.C. 461(b).

The basis  for this  guarantee was  more fully  explained by  the

Supreme Court in Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920):

     [T]he primary  purpose of the prohibition against diminution
     was ...  to attract  good and competent men to the bench and
     to promote that independence of action and judgment which is
     essential to  the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations
     and pervading principles of the Constitution.

In Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 (1925), the high Court explained

which amount of compensation is protected against diminution:

     The words  and history  of  the  clause  indicate  that  the
     purpose was  to impose  upon Congress the duty definitely to
     declare what  sum shall be received by each judge out of the
     public funds  and the times for payment.  When this duty has
     been  complied   with  the   amount  specified  becomes  the
     compensation which  is protected  against diminution  during
     his continuance in office.

            Notice of Treaty Violations:  Page 4 of 9


     Evans and  Miles were  not the last words that the Court was
     to express on the issue of taxation of judicial incomes.  In
     O'Malley v.  Woodrough,  307  U.S.  277  (1939),  the  Court
     repudiated both  Evans  and  Miles  and  held  that  a  non-
     discriminatory general  income tax may be applied to federal
     judges without  diminishing judicial compensation within the
     meaning of the compensation clause.

                           ["The Constitutional Guaranty Against]
                          [Diminution of Judicial Compensation,"]
                         [UCLA Law Review, Vol. 24, pgs. 308-350]

After reviewing  O'Malley v.  Woodrough supra,  Defendant submits

that the  holding in  that case  is based  on a  faulty  premise,

namely, that  there is  only one  (1)  class  of  citizenship  in

America.   O'Malley should  be  overturned:    in  light  of  the

preponderance of  cases which  demonstrate  two  (2)  classes  of

citizenship;   in light of newly found evidence;  and in light of

the notable  and demonstrable  decline in  the American judiciary

since 1939, the year the Public Salary Tax Act was first enacted.

     The basis  for the  O'Malley decision  is the  high  Court's

mistaken belief  that a  federal judge  can be taxed in his (her)

capacity as  a citizen, without violating Article III, Section 1,

and without compromising the judge's competence and independence.

However, there  is nothing  in O'Malley to indicate that the high

Court adequately  understood how  two classes of citizenship bear

on this  question (taxing  the pay of federal judges).  Moreover,

there is no law requiring federal judges to be either citizens of

the United States, or Citizens of the several states.  Therefore,

the O'Malley decision is founded on a false premise, namely, that

all federal judges are necessarily citizens of either class.

     The  uncontroverted   evidence   establishing   the   failed

ratification of  the so-called  Sixteenth  Amendment  casts  this

entire debate  in an  entirely new  light.   See People v. Boxer,

California Supreme  Court, Case  Number S-030016,  December 1992;

Full Faith and Credit Clause.  The fundamental guarantees against

            Notice of Treaty Violations:  Page 5 of 9

direct  taxation  of  all  citizens  without  apportionment,  and

against diminution  of the compensation of federal judges, remain

as operative  today as they were on the day the U.S. Constitution

was first  adopted.   See 1:2:3,  1:9:4,  and  3:1  in  the  U.S.

Constitution,  which  have  never  been  repealed.    Repeals  by

implication are not favored.

     Defendant submits that the only logical basis on which these

guarantees can  now be  avoided is  the doctrine  of  territorial

heterogeneity.  Confer in The Federal Zone:  Cracking the Code of

Internal Revenue,  Fourth Edition,  available on the Internet via

the Alta  Vista search  engine;   see also  U.S.  v.  Lopez,  131

L.Ed.2d 626 (1995):

     Each of  these [schools]  now has  an invisible federal zone
     [sic] extending  1,000 feet  beyond  the  (often  irregular)
     boundaries of the school property.
                                                 [emphasis added]

Here, the  U.S. Supreme Court utilized the term "federal zone" as

a common  noun, without any citations or footnotes.  The doctrine

of territorial  heterogeneity, as  such, is summarized as follows

in the  Conclusions of  The Federal  Zone:   Cracking the Code of

Internal Revenue, to wit:

     In exercising its exclusive authority over the federal zone,
     Congress  is   not  subject   to  the   same  constitutional
     limitations that  exist inside  the 50  States.    For  this
     reason, the  areas that  are inside  and outside the federal
     zone are  heterogeneous with  respect to  each other.   This
     difference   results   in   a   principle   of   territorial
     heterogeneity:   the  areas  within  the  federal  zone  are
     subject to one set of rules;  the areas without (or outside)
     the federal  zone are  subject to  a different set of rules.
     The Constitution  rules outside  the zone  and inside the 50
     States.   The Congress rules inside the zone and outside the
     50 States.   The  50 States  are, therefore,  in one general
     class, because  all constitutional  restraints upon Congress
     are in  force throughout the 50 States, without prejudice to
     any one  State.   The areas within the federal zone are in a
     different general  class, because  these same constitutional
     restraints simply do not limit Congress inside that zone.

        [The Federal Zone, electronic Fifth Edition, Conclusions]

            Notice of Treaty Violations:  Page 6 of 9

     In the  pivotal case  of Downes  v. Bidwell,  182  U.S.  244

(1901), which  is discussed  at several  places in  the book  The

Federal Zone supra, the U.S. Supreme Court established a doctrine

whereby the  Constitution for  the "United States", as such, does

not extend  beyond the  limits of  the states which are united by

and under  it.  This doctrine of territorial heterogeneity is now

commonly identified as the "Downes Doctrine."

     This doctrine has been reinforced by subsequent decisions of

the U.S.  Supreme Court, notably, the case of Hooven & Allison v.

Evatt, 324  U.S. 652  (1945), in  which the high Court ruled that

the guarantees  of the  U.S. Constitution  extend to  the federal

zone only  as Congress has made those guarantees applicable.  The

United  States  District  Courts  are  currently  established  by

Congress   as    territorial   (federal    zone)   courts,   with

constitutional authority  emanating from  Article IV,  Section 3,

Clause 2, to wit:

     The Congress  shall have  Power to  dispose of  and make all
     needed Rules  and Regulations  respecting the  Territory  or
     other Property belonging to the United States;  ....

                       [U.S. Constitution, Art. 4, Sec. 3, Cl. 2]
                                                 [emphasis added]

     Defendant submits,  for the  careful consideration  of  this

honorable Court,  an offer  to prove  that all  Union states have

unlawfully subordinated  themselves to the municipal jurisdiction

of the  United States  (federal government),  so as to invoke the

Downes Doctrine  against Citizens  of Alabama  state who  are not

also citizens  of the  United States.   Compare  31 CFR  51.2 and

            Notice of Treaty Violations:  Page 7 of 9

52.2, and  the Executive  Order(s) removing said regulations from

federal depository  libraries.  This has had the unconstitutional

effect of  rendering the  corporate State  of Alabama a municipal

subdivision  of   the  District   of  Columbia,  permitting  said

corporate State  completely to  ignore the  U.S. Constitution and

all of  the fundamental  guarantees  expressed  therein,  and  to

impose  municipal   codes  upon   Defendant  in  a  manner  which

constitutes unlawful dominion over the Person and Property of the


     It  is   evident  now   that  the   United  States  (federal

government) cannot  locate a single federal judge anywhere in the

federal judiciary  whose  compensation  is  currently  not  being

diminished by  federal income  taxes.   In and  of  itself,  this

evidence is  proof that  the United  States (federal  government)

cannot and  will not  provide Defendant  with due process of law,

because relief  cannot be  obtained from  any court  in  America,

state or  federal, without  a qualified  and competent  judge  to

issue said relief.

     At a  class sponsored by the Law School of the University of

Arizona in  January of  1997, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice

of the  U.S. Supreme  Court, was  heard to admit that all federal

judges  are  currently  paying  federal  income  taxes  on  their

judicial compensation, without exception.  See the essay entitled

"The Lawless  Rehnquist"  commemorating  that  historical  event.

Said essay is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if

set forth fully herein.

            Notice of Treaty Violations:  Page 8 of 9

     Moreover, recent  research has  also proven that the federal

judiciary has  sabotaged the U.S. Constitution and corrupted laws

governing the  conduct of the federal courts.  This has been done

in part  by creating  the false impression that the United States

District  Court  ("USDC")  has  territorial  and  subject  matter

jurisdiction within the several states of the Union, particularly

over criminal prosecutions, when it does not.

     The truth is that the USDC is designed to adjudicate matters

that arise within the federal zone, and the District Court of the

United States  ("DCUS") is  designed to  adjudicate matters  that

arise within  the state  zone.   This honorable Court will please

take formal judicial notice of the fact that the USDC is named on

the ORDER  of United  States District  Judge  James  H.  Hancock,

allegedly remanding  the instant  case back  to the Circuit Court

for Etowah  County.   The same  is true  of the  ORDER by Circuit

Court  Judge   Donald  W.   Stewart,   allegedly   ordering   the

incarceration of  Defendant.  This is a fraud upon Defendant, and

upon all  American People, who enjoy the fundamental guarantee of

due process  of law.   Sedition  by syntax  is not due process of

law.  See Title 28, United States Code, in toto;  see also Act of

June 25,  1948:   "... [P]rovisions of this title [28 U.S.C.] ...

with respect to the organization of the court, shall be construed

as a continuation of existing law ..."  [emphasis added].

                  [M O R E   T O   F O L L O W]

            Notice of Treaty Violations:  Page 9 of 9

                             #  #  #

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Alabama v. Kemp