Time: Wed Dec 17 05:56:38 1997 To: han-wi@pop.ri.ultranet.com From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar] Subject: WHO WROTE IT? Cc: Bcc: References: I wrote it, using a pen name. What is your name and address for service of legal process, please? Thank you. /s/ Paul Mitchell, Candidate for Congress http://supremelaw.com At 07:35 AM 12/17/97, you wrote: > >-> SearchNet's SNETNEWS Mailing List > >Paul Andrew Mitchel posted this memo as the AUTHOR, yet in the book (The >Federal Zone) the Memo is from Mitch Modeleski to S-A-P. So PAUL which is >it??? And why did Mitch give you NO credit as the author of the MEMO???? >Have you sued ??? > >Anyone who wishes to verify this can go to http://www.deoxy.org/fz/fedzone.htm > >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >---- ><Paul Andrew Mitchel's Post> > >MEMO > >TO: Edward A. Ellison, Jr., J.D. > John William Kurowski > >FROM: Paul Andrew Mitchell, Author > "The Federal Zone" > >DATE: March 24, 1992 > >SUBJECT: "Direct Taxation and the 1990 Census" > your essay in Reasonable Action newsletter, > Save-A-Patriot Fellowship, July/August 1991 > > >-------------------------------------------------------------------------- ><From the book!!!!> > >Appendix W: Memos on Downes vs Bidwell > > >MEMO >TO: Edward A. Ellison, Jr., J.D. > John William Kurowski >FROM: Mitch Modeleski, Founder > Account for Better Citizenship >DATE: March 24, 1992 >SUBJECT: "Direct Taxation and the 1990 Census" > your essay in Reasonable Action newsletter, > Save-A-Patriot Fellowship, July/August 1991 > > > >I was very gratified to see such a thorough and authoritative treatment >of "direct taxation" in the July/August 1991 issue of the Reasonable >Action newsletter. My research continues to convince me of the extreme >constitutional importance of the apportionment rule for direct taxes >levied by Congress within the 50 States of the Union. I am writing this >memo to share with you some of my thoughts on the subject, and to offer >my challenge to a few points which are not necessarily beyond dispute. >Please understand that I am in general agreement with most, but not all >of your essay. Permit me to play "devil's advocate" as I focus on some >issues which deserve greater elaboration and substantiation. >The so-called 16th Amendment remains highly relevant to this subject, >for a number of important reasons. First of all, since 1913, several >federal courts have attempted to isolate the precise effects of a >ratified 16th Amendment. Unfortunately for us, when all of these cases >are assembled side-by-side, the rulings are not consistent. We are >forced to admit the existence of separate groups of court decisions that >flatly contradict each other. One group puts income taxes into the class >of indirect, excise taxes. Another group puts income taxes into the >class of direct taxes. One group argues that a ratified 16th Amendment >did not change or repeal any other clause of the Constitution. Another >group argues that a ratified 16th Amendment relieved income taxes from >the apportionment rule. Even experts disagree. To illustrate the range >of disagreement on such fundamental constitutional issues, consider the >conclusion of legal scholar Vern Holland: > > > ... [T]he Sixteenth Amendment did not amend the > Constitution. The United States Supreme Court by unanimous > decisions determined that the amendment did not grant any > new powers of taxation; that a direct tax cannot be > relieved from the constitutional mandate of apportionment; > and the only effect of the amendment was to overturn the > theory advanced in the Pollock case which held that a tax on > income, was in legal effect, a tax on the sources of the > income. > [The Law That Always, page 220] > > > >Now consider the opposing view of another competent scholar. After much >research and much litigation, author and attorney Jeffrey A. Dickstein >offers the following concise clarification: > > > A tax imposed on all of a person's annual gross receipts is > a direct tax on personal property that must be apportioned. > A tax imposed on the "income" derived from those gross > receipts is also a direct tax on property, but as a result > of the Sixteenth Amendment, Congress no longer has to enact > legislation calling for the apportionment of a tax on that > income. > [Judicial Income and Your Income Tax, pages 60-61] > > > >The following Appellate ruling is unique among all the relevant federal >cases for its clarity and conciseness on this question: > > > The constitutional limitation upon direct taxation was > modified by the Sixteenth Amendment insofar as taxation of > income was concerned, but the amendment was restricted to > income, leaving in effect the limitation upon direct > taxation of principal. > [Richardson vs United States, 294 F.2d 593 (1961)] > [emphasis added] > > > >Granted, this is not a decision by the Supreme Court, but the decision >is useful because it is so clear and concise, and also because it is >very representative of that group of rulings which found that a ratified >16th Amendment relieved income taxes from the apportionment rule. By >inference, if income taxes were controlled by the apportionment rule >prior to the 16th Amendment, then they must be direct taxes (according >to one group of rulings). > >Recall now that 17,000 State-certified documents have been assembled to >prove that the 16th Amendment was never ratified. Congress has already >been served with several official complaints documenting the evidence >against the 16th Amendment, pursuant to the First Amendment guarantee >for redress of grievances. Congress has now fallen silent. I am the >author of one of these complaints (see The Federal Zone, Appendix J). >Relying on one group of rulings, the Pollock, Peck, Eisner and Shaffer >decisions leave absolutely no doubt about the consequences of the failed >ratification: the necessity still exists for an apportionment among the >50 States of all direct taxes, and income taxes are direct taxes. > >Federal courts did not hesitate to identify the effects of a ratified >16th Amendment. Now that the evidence against its ratification is so >overwhelming and incontrovertible, the federal courts are unwilling to >identify the effects of the failed ratification. These courts have opted >to call it a "political" question, even though it wasn't a "political" >question in the years immedNow that the evidence against its >ratification is so overwhelming and incontrovertible, the federal courts >are unwilling to identify the effects of the failed ratification. These >courts have opted to call it a "political" question, even though it >wasn't a "political" question in the years immediately after Philander >C. Knox declared it ratified. I personally find it hard to believe that >the federal courts are incapable of exercising the logic required to >isolate the legal effects of the failed ratification. Quite simply, if a >ratified 16th Amendment had effect X, then a failed ratification proves >that X did not happen. What is X? Their "political" unwillingness to >exercise basic logic means that the federal courts have abdicated their >main responsibility -- to uphold the constitution -- > >Let me begin my answer to that question by first quoting from your >essay, in the section entitled "Documenting the Truth": > > > The Constitution still grants to the Congress the power of > laying an "apportioned" direct tax but notwithstanding the > advent of the 16th Amendment all "direct" taxes must be > apportioned. There is no exception to this rule. > [emphasis added] > > > >In a strictly normative sense, I would certainly agree that this is the >way it should be. But, in a practical and empirical sense, is this >really the way it is? I say no. In exercising its exclusive authority >over the federal zone, Congress is not subject to the same >constitutional limitations that exist inside the 50 States. For this >reason, the areas that are inside and outside the federal zone are >heterogeneous with respect to each other. This difference results in a >principle of territorial heterogeneity: the areas within (or inside) the >federal zone are subject to one set of rules; the areas without (or >outside) the federal zone are subject to a different set of rules. The >Constitution rules outside the zone and inside the 50 States. The >Congress rules inside the zone and outside the 50 States. The 50 States >are, therefore, in one general class, because all constitutional >restraints upon Congress are in force throughout the 50 States, without >prejudice to any one State. The areas within the federal zone are in a >different general class, because these same constitutional restraints >simply do not limit Congress inside that zone (see The Federal Zone, >chapters 12 and 13). > >I would never ask you to accept this principle of territorial >heterogeneity simply on faith. There is solid case law to substantiate >it. You may recall, it is the Hooven case which officially defined the >three separate and distinct meanings of the term "United States". This >same definition can also be found in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth >Edition. The Supreme Court ruled that this case would be the last time >it would address official definitions of the term "United States". >Therefore, this ruling must be judicially noticed by the entire American >legal (and paralegal) community. In my opinion, the most significant >holding in Hooven has to do with territorial heterogeneity, as follows: > > > ... [T]he United States** may acquire territory by conquest > or by treaty, and may govern it through the exercise of the > power of Congress conferred by Section 3 of Article IV of > the Constitution .... > In exercising this power, Congress is not subject to the > same constitutional limitations, as when it is legislating > for the United States***. ... And in general the guaranties > [sic] of the Constitution, save as they are limitations upon > the exercise of executive and legislative power when exerted > for or over our insular possessions, extend to them only as > Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power over > territory belonging to the United States**, has made those > guarantees applicable. > [Hooven & Allison Co. vs Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945)] > [emphasis added] > > > >I have taken the liberty of adding asterisks ("**","***") to the above, >in order to identify which meaning of "United States" is being used in >each occurrence of the term. Computer users prefer the term "stars" over >"asterisks" because it has fewer syllables. > >Return now to your statement that "there is no exception to this rule" >that all direct taxes must be apportioned. Using the Hooven case and >others as our guide, it is more accurate to say that all direct taxes >must be apportioned whenever they are levied inside the 50 States of the >Union. On the other hand, direct taxes need NOT be apportioned whenever >they are levied outside the 50 States of the Union, and inside the areas >of land over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction. The >authorities for this exclusive legislative jurisdiction are 1:8:17 and >4:3:2 in the U.S. Constitution. You may disagree with this >interpretation of the term "exclusive", and that is your right, but in >doing so you are disagreeing with the Supreme Court. Evidently, this was >not the first, nor the last time the high Court has differed with the >Framers of the Constitution. > >As it turns out, the pivotal case law on this question predates Hooven >by 44 years, and predates the so-called 16th Amendment by 12 years. In >Downes vs Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), the issue was a discriminatory >tariff which Congress had levied on goods imported from Puerto Rico (or >"Porto Rico" as it was spelled then). Congress had recently obtained >exclusive legislative jurisdiction over this territory by and predates >the so-called 16th Amendment by 12 years. In Downes vs Bidwell, 182 U.S. >244 (1901), the issue was a discriminatory tariff which Congress had >levied on goods imported from Puerto Rico (or "Porto Rico" as it was >spelled then). Congress had recently obtained exclusive legislative >jurisdiction over this territory by virtue of the treaty of peace with >Spain. The import duty was obviously not uniform, as required by 1:8:1 >in the U.S. Constitution, since it was levied specifically against goods > > >The controversy that surrounded Downes vs Bidwell was intense, as >evidenced by the flurry of articles that were published in the Harvard >Law Review on the subject of "The Insular Cases" as they were called. >Perhaps the most lucid criticism of the Downes majority can be found in >Justice Harlan's dissent: > > > The idea prevails with some -- indeed, it found expression > in arguments at the bar -- that we have in this country > substantially or practically two national governments; one, > to be maintained under the Constitution, with all its > restrictions; the other to be maintained by Congress > outside and independently of that instrument, by exercising > such powers as other nations of the earth are accustomed to > exercise. > [Downes vs Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)] > [emphasis added] > > > >To appreciate how alarmed Justice Harlan had become as a result of this >new "theory", consider the following from his dissent: > > > I take leave to say that if the principles thus announced > should ever receive the sanction of a majority of this > court, a radical and mischievous change in our system of > government will be the result. We will, in that event, pass > from the era of constitutional liberty guarded and protected > by a written constitution into an era of legislative > absolutism. ... > It will be an evil day for American liberty if the theory of > a government outside of the supreme law of the land finds > lodgment in our constitutional jurisprudence. No higher > duty rests upon this court than to exert its full authority > to prevent all violation of the principles of the > Constitution. > [Downes vs Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)] > [emphasis added] > > > >This theory has been documented by patriot John Knox as follows: > > > This theory of a government operating outside the > Constitution over its own territory with citizens of the > United States belonging thereto under Article 4, Section 3, > Clause 2 of the Constitution was further confirmed in 1922 > by the Supreme Court in Balzac vs Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 300 > (EXHIBIT #4) where that Court affirmed that the Constitution > does not apply outside the limits of the 50 States of the > Union at page 305 quoting Downes, supra and De Lima, supra. > That under Article IV, section 3 the "United States" was > given exclusive power over the territories and their > citizens of the "United States" residing therein. > > > >This quote is from an unpublished brief entitled "Memorandum in Support >of Request for the District Court to Consider the T.R.O. and Injunction >by the Magistrate" by John Knox, Knox vs U.S., United States District >Court for the Western District of Texas, San Antonio, Texas, Case No. >SA-89-CA-1308. > >People will not fully appreciate a central thesis of The Federal Zone if >they believe that I agree with the minimal majority by which Downes was >decided. I don't agree with the majority; I agree with Harlan. I have >simply tried to describe, in lucid language, how Congress is now able to >pass legislation which is not restrained by the U.S. Constitution as we >know it. This type of legislation is also known as "municipal" law, >because Congress is the municipal authority inside the federal zone. >When I visited the District of Columbia during my senior year at UCLA as >a summer intern in political science, I asked a Capitol guard where I >could find city hall. We were standing on the Capitol lawn when he >pointed to the Capitol Building and said, "That is City Hall!" > >The Downes decision sent many shock waves through the American legal >community, as evidenced by the deep concern that is expressed by author >Littlefield in "The Insular Cases", 15 Harvard Law Review 169, 281. He >points out how the dissenting minority were of a single mind, while the >assenting majority exploited a multiplicity of conflicting and mutually >incompatible themes. Just one vote turned the tide. Littlefield's words >jump off the page like grease popping off a sizzling griddle. > >Accordingly, I now believe that we must go back further than 1913 to >isolate the major turn in the tide of American constitutional integrity >and continuity. Medina in The Silver Bulletin traces the fork to the >tragic American Civil War -- the counter revolution -- when Lincoln was >murdered by a Rothschild agent, clearing the stage for resurrecting the >federalists' heartthrob -- a central bank. For example, in the context >of everything we now know about territorial heterogeneity, to the extent >that it was a "municipal" statute for the federal zone, the Federal >Reserve Act was constitutional under the rubric of the Downes doctrine. > >The consequences of this doctrine have been profound and far-reaching, >just as Harlan predicted. One of Lyndon Johnson's first official acts >was to rescind JFK's executive order authorizing the circulation of $4.5 >billion in interest-free "United States Notes" instead of >interest-bearing "Federal Reserve Notes". It is a shame that Oliver >Stone did not cover this motive in his movie JFK. All we need to do is >connect the dots, and the picture will emerge, clear as day. > >Specifically, Title 26 is a municipal statute and, as such, it is not >subject to the apportionment rule. The territorial scope of Title 26 is >the federal zone; the political scope of Title 26 is the set of >"persons" who are either citizens and/or residents of that zone: "U.S.** >citizens" and "U.S.** residents". The term "U.S.**" in this context >refers to the second of the three Hooven definitions, namely, the >territory over which the sovereignty of Congress extends, i.e., the >federal zone. Incidentally, the flat tax provisions in Title 26 do >conform to the uniformity rule because the tax rate is uniform across >the 50 States (see A Ticket To Liberty, by Lori Jacques). > >Since involuntary servitude is now forbidden everywhere in this land, it >is possible under law to acquire citizenship in the federal zone at will >via naturalization, even if one is a natural born Sovereign State >Citizen by birth. It is also possible to abandon citizenship in the >federal zone at will, via expatriation. In this context, it is revealing >that the Internal Revenue Code has provisions for dealing with "U.S.** >citizens" who expatriate to avoid the tax. Similarly, Americans are free >to reside wherever they want, under the law. If you choose to reside in >the federal zone, you are liable for the income tax, by definition (see >26 U.S.C. 7701(b)(1)(A) and 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1(b)). Finally, if you are a >"nonresident alien" with respect to the "United States**" as those terms >are defined in Title 26 and in Title 42, you are only liable for taxes >on income which is effectively connected with a U.S.** trade or >business, and on income which derives from U.S.** sources. All other >income for nonresident aliens is excluded from the computation of "gross >income" as defined (see 26 U.S.C. 872(a)). > >I hope this discussion has provided you with some valuable feedback >concerning the 16th Amendment, direct taxes, the apportionment rule, >Title 26 and The Federal Zone. You have, no doubt, heard several >references to the "secret jurisdiction" under which the IRS has been >operating. I now believe that this jurisdiction is no longer totally a >secret; it issues from 1:8:17 and 4:3:2 in the Constitution. Contrary to >the statement quoted above from your essay, there are exceptions to the >apportionment rule for direct taxes, and there are exceptions to the >uniformity rule for indirect taxes. Inside the federal zone, Congress is >free to do pretty much whatever it wants, per the Downes doctrine. >Inside the federal zone, it is a legislative democracy, with majority >rule. If you want to change the rules, then change the majority. Our >best hope for changing those rules rests, therefore, in changing the >membership in the House and Senate. As a Sovereign State Citizen, >however, I am not subject to those rules, primarily and most importantly >because the Constitution created the legislature and We Sovereigns >created the Constitution. A Sovereign is never subject to his own >creation, unless he volunteers himself into that status, for whatever >reason (e.g., the security of socialism a/k/a Social Security). > >For your edification, the following is a list of Harvard Law Review >articles which discuss the insular cases in some detail: > > > Langdell, "The Status of Our New Territories" > 12 Harvard Law Review, 365, 371 > Thayer, "Our New Possessions" > 12 Harvard Law Review, 464 > Thayer, "The Insular Tariff Cases in the Supreme Court" > 15 Harvard Law Review 164 > Littlefield, "The Insular Cases" > 15 Harvard Law Review, 169, 281 > >-> Send "subscribe snetnews " to majordomo@world.std.com >-> Posted by: han-wi@ri.ultranet.com > > >
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