Time: Sun Mar 09 14:00:14 1997
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Date: Sun, 09 Mar 1997 13:36:05 -0800
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From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar]
Subject: SLS: Constitutional School - Federalist Papers #9 (fwd)

<snip>
>FEDERALIST No. 9
>
>The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
>For the Independent Journal.
>
>HAMILTON
>
>To the People of the State of New York:
>
>A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and
>liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and
>insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of the petty
>republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of
>horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were
>continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions
>by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration
>between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If they exhibit
>occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived contrast to
>the furious storms that are to succeed. If now and then
>intervals of felicity open to view, we behold them with a
>mixture of regret, arising from the reflection that the pleasing
>scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous
>waves of sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of glory
>break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a
>transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at the same time
>admonish us to lament that the vices of government should
>pervert the direction and tarnish the lustre of those bright
>talents and exalted endowments for which the favored soils that
>produced them have been so justly celebrated.
>
>>From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics
>the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only
>against the forms of republican government, but against the very
>principles of civil liberty. They have decried all free
>government as inconsistent with the order of society, and have
>indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its friends and
>partisans. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the
>basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in a few
>glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms. And, I trust,
>America will be the broad and solid foundation of other
>edifices, not less magnificent, which will be equally permanent
>monuments of their errors.
>
>But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched
>of republican government were too just copies of the originals
>from which they were taken. If it had been found impracticable
>to have devised models of a more perfect structure, the
>enlightened friends to liberty would have been obliged to
>abandon the cause of that species of government as indefensible.
>The science of politics, however, like most other sciences, has
>received great improvement.  The efficacy of various principles
>is now well understood, which were either not known at all, or
>imperfectly known to the ancients.  The regular distribution of
>power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative
>balances and checks; the institution of courts composed of
>judges holding their offices during good behavior; the
>representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of
>their own election: these are wholly new discoveries, or have
>made their principal progress towards perfection in modern
>times. They are means, and powerful means, by which the
>excellences of republican government may be retained and its
>imperfections lessened or avoided. To this catalogue of
>circumstances that tend to the amelioration of popular systems
>of civil government, I shall venture, however novel it may
>appear to some, to add one more, on a principle which has been
>made the foundation of an objection to the new Constitution; I
>mean the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within which such systems are
>to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of a single
>State or to the consolidation of several smaller States into one
>great Confederacy. The latter is that which immediately concerns
>the object under consideration. It will, however, be of use to
>examine the principle in its application to a single State,
>which shall be attended to in another place.
>
>The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress faction and to
>guard the internal tranquillity of States, as to increase their
>external force and security, is in reality not a new idea. It
>has been practiced upon in different countries and ages, and has
>received the sanction of the most approved writers on the
>subject of politics. The opponents of the plan proposed have,
>with great assiduity, cited and circulated the observations of
>Montesquieu on the necessity of a contracted territory for a
>republican government.  But they seem not to have been apprised
>of the sentiments of that great man expressed in another part of
>his work, nor to have adverted to the consequences of the
>principle to which they subscribe with such ready acquiescence.
>
>When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the
>standards he had in view were of dimensions far short of the
>limits of almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia,
>Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor
>Georgia can by any means be compared with the models from which
>he reasoned and to which the terms of his description apply. If
>we therefore take his ideas on this point as the criterion of
>truth, we shall be driven to the alternative either of taking
>refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, or of splitting
>ourselves into an infinity of little, jealous, clashing,
>tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing
>discord, and the miserable objects of universal pity or
>contempt. Some of the writers who have come forward on the other
>side of the question seem to have been aware of the dilemma; and
>have even been bold enough to hint at the division of the larger
>States as a desirable thing. Such an infatuated policy, such a
>desperate expedient, might, by the multiplication of petty
>offices, answer the views of men who possess not qualifications
>to extend their influence beyond the narrow circles of personal
>intrigue, but it could never promote the greatness or happiness
>of the people of America.
>
>Referring the examination of the principle itself to another
>place, as has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to
>remark here that, in the sense of the author who has been most
>emphatically quoted upon the occasion, it would only dictate a
>reduction of the SIZE of the more considerable MEMBERS of the
>Union, but would not militate against their being all
>comprehended in one confederate government. And this is the true
>question, in the discussion of which we are at present
>interested.
>
>So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in
>opposition to a general Union of the States, that he explicitly
>treats of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC as the expedient for extending
>the sphere of popular government, and reconciling the advantages
>of monarchy with those of republicanism.
>
>"It is very probable," (says he1) "that mankind would have been
>obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a
>single person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution
>that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together
>with the external force of a monarchical government. I mean a
>CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC.
>
>"This form of government is a convention by which several
>smaller STATES agree to become members of a larger ONE, which
>they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies
>that constitute a new one, capable of increasing, by means of
>new associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power as
>to be able to provide for the security of the united body.
>
>"A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force,
>may support itself without any internal corruptions. The form of
>this society prevents all manner of inconveniences.
>
>"If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme
>authority, he could not be supposed to have an equal authority
>and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to have too
>great influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to
>subdue a part, that which would still remain free might oppose
>him with forces independent of those which he had usurped and
>overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation.
>
>"Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate
>states the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into
>one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The
>state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the
>confederacy may be dissolved, and the confederates preserve
>their sovereignty.
>
>"As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys
>the internal happiness of each; and with respect to its external
>situation, it is possessed, by means of the association, of all
>the advantages of large monarchies."
>
>I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting
>passages, because they contain a luminous abridgment of the
>principal arguments in favor of the Union, and must effectually
>remove the false impressions which a misapplication of other
>parts of the work was calculated to make. They have, at the same
>time, an intimate connection with the more immediate design of
>this paper; which is, to illustrate the tendency of the Union to
>repress domestic faction and insurrection.
>
>A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised
>between a CONFEDERACY and a CONSOLIDATION of the States. The
>essential characteristic of the first is said to be, the
>restriction of its authority to the members in their collective
>capacities, without reaching to the individuals of whom they are
>composed. It is contended that the national council ought to
>have no concern with any object of internal administration. An
>exact equality of suffrage between the members has also been
>insisted upon as a leading feature of a confederate government.
>These positions are, in the main, arbitrary; they are supported
>neither by principle nor precedent. It has indeed happened, that
>governments of this kind have generally operated in the manner
>which the distinction taken notice of, supposes to be inherent
>in their nature; but there have been in most of them extensive
>exceptions to the practice, which serve to prove, as far as
>example will go, that there is no absolute rule on the subject.
>And it will be clearly shown in the course of this investigation
>that as far as the principle contended for has prevailed, it has
>been the cause of incurable disorder and imbecility in the
>government.
>
>The definition of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC seems simply to be "an
>assemblage of societies," or an association of two or more
>states into one state. The extent, modifications, and objects of
>the federal authority are mere matters of discretion. So long as
>the separate organization of the members be not abolished; so
>long as it exists, by a constitutional necessity, for local
>purposes; though it should be in perfect subordination to the
>general authority of the union, it would still be, in fact and
>in theory, an association of states, or a confederacy. The
>proposed Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the
>State governments, makes them constituent parts of the national
>sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the
>Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and
>very important portions of sovereign power. This fully
>corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the
>idea of a federal government.
>
>In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three
>CITIES or republics, the largest were entitled to THREE votes in
>the COMMON COUNCIL, those of the middle class to TWO, and the
>smallest to ONE. The COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all
>the judges and magistrates of the respective CITIES. This was
>certainly the most, delicate species of interference in their
>internal administration; for if there be any thing that seems
>exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it is the
>appointment of their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking of
>this association, says: "Were I to give a model of an excellent
>Confederate Republic, it would be that of Lycia." Thus we
>perceive that the distinctions insisted upon were not within the
>contemplation of this enlightened civilian; and we shall be led
>to conclude, that they are the novel refinements of an erroneous
>theory.
>
>PUBLIUS.
>
>1 "Spirit of Lawa," vol. i., book ix., chap. i.
>
>
>===============================================================
>Heaven's Messenger (777)
>In the name and by the Will of Almighty God, Jesus Christ his Son, and in
>the Holy Spirit


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Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.    : Counselor at Law, federal witness
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