Time: Wed Mar 19 21:28:40 1997 by primenet.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id QAA09244; Wed, 19 Mar 1997 16:01:53 -0700 (MST) by usr02.primenet.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id QAA04539; Wed, 19 Mar 1997 16:01:24 -0700 (MST) Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 21:25:31 -0800 To: (Recipient list suppressed) From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar] Subject: SLS: Notice of Treaty Violations (on removal) [This text is formatted in Courier 11, non-proportional spacing.] William Michael Kemp, Sui Juris c/o General Delivery Gadsden, Alabama state [zip code exempt] In Propria Persona Under Protest, Necessity, and by Special Visitation all rights reserved [ D R A F T] SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA STATE STATE OF ALABAMA, ) Case No. ______________________ ) Circuit Case No. CC-95-1083-DWS Plaintiff, ) Appellate Case No. ____________ ) v. ) NOTICE OF TREATY VIOLATIONS: ) Tenth Amendment; Universal WILLIAM MICHAEL KEMP [sic], ) Declaration of Human Rights; ) International Covenant on Civil Defendant. ) and Political Rights; and ) Supremacy Clause: ________________________________) de novo COMES NOW William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris, Citizen of Alabama state and Defendant in the above entitled action (hereinafter "Defendant"), to provide formal Notice to all interested party(s), and to demand mandatory judicial by this honorable Court, pursuant to the Tenth Amendment in the Constitution for the United States of America, as lawfully amended (hereinafter "U.S. Constitution"), of United States (federal government) treaty violations in the instant case. Said treaty violations must be addressed by Alabama state, pursuant to the explicit Reservation of legal Rights which Congress specifically attached to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Said treaties are rendered supreme Law of this Land, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause in the U.S. Constitution. Notice of Treaty Violations: Page 1 of 9 Defendant asserts His fundamental Rights, both substantive and procedural, to Notice and Hearing in a federal court of competent jurisdiction to adjudicate the role of United States (federal government) officers, employees, and agents in providing financial and other assistance to the Etowah County Drug Task Force. Defendant herein alleges systematic violations of fundamental Rights by said Task Force, under color of unconstitutional federal practices and procedures. To this end, Defendant attempted to remove the instant case into the District Court of the United States ("DCUS"), in order to obtain appropriate relief specifically including, but not limited to, ORDERS compelling the production of documents properly requested under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") and enjoining the improper withholding of same. The federal court of original jurisdiction to issue said ORDERS is the DCUS. See 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B); American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511 (1828), 7 L.Ed 242; Balzac v. Porto Rico [sic], 42 S.Ct. 343, 258 U.S. 298 at 312, 66 L.Ed 627 (1921). Compare also 18 U.S.C. 1964(a) with 1964(c). Two international human rights treaties have been enacted by Congress, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause and the Tenth Amendment, specifically to guarantee the enforcement of fundamental human Rights on behalf of Defendant, who is a Citizen of Alabama state and not also a citizen of the United States ("federal citizen"). See Gardina v. Board of Registrars, 160 Ala. 155, 48 S. 788, 791 (1909). For purposes of the instant case, the most salient of these fundamental Rights is Defendant's Notice of Treaty Violations: Page 2 of 9 unalienable guarantee to due process of law in courts of competent jurisdiction. Said treaties are unique, in many ways, for having been enacted with explicit reservations of Rights by Congress. The most salient of these reserved Rights grants legal standing to localities to compel United States (federal government) obedience to said treaties, in the event that the United States (federal government) should fail to perform its legal and moral obligations under same. Given the express legislative intent of the reservation of legal standing for localities, there is no question but that Congress meant to embrace the several States of the Union in its definition of the term "locality." Alabama state is such a member of the Union of several States, united by and under the U.S. Constitution. Defendant sought to obtain judicial review of the historical role of the United States (federal government) in the provision of financial and other assistance to Etowah County, Alabama state, which is a political subdivision of Alabama state (a "locality"). Defendant's plan to obtain such review included, among other things, one or more FOIA requests to obtain the financial records of the Etowah County Drug Task Force, which is a local administrative agency responsible to receive and disperse financial and other assistance provided by the United States (federal government), under auspices of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"). The federal court of original jurisdiction to compel production of documents properly requested under FOIA is the District Court of the United States ("DCUS"), a court of Notice of Treaty Violations: Page 3 of 9 competent jurisdiction within the territorial boundaries of the several states of the Union, pursuant to Article III in the U.S. Constitution. However, when Defendant applied to said DCUS for a Warrant of Removal of the instant case, for the purposes discussed above, Defendant was denied a hearing by a federal judge who was competent and qualified to preside in said court. See 28 U.S.C. 1441 et seq. More to the point, Article III guarantees that the compensation of federal judges shall not be diminished during their term in office. See Article III, Section 1. The term "shall" as used therein has a mandatory meaning. Said provision has also been interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court to mean that the compensation of federal judges cannot be diminished by federal income taxes, notwithstanding the so-called 16th amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See also 28 U.S.C. 461(b). The basis for this guarantee was more fully explained by the Supreme Court in Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920): [T]he primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was ... to attract good and competent men to the bench and to promote that independence of action and judgment which is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations and pervading principles of the Constitution. In Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 (1925), the high Court explained which amount of compensation is protected against diminution: The words and history of the clause indicate that the purpose was to impose upon Congress the duty definitely to declare what sum shall be received by each judge out of the public funds and the times for payment. When this duty has been complied with the amount specified becomes the compensation which is protected against diminution during his continuance in office. However, Evans and Miles were not the last words that the Court was to express on the issue of taxation of judicial incomes. In Notice of Treaty Violations: Page 4 of 9 O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939), the Court repudiated both Evans and Miles and held that a non- discriminatory general income tax may be applied to federal judges without diminishing judicial compensation within the meaning of the compensation clause. ["The Constitutional Guaranty Against] [Diminution of Judicial Compensation,"] [UCLA Law Review, Vol. 24, pgs. 308-350] After reviewing O'Malley v. Woodrough supra, Defendant submits that the holding in that case is based on a faulty premise, namely, that there is only one (1) class of citizenship in America. O'Malley should be overturned: in light of the preponderance of cases which demonstrate two (2) classes of citizenship; in light of newly found evidence; and in light of the notable and demonstrable decline in the American judiciary since 1939, the year the Public Salary Tax Act was first enacted. The basis for the O'Malley decision is the high Court's mistaken belief that a federal judge can be taxed in his (her) capacity as a citizen, without violating Article III, Section 1, and without compromising the judge's competence and independence. However, there is nothing in O'Malley to indicate that the high Court adequately understood how two classes of citizenship bear on this question (taxing the pay of federal judges). Moreover, there is no law requiring federal judges to be either citizens of the United States, or Citizens of the several states. Therefore, the O'Malley decision is founded on a false premise, namely, that all federal judges are necessarily citizens of either class. The uncontroverted evidence establishing the failed ratification of the so-called Sixteenth Amendment casts this entire debate in an entirely new light. See People v. Boxer, California Supreme Court, Case Number S-030016, December 1992; Full Faith and Credit Clause. The fundamental guarantees against Notice of Treaty Violations: Page 5 of 9 direct taxation of all citizens without apportionment, and against diminution of the compensation of federal judges, remain as operative today as they were on the day the U.S. Constitution was first adopted. See 1:2:3, 1:9:4, and 3:1 in the U.S. Constitution, which have never been repealed. Repeals by implication are not favored. Defendant submits that the only logical basis on which these guarantees can now be avoided is the doctrine of territorial heterogeneity. Confer in The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue, Fourth Edition, available on the Internet via the Alta Vista search engine; see also U.S. v. Lopez, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995): Each of these [schools] now has an invisible federal zone [sic] extending 1,000 feet beyond the (often irregular) boundaries of the school property. [emphasis added] Here, the U.S. Supreme Court utilized the term "federal zone" as a common noun, without any citations or footnotes. The doctrine of territorial heterogeneity, as such, is summarized as follows in the Conclusions of The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue, to wit: In exercising its exclusive authority over the federal zone, Congress is not subject to the same constitutional limitations that exist inside the 50 States. For this reason, the areas that are inside and outside the federal zone are heterogeneous with respect to each other. This difference results in a principle of territorial heterogeneity: the areas within the federal zone are subject to one set of rules; the areas without (or outside) the federal zone are subject to a different set of rules. The Constitution rules outside the zone and inside the 50 States. The Congress rules inside the zone and outside the 50 States. The 50 States are, therefore, in one general class, because all constitutional restraints upon Congress are in force throughout the 50 States, without prejudice to any one State. The areas within the federal zone are in a Notice of Treaty Violations: Page 6 of 9 different general class, because these same constitutional restraints simply do not limit Congress inside that zone. [The Federal Zone, electronic Fifth Edition, Conclusions] In the pivotal case of Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), which is discussed at several places in the book The Federal Zone supra, the U.S. Supreme Court established a doctrine whereby the Constitution for the "United States", as such, does not extend beyond the limits of the states which are united by and under it. This doctrine of territorial heterogeneity is now commonly identified as the "Downes Doctrine." This doctrine has been reinforced by subsequent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, notably, the case of Hooven & Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), in which the high Court ruled that the guarantees of the U.S. Constitution extend to the federal zone only as Congress has made those guarantees applicable. The United States District Courts are currently established by Congress as territorial (federal zone) courts, with constitutional authority emanating from Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, to wit: The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needed Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; .... [U.S. Constitution, Art. 4, Sec. 3, Cl. 2] [emphasis added] Defendant submits, for the careful consideration of this honorable Court, an offer to prove that all Union states have unlawfully subordinated themselves to the municipal jurisdiction of the United States (federal government), so as to invoke the Downes Doctrine against Citizens of Alabama state who are not also citizens of the United States. Compare 31 CFR 51.2 and Notice of Treaty Violations: Page 7 of 9 52.2, and the Executive Order(s) removing said regulations from federal depository libraries. This has had the unconstitutional effect of rendering the corporate State of Alabama a municipal subdivision of the District of Columbia, permitting said corporate State completely to ignore the U.S. Constitution and all of the fundamental guarantees expressed therein, and to impose municipal codes upon Defendant in a manner which constitutes unlawful dominion over the Person and Property of the Defendant. It is evident now that the United States (federal government) cannot locate a single federal judge anywhere in the federal judiciary whose compensation is currently not being diminished by federal income taxes. In and of itself, this evidence is proof that the United States (federal government) cannot and will not provide Defendant with due process of law, because relief cannot be obtained from any court in America, state or federal, without a qualified and competent judge to issue said relief. At a class sponsored by the Law School of the University of Arizona in January of 1997, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, was heard to admit that all federal judges are currently paying federal income taxes on their judicial compensation, without exception. See the essay entitled "The Lawless Rehnquist" commemorating that historical event. Said essay is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein. Moreover, recent research has also proven that the federal judiciary has sabotaged the U.S. Constitution and corrupted laws Notice of Treaty Violations: Page 8 of 9 governing the conduct of the federal courts. This has been done in part by creating the false impression that the United States District Court ("USDC") has territorial and subject matter jurisdiction within the several states of the Union, particularly over criminal prosecutions, when it does not. The truth is that the USDC is designed to adjudicate matters that arise within the federal zone, and the District Court of the United States ("DCUS") is designed to adjudicate matters that arise within the state zone. This honorable Court will please take formal judicial notice of the fact that the USDC is named on the ORDER of United States District Judge James H. Hancock, allegedly remanding the instant case back to the Circuit Court for Etowah County. The same is true of the ORDER by Circuit Court Judge Donald W. Stewart, allegedly ordering the incarceration of Defendant. This is a fraud upon Defendant, and upon all American People, who enjoy the fundamental guarantee of due process of law. Sedition by syntax is not due process of law. See Title 28, United States Code, in toto; see also Act of June 25, 1948: "... [P]rovisions of this title [28 U.S.C.] ... with respect to the organization of the court, shall be construed as a continuation of existing law ..." [emphasis added]. [M O R E T O F O L L O W] Notice of Treaty Violations: Page 9 of 9 # # # ======================================================================== Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S. : Counselor at Law, federal witness email: [address in tool bar] : Eudora Pro 3.0.1 on Intel 586 CPU web site: http://www.supremelaw.com : library & law school registration ship to: c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776 : this is free speech, at its best Tucson, Arizona state : state zone, not the federal zone Postal Zone 85719/tdc : USPS delays first class w/o this ========================================================================
Return to Table of Contents for
Supreme Law School: E-mail