Time: Thu Mar 27 06:17:06 1997
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Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 06:15:17 -0800
To: tjeffoc@sirius.com
From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar]
Subject: SLS: Comparison of Drug & Alcohol Prohibitions
Unless I am mistaken, I believe that
Barbara Tuchman also wrote "A Distant Mirror,"
an historical novel about the black plague,
and its contemporary parallels.
/s/ Paul Mitchell
At 02:57 PM 3/25/97 -0500, you wrote:
>The lists seem to be getting a litttle stale of late. The following is
>offered in hopes of provoking some discussion:
>
>
>In 1984 the late historian, Barbara Tuchmman advanced the thesis that
>otherwise competent governments occasionally adopt policies at odds with
>their national best interests. Nevertheless, for one or another reason, the
>particular policy continues to be endorsed through successive changes in
>government; eventually assuming the dimensions of a national folly. Her
>book, "March of Folly," listed three criteria for recognition of the
>phenomenon and analyzed US policy toward Viet Nam between 1945 and 1975 as
>a contemporary example. Many Americans would also conclude that drug
>prohibition, initiated by passage of the Harrison Act in December, 1914 and
>still in force as our national policy over eight decades later would easily
>meet Tuchman's criteria and thus qualify as a representative folly:
>1.) The adverse effects of the policy could have been anticipated, and
>indeed were pointed out and warned against by some observers out at the
>time of its adoption.
>2.) The continuing adverse effects of the policy were either unrecognized
>or not admitted to by responsible officials during the time it was in
>effect.
>3.) The policy continued to be supported through the successive political
>lifetimes of more than one change of government.(This eliminates from
>consideration the disastrous personal foibles of a dictator.)
>
>Historically, policy errors which have matured into folly may be ended by
>one of several mechanisms, depending on the focus of the policy and the
>source of the opposition. Foreign policy follies may end by loss of
>territory or influence through either diplomatic or military defeat.
>Domestic opposition to a strongly entrenched policy must come from the
>grass roots and runs the risk of civil war (as with slavery in the US). In
>our recent history, the Viet Nam war was ended by a combination of military
>resistance from the North Viet Namese sufficient to deny a US military
>victory short of unacceptable escalation in cost. Even so, a wide spread,
>persistent, and divisive anti-war movement at home was ultimately necessary
>to force the government to abandon its military adventure in Viet Nam, and
>modify, if not abandon its disastrous Indo-China policy.
>
> In the second decade of this century, the US Federal Government embarked
>on a complex prohibition experiment composed of two separate programs; one
>aimed at alcohol (Prohibition) the other at drugs ( Harrison Narcotic Act,
>eventually the current drug war). Although at least partially rooted in
>the same optimistic utopianism which characterized the emergent populism of
>the day, the practical expression of prohibition theory was bifurcated from
>the very outset into two programs; each initiated entirely separately and
>by quite different mechanisms. The two prohibitions also differed in the
>amount and intensity of public debate attendant on their adoption, and
>finally, they were subject to completely separate outcomes in terms of
>their ultimate fate as public policy. Alcohol Prohibition was ignominiously
>repudiated by the Repeal (23rd) Amendment after a brief 13 year trial. Drug
>prohibition not only survived, it has become an overarching component of
>our national policy, almost to the point of dogma. It has also been
>exported to the entire world via the UN Single Convention Treaty of New
>York (1961). It is safe to say that aside from resistance to Communism and
>the need to prosecute the Cold War, no item of federal policy has received
>such thorough and enduring support as drug prohibition.
>
>A logical question someone interested in prohibition as an instrument of
>public policy might well ask is why two substance prohibition projects with
>such similar aims would end up faring so differently following enactment. I
>believe there are several historical answers to this question and that
>those answers have great practical significance for us, now that some
>semblance of an organized opposition to present drug policy seems to be
>emerging.
>
>Comments invited. Why do *you* think Prohibition and the drug war have had
>such different outcomes as policy? Does history matter? If so, how should
>we be guided?
>
>Tom O'Connell
>
>
>
>
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Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S. : Counselor at Law, federal witness
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