Editor's note: A fully linked version of this file can be found at Internet URL: http://supremelaw.com/authors/mitchell/karmacts.htm The following version of this file is being maintained for redundancy.For Immediate Release November 2, 1996
All Rights Reserved
The law of karma is this: what goes around, comes around. When you begin with freedom, freedom comes back to dwell in your house.
And so, we have come to this point in decoding Title 28 of the United States Codes: there are two classes of federal "District Courts" in the federal court system.
One class is for the federal zone; the other class is for the state zone.
Using a very powerful rule of statutory construction, "inclusio unius est exclusio alterius," we show that the phrase "District Court of the United States" refers to federal courts for the state zone; and the phrase "United States District Court" refers to federal courts for the federal zone.
We have this on the authority of the Supreme Court of the United States, most notably in the cases of American Insurance Company v. 356 Bales of Cotton, and Balzac v. Porto Rico [sic].
Now, here's the rub: Since federal courts are creatures of statutes only, they can only cognize subject matters which are assigned to them expressly by statutes.
When it comes to criminal jurisdiction, the controlling statute is 18 U.S.C. 3231.
This statute grants original jurisdiction to the District Courts of the United States (DCUS), but does not mention the United States District Courts (USDC)!
How about them apples?
Remember this carefully:
Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (in Latin ).
Inclusion of one is exclusion of others (in English).
Since the USDC is not mentioned, its omission can be inferred as intentional. (Read that again, then confirm it in Black's Law Dictionary, any edition).
So, from the historian's point of view, Congress has permitted the limited territorial and subject matter jurisdiction of the USDC to be extended, unlawfully, into the state zone, and into subject matters over which said court has no jurisdiction whatsoever.
This deception was maintained as long as nobody noticed, but now it is obvious, and quite difficult to change, without bringing down the whole house of cards (which is happening, by the way. The Liege firemen are literally hosing their own corrupt court buildings, so we're not alone in this department of judicial tyranny.)
By the way, the famous Belgian Firemen from Liege have been invited, via the Internet, to discharge the Belgian debt to the United States by moving their talents state-side. They should return home debt free, in about ten years or so, depending on available supplies of soap and water.
Imagine a sheet of Saran Wrap, which has been yanked too far, by pulling it beyond the strict territorial boundaries which surround the federal zone.
This is the United States District Court (USDC), in all its limited Honors and tarnished glory.
Further proof of this bad karma can be found by comparing 18 U.S.C. 1964(a) and 1964(c). Both statutes grant authority to issue remedies to restrain racketeering activities prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 1962. Section 1964(a) grants civil jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief to the DCUS; Section 1964(c) grants civil jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief to the USDC. Both refer to the exact same subject matter, namely, RICO (Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) activities.
So, when these two statutes are otherwise identical, why did Congress need to enact two separate statutes?
The answer is simple: one authority was needed for the DCUS, and the other was needed for the USDC. Simple, really, when the sedition by syntax is explained in language which penetrates the deception.
Now, if this is truly the case, and nobody has been able to prove us wrong about this matter, the United States (federal government) is in a heap of trouble here, because it has been prosecuting people in the wrong courts ever since the Civil War; furthermore, those courts have no criminal jurisdiction whatsoever, because such an authority is completely lacking from Titles 18 and 28, both of which have been enacted into positive law, unlike Title 26, which has not been enacted into positive law. See Title 1 for details.
What do we do with this earth-shaking discovery? Well, when any federal case is filed, the criminal defendant should submit a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request immediately, for such things as any regulations which have been published in the Federal Register, pursuant to the Federal Register Act, for 18 U.S.C. 3231.
It won't hurt to send submit similar FOIA requests for the credentials of all federal employees who have "touched" the case in any way.
Since we already know that there are no regulations for 18 U.S.C. 3231, and that federal employees will usually refuse to produce their credentials, your FOIA requests will be met with silence, whereupon you will file a FOIA appeal. Once the appeal deadline has run, you are in court.
But which court? Guess ...
... the answer is the District Court of the United States. What an amazing discovery, yes? A United States District Judge in Arizona, in late Spring of 1996, ruled that the United States District Court (USDC) is not the proper forum to litigate a request under the FOIA. That can only be because FOIA requests must be litigated in the District Court of the United States (DCUS).
Now we have the United States checkmated. The proper forum for FOIA is now res judicata. If the DCUS is the proper forum for FOIA, and if the USDC is NOT the proper forum for FOIA, then the USDC is not the proper forum for prosecuting violations of Title 18 either, because the USDC does not show up in 5 U.S.C. 552 or in 18 U.S.C. 3231!
Read that last paragraph again, and again, until you get it. It's okay to admit that you must read it several times; this writer once read a paragraph from Hooven and Allison v. Evatt some 20 different times, until the meaning was finally clear.
Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. The omission by Congress of the USDC from 18 U.S.C. 3231 must have been intentional; the maxim certainly allows us to infer that it was intentional. Use of this maxim allows for us to exploit one of the most powerful techniques in American jurisprudence. It is called "collateral attack" -- a broadside, rather than a head-on, collision.
Knowledge is power, and power is freedom ...
... freedom. Freedom! FREEDOM!!!
Common Law Copyright
Paul Andrew Mitchell
Counselor at Law, federal witness
and Citizen of Arizona state
All Rights Reserved Without Prejudice
November 2, 1996