Time: Fri May 16 02:40:33 1997 by primenet.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id VAA08627; Wed, 14 May 1997 21:51:49 -0700 (MST) by usr05.primenet.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id VAA12031; Wed, 14 May 1997 21:48:13 -0700 (MST) Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 02:39:31 -0700 To: (Recipient list suppressed) From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar] Subject: SLS: Knowledge of Pearl Harbor Attack (fwd) <snip> > >The sensational transcript of the German intercept of the Churchill call to >FDR on 11/26/41!! > > Did Churchill Reveal the Pending Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor to > Roosevelt Two Weeks Before the Attack? > >Did FDR know about the December 7 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in >advance? Case closed now. They discuss Pearl in detail as the target of the >Jap attack and FDR opines that the Sons of Nippon can't do much damage. >Churchill neglects to bring up Taranto and FDR states he will turn a deaf >ear to intell unless it is completely certain that all is known. The >conversation closes with FDR telling Churchill he will clear out of town >(which he did -- going to Warm Springs until a frantic Stimson and Hull >insisted he return). "What I don't know, can't hurt me," he says. >Unfortunately for 2,100 Americans, they didn't know either. > >This was all recorded, read and transcribed by Germany. Leaving open the >possiblity that the actual wire recording still exists somewhere! > >This material has sat in American archives since 1945! The source is >Gestapo Chief: The 1948 Interrogation of Henrich Muller published in 1995 >by R. J. Bender of San Jose, CA., a well-known militaria publisher. Muller >was the German intelligence officer in charge of anti-Soviet operations and >the material about the Soviet Union in the conversations was forwarded to >him. At the end of the war, the U.S. turned Muller to its own uses and his >files were lodged in the National Archives - evidently without being >sanitized. The transcript is located at: National Archives Roll T-175, >frames 129 et seq. I have transcibed the entire conversation and attached >it [below]. Transcript from pages 46-50. The bracketed portions represent >German inserts in the original text to better explain word meanings that >were thought to be too obscure for German readers. > >The original transcript shows Roosevelt as "A" and Churchill as "B". For >clarity, I have replaced their names for the letters. The Germans were >reading the radio-telephone transmissions of Roosevelt and Churchill from >September 7, 1941. I am told (since I haven't read the book yet, just these >xeroxed pages) that Muller was amazed that the two statesmen took no >greater care in their conversations than they did. But, of course, he was >unaware of the even greater blunder of "Enigma" on the German side. > >Hot stuff, eh? It reads like a piece of an America First Committee >nightmare. > >MKOT >--------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > THE GERMAN TRANSCRIPT > >November 26, 1941 13:15 hours (Berlin or Holland time?) > >Churchill: I am frightfully sorry to disturb you at this hour, Franklin, >but matters of a most vital import have transpired and I felt that I must >convey them to you immediately. > >Roosevelt: That's perfectly all right, Winston. I'm sure you wouldn't >trouble me at this hour for trivial concerns. > >Churchill: Let me preface my information with an explanation addressing the >reason I have not alluded to these facts earlier. In the first place, until >today, the information was not firm. On matters of such gravity, I do not >like to indulge in idle chatter. Now, I have in my hands, reports from our >agents in Japan as well as the most specific intelligence in the form of >the highest level Japanese naval coded messages [conversation broken] for >some time now. > >Roosevelt: I felt that this is what you were about. How serious is it? > >Churchill: It could not be worse. A powerful Japanese task force comprising >[composed of] six of their carriers, two battleships and a number of other >units to include [including] tankers and cruisers, has sailed yesterday >from a secret base in the northern Japanese islands. > >Roosevelt: We both knew this was coming. There are also reports in my hands >about a force of some size making up in China and obviously intended to go >[move] South. > >Churchill: Yes, we have all of that. [Interruption]... are far more >advanced than you in our reading of the Jap naval operations codes. But >even without that, their moves areevident. And they will indeed move South >but the force I spoke of is not headed South, Franklin, it is headed >East... > >Roosevelt: Surely you must be...will you repeat that please? > >Churchill: I said to the East. This force is sailing to the East...towards >you. > >Roosevelt: Perhaps they set an easterly course to fool any observers and >then plan to swing South to support the landings in the southern areas. I >have... > >Churchill: No, at this moment, their forces are moving across the northern >Pacific and I can assure you that their goal is the [conversation broken] >fleet in Hawaii. At Pearl Harbor. > >Roosevelt: This is monstrous. Can you tell me...indicate... the nature of >your intelligence? [conversation broken] reliable? Without compromising >your sources... > >Churchill: Yes, I will have to be careful. Our agents in Japan have been >reporting on the gradual [conversation broken] units. And these have >disappeared from Japanese home waters. We also have highly reliable sources >in the Japanese foreign service and even in the military... > >Roosevelt: How reliable? > >Churchill: One of the sources is the individual who supplied us the >material on the diplomatic codes that [conversation broken] and a naval >office [sic] whom our service has compromised. You must trust me, Franklin >and I can not be more specific. > >Roosevelt: I accept this. > >Churchill: We cannot compromise our codebreaking. You understand this. Only >myself and a few [conversation broken] not even Hopkins. It will go >straight to Moscow and I am not sure we want that. > >Roosevelt: I am still attempting to...the obvious implication is that the >Japs are going to do a Port Arthur on us at Pearl Harbor. Do you concur? > >Churchill: I do indeed. Unless they add an attack on the Panama Canal to >this vile business. I can hardly envision the canal as a primary goal, >especially with your fleet lying athwart their lines of communications with >Japan. No, if they do strike the canal, they will have to first neutralize >[destroy] your fleet [conversation broken]. > >Roosevelt: The worst form of treachery. We can prepare our defenses on the >islands and give the a warm welcome when they come. It certainly would put >some iron up Congress' ass [asshole]. > >Churchill: On the other hand, if they did launch a bombing raid, given that >the aircraft would only be of the carrier-borne types, how much actual >damage could they inflict? And on what targets? > >Roosevelt: I think torpedoes would be ruled out at the outset. Pearl is far >too shallow to permit a successful torpedo attack. Probably they would drop >medium bombs on the ships and then shoot[conversation broken] damage a >number of ships and no doubt the Japs would attach our airfields. I could >see some damage there but I don't think either an airfield or a battleship >could sink very far. What do your people give you as the actual date of the >attack? > >Churchill: The actual date given is the eighth of December. That's a >Monday. > >Roosevelt: The fleet is in harbor over the weekend. They often sortie >during the week... > >Churchill: The Japs are asking [conversation broken] exact dispositions of >your ships on a regular basis. > >Roosevelt: But Monday seems odd. Are you certain? > >Churchill: It is in the calendar. Monday is the eighth. [conversation >broken] > >Roosevelt: ...then I will have to consider the entire problem. A Japanese >attack on us, which would result in war between us...and certainly you as >well...would certainly fulfill two of the most important requirements of >our policy. Harry has told me repeatedly...and I have more faith in him >that I do in the Soviet ambassador...that Stalin is desperate at this >point. The Nazis are at the gates of Moscow, his armies are melting >away...the government has evacuated and although Harry and Marshall feel >that Stalin can hang on and eventually defeat Hitler, there is no saying >what could transpire [happen] if the Japs suddenly fell on Stalin's rear. >In spite of all the agreements between them and the Japs dropping Matsuoka, >there is still strong anti-Russian sentiment in High Japanese military >circles. I think we have to decide what is more important...keeping Russia >in the war to bleed the Nazis dry to their own eventual destruction >[conversation broken] supply Stalin with weapons but do not forget, in fact >he is your ally, not mine. There are strong isolationist feelings here and >there are quite a number of anti-communists... > >Churchill: Fascists... > >Roosevelt: Certainly, but they would do all they could to block any attempt >on my part to more than give some monetary assistance to Stalin. > >Churchill: But we too have our major desperations, Franklin. Our shipping >upon which our nation depends, is being sunk by the huns faster than we >could ever replace [conversation broken] the Japs attack both of us in the >Pacific? We could lose Malaya which is our primary source of rubber and >tin. And if the Japs get Java and the oil, they could press South to >Australia and I have told you repeatedly, we cannot hold [conversation >broken] them much but in truth I cannot deliver. We need every man and >every ship to fight Hitler in Europe...India too. If the Japs get into >Malaya, they can press on virtually unopposed into Burma and then India. >Need I tell you of the resultant destruction of our Empire? We cannot >survive on this small island, Franklin, [conversation broken] allow the >nips (knips?) to attack, you can get your war declaration through your >Congress after all. [Conversation broken] > >Roosevelt: ... not as capable as you are at translating their messages and >the army and navy are very jealous of each other. There is so much coming >in that everyone is confused. We have no agents in place in Japan and every >day dozens of messages are [conversation broken] that contradict each other >or not well translated. I have seen three translations of the same message >with three entirely different meanings [conversations broken] address your >concern about British holdings in the Pacific...if the Japanese do attack >both of us, eventually we will be able to crush them and regain all of the >lost territories. As for myself, I will be damned glad to be rid of the >Phillipines. [sic] > >Churchill: I see this as a gamble [conversation broken] what would your >decision be? We cannot procrastinate over this for too long. Eleven or >twelve days are all we have. Can we not agree in principle now? I should >mention that several advisors have counseled [advised] against informing >you of this and allowing it to happen. You see by my notifying you where my >loyalty lies. Certainly to one who is heart and soul with us against >Hitler. > >Roosevelt: I do appreciate your loyalty, Winston. What on the other hand, >will happen here if one of our intelligence people is able to intercept, >decipher and deliver to me the same information you just gave me? I cannot >ignore it...all of my intelligence people will know about it then. I could >not ignore this. > >Churchill: But if it were just a vague message then? > >Roosevelt: No, a specific message. I could not just sweep it under the rug >like that [conversation broken] > >Churchill: Of course not. I think we should let matters develop as they >will. > >Roosevelt: I think that perhaps I can find a reason to absent [leave] >myself from Washington while this crisis develops. What I don't know can't >hurt me and I too can misunderstand messages, especially at a distance >[conversation broken] > >Churchill: Completely. My best to you all there. > >Roosevelt: Thank you for your call. > >National Archives Roll T-175, frames 129 et seq. > ======================================================================== Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S. : Counselor at Law, federal witness email: [address in tool bar] : Eudora Pro 3.0.1 on Intel 586 CPU web site: http://www.supremelaw.com : library & law school registration ship to: c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776 : this is free speech, at its best Tucson, Arizona state : state zone, not the federal zone Postal Zone 85719/tdc : USPS delays first class w/o this ========================================================================
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