Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Counselor at Law and federal witness
c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776
Tucson, Arizona state, USA
zip code exempt (formerly DMM 122.32)

Under Protest and by Special Visitation
with explicit reservation of all rights







                  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                  JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ARIZONA


IN RE GRAND JURY SUBPOENA      ) Case No. GJ-95-1-6 (JMR)
SERVED ON                      )
NEW LIFE HEALTH CENTER COMPANY ) COMPANY'S OPPOSITION TO
                               ) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE,
                               ) DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL, AND
                               ) CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONALITY
                               ) OF "ILLEGAL TAX PROTESTOR"
                               ) CLASSIFICATIONS
_______________________________)


COMES NOW  Paul Andrew,  Mitchell, Sui  Juris, Sovereign  Arizona

Citizen (hereinafter  "Counsel") and  Vice  President  for  Legal

Affairs of  New Life  Health Center  Company,  an  Unincorporated

Business Trust domiciled in the Arizona Republic (hereinafter the

"Company"):   (1) to  file this statement in opposition to Robert

L. Miskell's  MOTION TO STRIKE certain pleadings already filed on

behalf of  the Company,   (2)  to demand  a jury trial of certain

substantial issues  of law and fact which have arisen as a result

of his  MOTION TO  STRIKE, (3) to challenge the constitutionality

of all  "illegal tax  protestor" classifications,  and    (4)  to

provide notice of same to all interested parties.  Mr. Miskell is

hereinafter identified as "Miskell."


  Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
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     Miskell's  rationale   for  striking  certain  pleadings  is

founded on  false and suspicious premises.  His faulty logic goes

like this:   First, he alleges that the Company is an "artificial

entity," like  a corporation,  partnership, or association.  Such

entities can  only appear  in federal  court through  a  licensed

attorney, citing Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194

(1993).   Neither Dr.  Eugene A. Burns, D.C., N.D., the Company's

General Manager,  nor its  Counsel of  record, Mr.  Paul  Andrew,

Mitchell, B.A.,  M.S., is  a licensed  attorney.   The  Company's

pleadings to date were filed by Counsel.  Therefore, in Miskell's

opinion, they  should be  stricken from  the record, because they

can only  be filed  on  behalf  of  the  Company  by  a  licensed

attorney.  So goes Miskell's illogic.

     The Company  will now  prove that Miskell's logic is faulty,

that his  true motives  are suspect  and, for  these reasons, his

MOTION TO  STRIKE should be tabled until such time as a competent

and lawful  trial jury can be polled on certain issues of law and

fact which weigh heavily on this MOTION TO STRIKE.

     The Rowland case very specifically dealt with a corporation,

but noted  that "...  [T]he lower courts have uniformly held that

28 U.S.C.  1654 ... does not allow corporations, partnerships, or

associations to  appear in  federal court  other than  through  a

licensed attorney."   See  Miskell's accurate quotation on page 2

of his  MOTION TO  STRIKE.    Since  the  Company  is  neither  a

corporation, partnership,  or an  association,  this  ruling  has

absolutely no bearing on the question now before us.

     As has  been repeatedly  stated by  the Company  --  in  the

opening paragraphs  of almost  every pleading, in affidavits, and

in open testimony before this honorable Court -- both Counsel and

Dr. Eugene  A. Burns  (hereinafter  "Dr.  Burns")  have  made  it


  Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
                          Page 2 of 20


abundantly  clear   to  this   Court  that   the  Company  is  an

Unincorporated Business  Trust domiciled in the Arizona Republic.

An unrebutted affidavit stands as the truth of the case.

     When Miskell  attempted to  argue in  open  Court  that  the

Company has no Fifth Amendment Immunity, he based his argument on

the faulty  presumption that  it is  a corporation.    Dr.  Burns

rebutted this  presumption at the podium and Miskell fell silent,

failing to  provide  any  additional  evidence  or  arguments  in

support of  his faulty  presumption.   No affidavit(s)  have been

forthcoming from  the United States to rebut any of the Company's

affidavits.   Counsel now  argues that  Miskell has been estopped

from raising this issue again, because his silence at that moment

created an  estoppel by  acquiescence, given  everything that has

already occurred in this case:

     Silence is  a species of conduct, and constitutes an implied
     representation of  the existence  of the  state of  facts in
     question, and  the estoppel  is  accordingly  a  species  of
     estoppel by misrepresentation.  [cite omitted]  When silence
     is of  such a character and under such circumstances that it
     would become  a fraud  upon the  other party  to permit  the
     party who  has kept  silent to  deny what  his  silence  has
     induced the  other to  believe and act upon, it will operate
     as an estoppel.
                             [Carmine v. Bowen, 64 A. 932 (1906)]
                                                 [emphasis added]

     Miskell goes on incorrectly to cite United States of America

v. Stepard  et al., 876 F.Supp. 214, 215 (D.Ariz., Oct. 4, 1994).

In this  case, a  motion to  strike answers  filed on  behalf  of

trusts by  a non-attorney  trustee was  granted.   A copy of this

two-page decision  is  attached,  for  the  Court's  convenience.

Because Stepard may appear to be controlling in the instant case,

on behalf  of the  Court and  the Company,  its chosen Counsel of

record will  analyze Stepard  carefully to show that it, too, has


  Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
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no real application to the instant case.

     First of  all, under  separate cover,  Counsel  has  already

filed the  Company's NOTICE  OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE

AND RECONSIDERATION,  AND CHALLENGE  TO HOLDINGS  OF U.S. SUPREME

COURT, served  via mail  on June  9, 1996.   This pleading is now

incorporated by  reference as if set forth fully herein;  it goes

into great  depth to explain the crucial distinction that must be

made between the "United States of America," on the one hand, and

the "United States," on the other hand.

     Miskell misquotes  the Stepard  case by  listing the "United

States"  as   the  Plaintiff   in  that  case;    however,  close

examination of  the  published  opinion  reveals  that  the  real

Plaintiff was  the "United  States of  America."   Counsel argues

that the  Stepard court  was improperly convened because Congress

has not  granted standing  to the  "United States  of America" to

bring the action described in that decision.

     Furthermore, the Stepard case makes no distinction between a

statutory trust,  on the  one hand,  and a  pure (or  Common Law)

trust, on the other hand.  Counsel has already briefed this Court

in depth  on the  crucial distinction  between the  two kinds  of

trusts.   See the Company's NOTICE OF OFFER WITHDRAWAL;  PETITION

FOR CLARIFICATION, FOR RECONSIDERATION, FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, AND

FOR  ORDERS   TO  SHOW   CAUSE;  WITH   POINTS  AND  AUTHORITIES,

particularly pages  16 thru  23 inclusive.   The law and facts as

stated in  said pages  also remain  unrebutted by  Miskell, again

activating the operation of estoppel against his faulty premises.


  Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
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     Specifically, the  Company  consists  of Individuals who are

Citizens of Arizona state,  and who,  therefore,  are entitled to

certain fundamental  Rights, Privileges,  and Immunities  such as

those guaranteed  by the  Privileges and  Immunities clause [Art.

IV, Sec.  2, Cl.  1] of the U.S. Constitution, which do not apply

to corporations  or other  "artificial entities."   See  296 U.S.

344, 56  S.Ct. 289.  Again, Miskell's silence in the face of this

pleading has activated estoppel by acquiescence.

     The  Stepard  Court  may  have  been  correct  for  applying

statutory rules  to the  trust defendants in that case, if indeed

they were  statutory trusts;   however, the Company is not in the

same class  as a  statutory trust.  The Company hereby makes this

offer to prove, conclusively, that it is not a statutory trust by

placing into  evidence the original trust indenture document, but

only on  the condition that its disclosure is first authorized by

the individual(s)  currently empowered  to do  so.   Dr. Burns is

presently not authorized to disclose said indenture without prior

written permission  of the Trustee, and He is subject to criminal

sanction if  He does  disclose  such  a  document  without  prior

written permission.  See "Non-Disclosure Agreement" already filed

in the official Court record of the instant case.

     Finally, the  Stepard case  is short,  lacks erudition,  and

flies in  the face  of the mountain of law and history which have

already been  presented to this Court in the Company's previously

filed NOTICE  AND DEMAND FOR THE RIGHT TO ENJOY THE ASSISTANCE OF

COUNSEL OF  CHOICE, and  MEMORANDUM OF  POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN

SUPPORT OF  COMPANY'S CHALLENGE TO JURISDICTION FOR VIOLATING THE

FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEE  OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL:  Sixth

Amendment (hereinafter "COUNSEL DEMAND").


  Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
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     Counsel submits  that the  Stepard court  was biased  by  an

organized syndicate  of prejudice  within  all  branches  of  the

federal and  state governments  against trusts like International

Tax Strategies  because  they  are  classified  as  "illegal  tax

protestor" schemes.

     The Stepard court made a big deal of an isolated and generic

paragraph from  C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d

696 (1987)  in which  Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals gushed forth

concerning the  "reciprocal relationship  between the bar and the

bench," as follows:

     The reciprocal  relationship between  the bar  and the bench
     permits an exception only for a person acting personally.  A
     federal court  rightly  expects  a  lawyer  to  represent  a
     litigant.   By its  supervision of  the bar  and through  it
     [sic] reliance on lawyers before it, the court is enabled to
     function.   Professional    competence   and    professional
     responsibility are  the sine  qua non  of federal litigation
     and effective judicial response.

         [U.S.A. v. Stepard, 876 F.Supp. 214, 215 (D.Ariz. 1994)]
     [quoting C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. U.S., 818 F.2d 696 (1987)

It may  be true  that a  federal  court  "expects"  a  lawyer  or

attorney to  represent a  litigant, but  the Faretta  case proves

that there  is no  such requirement.   See Faretta v. California,

422 U.S.  806 (1975),  a landmark case in American constitutional

jurisprudence.   Indeed, the  Company's COUNSEL  DEMAND goes into

great detail  to frame  this "reciprocal  relationship" in  terms

which are  closer to the truth, namely, the bar associations have

become a closed-shop monopoly bent on self-aggrandizement.

     The purpose  of this  monopoly has  not really changed since

the ratification  of the  original Thirteenth  Amendment in 1819.

By the  time this  Amendment had become Law, the abusive business

and questionable  legal practices  of this  monopoly  had  become

unbearable, even  to American  lawmakers.  "By its supervision of


  Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
                          Page 6 of 20


the bar  and through its reliance on lawyers before it, the court

is enabled  to  function,"  all  the  better  to  perpetuate  the

restraint of  trade and  the impairment  of contracts  which  are

repeatedly perpetrated by this monopoly, not to mention a host of

other serious,  even criminal  abuses.  See the Company's COUNSEL

DEMAND for details, filed separately and incorporated herewith.

     Furthermore, the  ratification of  the  original  Thirteenth

Amendment raises  another host  of serious questions having to do

with the  forfeiture of citizenship and the disqualification from

serving in any state or federal public offices.  The organic U.S.

Constitution does  contain a  specific prohibition against Titles

of Nobility.  See Article I, Section 10, Clause 1.  However, this

provision failed to define any penalties for exercising Titles of

Nobility.    The  Thirteenth  Amendment  cured  this  failure  by

reiterating the  ban on  Titles of  Nobility,  and  by  carefully

defining two  penalties for  their exercise:   (1)  the  loss  of

citizenship and   (2) the disqualification from serving in public

office anywhere in America.  That Amendment reads:

                          Article XIII.

     If any  citizen of  the United  States shall  accept, claim,
     receive, or retain any title of nobility or honor, or shall,
     without the  consent of  congress,  accept  and  retain  any
     present, pension,  office or emolument of any kind whatever,
     from any  emperor, king,  prince,  or  foreign  power,  such
     person shall cease to be a citizen of the United States, and
     shall be  incapable of  holding any  office or  profit under
     them, or either of them.

                           [Thirteenth Amendment, emphasis added]

The Exhibits  attached to this pleadings are incorporated here by

reference as  if  set  forth  fully  herein.    These  include  a

certified copy  of the Constitution of the United States as found

in the  Colorado State Archives and Public Records as of the year


  Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
                          Page 7 of 20


1867 (one year before the so-called Fourteenth Amendment).  It is

very  revealing  that  these  archives  also  show  a  Fourteenth

Amendment which bans slavery;  it is not the so-called Fourteenth

Amendment which  has generated  so much  litigation, and  so much

controversy, since  it was forced down the throats of 10 Southern

States immediately after the Civil War:

                          Article XIV.

     1.   Neither slavery  nor involuntary servitude, except as a
     punishment for  crime whereof the party shall have been duly
     convicted, shall  exist within  the United  States,  or  any
     place subject to their jurisdiction.

     2.   Congress shall  have power  to enforce  this article by
     appropriate legislation.

            [Amendments to the Constitution of the United States]
                     [Colorado State Archives and Public Records]
                                                   [Printed 1867]

     The attached  essay entitled  "Esquires" by  author John  E.

Trumane,  all  rights  reserved,  goes  into  some  of  the  many

astounding (even  shocking) implications  that can,  and must, be

drawn from  the relatively  recent discovery  that  the  original

Thirteenth Amendment was, indeed, lawfully ratified in accordance

with the  provisions of  Article V  in the U.S. Constitution.  It

was in  the year  1819 that  Virginia's passage of this Amendment

put it over the top and into the U.S. Constitution.

     The  essay   by  author   Joyce  Rosenwald   entitled   "Bar

Associations Maintain Monopoly through the 'Unauthorized Practice

of Law,'"  raises a  number of  complementary issues, including a

provision in  the Administrative  Procedures  Act  ("APA")  which

allows any  person compelled  to appear  before an administrative

agency to  be accompanied,  represented, or advised by counsel or

by other  qualified representative.   See  5 U.S.C.  555(b).   In

particular:


  Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
                          Page 8 of 20


     This subsection does not grant or deny a person who is not a
     lawyer the right to appear for or represent others before an
     agency or in an agency proceeding.

     Rosenwald describes  how this  law was challenged by the Bar

Association in the case of Sperry v. State of Florida ex rel. the

Florida Bar,  373 U.S. 379, 83 S.Ct. 1322, 10 L.Ed.2d 428 (1963).

This case involved a non-attorney (i.e. unlicensed) authorized to

represent clients before the U.S. Patent Office.  The Florida Bar

claimed he  was violating  that state's  practice-of-law statute.

The U.S.  Supreme Court  ruled that  the Supremacy  Clause in the

U.S. Constitution  gave federal  laws supremacy  over conflicting

state laws.  The High Court ruled:

     ... [D]espite  protests of the bar, Congress in enacting the
     Administrative Procedure  Act refused  to limit the right to
     practice before  the  administrative  agencies  to  lawyers:
     Article IX of the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights in 1776
     guaranteed  "[t]hat   in  all   prosecutions  for   criminal
     offences, a  man hath a right to be heard by himself and his
     council ...."  The Vermont Declaration of Rights (Art. X) in
     1777  protected   the  right   of  self-representation  with
     virtually identical  language.    The  Georgia  Constitution
     (Art. LVIII)  in 1777  declared that  its provisions barring
     the unauthorized  practice of  law  were  "not  intended  to
     exclude any  person from  that inherent  privilege of  every
     freeman, the  liberty to  plead his own cause."  In 1780 the
     Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, Art. XII, provided that
     the accused  had a  right to  be heard  "by himself,  or his
     counsel at  his election."  The New Hampshire Bill of Rights
     (Art. XV)  in 1783  affirmed the right of the accused "to be
     fully heard  in his  defence by  himself, and  counsel."  In
     1792 the  Delaware Constitution  (Art. I,  Sec. 7) preserved
     the  right   in  language  modeled  after  Art.  IX  of  the
     Pennsylvania Declaration  of Rights.    Similarly,  in  1798
     Georgia included  in its  Constitution (Art.  III, Sec. 8) a
     provision that  protected the right of the accused to defend
     "by himself or counsel, or both."

             [Sperry v. State of Florida ex rel. the Florida Bar]
              [373 U.S. 379, 83 S.Ct. 1322, 10 L.Ed.2d 428 (1963)
                                                 [emphasis added]

It is notable that the Stepard case cited supra bases its holding

on Rule  31(a)(3) of  the Rules  of the Arizona Supreme Court, to

wit:


  Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
                          Page 9 of 20


     Except as  hereinafter provided  in  subsection  4  of  this
     section (a),  no person  shall practice law in this state or
     hold himself  out as  one who may practice law in this state
     unless he is an active member of the state bar.

     It is revealing that the Stepard court did not take the time

to investigate  the holding  of the  U.S. Supreme  Court  in  the

Sperry case  cited above, or any of the many authorities cited in

the Company's  COUNSEL DEMAND.    One  could  argue  that  Sperry

concerned non-licensed  counsels appearing  before administrative

agencies  (executive  branch),  whereas  Stepard  concerned  non-

licensed trustees  appearing in  a courtroom  (judicial  branch).

Counsel argues  that the  U.S. Constitution  is the  last word in

this  debate,   and  that   the  Sixth  and  original  Thirteenth

Amendments are the supreme controlling Law in the instant case.

     The etymology  of the  word  "attorney"  is  also  extremely

revealing for demonstrating the hidden agenda of the monopolistic

bar associations.   The  word "attorney" is derived from the word

"attorn" which,  in feudal law, is to turn or transfer homage and

service from one lord to another:

     ATTORN.   v.i. ...  In the  feudal law, to turn, or transfer
     homage and  service from  one lord  to another.  This is the
     act of  feudatories, vassals or tenants, upon the alienation
     of the estate.  Blackstone. Encyc.

     ATTORNEY.   n.   [ ...  One who  takes the  turn or place of
     another.  See Attorn and Turn.]

                    [American Dictionary of the English Language]
                              [Noah Webster, First Edition, 1828]
                                                 [emphasis added]

This same  meaning has  been preserved  right up  to the  present

time.   In Black's  Law Dictionary,  Fourth  Edition,  a  similar

definition is found:


  Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
                          Page 10 of 20


     ATTORN.   To turn  over;   to transfer  to another  money or
     goods;   to  assign  to  some  particular  use  or  service.
     Hemminger v.  Klaprath, 15  N.J. Misc. 163, 189 A. 363, 364.
     To consent to the transfer of a rent or reversion.  To agree
     to become  tenant to  one as  owner or landlord of an estate
     previously held  of another,  or to agree to recognize a new
     owner of a property or estate and promise payment of rent to
     him.   Hurley v.  Stevens, 220  Mo.App. 1057,  279 S.W. 720,
     722.

                           Feudal Law

          To turn  over;   to transfer to another money or goods;
     to assign  to some  particular use  or service.  2 Bla.Comm.
     288;  1 Spence, Eq.Jur. 137.

          Where a  lord aliened his seigniory, he might, with the
     consent of  the tenant, and in some cases without, attorn or
     transfer the homage and service of the latter to the alienee
     or new lord.  Bract. fols. 81b, 82.

                   [Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, 1951]

And, in  Bouvier's Law Dictionary, published in the year 1870, we

find almost identical language:

     ATTORN.   To turn  over;   to transfer  to another  money or
     goods;   to  assign  to  some  particular  use  or  service.
     Kennet, Paroch. Antiq. 283.

          Used of a lord's transferring the homage and service of
     his tenant to a new lord.  Bract. 81, 82;  1 Sullivan, Lect.
     227.

          To transfer services or homage.


     Thus, it  appears  that  "attorneys"  who  are  licensed  to

"practice law" in "feudal" courts by the State Bar of Arizona are

actually involved  in a monopoly whose main purpose is to oversee

the transfer  of money  or other goods from clients to themselves

and to  the members of their "association."  This is particularly

the case  when the  money or other goods (the "estate") are to be

transferred from  the homage and service of one lord to a new and

completely different lord.  Simply substitute "The Bank" and "The

Fund" for  "a new  and completely  different lord,"  and you have

solved the riddle of contemporary feudal "laws."


  Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
                          Page 11 of 20


     Indeed, since  The Bank  and The  Fund  now  claim  to  have

perfected a  multi-trillion dollar  "lien" against  the  American

People and their assets:

                      $5,000,000,000,000.00

it is  completely consistent  with "feudal"  law that "attorneys"

are "expected"  to facilitate  the transfer  of property into the

ownership and  control of  those foreign  principals.   This  is,

indeed, the reciprocal relationship between the bar and the bench

to which  the Stepard  case referred:  "By its supervision of the

bar and  through its  reliance on lawyers before it, the court is

enabled to  function" (read  "collect money").   Can  it be  that

American courts  are now  unduly influenced  by The  Bank and The

Fund, in  a rolling  rehypothecation  imposed  by  an  artificial

"bankruptcy" begun in 1933 with FDR'S "Bank Holiday"?

     Of course,  we are  actually operating now under FEUDAL LAW,

also known  as FEDERAL  LAW, also known as inland admiralty.  For

proof, see the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 9(h), which

mentions (but  does not  show) the Supplemental Rules for Certain

Admiralty and  Maritime Claims.  You must work hard to get access

to these  rules, because  they are  a well kept secret, very much

like the  regulations which  implement the Buck Act.  Witness the

following language,  found in the private library of a bankruptcy

attorney in Phoenix, Arizona:

     It is  quite possible  that a financially troubled taxpayer,
     who has  deferred payment  of an assessed tax, will not know
     whether or  when a  tax lien  has been  imposed upon all his
     property because  initially the  general tax lien is usually
     of the  secret variety.   It  arises  automatically  on  the
     occurrence   of   certain   events   and   without   express
     notification to  the  taxpayer.  ...    The  fact  that  the
     Government may  or may  not file  a notice  of its  lien  in


  Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
                          Page 12 of 20


     appropriate public  records has  nothing whatever to do with
     the validity of the lien against the taxpayer himself.  With
     a so-called secret lien, the Government's rights against the
     taxpayer's  property  will  be  preserved  against  all  but
     subsequent purchasers,  mechanics' lienors,  judgement  lien
     creditors, holders  of security  interests, and a trustee in
     bankruptcy.

                       [Federal Tax Liens, William T. Plumb, Jr.]
                          [American Law Institute, 1972, page 10]

     The federal Constitution makes a careful distinction between

natural born  Citizens of  the states, and citizens of the United

States (compare  2:1:5 with  Section  1  of  the  so-called  14th

Amendment).   One is an unconditional Sovereign by natural birth,

who is  endowed by  the Creator  with certain unalienable rights;

the other  has been  granted the  revocable privileges of federal

citizenship, endowed  by the  Congress of the United States.  See

"Federal citizenship"  in Black's  Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition.

One is  a Citizen,  the other  is a subject.  One is a Sovereign,

the  other   is  a   subordinate.    One  is  a  Citizen  of  Our

constitutional Republic;  the other is a citizen of a legislative

democracy (the feudal zone), where Roman Civil Law prevails.

     Notice the  superior/subordinate relationship  between these

two statuses.   We  are forever  indebted to M. J. "Red" Beckman,

co-author of The Law That Never Was with Bill Benson, for clearly

illustrating the  important difference  between  the  two.    Red

Beckman  has  delivered  many  eloquent  lectures  based  on  the

profound simplicity of the following table:

          Chain of command and authority in a:

          Majority Rule            Constitutional
          Democracy                Republic

          X                        Creator
          Majority                 Individual
          Government               Constitution
          Public Servants          Government
          Case & Statute Law       Public Servants
          Corporations             Statute Law
          individual               Corporations


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     In this  illustration, a  democracy ruled  by  the  majority

places the  individual at  the bottom,  and an unknown elite, Mr.

"X" at  the top.   The  majority (or  mob) elects a government to

hire public  "servants" who  write laws primarily for the benefit

of  corporations.     These  corporations  are  either  owned  or

controlled by  Mr. X,  a clique  of the ultra-wealthy who seek to

restore a  two-class "feudal"  society.  They exercise their vast

economic power so as to turn all of America into a "feudal zone".

     The rights of individuals occupy the lowest priority in this

chain of  command.   Those rights often vanish over time, because

democracies eventually  self-destruct.   The enforcement  of laws

within this  scheme is  the job  of administrative tribunals, who

specialize in  holding individuals to the letter of all rules and

regulations of  the corporate  state, no matter how arbitrary and

with little  if any regard for fundamental human Rights which are

normally guaranteed by "democratic" institutions:

     A democracy  that  recognizes  only  manmade  laws  perforce
     obliterates the concept of Liberty as a divine right.

                     [A Ticket to Liberty, November 1990 edition]
                                       [page 146, emphasis added]

     In the  Constitutional  Republic,  however,  the  Rights  of

Individuals are  Supreme.  Individuals delegate their Sovereignty

to a  written contract,  called a  Constitution,  which  empowers

government to  hire public  servants to  write laws primarily for

the benefit  of Individuals.   The corporations occupy the lowest

priority in this chain of command, since their primary objectives

are to  maximize the  enjoyment  of  Individual  Rights,  and  to

facilitate the fulfillment of Individual responsibilities.


  Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
                          Page 14 of 20


     The  enforcement   of  laws   within  this   scheme  is  the

responsibility of  Sovereign  Individuals,  who  have  created  a

system of  government which  reserves  to  them  the  fundamental

Rights to  exercise power in three arenas:  the voting booth, the

trial jury,  and the  grand jury.   Without  a  jury  verdict  of

"guilty", for  example,  no  law  can  be  enforced,  no  penalty

exacted, no  punishment imposed.  The behavior of public servants

is tightly  restrained by  contractual terms,  as  found  in  the

written Constitutions, both state and federal.  Statutes and case

law are  created primarily  to limit  and define  the  scope  and

extent of public servant power.

     This brings  us full  circle to Mr. Robert L. Miskell, a man

who purports  to be  a conscientious  public servant,  but  whose

behavior has  already implicated  him in  several counts  of mail

fraud, jury  tampering,  obstruction  of  justice,  perjury,  and

contempt of court.  See all prior pleadings.

     The evidence of these overt acts is found, of course, in the

very pleadings  and voluminous  documentary exhibits which he now

seeks to  strike, forever,  from the official court record in the

instant case.    But  of  course,  "Professional  competence  and

professional responsibility  are the  sine  qua  non  of  federal

litigation  and effective judicial response."  See Stepard supra,

one of  the "controlling"  cases upon which Miskell is basing his

MOTION TO STRIKE.

     Are we  to believe  that multiple  felonies are  the mark of

professional  competence  and  professional  responsibility,  the

"sine qua  non" of  federal litigation  (without which  there  is

nothing)?  We think not.


  Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
                          Page 15 of 20


     Would  Miskell  have  us  believe  that  effective  judicial

response is  measured by  the number  of times  he can  get  away

conspiring with  named and  unnamed accomplices to transfer (read

"attorn") property from Citizens of Arizona state, like Dr. Burns

and His  colleagues, into  the hands  of his  principals, whoever

they might  be?  After all, he works for the office of the United

States Attorn-ees.

     These, indeed,  are  questions  which  should  and  MUST  be

presented to a competent and lawful trial jury, to decide whether

Miskell's real motives for his MOTION TO STRIKE are not, in fact,

criminal to  the core,  and to  decide whether or not he is using

his "licensed  attorney"  argument  as  a  cloak  and  dagger  to

continue what  he has  been making  quite a profit doing for many

years now, at least since being fined $4,797 for repeatedly lying

to  a   federal  Court   in  Phoenix.    Such  a  fine  is  quite

extraordinary, at  a low  point in  the integrity  of the Justice

Department (some are calling it the "Just-US" Department).

     The jury  needs to  examine, for  example, the testimony and

evidence indicating  that U.S.  Attorneys  (attorn-ees)  are  now

routinely receiving  $25,000 from  the "Internal Revenue Service"

(and the  President $35,000)  for each grand jury indictment they

succeed in  obtaining against  "illegal tax protestors," whatever

that might be.

     Counsel submits  that Dr. Burns and His associates have been

so classified by Miskell and his accomplices within the "Internal

Revenue Service"  and the  Department of  Justice, both  here  in

Arizona and  also in Washington, D.C.  See the JOINT AFFIDAVIT OF

DR. AND MRS. EUGENE BURNS AND DR. AND MRS. SHELDON DEAL, recently

filed in the instant case (too recently for rebuttal).


  Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
                          Page 16 of 20


     Accordingly, Counsel  hereby provides  formal notice  to all

interested parties of His formal challenge to each and every last

statute, regulation, rule, custom, practice, policy and procedure

which relies, either directly or indirectly, on this unlawful and

unconstitutional mis-classification.

     Specifically, "protest"  has never  ever been  "illegal"  or

unlawful in  this country.   See  the First Amendment.  Moreover,

"protest" is  a formal,  legal declaration which is recognized by

the Uniform  Commercial Code  for explicitly reserving all Rights

which a  Person then  possesses, and  prevents the loss of any of

those  Rights  by  application  of  the  concepts  of  waiver  or

estoppel.  The late Howard Freeman explained it this way:

     U.C.C. 1-207:4  Sufficiency of reservation.

     Any expression  indicating any  intention to preserve rights
     is sufficient, such as "without prejudice," "under protest,"
     "under  reservation,"   or  "with  reservation  of  all  our
     rights."

     The Code  states an  "explicit" reservation  must  be  made.
     "Explicit" undoubtedly  is used  in place  of  "express"  to
     indicate that the reservation must not only be "express" but
     it  must  also  be  "clear"  that  such  a  reservation  was
     intended.

     The term  "explicit" as  used in  U.C.C. 1-207  means  "that
     which is  so clearly  stated or distinctively set forth that
     there is no doubt as to its meaning." ...


  Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
                          Page 17 of 20


     U.C.C. 1-207:7  Effect of reservation of rights.

     The making  of  a  valid  reservation  of  rights  preserves
     whatever rights  the person  then possesses and prevents the
     loss of  such rights by application of concepts of waiver or
     estoppel ....


     U.C.C. 1-207:9  Failure to make reservation.

     When a  waivable right  or claim is involved, the failure to
     make a  reservation thereof  causes a  loss of the right and
     bars its assertion at a later date ....


     U.C.C. 1-103:6  Common law.

     The Code  is "Complementary" to the common law which remains
     in force except where displaced by the Code ....

     A statute should be construed in harmony with the common law
     unless there  is a  clear legislative intent to abrogate the
     common law.  ...   "The Code  cannot be  read to  preclude a
     common law action."

                            ["The Two United States and the Law"]
                                [undated essay by Howard Freeman]

     In order  for statutes  and regulations  utilizing the  term

"illegal  tax  protestor"  to  be  constitutional  in  the  first

instance,  the   adjective  "illegal"   cannot  modify  the  noun

"protestor";   it must  modify the  noun "tax",  thus providing a

telling admission  on the  part of  our vaulted  Congress of what

many Americans  have known  for a long time, namely, that the tax

is illegal, not the protest, nor the protestors.

     To  brand  human  beings  with  this  unconstitutional  mis-

classification is  bad enough;   the  "Internal Revenue  Service"

then goes on to persecute such People, financially and otherwise,

by every means available in their arsenal of summary punishments,

without due process of law, and completely outside the restraints

which were put in place specifically to prevent this very kind of

thing from happening.


  Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
                          Page 18 of 20


     Let's call  it for  what it is: EXTORTION, and the syndicate

sponsoring it  is a  RACKET.   It is,  indeed, a  return  to  low

fascism, and  it is  high time that Congress and the Courts put a

stop to  it, if  the President  won't (remember, he gets money --

lots of  it --  from this  very same syndicate, if what we allege

about PMRS turns about to be true, in fact).


                          RELIEF SOUGHT

     On  behalf  of  the  Company,  Counsel  hereby  respectfully

demands this  honorable Court  to table the Motion to Strike, and

to order  a jury  trial to  resolve substantial issues of law and

fact now  in controversy,  including but not limited to Miskell's

real motives  for moving  to strike material evidence implicating

him and  other accomplices  in a  conspiracy of  mail fraud, jury

tampering, obstruction of justice, perjury and contempt of court.

     Counsel also respectfully requests an Order to the office of

the United  States Attorney  to show  cause why the term "illegal

tax protestor" should not be stricken completely from all federal

laws, regulations,  forms, schedules, rules, policies, practices,

procedures,  and   customs  for   being  an   oxymoron   and   an

unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment.


Executed on June 10, 1996

/s/ Paul Mitchell

Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state
all rights reserved without prejudice


  Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
                          Page 19 of 20


                        PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Paul  Andrew, Mitchell,  B.A.,  M.S.,  hereby  certify,  under

penalty of  perjury, under  the laws  of  the  United  States  of

America, without the "United States", that I am at least 18 years

of age  and a Citizen of one of the United States of America, and

that I personally served the following document(s):

                     COMPANY'S OPPOSITION TO
                  PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE,
                   DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL, AND
                CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
             "ILLEGAL TAX PROTESTOR" CLASSIFICATIONS

by placing  said document(s)  with exhibits in first class United

States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to:

ROBERT L. MISKELL                  John M. Roll
Acapulco Building, Suite 8310      U.S. District Court
110 South Church Avenue            55 E. Broadway
Tucson, Arizona                    Tucson, Arizona

JANET NAPOLITANO                   Clerk
Acapulco Building, Suite 8310      U.S. District Court
110 South Church Avenue            55 E. Broadway
Tucson, Arizona                    Tucson, Arizona

Grand Jury Foreperson              Postmaster
In re: New Life Health Center Co.  U.S. Post Office
55 E. Broadway                     Downtown Station
Tucson, Arizona                    Tucson, Arizona

Judge Alex Kozinski                Evangelina Cardenas
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals     "Internal Revenue Service"
125 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 200     300 West Congress
Pasadena, California               Tucson, Arizona

Attorney General                   Solicitor General
Department of Justice              Department of Justice
10th and Constitution, N.W. !      10th and Constitution, N.W. !
Washington, D.C.                   Washington, D.C.


Dated:  June 10, 1996

/s/ Paul Mitchell
________________________________________
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state
all rights reserved without prejudice


  Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
                          Page 20 of 20


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IN RE GRAND JURY SUBPOENA SERVED ON NEW LIFE HEALTH CENTER COMPANY