Time: Wed Dec 17 05:58:26 1997
To: han-wi@pop.ri.ultranet.com
From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar]
Subject: I WROTE IT!

One last thing:  YOU are in violation 
of the copyright restrictions stated
in the Preface.

You have now been lawfully notified.

/s/ Paul Mitchell
Candidate for Congress

At 07:35 AM 12/17/97, you wrote:
>->  SearchNet's   SNETNEWS   Mailing List
>Paul Andrew Mitchel posted this memo as the AUTHOR, yet in the book (The
>Federal Zone) the Memo is from Mitch Modeleski to S-A-P.  So PAUL which is
>it??? And why did Mitch give you NO credit as the author of the MEMO????
>Have you sued ??? 
>Anyone who wishes to verify this can go to http://www.deoxy.org/fz/fedzone.htm
><Paul Andrew Mitchel's Post>
>TO:       Edward A. Ellison, Jr., J.D.
>          John William Kurowski
>FROM:     Paul Andrew Mitchell, Author
>          "The Federal Zone"
>DATE:     March 24, 1992
>SUBJECT:  "Direct Taxation and the 1990 Census"
>          your essay in Reasonable Action newsletter,
>          Save-A-Patriot Fellowship, July/August 1991
><From the book!!!!>
>Appendix W: Memos on Downes vs Bidwell
>TO:       Edward A. Ellison, Jr., J.D.
>          John William Kurowski
>FROM:     Mitch Modeleski, Founder
>          Account for Better Citizenship
>DATE:     March 24, 1992
>SUBJECT:  "Direct Taxation and the 1990 Census"
>          your essay in Reasonable Action newsletter,
>          Save-A-Patriot Fellowship, July/August 1991
>I was very gratified to see such a thorough and authoritative treatment 
>of "direct taxation" in the July/August 1991 issue of the Reasonable 
>Action newsletter. My research continues to convince me of the extreme 
>constitutional importance of the apportionment rule for direct taxes 
>levied by Congress within the 50 States of the Union. I am writing this 
>memo to share with you some of my thoughts on the subject, and to offer 
>my challenge to a few points which are not necessarily beyond dispute. 
>Please understand that I am in general agreement with most, but not all 
>of your essay. Permit me to play "devil's advocate" as I focus on some 
>issues which deserve greater elaboration and substantiation. 
>The so-called 16th Amendment remains highly relevant to this subject, 
>for a number of important reasons. First of all, since 1913, several 
>federal courts have attempted to isolate the precise effects of a 
>ratified 16th Amendment. Unfortunately for us, when all of these cases 
>are assembled side-by-side, the rulings are not consistent. We are 
>forced to admit the existence of separate groups of court decisions that 
>flatly contradict each other. One group puts income taxes into the class 
>of indirect, excise taxes. Another group puts income taxes into the 
>class of direct taxes. One group argues that a ratified 16th Amendment 
>did not change or repeal any other clause of the Constitution. Another 
>group argues that a ratified 16th Amendment relieved income taxes from 
>the apportionment rule. Even experts disagree. To illustrate the range 
>of disagreement on such fundamental constitutional issues, consider the 
>conclusion of legal scholar Vern Holland: 
>     ...  [T]he   Sixteenth   Amendment   did   not   amend   the
>     Constitution.   The United States Supreme Court by unanimous
>     decisions determined  that the  amendment did  not grant any
>     new powers  of taxation;    that  a  direct  tax  cannot  be
>     relieved from  the constitutional  mandate of apportionment;
>     and the  only effect  of the  amendment was  to overturn the
>     theory advanced in the Pollock case which held that a tax on
>     income, was  in legal  effect, a  tax on  the sources of the
>     income.
>                                  [The Law That Always, page 220]
>Now consider the opposing view of another competent scholar. After much 
>research and much litigation, author and attorney Jeffrey A. Dickstein 
>offers the following concise clarification: 
>     A tax  imposed on all of a person's annual gross receipts is
>     a direct  tax on personal property that must be apportioned.
>     A tax  imposed on  the "income"  derived  from  those  gross
>     receipts is  also a  direct tax on property, but as a result
>     of the  Sixteenth Amendment, Congress no longer has to enact
>     legislation calling  for the  apportionment of a tax on that
>     income.
>               [Judicial Income and Your Income Tax, pages 60-61]
>The following Appellate ruling is unique among all the relevant federal 
>cases for its clarity and conciseness on this question: 
>     The  constitutional  limitation  upon  direct  taxation  was
>     modified by  the Sixteenth  Amendment insofar as taxation of
>     income was  concerned, but  the amendment  was restricted to
>     income,  leaving   in  effect  the  limitation  upon  direct
>     taxation of principal.
>               [Richardson vs United States, 294 F.2d 593 (1961)]
>                                                 [emphasis added]
>Granted, this is not a decision by the Supreme Court, but the decision 
>is useful because it is so clear and concise, and also because it is 
>very representative of that group of rulings which found that a ratified 
>16th Amendment relieved income taxes from the apportionment rule. By 
>inference, if income taxes were controlled by the apportionment rule 
>prior to the 16th Amendment, then they must be direct taxes (according 
>to one group of rulings). 
>Recall now that 17,000 State-certified documents have been assembled to 
>prove that the 16th Amendment was never ratified. Congress has already 
>been served with several official complaints documenting the evidence 
>against the 16th Amendment, pursuant to the First Amendment guarantee 
>for redress of grievances. Congress has now fallen silent. I am the 
>author of one of these complaints (see The Federal Zone, Appendix J). 
>Relying on one group of rulings, the Pollock, Peck, Eisner and Shaffer 
>decisions leave absolutely no doubt about the consequences of the failed 
>ratification: the necessity still exists for an apportionment among the 
>50 States of all direct taxes, and income taxes are direct taxes. 
>Federal courts did not hesitate to identify the effects of a ratified 
>16th Amendment. Now that the evidence against its ratification is so 
>overwhelming and incontrovertible, the federal courts are unwilling to 
>identify the effects of the failed ratification. These courts have opted 
>to call it a "political" question, even though it wasn't a "political" 
>question in the years immedNow that the evidence against its 
>ratification is so overwhelming and incontrovertible, the federal courts 
>are unwilling to identify the effects of the failed ratification. These 
>courts have opted to call it a "political" question, even though it 
>wasn't a "political" question in the years immediately after Philander 
>C. Knox declared it ratified. I personally find it hard to believe that 
>the federal courts are incapable of exercising the logic required to 
>isolate the legal effects of the failed ratification. Quite simply, if a 
>ratified 16th Amendment had effect X, then a failed ratification proves 
>that X did not happen. What is X? Their "political" unwillingness to 
>exercise basic logic means that the federal courts have abdicated their 
>main responsibility -- to uphold the constitution --
>Let me begin my answer to that question by first quoting from your 
>essay, in the section entitled "Documenting the Truth": 
>     The Constitution  still grants  to the Congress the power of
>     laying an  "apportioned" direct  tax but notwithstanding the
>     advent of  the 16th  Amendment all  "direct" taxes  must  be
>     apportioned.  There is no exception to this rule.
>                                                 [emphasis added]
>In a strictly normative sense, I would certainly agree that this is the 
>way it should be. But, in a practical and empirical sense, is this 
>really the way it is? I say no. In exercising its exclusive authority 
>over the federal zone, Congress is not subject to the same 
>constitutional limitations that exist inside the 50 States. For this 
>reason, the areas that are inside and outside the federal zone are 
>heterogeneous with respect to each other. This difference results in a 
>principle of territorial heterogeneity: the areas within (or inside) the 
>federal zone are subject to one set of rules; the areas without (or 
>outside) the federal zone are subject to a different set of rules. The 
>Constitution rules outside the zone and inside the 50 States. The 
>Congress rules inside the zone and outside the 50 States. The 50 States 
>are, therefore, in one general class, because all constitutional 
>restraints upon Congress are in force throughout the 50 States, without 
>prejudice to any one State. The areas within the federal zone are in a 
>different general class, because these same constitutional restraints 
>simply do not limit Congress inside that zone (see The Federal Zone, 
>chapters 12 and 13). 
>I would never ask you to accept this principle of territorial 
>heterogeneity simply on faith. There is solid case law to substantiate 
>it. You may recall, it is the Hooven case which officially defined the 
>three separate and distinct meanings of the term "United States". This 
>same definition can also be found in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth 
>Edition. The Supreme Court ruled that this case would be the last time 
>it would address official definitions of the term "United States". 
>Therefore, this ruling must be judicially noticed by the entire American 
>legal (and paralegal) community. In my opinion, the most significant 
>holding in Hooven has to do with territorial heterogeneity, as follows: 
>     ... [T]he  United States** may acquire territory by conquest
>     or by  treaty, and may govern it through the exercise of the
>     power of  Congress conferred  by Section  3 of Article IV of
>     the Constitution ....
>     In exercising  this power,  Congress is  not subject  to the
>     same constitutional  limitations, as  when it is legislating
>     for the  United States***. ... And in general the guaranties
>     [sic] of the Constitution, save as they are limitations upon
>     the exercise of executive and legislative power when exerted
>     for or  over our insular possessions, extend to them only as
>     Congress, in  the exercise  of its  legislative  power  over
>     territory belonging  to the  United States**, has made those
>     guarantees applicable.
>             [Hooven & Allison Co. vs Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945)]
>                                                 [emphasis added]
>I have taken the liberty of adding asterisks ("**","***") to the above, 
>in order to identify which meaning of "United States" is being used in 
>each occurrence of the term. Computer users prefer the term "stars" over 
>"asterisks" because it has fewer syllables. 
>Return now to your statement that "there is no exception to this rule" 
>that all direct taxes must be apportioned. Using the Hooven case and 
>others as our guide, it is more accurate to say that all direct taxes 
>must be apportioned whenever they are levied inside the 50 States of the 
>Union. On the other hand, direct taxes need NOT be apportioned whenever 
>they are levied outside the 50 States of the Union, and inside the areas 
>of land over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction. The 
>authorities for this exclusive legislative jurisdiction are 1:8:17 and 
>4:3:2 in the U.S. Constitution. You may disagree with this 
>interpretation of the term "exclusive", and that is your right, but in 
>doing so you are disagreeing with the Supreme Court. Evidently, this was 
>not the first, nor the last time the high Court has differed with the 
>Framers of the Constitution. 
>As it turns out, the pivotal case law on this question predates Hooven 
>by 44 years, and predates the so-called 16th Amendment by 12 years. In 
>Downes vs Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), the issue was a discriminatory 
>tariff which Congress had levied on goods imported from Puerto Rico (or 
>"Porto Rico" as it was spelled then). Congress had recently obtained 
>exclusive legislative jurisdiction over this territory by and predates 
>the so-called 16th Amendment by 12 years. In Downes vs Bidwell, 182 U.S. 
>244 (1901), the issue was a discriminatory tariff which Congress had 
>levied on goods imported from Puerto Rico (or "Porto Rico" as it was 
>spelled then). Congress had recently obtained exclusive legislative 
>jurisdiction over this territory by virtue of the treaty of peace with 
>Spain. The import duty was obviously not uniform, as required by 1:8:1 
>in the U.S. Constitution, since it was levied specifically against goods 
>The controversy that surrounded Downes vs Bidwell was intense, as 
>evidenced by the flurry of articles that were published in the Harvard 
>Law Review on the subject of "The Insular Cases" as they were called. 
>Perhaps the most lucid criticism of the Downes majority can be found in 
>Justice Harlan's dissent: 
>     The idea prevails with some  --  indeed, it found expression
>     in arguments  at the  bar   --  that we have in this country
>     substantially or practically two national governments;  one,
>     to be  maintained  under  the  Constitution,  with  all  its
>     restrictions;   the  other  to  be  maintained  by  Congress
>     outside and  independently of that instrument, by exercising
>     such powers  as other nations of the earth are accustomed to
>     exercise.
>                         [Downes vs Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]
>                                                 [emphasis added]
>To appreciate how alarmed Justice Harlan had become as a result of this 
>new "theory", consider the following from his dissent: 
>     I take  leave to  say that  if the principles thus announced
>     should ever  receive the  sanction of  a  majority  of  this
>     court, a  radical and  mischievous change  in our  system of
>     government will be the result.  We will, in that event, pass
>     from the era of constitutional liberty guarded and protected
>     by  a  written  constitution  into  an  era  of  legislative
>     absolutism. ...
>     It will be an evil day for American liberty if the theory of
>     a government  outside of  the supreme  law of the land finds
>     lodgment in  our constitutional  jurisprudence.   No  higher
>     duty rests  upon this court than to exert its full authority
>     to  prevent   all  violation   of  the   principles  of  the
>     Constitution.
>                         [Downes vs Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]
>                                                 [emphasis added]
>This theory has been documented by patriot John Knox as follows: 
>     This  theory   of  a   government  operating   outside   the
>     Constitution over  its own  territory with  citizens of  the
>     United States  belonging thereto under Article 4, Section 3,
>     Clause 2  of the  Constitution was further confirmed in 1922
>     by the  Supreme Court  in Balzac vs Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 300
>     (EXHIBIT #4) where that Court affirmed that the Constitution
>     does not  apply outside  the limits  of the 50 States of the
>     Union at  page 305 quoting Downes, supra and De Lima, supra.
>     That under  Article IV,  section 3  the "United  States" was
>     given  exclusive   power  over  the  territories  and  their
>     citizens of the "United States" residing therein.
>This quote is from an unpublished brief entitled "Memorandum in Support 
>of Request for the District Court to Consider the T.R.O. and Injunction 
>by the Magistrate" by John Knox, Knox vs U.S., United States District 
>Court for the Western District of Texas, San Antonio, Texas, Case No. 
>People will not fully appreciate a central thesis of The Federal Zone if 
>they believe that I agree with the minimal majority by which Downes was 
>decided. I don't agree with the majority; I agree with Harlan. I have 
>simply tried to describe, in lucid language, how Congress is now able to 
>pass legislation which is not restrained by the U.S. Constitution as we 
>know it. This type of legislation is also known as "municipal" law, 
>because Congress is the municipal authority inside the federal zone. 
>When I visited the District of Columbia during my senior year at UCLA as 
>a summer intern in political science, I asked a Capitol guard where I 
>could find city hall. We were standing on the Capitol lawn when he 
>pointed to the Capitol Building and said, "That is City Hall!" 
>The Downes decision sent many shock waves through the American legal 
>community, as evidenced by the deep concern that is expressed by author 
>Littlefield in "The Insular Cases", 15 Harvard Law Review 169, 281. He 
>points out how the dissenting minority were of a single mind, while the 
>assenting majority exploited a multiplicity of conflicting and mutually 
>incompatible themes. Just one vote turned the tide. Littlefield's words 
>jump off the page like grease popping off a sizzling griddle. 
>Accordingly, I now believe that we must go back further than 1913 to 
>isolate the major turn in the tide of American constitutional integrity 
>and continuity. Medina in The Silver Bulletin traces the fork to the 
>tragic American Civil War -- the counter revolution -- when Lincoln was 
>murdered by a Rothschild agent, clearing the stage for resurrecting the 
>federalists' heartthrob -- a central bank. For example, in the context 
>of everything we now know about territorial heterogeneity, to the extent 
>that it was a "municipal" statute for the federal zone, the Federal 
>Reserve Act was constitutional under the rubric of the Downes doctrine. 
>The consequences of this doctrine have been profound and far-reaching, 
>just as Harlan predicted. One of Lyndon Johnson's first official acts 
>was to rescind JFK's executive order authorizing the circulation of $4.5 
>billion in interest-free "United States Notes" instead of 
>interest-bearing "Federal Reserve Notes". It is a shame that Oliver 
>Stone did not cover this motive in his movie JFK. All we need to do is 
>connect the dots, and the picture will emerge, clear as day. 
>Specifically, Title 26 is a municipal statute and, as such, it is not 
>subject to the apportionment rule. The territorial scope of Title 26 is 
>the federal zone; the political scope of Title 26 is the set of 
>"persons" who are either citizens and/or residents of that zone: "U.S.** 
>citizens" and "U.S.** residents". The term "U.S.**" in this context 
>refers to the second of the three Hooven definitions, namely, the 
>territory over which the sovereignty of Congress extends, i.e., the 
>federal zone. Incidentally, the flat tax provisions in Title 26 do 
>conform to the uniformity rule because the tax rate is uniform across 
>the 50 States (see A Ticket To Liberty, by Lori Jacques). 
>Since involuntary servitude is now forbidden everywhere in this land, it 
>is possible under law to acquire citizenship in the federal zone at will 
>via naturalization, even if one is a natural born Sovereign State 
>Citizen by birth. It is also possible to abandon citizenship in the 
>federal zone at will, via expatriation. In this context, it is revealing 
>that the Internal Revenue Code has provisions for dealing with "U.S.** 
>citizens" who expatriate to avoid the tax. Similarly, Americans are free 
>to reside wherever they want, under the law. If you choose to reside in 
>the federal zone, you are liable for the income tax, by definition (see 
>26 U.S.C. 7701(b)(1)(A) and 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1(b)). Finally, if you are a 
>"nonresident alien" with respect to the "United States**" as those terms 
>are defined in Title 26 and in Title 42, you are only liable for taxes 
>on income which is effectively connected with a U.S.** trade or 
>business, and on income which derives from U.S.** sources. All other 
>income for nonresident aliens is excluded from the computation of "gross 
>income" as defined (see 26 U.S.C. 872(a)). 
>I hope this discussion has provided you with some valuable feedback 
>concerning the 16th Amendment, direct taxes, the apportionment rule, 
>Title 26 and The Federal Zone. You have, no doubt, heard several 
>references to the "secret jurisdiction" under which the IRS has been 
>operating. I now believe that this jurisdiction is no longer totally a 
>secret; it issues from 1:8:17 and 4:3:2 in the Constitution. Contrary to 
>the statement quoted above from your essay, there are exceptions to the 
>apportionment rule for direct taxes, and there are exceptions to the 
>uniformity rule for indirect taxes. Inside the federal zone, Congress is 
>free to do pretty much whatever it wants, per the Downes doctrine. 
>Inside the federal zone, it is a legislative democracy, with majority 
>rule. If you want to change the rules, then change the majority. Our 
>best hope for changing those rules rests, therefore, in changing the 
>membership in the House and Senate. As a Sovereign State Citizen, 
>however, I am not subject to those rules, primarily and most importantly 
>because the Constitution created the legislature and We Sovereigns 
>created the Constitution. A Sovereign is never subject to his own 
>creation, unless he volunteers himself into that status, for whatever 
>reason (e.g., the security of socialism a/k/a Social Security). 
>For your edification, the following is a list of Harvard Law Review 
>articles which discuss the insular cases in some detail: 
>     Langdell, "The Status of Our New Territories"
>     12 Harvard Law Review, 365, 371
>     Thayer, "Our New Possessions"
>     12 Harvard Law Review, 464
>     Thayer, "The Insular Tariff Cases in the Supreme Court"     
>     15 Harvard Law Review 164
>     Littlefield, "The Insular Cases"
>     15 Harvard Law Review, 169, 281
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