Time: Wed May 28 17:19:51 1997 by primenet.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id OAA29373; Wed, 28 May 1997 14:47:27 -0700 (MST) by usr09.primenet.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id OAA09416; Wed, 28 May 1997 14:47:19 -0700 (MST) Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 17:06:45 -0700 To: (Recipient list suppressed) From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar] Subject: SLS: CLINTON v. JONES (fwd) <snip> Paul Mitchell comments: Paula Jones is a federal citizen, to have standing under 42 U.S.C. 1983. /s/ Paul Mitchell http://www.supremelaw.com > >--------------------------------------------------------------- > AN E-BULLETIN > LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE -- CORNELL LAW SCHOOL > lii@lii.law.cornell.edu >--------------------------------------------------------------- >The following decisions have just arrived via the LII's >direct Project HERMES feed from the Supreme Court. > >These are not the decisions themselves nor excerpts from them, >but summaries (syllabi) prepared by the Court's Reporter of >Decisions. Instructions for accessing the full text of any of >these decisions are provided at the end of this bulletin. > >=============================================================== >[snip] >=============================================================== >CLINTON v. JONES > >certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth >circuit > >No. 95-1853. Argued January 13, 1997 -- Decided May 27, 1997 > >=============================================================== >Respondent sued under 42 U.S.C. Sects. 1983 and 1985 and Arkansas >law to recover damages from petitioner, the current President of >the United States, alleging, inter alia, that while he was >Governor of Arkansas, petitioner made "abhorrent" sexual advances >to her, and that her rejection of those advances led to >punishment by her supervisors in the state job she held at the >time. Petitioner promptly advised the Federal District Court that >he would file a motion to dismiss on Presidential immunity >grounds, and requested that all other pleadings and motions be >deferred until the immunity issue was resolved. After the court >granted that request, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss >without prejudice and to toll any applicable statutes of >limitation during his Presidency. The District Judge denied >dismissal on immunity grounds and ruled that discovery could go >forward, but ordered any trial stayed until petitioner's >Presidency ended. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal >denial, but reversed the trial postponement as the "functional >equivalent" of a grant of temporary immunity to which petitioner >was not constitutionally entitled. The court explained that the >President, like other officials, is subject to the same laws that >apply to all citizens, that no case had been found in which an >official was granted immunity from suit for his unofficial acts, >and that the rationale for official immunity is inapposite where >only personal, private conduct by a President is at issue. The >court also rejected the argument that, unless immunity is >available, the threat of judicial interference with the Executive >Branch would violate separation of powers. > >Held: > >1. This Court need not address two important constitutional >issues not encompassed within the questions presented by the >certiorari petition: (1) whether a claim comparable to >petitioner's assertion of immunity might succeed in a state >tribunal, and (2) whether a court may compel the President's >attendance at any specific time or place. Pp. 7-9. > >2. Deferral of this litigation until petitioner's Presidency ends >is not constitutionally required. Pp. 7-28. > >(a) Petitioner's principal submission--that in all but the most >exceptional cases, the Constitution affords the President >temporary immunity from civil damages litigation arising out of >events that occurred before he took office--cannot be sustained >on the basis of precedent. The principal rationale for affording >Presidents immunity from damages actions based on their official >acts--i.e., to enable them to perform their designated functions >effectively without fear that a particular decision may give rise >to personal liability, see, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. >731, 749, 752, and n. 32--provides no support for an immunity for >unofficial conduct. Moreover, immunities for acts clearly within >official capacity are grounded in the nature of the function >performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it. >Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229. The Court is also >unpersuaded by petitioner's historical evidence, which sheds >little light on the question at issue, and is largely canceled by >conflicting evidence that is itself consistent with both the >doctrine of presidential immunity as set forth in Fitzgerald, and >rejection of the immunity claim in this case. Pp. 9-15. > >(b) The separation of powers doctrine does not require federal >courts to stay all private actions against the President until he >leaves office. Even accepting the unique importance of the >Presidency in the constitutional scheme, it does not follow that >that doctrine would be violated by allowing this action to >proceed. The doctrine provides a self executing safeguard against >the encroachment or aggrandizement of one of the three co equal >branches of Government at the expense of another. Buckley v. >Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122. But in this case there is no suggestion >that the Federal Judiciary is being asked to perform any function >that might in some way be described as "executive." Respondent is >merely asking the courts to exercise their core Article III >jurisdiction to decide cases and controversies, and, whatever the >outcome, there is no possibility that the decision here will >curtail the scope of the Executive Branch's official powers. The >Court rejects petitioner's contention that this case--as well as >the potential additional litigation that an affirmance of the >Eighth Circuit's judgment might spawn--may place unacceptable >burdens on the President that will hamper the performance of his >official duties. That assertion finds little support either in >history, as evidenced by the paucity of suits against sitting >Presidents for their private actions, or in therelatively narrow >compass of the issues raised in this particular case. Of greater >significance, it is settled that the Judiciary may severely >burden the Executive Branch by reviewing the legality of the >President's official conduct, see e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube >Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, and may direct appropriate process >to the President himself, see e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 >U.S. 683. It must follow that the federal courts have power to >determine the legality of the President's unofficial conduct. The >reasons for rejecting a categorical rule requiring federal courts >to stay private actions during the President's term apply as well >to a rule that would, in petitioner's words, require a stay "in >all but the most exceptional cases." Pp. 15-24. > >(c) Contrary to the Eighth Circuit's ruling, the District Court's >stay order was not the "functional equivalent" of an >unconstitutional grant of temporary immunity. Rather, the >District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an >incident to its power to control its own docket. See, e.g., >Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254. Moreover, the >potential burdens on the President posed by this litigation are >appropriate matters for that court to evaluate in its management >of the case, and the high respect owed the Presidency is a matter >that should inform the conduct of the entire proceeding. >Nevertheless, the District Court's stay decision was an abuse of >discretion because it took no account of the importance of >respondent's interest in bringing the case to trial, and because >it was premature in that there was nothing in the record to >enable a judge to assess whether postponement of trial after the >completion of discovery would be warranted. Pp. 25-27. > >(d) The Court is not persuaded of the seriousness of the alleged >risks that this decision will generate a large volume of >politically motivated harassing and frivolous litigation and that >national security concerns might prevent the President from >explaining a legitimate need for a continuance, and has >confidence in the ability of federal judges to deal with both >concerns. If Congress deems it appropriate to afford the >President stronger protection, it may respond with legislation. >Pp. 27-28. > >72 F.3d 1354, affirmed. > >Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which >Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, >and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed an opinion >concurring in the judgment. > >=============================================================== >[snip] >=============================================================== >These and all other recent Supreme Court decisions are >archived in full text at > http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/ > (in hypertext versions prepared by the LII and the > original word-processing files received from the Court) >--------------------------------------------------------------- >[end quote] ======================================================================== Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S. : Counselor at Law, federal witness email: [address in tool bar] : Eudora Pro 3.0.1 on Intel 586 CPU web site: http://www.supremelaw.com : library & law school registration ship to: c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776 : this is free speech, at its best Tucson, Arizona state : state zone, not the federal zone Postal Zone 85719/tdc : USPS delays first class w/o this ========================================================================
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