Time: Mon Jul 21 00:15:57 1997 by primenet.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id AAA14435 for [address in tool bar]; Mon, 21 Jul 1997 00:15:13 -0700 (MST) by usr09.primenet.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id AAA08865; Mon, 21 Jul 1997 00:14:18 -0700 (MST) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 1997 00:13:49 -0700 To: (Recipient list suppressed) From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar] Subject: SLS: Strategic Assessment: The Internet <snip> > >The entire article, from which this excerpt is taken, can be viewed at: >http://www.copi.com/articles/IntelRpt/swett.html > >Jilain > > STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT: THE INTERNET > > Prepared by > > Mr. Charles Swett > Assistant for Strategic Assessment > > Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and > Low-Intensity Conflict > (Policy Planning) > > Room 2B525, the Pentagon 703-693-5208 17 July 1995 > >Abstract > >The political process is moving onto the Internet. Both within the United >States and internationally, individuals, interest groups, and even nations >are using the Internet to find each other, discuss the issues, and further >their political goals. The Inte rnet has also played an important role in >recent conflicts. As a result, overseas segments of the Internet can be a >useful tool for DoD, both for >gathering and for disseminating information. By monitoring public message >traffic and alternative news sources from around the world, early warning of >impending significant developments could be developed, in advance of more >traditional means of indications and warning. Commentary placed on the >Internet by observers on the scene of low-intensity conflicts overse as >could be useful to U.S. policymaking. During larger scale conflicts, when >other conventional channels are disrupted, the Internet can be the only >available means of communication into and out of the affected areas. >Internet messages originating within regions under authoritarian control >could provide other useful intelligence. Public messages conveying >information about the intent of overseas groups prone to disrupting U.S. >military operations can provide important counterintelligence. The Internet >could also be used offensively as an additional medium in psychological >operations campaigns and to help achieve >unconventional warfare objectives. Used creatively as an integral asset, the >Internet can facilitate many DoD operations and activities. > >John Anderson's concept for using the Internet to provide early warning of >impending security threats has a great deal of merit. Internet message >traffic about developing situations tends to precede news and intelligence >reporting, since the individuals w ho originate that traffic are not >constrained by the >resource limitations to which news and intelligence organizations are >subject. Those organizations must prioritize their efforts, focusing on what >appears to be the most important items of the moment. Individual observers >overseas who have access to the Internet can write about anything that >interests them. It is likely that routine monitoring of messages originating >in other countries would help provide strategic warning of developing >security threats that would be of concern to the United States. > >At the same time, it should be noted that a great deal of the message >traffic on the Internet is idle chit-chat with no intelligence value >whatsoever, a veritable "Tower of Babble." Monitoring of that traffic would >need to be supported by automated filter s that pass through for human >analysis only >those messages that satisfy certain relevance criteria. It is also important >to note that the accuracy of much of the information on the Internet would >be suspect: "Information and disinformation about breaking events are pretty >raw on the Net. That's the point. You don't know what to think of any >particular bit of information, how to gauge its credibility... You never >really know how to gauge the credibility of the nightly news or the morning >paper, either..." > >Thus new means of validating information received in this way would be >needed. Alteratively, news reports on the Internet could be used to cue >higher confidence means of U.S. intelligence collection, by alerting us to >potentially important factors and allowing us to orient and focus our >collection more >precisely. > >Beside being used to develop early warning of developing conflicts or the >beginnings of new global trends or "sea changes," the Internet can be used >at the opposite end of the spectrum: to obtain pinpoint information about >specific matters of interest. Networks of human sources with access to the >Internet could be developed in areas of security concern to the U.S., and >these sources could be oriented to seek specific needed information. If >constructed and managed correctly, such a system could be much mor e >responsive and efficient than the current complex, unwieldy intelligence >tasking and collection processes we must use. We might even consider >cultivating the capability to perform strategic reconnaissance "by modem." >This approach could never replace official DoD intelligence collection >systems or services, but could be a useful adjunct. > >The Internet can also serve counterintelligence purposes. For example, a >message posted recently in an Internet discussion group for left-wing >political activists repeated for their benefit an Associated Press article >about an upcoming U.S. Army Special Operations Command training exercise >directed >at the (empty) St. Moritz Hotel in Miami Beach. > >If it became widely known that DoD were monitoring Internet traffic for >intelligence or counterintelligence purposes, individuals with personal >agendas or political purposes in mind, or who enjoy playing pranks, would >deliberately enter false or misleading messages. Our analysis function would >need to account for this. > >Just as the U.S. could be vulnerable to disinformational e-mail, politically >active groups using the Internet could be vulnerable to deceptive messages >introduced by hostile persons or groups. Far-right groups and far-left >groups tend to watch each other, and it is likely that "moles" will obtain >access to the other camps' networks for the purpose of disrupting their >operations. This would tend to weaken the protection afforded by coding or >encrypting messages. > >Increasingly, officials in national governments, foreign military officers, >business persons, and journalists, are obtaining access to the Internet and >establishing individual e-mail addresses. There is even a commercial service >that will shortly offer ac cess to an online database of the names, >organizational titles, phone/fax numbers, and Internet e-mail addresses of >virtually all government officials in all countries. Using this information, >it would be possible to employ the Internet as an additional medium for >Psychological Operations (Psyops) campaigns. E-mail conveying the U.S. >perspective on issues and events could be efficiently and rapidly >disseminated to a very wide audience. > >The U.S. might be able to employ the Internet offensively to help achieve >unconventional warfare objectives. Information could be transmitted over the >Internet to sympathetic groups operating in areas of concern that allows >them to conduct operations them selves that we might otherwise have to send >our own special forces to accomplish. Although such undertakings would have >their own kinds of risks, they would have the benefit of reducing the >physical risks to our special forces personnel, and limiting the direct >political involvement of the United States since the actions we desire would >be carried out by indigenous groups. > >Recommendations > >NOTE: The recommendations listed below should be carried out only in full >compliance with the letter and the spirit of the law, and without violating >the privacy of American citizens > > * All DoD professional and support personnel should have an Internet >e-mail address with convenient access and a user-friendly interface. > > *Individual analysts in DoD intelligence agencies should routinely >monitor Internet traffic (that is readily accessible to the general public) >related to their responsibilities. Agencies should establish high volume >internal outlets to provide them with this traffic, subject to appropriate >relevance filters. > > * DoD intelligence agencies should investigate the role of the Internet >in helping coordinate the operations of political activists and paramilitary >groups in regions of interest > > * An early warning capability should be established that uses Internet >messages to help identify developing situations overseas that could lead to >security threats > > * Officials planning and conducting DoD civil affairs programs overseas >should be informed about any activists working in their vicinity who use the >Internet > > * The OSD Public Affairs site on the Internet should accept feedback >from callers and should provide responses, using the full potential of the >Internet for supporting DoD public affairs programs. Although it would be >impractical to provide an individual reply to every incoming e-mail message, >statistical profiles of opinions conveyed by large volumes of messages could >be used to compose periodic DoD bulletins addressing them in general terms. >This would help >provide a semi-interactive environment within our resource limitations. > > * Subject to appropriate security and propriety precautions, DoD >officials involved in formulating DoD policy should be given access to the >advice and thinking of people on the Internet with relevant expertise. > > * DoD should continue to monitor the evolution of the Internet and its >role in national security. > > * The Internet should be incorporated in our Psyops planning as an >additional medium. > > * Means of employing the Internet offensively in support of our >unconventional warfare objectives should be explored. > > * Senior DoD officials should be kept aware of domestic U.S. political >developments on the Internet that relate to DoD interests. > >Prepared by Mr. Charles Swett >OASD(SO/LIC) Policy Planning >x35208 >17 April 1995 > > > > > > > ~~~Tell me not, in mournful numbers, > Life is but an empty dream! > For the soul is dead that slumbers, > And things are not what they seem.~~~ > > >====Jilain can be reached via email at jilain@rt66.com > or via IRC undernet channel #blackvault==== > > >-> Send "subscribe snetnews " to majordomo@world.std.com >-> Posted by: Jilain <jilain@rt66.com> > > > ======================================================================== Paul Andrew Mitchell : Counselor at Law, federal witness B.A., Political Science, UCLA; M.S., Public Administration, U.C. Irvine tel: (520) 320-1514: machine; fax: (520) 320-1256: 24-hour/day-night email: [address in tool bar] : using Eudora Pro 3.0.3 on 586 CPU website: http://www.supremelaw.com : visit the Supreme Law Library now ship to: c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776 : this is free speech, at its best Tucson, Arizona state : state zone, not the federal zone Postal Zone 85719/tdc : USPS delays first class w/o this As agents of the Most High, we came here to establish justice. We shall not leave, until our mission is accomplished and justice reigns eternal. ======================================================================== [This text formatted on-screen in Courier 11, non-proportional spacing.]
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