Time: Thu May 29 22:08:50 1997 by primenet.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id WAA09469; Thu, 29 May 1997 22:02:51 -0700 (MST) by usr02.primenet.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id WAA21791; Thu, 29 May 1997 22:02:36 -0700 (MST) Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 22:02:04 -0700 To: (Recipient list suppressed) From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar] Subject: SLS: Necessity for Delegated Authority >Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 00:42:51 -0400 >From: "Dr. Braces" <drbraces@smart1.net> >Organization: SouthFlorida Orthodontics >To: pmitch@primenet.com >Subject: (no subject) > >-- CASES DEALING WITH NECESSITY FOR DELEGATED AUTHORITY > Sources for additional authority: > C.J.S., Officers, § 190-199; > C.J.S., Public Admin. Law, § 49-58; > Am Jur2d, Public Officers, § 298-311; > Am Jur2d, Admin. Law, § 69-74, and 221-226. > Related: 65 ALR 811, and 107 ALR 1483 (delegations re taxes). > > Pierce v. United States (The Floyd Acceptances), 7 Wall. (74 >U.S.) 666 (1869): Bills of exchange upon which Secretary of War had >signed were at issue; the court held that the U.S. was not liable upon >these instruments, stating: > We have no officers in this government from the President down >to the most subordinate agent, who does not hold office under the law, >with prescribed duties and limited authority. And while some of these, >as the President, the Legislature and the Judiciary, exercise powers in >some sense left to the more general definitions necessarily incident to >fundamental law found in the Constitution, the larger portion of them >are the creation of statutory law, with duties and powers prescribed and >limited by that law, 7 Wall., at 677-678. > Our statute books are filled with Acts authorizing the making of >contracts with the government through its various officers and >departments but, in every instance, the person entering into such a >contract must look to the statute under which it is made, and see for >himself that his contract comes within the terms of the law, 7 Wall., at >680. > > United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 1 S.Ct. 240 (1882): >Arlington, Lee's estate, subject of litigation, the United States >claiming ownership via tax sale some years earlier. In holding for Lee's >heirs, the Court stated: > No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No >officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the >officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are >creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It is the only supreme >power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office >participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit >to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon >the exercise of the authority which it gives, 106 U.S., at 220. > Shall it be said... that the courts cannot give remedy when the >citizen has been deprived of his property by force, his estate seized >and converted to the use of the government without any lawful authority, >without any process of law, and without any compensation, because the >president has ordered it and his officers are in possession? If such be >the law of this country, it sanctions a tyranny which has no existence >in the monarchies of Europe, nor in any other government which has a >just claim to well-regulated liberty and the protection of personal >rights, 106 U.S., at 220, 221. > > United States v. Smith, 124 U.S. 525, 533, 8 S.Ct. 595 (1888): >appointment of collector by head of agency. Agent indicted for >embezzlement and issue was whether he was officer: > The constitution ... declares that 'the congress may by law vest >the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the >president alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.' >There must be, therefore, a law authorizing the head of a department to >appoint clerks of the collector before his approbation of their >appointment can be required. No such law is in existence. Our >conclusion, therefore, is that ... clerks of the collector .... are not >appointed by the head of any department within the meaning of the >constitutional provision. > > Utah Power and Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 37 >S.Ct. 387 (1917): Power company built structures upon federal lands and >claimed right through prior approval of government agents; held: > Of this it is enough to say that the United States is neither >bound nor estopped by acts of its officers or agents in entering into an >arrangement or agreement to do or cause to be done what the law does not >sanction or permit, 243 U.S., at 409. > > Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 49 S.Ct. >129 (1929): The mills and subordinate revenue agent entered into >informal compromise agreement regarding tax liability, the validity of >which was at issue here. That agreement was held invalid: > We think that Congress intended by the statute to prescribe the >exclusive method by which tax cases could be compromised, requiring >therefor the concurrence of the Commissioner and the Secretary, and >prescribing the formality with which, as a matter of public concern, it >should be attested in the files of the Commissioner's office; and did >not intend to intrust the final settlement of such matters to the >informal action of subordinate officials of the Bureau. When a statute >limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative >of any other mode, 278 U.S., at 288, 289. > It is plain that no compromise is authorized by this statute >which is not assented to by the Secretary of the Treasury... For this >reason, if for no other, the informal agreement made in this case did >not constitute a settlement which in itself was binding upon the >Government or the Mills, 278 U.S., at 289. >See also Brubaker v. United States, 342 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1965). > > United States v. Mott, 37 F.2d 860, 862 (10th Cir. 1930): Indian >leased land and got a million in royalties, which were held by Sec. >Agreement made to disburse funds held to be without authority: > Where an executive officer, under his misconstruction of the >law, has acted without or beyond the powers given him, the courts have >jurisdiction to restore the status quo ante insofar as that may be done >(cites omitted). >Affirmed, Mott v. United States, 283 U.S. 747, 51 S.Ct. 642 (1931). > >Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 51 S.Ct. 587 >(1931): Battle over advertising of obesity cure. > Official powers cannot be extended beyond the terms and >necessary implications of the grant. If broader powers be desirable, >they must be conferred by Congress. They cannot be merely assumed by >administrative officers; nor can they be created by the courts in the >proper exercise of their judicial functions, 283 U.S., at 649. > > State ex rel McConnell v. First State Bank, 22 Tenn. App. 577, >124 S.W.2d 726, 733 (1938): Bank insolvency case: > All persons dealing with public officers are bound to take >notice of the law prescribing their authority and powers. > > Continental Casualty Co. v. United States, 113 F.2d 284 (5th >Cir. 1940): > Public officers are merely the agents of the public, whose >powers and authority are defined and limited by law. Any act without the >scope of the authority so defined does not bind the principal, and all >persons dealing with such agents are charged with knowledge of the >extent of their authority, 113 F.2d, at 286. > > Department of Ins. of Indiana v. Church Members Relief Ass'n., >217 Ind. 58, 26 N.E.2d 51 (1940): > When the right to do a thing depends upon legislative authority, >and the Legislature has failed to authorize it, or has forbidden it, no >amount of acquiescence, or consent, or approval of the doing of it by a >ministerial officer, can create a right to do the thing which is >unauthorized or forbidden, 26 N.E.2d, at 52. > > United States v. Hawthorne, 31 F.Supp. 827, 829 (N.D. Tex. >1940): > A regulation dies with the statute from which it gains its life. > > Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289, 61 S.Ct. 995 >(1941): A bond was given for taxes, the collector released that bond, >but government sued on the bond. Held: > Power to release or otherwise dispose of the rights and property >of the United States is lodged in the Congress by the Constitution. Art. >IV, § 3, Cl. 2. Subordinate officers of the United States are >without that power, save only as it has been conferred upon them by Act >of Congress or is to be implied from other powers so granted. [cites >omitted]. Collectors of internal revenue are subordinate officers >charged with the ministerial duty of collecting taxes... There is no >statute in terms authorizing them to remit taxes, to pass upon the >claims for abatement of taxes or to release any obligation for their >payment. Only the Commissioner, with the consent of the Secretary of the >Treasury, is authorized to compromise a tax deficiency for a sum less >than the amount lawfully due... > There is thus no basis in the statutes of the United States for >implying an authority in a collector to release a bond for the payment >of the tax which the Commissioner alone is permitted to reduce by way of >compromise when the Secretary of the Treasury consents, 313 U.S., at >294, 295. > > Quaker Oats Co. v. Fed. Security Administrator, 129 F.2d 76, 80 >(7th Cir. 1942), reversed on other grounds at 318 U.S. 218, 63 S.Ct. 589 >(1943): > We assume there could be no dissent from the proposition that an >administrative agency has only such authority in the administration of a >Congressional enactment as is expressly conferred, or as may be >reasonably implied. > > Youngblood v. United States, 141 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1944): >Action to compel recorder to record tax liens. > [T]he authority of ministerial officers is to be strictly >construed as including only such powers as are expressly conferred, or >necessarily implied, 141 F.2d, at 913. >See also United States v. Watashe, 102 F.2d 428, 431 (10th Cir. 1939). > > Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 64 S.Ct. 559 (1944): Milk price >control act administered by Ag. Sec. was subject to challenge: > When Congress passes an Act empowering administrative agencies >to carry on governmental activities, the power of those agencies is >circumscribed by the authority granted.... The responsibility of >determining the limits of statutory grants of authority in such >instances is a judicial function entrusted to the courts, 321 U.S., at >309, 310. >See also Garvey v. Freeman, 397 F.2d 600, 605 (10th Cir. 1968). > > > Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 68 S.Ct. 1 >(1947): > Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone >entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of >having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the >Government stays within the bounds of his authority. The scope of this >authority may be explicitly defined by Congress or be limited by >delegated legislation, properly exercised through the rule-making power. >And this is so even though, as here, the agent himself may have been >unaware of the limitations upon his authority, 332 U.S., at 384. > > United States v. Jones, 176 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1949): U.S. >brought action to set aside sale of surplus WWII items, but Jones >prevailed in both the District Court and on appeal. The court held: > This means that a public officer, in exercising powers conferred >upon him by statute and regulation, is bound to follow the mode or >manner prescribed. One who deals with such official is on his notice of >possible limitations of authority. And no estoppel can arise against the >Government from the performance of unauthorized acts or from authority >exercised in a manner forbidden, 176 F.2d, at 281. > > Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, >69 S.Ct. 1457 (1949): suits agent govt agents: personal if without >authority. > > Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 >S.Ct. 863 (1952): Truman's takeover of the steel mills held >unconstitutional. > > Sittler v. Board of Control of Michigan College of Mining and >Technology, 333 Mich. 681, 53 N.W.2d 681 (1952): > 'The extent of the authority of the people's public agents is >measured by the statute from which they derive their authority, not by >their own acts and assumption of authority.' > 'Public officers have and can exercise only such powers as are >conferred on them by law...' > 'The powers of State officers being fixed by law, all persons >dealing with such officers are charged with knowledge of the extent of >their authority,' 53 N.W.2d, at 684. > > Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 75 S.Ct. 790 (1955): A doctor was >cleared twice of loyalty charges, but the Board on its own reconsidered >those charges and debarred him from federal service for such; in >reversing, the Court held: > Agencies, whether created by statute or Executive Order, must of >course be free to give reasonable scope to the terms conferring their >authority. But they are not free to ignore plain limitations on that >authority, 349 U.S., at 345. > > Phillips v. Fidalgo Island Packing Co., 238 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. >1956): > Here the jurisdiction of the old commission over the subject >matter had expired by abolition of the agency. The delegated power to >the Executive Director of the old commission expired when it went out of >existence. The rulings may be explained upon principles of agency as >well as upon grounds of lack of jurisdiction. If the new commission >desired to delegate power to the Executive Director, it could not act >before its creation and assumption of authority. His purported action in >the interim between the expiration of his delegation of power by the old >commission and the organization of the new commission was void, not >voidable, because no body had jurisdiction of the subject matter at the >time and he had no delegated authority to act in the premises. The fact >that the acts abolishing one body and creating another were passed >simultaneously is without significance, 238 F.2d, at 235. >But, see contra authority at Pentheny, Ltd. v. Gov't. of Virgin Islands, >360 F.2d 786, 790 (3rd Cir. 1966): repeal and re-enactment considered as >a substitution. > > Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gordon, 244 F.2d 818 (3rd >Cir. 1957): Defendant and endorser gave note to government as result of >loan, and upon suit, District Attorney extended terms, for which >endorser argued that he had been released. Court held act of DA void as >lacking authority: > It is well settled that no consideration of public policy can >properly induce a court to reject the statutory definition of the powers >of an officer, and that anyone dealing with such officer is required to >take notice of the extent of authority conferred by law upon him, 244 >F.2d, at 820, 821. > > Board of Comm. of Peace Officers Annuity and Benefit Fund v. >Clay, 214 Ga. 70, 102 S.E.2d 575 (1958): > The powers of all public officers are defined by law... Where >the law creates an office, one holding such office has no authority to >perform any act not legitimately within the scope of such authority, 102 >S.E.2d, at 577. > > Flavell v. Dept. of Welfare, City and County of Denver, 355 P.2d >941 (Colo. 1960): > It follows that a collateral attack may be made here for 'acts >or orders [of administrative officers or agencies] which do not come >clearly within the powers granted or which fall beyond the purview of >the statute granting the agency or body its powers [such orders] are not >merely erroneous, but are void'....'They [officers or agencies] are >without power to act contrary to the provisions of the law or the clear >legislative intendment, or to exceed the authority conferred on them by >statute, 355 P.2d, at 943. > > Ledgering v. State of Washington, 385 P.2d 522 (Wash. 1963): >Driver's license revocation case. > We do not believe, however, that when the legislature vested in >the director discretionary power to suspend... it, absent express >declaration, intended the power of executive decision in this area be >delegated by the director to assistants, or relegated to a simple >mechanical process. > Gathering, collating, and presenting such facts as may be >required by the director, together with making appropriate >recommendations, preparing, signing, and mailing notices and orders in >the name of the director are without doubt delegable duties. But, the >basic responsibility and authority of exercising the discretion and >power of decision...rests exclusively with the director, 385 P.2d, at >526. > > Independent School District #639, Vesta v. Independent School >District #893, Echo, 160 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1968): > To allow one to take official action simply by giving oral >approval to a letter which does not recite the action and which does not >go out under one's name is to extend permissible delegation beyond >reasonable bounds, 160 NW 2d, at 689. > > Country Gas Service, Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 147 (1st >Cir. 1969): Taxpayers entered into compromise with revenue agent to >settle tax liability in beneficial manner. In holding the agent's >agreement void, the court stated: > The narrow issue presented by this case is whether the revenue >agent had authority to make a binding agreement ... The exclusive >procedure for compromising tax liabilities is set forth in Int. Rev. >Code of 1954 § 7122. This section explicitly reposes such authority >in 'the Secretary or his delegate', and such delegation stops at the >district level. Since the exclusive means of compromise established by >§ 7122 was not utilized in this case, any arrangement taxpayer made >with agent McInnis had no legal standing, 405 F.2d, at 149, 150. >Court cited delegation orders in this case. >See also Brooks v. United States, 833 F.2d 1136, 1145 (4th Cir. 1987), >and excellent list of cases cited therein. > > California School Employees Ass'n. v. Personnel Comm. of >P.V.U.S.D., 89 Cal. Rptr. 620, 474 P.2d 436 (1970): > As a general rule, powers conferred upon public agencies and >officers which involve the exercise of judgment or discretion are in the >nature of public trusts and cannot be surrendered or delegated to >subordinates in the absence of statutory authorization [cites omitted]. >Under normal circumstances and absent statutory provisions to the >contrary the dismissal of employees involves the exercise of judgment or >discretion. > On the other hand, public agencies may delegate the performance >of ministerial tasks, including the investigation and determination of >facts preliminary to agency action [cites omitted]. Moreover, an >agency's subsequent approval or ratification of an act delegated to a >subordinate validates the act, which becomes the act of the agency >itself, 474 P.2d, at 439. > > Tulsa Exposition and Fair Corp. v. Board of County >Commissioners, 468 P.2d 501 (Ok. 1970): > Counties have only such authority as is granted by statute >[cites omitted]. The Board of County Commissioners in exercising >corporate powers is limited to those fields expressly assigned to such >subdivisions of the state by the legislature [cites omitted]. Public >officers possess only such authority as is conferred upon them by law >and such authority must be exercised in the manner provided by law, 468 >P.2d, at 508. >See also Brown v. State Election Board, 369 P.2d 140 (Ok. 1962). > > Baker v. Deschutes County, 498 P.2d 803 (Or.App. 1972): Contract >to sell county land held void: > It is fundamental law that government entities and their >officers must find sanction for their actions in the statute itself. >There is no apparent authority in a public officer whose duties are >prescribed by law as there would be in the case of an agent for a >private party [cites omitted]. > Persons contracting with a public officer acting under a public >law must, at their peril, ascertain the scope of the officer's authority >[cites omitted] and are chargeable with notice of the contents of the >enactment conferring that authority. A contract by a public officer in >excess of the provisions of the statute authorizing such contract is >void, so far as it departs from or exceeds the terms of the law under >which it was attempted to be negotiated, 498 P.2d, at 805. > > Soriano v. United States, 494 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1974): > [A]n administrative agency is a creature of statute, having only >those powers expressly granted to it by Congress or included by >necessary implication from the Congressional grant, 494 F.2d, at 683. > > Steele v. Gray, 64 Wis.2d 422, 219 N.W.2d 312 (1974): Question >regarding delegation of authority to revoke good time credits of >prisoners: > [A]n officer in whom discretionary power is vested cannot >delegate that power without statutory authority to do so, 219 N.W.2d, at >316. > > United States v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1976): Indians >convicted of trespass had convictions reversed due to lack of delegated >authority of Forest Service officials to close part of national forest: > Absent an explicit delegation from the Secretary, the boundaries >of the Forest Supervisors' authority should not be extended into areas >the regulations have clearly reserved for higher officials. > By immediately closing the entire area, the Supervisor went >beyond the limits of his authority and exercised a power that had not >been granted to him. The closure orders were invalid and the trespass >convictions cannot stand, 535 F.2d, at 1152. >Court referenced organizational structure and delegation orders >published in the CFR. > > Lopez-Telles v. I.N.S., 564 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1977): Deportee >alleged that administrative law judge could refuse to deport for >humanitarian reasons. In rejecting this argument, it was stated: > Immigration judges, or special inquiry officers, are creatures >of statute, receiving some of their powers and duties directly from >Congress... and some of them by subdelegation from the Attorney >General... These statutes and the regulations implementing them... >contain a detailed and elaborate description of the authority of >immigration judges. Nowhere is there any mention of the power of an >immigration judge to award the type of discretionary relief that was >sought here, 564 F.2d, at 1303. > > Churchill v. S.A.D. No. 49 Teachers Ass'n., 380 A.2d 186 (Me. >1977): > [P]ublic bodies or officers may exercise only that power which >is conferred upon them by law. The source of that authority must be >found in the enabling statute either expressly or by necessary inference >as an incidence essential to the full exercise of the powers >specifically granted, 380 A.2d, at 192. > > Champaign County, Illinois v. United States Law Enforcement >Assistance Administration, 611 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1979): > [A] delegation of authority survives the resignation of the >person who issued the delegation, 611 F.2d, at 1207. >See also Railroad Yardmasters of America v. Harris, 721 F.2d 1332, 1343 >(D.C. Cir. 1983): Delegations are not affected by change in personnel >but continue until revoked; cites several cases; United States v. Morton >Salt Co., 216 F.Supp. 250, 255-56 (D. Minn. 1962); and In re Subpoena of >Persico, 522 F.2d 41, 62 (2nd Cir. 1975). > > Hoppe v. King County, 95 Wash.2d 332, 622 P.2d 845 (1980): > Public officers have only those powers expressly granted or >necessarily implied by statute, 622 P.2d, at 848. > > Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1981): Retirement >benefits case. Court stated: > Persons dealing with the government are charged with knowing >government statutes and regulations, and they assume the risk that >government agents may exceed their authority and provide misinformation, >644 F.2d, at 1383. > > Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 650 F.2d 1093 >(9th Cir. 1981): Employment contract action involving charge of age >discrimination. Court held: > All persons in the United States are chargeable with knowledge >of the Statutes-at-Large....[I]t is well established that anyone who >deals with the government assumes the risk that the agent acting in the >government's behalf has exceeded the bounds of his authority, 650 F.2d, >at 1100. > > American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees v. >Olson, 338 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 1983): Union action to compel state to pay >wage increase via union agreement: > It is well settled that public officials have only such >authority as is expressly given them by the constitution and statutes >together with those powers and duties which are necessarily implied from >the express grant of authority, 338 N.W.2d, at 100. > > In re Benny, 29 B.R. 754, 762 (N.D. Cal. 1983): > [A]n unlawful or unauthorized exercise of power does not become >legitimated or authorized by reason of habitude. >See also Umpleby, by and through Umpleby v. State, 347 N.W.2d 156, 161 >(N.D. 1984). > > Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1523 (D.C. >Cir. 1984): > [W]hen an officer acts wholly outside the scope of the powers >granted to him by statute or constitutional provision, the official's >actions have been considered to be unauthorized. > > Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 610 F.Supp. 1234, 1242 (N.D. >Ill. 1985): > Acting without statutory power at all, or misapplying one's >statutory power, will result in a finding that such action was ultra >vires. >(On appeal: 773 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1985), and 107 S.Ct. 638. > > Boulez v. C.I.R., 810 F.2d 209 (D.C.Cir. 1987): Oral compromise >held invalid as contrary to regulations. Court relied upon delegation >orders. > United States v. Providence Journal Company, 485 U.S. 693, 108 >S.Ct. 1502 (1988): District judge appointed a private attorney to pursue >contempt charge against a party in judge's court. On appeal, contempt >vacated, and attorney pursued writ, which was granted. In vacating writ, >the Supremes held that only the Solicitor General had authority to apply >for writ on behalf of the United States, a power not possessed by the >attorney. United States v. Solomon, 563 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir. 1977): AG >has no right to sue without authority in statute. > > United States v. Plesinski, 912 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1990): State >Attorney General appointed special U.S. prosecutor. His authority was >upheld. >Cases concerning proposition that agencies must act within their >statutory authority: > (a) Regents of University System of Georgia v. Carroll, 338 U.S. >586, 597, 598, 70 S.Ct. 370 (1950): As an administrative body, the >Commission must find its powers within the compass of the authority >given it by Congress; > (b) F.T.C. v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 428, 77 S.Ct. 502 >(1957): the Commission may exercise only the powers granted it by the >Act; > (c) Civil Aeronautics Board v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. >316, 322, 81 S.Ct. 1611 (1961): the fact is that the Board is entirely a >creature of Congress and the determinative question is not what the >Board thinks it should do but what Congress has said it can do. > >Excellent summary of law and principles regarding delegations: >Shreveport Engraving Co. v. United States, 143 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1944), >and Krug v. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co., 245 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. >1957). > >Authority of public officials limited by statute: > > City of Los Angeles v. Industrial Accident Comm., 8 Cal. App. 2d >580, 47 P.2d 1096 (1935); > > Davis v. Pelley, 230 Ind. 248, 102 N.E.2d 910 (1952); > > Blue Boar Cafeteria Co. v. Hackett, 312 Ky. 288, 227 S.W.2d 199 >(1950); > > J.S. Bradley Co. v. Squire, 65 Ohio App. 186, 29 N.E.2d 430 >(1939); > > Probasco v. Sikes, 77 Wyo. 108, 307 P.2d 817, 821 (1957). > > Crosthwait v. State, 135 Tex. 119, 138 S.W.2d 1060, 1061 (1940). > > Thornton v. United States, 73-1 USTC 9232 (E.D.Pa. 1973): no >delegated authority to make jeopardy. > > The American public should know the functions and delegated >authority of federal agencies because it is charged with the knowledge >of the scope and limitations upon the authority of federal agents, who >can only act within the scope of such authority; see Federal Crop >Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384, 68 S. Ct. 1, 3 (1947); >Dade Park Jockey Club v. Commonwealth, 253 Ky. 314, 69 S.W.2d 363, 365 >(1934); Morris Plan Bank of Georgia v. Simmons, 201 Ga. 157, 39 S.E.2d >166, 175 (1946); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 70 F. Supp. >837, 860 (D.Minn. 1946); Sunshine Dairy v. Peterson, 183 Or. 305, 193 >P.2d 543, 552 (1948); United States v. Jones, 176 F.2d 278, 281 (9th >Cir. 1949); Patten v. State Personnel Board, 234 P.2d 987, 990 (Cal. >App. 1951); State ex rel Young v. Niblack, 99 N.E.2d 839, 841 (Ind. >1951); State v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 138 Conn. 334, 84 >A.2d 579, 581 (1951); Davis v. Pelley, 102 N.E.2d 910, 912 (Ind. 1952); >Lien v. Northwestern Engineering Co., 54 N.W.2d 472, 476 (S.D. 1952); >Sittler v. Board of Control of Michigan College, 333 Mich. 681, 53 >N.W.2d 681, 684 (1952); Bear River Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Placer >County, 258 P.2d 543, 546 (Cal. App. 1953); Rogers v. County Comm. of >New Haven County, 141 Conn. 426, 106 A.2d 757 (1954); Mason County Civic >Research Council v. County of Mason, 343 Mich. 313, 72 N.W.2d 292, 296 >(1955); Government of Virgin Islands v. Gordon, 244 F.2d 818, 821 (3rd >Cir. 1957); Joseph A. Cicci, Inc. v. Allanson, 187 N.Y.S.2d 911, 913 >(1959); Atlantic Co. v. Moseley, 215 Ga. 530, 111 S.E.2d 239, 242 >(1959); Flavell v. Dept. of Welfare, City and County of Denver, 355 P.2d >941, 943 (Colo. 1960); City of Calhoun v. Holland, 222 Ga. 817, 152 >S.W.2d 752, 754 (1966); Gray v. Johnson, 395 F.2d 533, 537 (10th Cir. >1968); Gammill v. Shackelford, 480 P.2d 920, 922 (Okl. 1970); Baker v. >Deschutes County, 498 P.2d 803, 805 (Or.App. 1972); City of Mercer >Island v. Steinmann, 9 Wash. App. 479, 513 P.2d 80, 83 (1973); United >States v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1976); Lopez-Telles v. >I.N.S., 564 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1977); Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank, >650 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 1981); Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F.2d 1378, 1383 >(9th Cir. 1981); Smith v. Sorensen, 748 F.2d 427, 432 (8th Cir. 1984); >and Watrel v. Commonwealth Dept. of Education, 488 A.2d 378, 381 (Pa. >Comwlth. 1985). And acts of federal agents without delegated authority >are void; see Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357, 62 S.Ct. 651 >(1942); United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 94 S.Ct. 1820 (1 > > >With Love, Liberty and Justice for All, >Alex >http://www.drbraces.com >e-mail: drbraces@drbraces.com > >"When the people fear their government you have tyranny. >When the government fears the People, you have liberty." > Thomas Jefferson > >Liberty is NEVER an option... only a condition to be lost! > > ======================================================================== Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S. : Counselor at Law, federal witness email: [address in tool bar] : Eudora Pro 3.0.2 on Intel 586 CPU web site: http://www.supremelaw.com : library & law school registration ship to: c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776 : this is free speech, at its best Tucson, Arizona state : state zone, not the federal zone Postal Zone 85719/tdc : USPS delays first class w/o this ========================================================================
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