Time: Sun Mar 09 14:00:14 1997 by primenet.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id LAA19864; Sun, 9 Mar 1997 11:16:56 -0700 (MST) Date: Sun, 09 Mar 1997 13:36:05 -0800 To: (Recipient list suppressed) From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar] Subject: SLS: Constitutional School - Federalist Papers #9 (fwd) <snip> >FEDERALIST No. 9 > >The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection >For the Independent Journal. > >HAMILTON > >To the People of the State of New York: > >A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and >liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and >insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of the petty >republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of >horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were >continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions >by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration >between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If they exhibit >occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived contrast to >the furious storms that are to succeed. If now and then >intervals of felicity open to view, we behold them with a >mixture of regret, arising from the reflection that the pleasing >scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous >waves of sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of glory >break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a >transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at the same time >admonish us to lament that the vices of government should >pervert the direction and tarnish the lustre of those bright >talents and exalted endowments for which the favored soils that >produced them have been so justly celebrated. > >>From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics >the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only >against the forms of republican government, but against the very >principles of civil liberty. They have decried all free >government as inconsistent with the order of society, and have >indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its friends and >partisans. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the >basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in a few >glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms. And, I trust, >America will be the broad and solid foundation of other >edifices, not less magnificent, which will be equally permanent >monuments of their errors. > >But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched >of republican government were too just copies of the originals >from which they were taken. If it had been found impracticable >to have devised models of a more perfect structure, the >enlightened friends to liberty would have been obliged to >abandon the cause of that species of government as indefensible. >The science of politics, however, like most other sciences, has >received great improvement. The efficacy of various principles >is now well understood, which were either not known at all, or >imperfectly known to the ancients. The regular distribution of >power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative >balances and checks; the institution of courts composed of >judges holding their offices during good behavior; the >representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of >their own election: these are wholly new discoveries, or have >made their principal progress towards perfection in modern >times. They are means, and powerful means, by which the >excellences of republican government may be retained and its >imperfections lessened or avoided. To this catalogue of >circumstances that tend to the amelioration of popular systems >of civil government, I shall venture, however novel it may >appear to some, to add one more, on a principle which has been >made the foundation of an objection to the new Constitution; I >mean the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within which such systems are >to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of a single >State or to the consolidation of several smaller States into one >great Confederacy. The latter is that which immediately concerns >the object under consideration. It will, however, be of use to >examine the principle in its application to a single State, >which shall be attended to in another place. > >The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress faction and to >guard the internal tranquillity of States, as to increase their >external force and security, is in reality not a new idea. It >has been practiced upon in different countries and ages, and has >received the sanction of the most approved writers on the >subject of politics. The opponents of the plan proposed have, >with great assiduity, cited and circulated the observations of >Montesquieu on the necessity of a contracted territory for a >republican government. But they seem not to have been apprised >of the sentiments of that great man expressed in another part of >his work, nor to have adverted to the consequences of the >principle to which they subscribe with such ready acquiescence. > >When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the >standards he had in view were of dimensions far short of the >limits of almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia, >Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor >Georgia can by any means be compared with the models from which >he reasoned and to which the terms of his description apply. If >we therefore take his ideas on this point as the criterion of >truth, we shall be driven to the alternative either of taking >refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, or of splitting >ourselves into an infinity of little, jealous, clashing, >tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing >discord, and the miserable objects of universal pity or >contempt. Some of the writers who have come forward on the other >side of the question seem to have been aware of the dilemma; and >have even been bold enough to hint at the division of the larger >States as a desirable thing. Such an infatuated policy, such a >desperate expedient, might, by the multiplication of petty >offices, answer the views of men who possess not qualifications >to extend their influence beyond the narrow circles of personal >intrigue, but it could never promote the greatness or happiness >of the people of America. > >Referring the examination of the principle itself to another >place, as has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to >remark here that, in the sense of the author who has been most >emphatically quoted upon the occasion, it would only dictate a >reduction of the SIZE of the more considerable MEMBERS of the >Union, but would not militate against their being all >comprehended in one confederate government. And this is the true >question, in the discussion of which we are at present >interested. > >So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in >opposition to a general Union of the States, that he explicitly >treats of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC as the expedient for extending >the sphere of popular government, and reconciling the advantages >of monarchy with those of republicanism. > >"It is very probable," (says he1) "that mankind would have been >obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a >single person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution >that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together >with the external force of a monarchical government. I mean a >CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC. > >"This form of government is a convention by which several >smaller STATES agree to become members of a larger ONE, which >they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies >that constitute a new one, capable of increasing, by means of >new associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power as >to be able to provide for the security of the united body. > >"A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, >may support itself without any internal corruptions. The form of >this society prevents all manner of inconveniences. > >"If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme >authority, he could not be supposed to have an equal authority >and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to have too >great influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to >subdue a part, that which would still remain free might oppose >him with forces independent of those which he had usurped and >overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation. > >"Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate >states the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into >one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The >state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the >confederacy may be dissolved, and the confederates preserve >their sovereignty. > >"As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys >the internal happiness of each; and with respect to its external >situation, it is possessed, by means of the association, of all >the advantages of large monarchies." > >I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting >passages, because they contain a luminous abridgment of the >principal arguments in favor of the Union, and must effectually >remove the false impressions which a misapplication of other >parts of the work was calculated to make. They have, at the same >time, an intimate connection with the more immediate design of >this paper; which is, to illustrate the tendency of the Union to >repress domestic faction and insurrection. > >A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised >between a CONFEDERACY and a CONSOLIDATION of the States. The >essential characteristic of the first is said to be, the >restriction of its authority to the members in their collective >capacities, without reaching to the individuals of whom they are >composed. It is contended that the national council ought to >have no concern with any object of internal administration. An >exact equality of suffrage between the members has also been >insisted upon as a leading feature of a confederate government. >These positions are, in the main, arbitrary; they are supported >neither by principle nor precedent. It has indeed happened, that >governments of this kind have generally operated in the manner >which the distinction taken notice of, supposes to be inherent >in their nature; but there have been in most of them extensive >exceptions to the practice, which serve to prove, as far as >example will go, that there is no absolute rule on the subject. >And it will be clearly shown in the course of this investigation >that as far as the principle contended for has prevailed, it has >been the cause of incurable disorder and imbecility in the >government. > >The definition of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC seems simply to be "an >assemblage of societies," or an association of two or more >states into one state. The extent, modifications, and objects of >the federal authority are mere matters of discretion. So long as >the separate organization of the members be not abolished; so >long as it exists, by a constitutional necessity, for local >purposes; though it should be in perfect subordination to the >general authority of the union, it would still be, in fact and >in theory, an association of states, or a confederacy. The >proposed Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the >State governments, makes them constituent parts of the national >sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the >Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and >very important portions of sovereign power. This fully >corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the >idea of a federal government. > >In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three >CITIES or republics, the largest were entitled to THREE votes in >the COMMON COUNCIL, those of the middle class to TWO, and the >smallest to ONE. The COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all >the judges and magistrates of the respective CITIES. This was >certainly the most, delicate species of interference in their >internal administration; for if there be any thing that seems >exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it is the >appointment of their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking of >this association, says: "Were I to give a model of an excellent >Confederate Republic, it would be that of Lycia." Thus we >perceive that the distinctions insisted upon were not within the >contemplation of this enlightened civilian; and we shall be led >to conclude, that they are the novel refinements of an erroneous >theory. > >PUBLIUS. > >1 "Spirit of Lawa," vol. i., book ix., chap. i. > > >=============================================================== >Heaven's Messenger (777) >In the name and by the Will of Almighty God, Jesus Christ his Son, and in >the Holy Spirit ======================================================================== Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S. : Counselor at Law, federal witness email: [address in tool bar] : Eudora Pro 3.0.1 on Intel 586 CPU web site: http://www.supremelaw.com : library & law school registration ship to: c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776 : this is free speech, at its best Tucson, Arizona state : state zone, not the federal zone Postal Zone 85719/tdc : USPS delays first class w/o this ========================================================================
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