Time: Thu Mar 20 05:36:03 1997
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	Wed, 19 Mar 1997 21:49:37 -0700 (MST)
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Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 05:30:23 -0800
To: David Quackenbush <davidq@SoCA.com>
From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar]
Subject: SLS: Alan Keyes on Consent of the Governed (fwd)

I think Thomas Jefferson already solved this
question, in the Declaration of Independence.
I convert it to the vernacular, simply by
changing to the first Person, as follows:


"We hold these truths to be self-evident:
that all of Us are created equal, and that
We are all endowed by Our Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, and that among these
are the Rights to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness;

"And that to secure these Rights, governments
are instituted among Us, deriving their just
powers from Our consent;

"And that whenever ANY form of government
becomes destructive of these ends, it is Our
Right to alter or abolish it, and to institute
a new government, laying its foundation on such
principles, and organizing its powers in such
form, as to Us shall seem most likely to effect
Our safety and Our happiness."

We, Us, Our ... they improve on the magnificent.


/s/ Paul Mitchell





At 02:23 PM 3/19/97 -0500, you wrote:
>Alan Keyes at Thomas Aquinas College, February 22, 1997.
>
>For a complete transcript of this remarkable evening, e-mail
>davidq@SoCA.com
>
>******
>
>No.  In the ultimate sense, the consent of the governed or a majority =
>of
>the governed to an unjust act does not make that act just.  That is =
>what
>is meant, I believe, by the existence of a transcendent principle of
>justice.  It does not depend, either, upon the will of the majority. 
>Always keeping in mind that the principle that all government, in =
>order
>to be legitimate, must be based upon consent, is not the same as =
>saying
>that all government based upon consent is legitimate.  That's not the
>same thing.  Isn't that a simple rule of logic?  I think it is:  a
>simple rule of logic.  
>
>So I think that we mustn't confuse these two things.  In order to be
>legitimate, government must be based upon consent.  But a government
>based upon consent is not necessarily legitimate, in all of its =
>actions
>or even in its character.  
>
>******
>
>That's right.  All government derives its legitimate authority from =
>the
>consent of the governed.  That's right.  But as I say, that fact does
>not necessarily make any particular use of that authority, or instance
>of that use, lawful -- that it, consistent with the principles of
>justice.  So:  there was a government in the United States of America
>framed in such a way that, for those who participated in it, it was
>government based upon consent.  In that sense it was legitimate.  As a
>consequence of their bad habits, that government did various and
>assorted things that sanctioned the existence of an institution called
>"slavery."  That, then, was an unjust act, which was sanctioned by a
>government legitimate in its principle, but illegitimate in its =
>action. 
>But what you are saying in constituting the principle of legitimacy
>predicated upon consent is not that individuals will never consent to
>injustice.  You're not saying that.  And I don't think that it
>necessarily follows, either.  So that's why you can have small-r
>republican governments that nonetheless do bad things.  
>
>I would ask a question, though.  And that is this.  At the point at
>which a person performs a bad act, does that bad act make them a bad
>person?  Isn't that a question we can legitimately ask?  Not every bad
>act makes a bad person.  Right?  Sometimes good people do bad things. 
>Or at least, people whom overall we would judge to be of good =
>character
>perform actions which are not consistent with that character. 
>Similarly, governments that are structured in such a way as to respect
>the legitimate principle of government may produce specific acts or
>decisions which do not respect that principle.  
>
>That, as Lincoln would point out, puts you in contradiction with
>yourself.  It does.  There's no doubt about that.  That's why it =
>becomes
>a very good argument for ending the injustice.  Because you are =
>saying: 
>'OK, over here I claim my freedom by virtue of the belief that all men
>are created equal, and endowed by their Creator with unalienable =
>rights;
>and I then use that freedom to establish a system of slavery which
>denies that principle.'  So, I'm definitely having a hard time keeping
>my principles straight.  But that doesn't mean that the basic =
>structure
>which is constituted so as to respect the principle isn't, in its =
>form,
>a just one.  It simply means that in our application of that -- our
>'use', if you like, of the freedom that it gives rise to -- we act in
>such a way as to contradict, and therefore implicitly to destroy, the
>principle from which we derive our rights under that government.  
>
>That's an argument I always make with respect to this whole abortion
>thing; I think that's where we are right now as a people.  We're in =
>the
>business of asserting as a right something that destroys our claim to
>rights in principle.  Now, you might argue that that act, in effect,
>devours the legitimacy of the regime.  And I believe that it certainly
>does, potentially.  Why is it that I would contend that it doesn't
>necessarily actually destroy all legitimacy in the regime?  For the =
>same
>reason that I won't declare that a person who performs a bad act has a
>bad character.  
>
>That's, kind of, something that you have to wait and see, isn't it?  =
>You
>wait and see whether you can reform the person, and avoid the act, or
>turn them from the act, on the basis of an appeal to their =
>conscience: 
>that is to say, their belief in the principle.  If that appeal to
>conscience consistently fails, then you conclude that this is a bad
>character; at which point you shun or abandon the character, I =
>presume,
>in order to avoid the occasion of sin.  In which case, also, I think,
>your moral obligation will be to shun or abandon that particular
>instance of government.  We may reach that stage, in America.  
>
>But I was actually making this point in the course of a conversation
>before I gave my talk, and this point, or a point like it, was raised,
>in terms of the legitimacy of the regime.  And the question I'd ask, =
>at
>a practical level, is this:  let us say that you have a -- because =
>it's
>easier to understand in this context -- you have a monarch, right?, in
>which there is an individual who is sovereign, and this individual has
>ministers who have, delegated from the sovereign, the power to make
>laws, or expound them.  Right?  And let us say that one of these
>ministers, who has power over the whole country, makes a law or =
>expounds
>something in such a way that a great injustice is perpetrated.  Well,
>that is, by virtue of its injustice, an unlawful act which would
>constitute, if it characterizes the sovereign will and judgment, a
>defect in the regime.  Right?  
>
>But first, before you concluded that, wouldn't you want to go talk to
>the king?  You sure would!  You would want to go:  'Hey, excuse me, =
>Your
>Majesty, but this guy over here, claiming to work for you, sent me a
>letter the other day' . . . .No:  'This guy over here, claiming to =
>work
>for you, has passed this ordinance, or has this law.  It violates all
>the basic principles of justice.  Do you agree with this?'  At that
>point, you are testing the integrity of the regime -- if all power
>inheres in the sovereign, right?, as a result of the structure of the
>regime.  If the sovereign assents to the injustice, you must then
>resist.  Right?  That would be the point at which, I imagine, you=EDd
>decide to rebel and overthrow that sovereign, in some form.  
>
>If, on the other hand, the sovereign says 'AAHH!!  I didn't understand
>what this guy is doing!  My conscience is offended by this.  We=EDre =
>going
>to change that.':  Then you have ascertained that the sovereign is not
>corrupt, right?, and that the regime is not, in fact, illegitimate.
>
>I would ask you:  in this country, where does the sovereign power
>inhere?  Does it inhere in the Supreme Court, ultimately?  So if the
>Supreme Court makes a decision like Roe v. Wade, must we conclude =
>that,
>as a consequence of that bad act, the regime is defective in its
>character?  I don't think so, because we still have an appeal to =
>make. 
>And that is an appeal to the true sovereign.  And the true sovereign, =
>in
>the United States, ultimately, is the will and judgment of the =
>people. 
>And we can still make that appeal.  
>
>Now, It happens that making that appeal to the sovereign, in our case,
>isn't a process of a few minutes.  It can be a process of a few years;
>in the case of slavery, it was the process of a few decades.  =
>Depending
>on how much patience you have with the sovereign, you will be willing =
>to
>put up with this process for a long while -- depending on how =
>egregious
>is the injustice, you will be willing to put up with the sovereign =
>for a
>long while.  Depending on how deadly, evil and inconvenient will be =
>the
>consequence of the conflict which results from overthrowing that
>sovereign, you will put up with the process of trying both to consult
>with and influence the sovereign for a while, maybe for a long while. =
> 
>
>I believe right now, on the issue of abortion, for instance, that's
>where we are in America.  That the instrument of government has =
>resulted
>in its operation in an injustice.  We are engaged -- and have been
>engaged over the course of years -- in an appeal to the conscience of
>the sovereign.  We engage in that battle; it moves to and fro.  I =
>would
>argue we have made some significant progress in the twenty-odd years =
>and
>more that we have been engaged in this struggle.  Twenty-five years.  
>
>And it continues.  Depending on your perspective, that period of =
>decades
>is either a long time, or a drop in the historic bucket.  I sort of =
>tend
>to the middle view:  it=EDs getting to be rather a long time, but not
>nearly as long as maybe it'll get to be, if we have sense.  We will
>continue in that work until we have, by one means or another, come
>absolutely to the conclusion that the sovereign is corrupt beyond =
>hope. 
>At which point, I think -- though it will be inconvenient and =
>difficult
>and dangerous, and fatal to the republic -- we will confront, on the
>part of people of conscience, a decision to withdraw.  
>
>But we know what that means, don't we?  And it won't only be over
>abortion, by the way; it will be over the whole principle that =
>abortion
>represents, which is the rejection of the notion that there is a
>transcendent basis for right which protects the dignity of the
>individual:  a transcendent basis for justice, which determines the
>limits of freedom, and which implies both moral discipline and respect
>for the integrity of certain institutions, including the family.  We
>live in an age when, more and more, it becomes possible that this =
>regime
>results in the utter disregard for justice, for principle, and for the
>integrity of those institutions.  
>
>But we are still in the midst of the struggle to determine whether =
>that
>disregard is transient or permanent.  And I don't believe that we can
>fairly conclude, right now, that we know which it is.  Until we can
>reach a conclusion, I don=EDt believe we're justified in even =
>entertaining
>the kinds of things that would lead this country into a rather nasty =
>and
>extended period of civil war.  
>
>I hope people realize that that's what we're talking about here.  We
>live in (indistinct word: 'wheat-piping'?) times of peace; we are used
>to believing that this country shall never be the scene of such
>conflict.  I promise you that it will be, if we do not succeed in
>dealing with these things.  We are not immune, any more than any other
>nation in the history of the world has been immune, from such
>conflicts.  
>
>But I don=EDt think we're at the stage, now, where we need entertain =
>those
>ideas which would lead to conflict, because I think that there are =
>still
>before us VAST opportunities for influencing the conscience, shaping =
>the
>conscience, educating the conscience of the sovereign.  Why?  Well,
>because in some sense the sovereign in this country is not like the
>sovereign when it inheres in a single individual body.  It=EDs like a
>river.  The water may be dirty right now, but if we work hard, we can
>clean it up.  And we've managed to do that with some of our rivers.  =
>You
>deal with the sources of pollution and, little by little, things get
>better.  I think we can do the same thing with our moral pollution.  =
>And
>we are morally obligated to try.  
>
>********
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