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From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar]
Subject: SLS: Necessity for Delegated Authority

>Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 00:42:51 -0400
>From: "Dr. Braces" <drbraces@smart1.net>
>Organization: SouthFlorida Orthodontics
>To: pmitch@primenet.com
>Subject: (no subject)
>
>-- 	CASES DEALING WITH NECESSITY FOR DELEGATED AUTHORITY
>	Sources for additional authority:
>	C.J.S., Officers, § 190-199;
>	C.J.S., Public Admin. Law, § 49-58;
>	Am Jur2d, Public Officers, § 298-311;
>	Am Jur2d, Admin. Law, § 69-74, and 221-226.
>	Related: 65 ALR 811, and 107 ALR 1483 (delegations re taxes). 
>
>	Pierce v. United States (The Floyd Acceptances), 7 Wall. (74 
>U.S.) 666 (1869): Bills of exchange upon which Secretary of War had 
>signed were at issue; the court held that the U.S. was not liable upon 
>these instruments, stating:
>	We have no officers in this government from the President down 
>to the most subordinate agent, who does not hold office under the law, 
>with prescribed duties and limited authority. And while some of these, 
>as the President, the Legislature and the Judiciary, exercise powers in 
>some sense left to the more general definitions necessarily incident to 
>fundamental law found in the Constitution, the larger portion of them 
>are the creation of statutory law, with duties and powers prescribed and 
>limited by that law, 7 Wall., at 677-678.
>	Our statute books are filled with Acts authorizing the making of 
>contracts with the government through its various officers and 
>departments but, in every instance, the person entering into such a 
>contract must look to the statute under which it is made, and see for 
>himself that his contract comes within the terms of the law, 7 Wall., at 
>680.
>
>	United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 1 S.Ct. 240 (1882): 
>Arlington, Lee's estate, subject of litigation, the United States 
>claiming ownership via tax sale some years earlier. In holding for Lee's 
>heirs, the Court stated:
>	No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No 
>officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the 
>officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are 
>creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It is the only supreme 
>power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office 
>participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit 
>to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon 
>the exercise of the authority which it gives, 106 U.S., at 220.
>	Shall it be said... that the courts cannot give remedy when the 
>citizen has been deprived of his property by force, his estate seized 
>and converted to the use of the government without any lawful authority, 
>without any process of law, and without any compensation, because the 
>president has ordered it and his officers are in possession? If such be 
>the law of this country, it sanctions a tyranny which has no existence 
>in the monarchies of Europe, nor in any other government which has a 
>just claim to well-regulated liberty and the protection of personal 
>rights, 106 U.S., at 220, 221.  
>
>	United States v. Smith, 124 U.S. 525, 533, 8 S.Ct. 595 (1888): 
>appointment of collector by head of agency. Agent indicted for 
>embezzlement and issue was whether he was officer:
>	The constitution ... declares that 'the congress may by law vest 
>the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the 
>president alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.' 
>There must be, therefore, a law authorizing the head of a department to 
>appoint clerks of the collector before his approbation of their 
>appointment can be required. No such law is in existence. Our 
>conclusion, therefore, is that ... clerks of the collector .... are not 
>appointed by the head of any department within the meaning of the 
>constitutional provision.   
>
>	Utah Power and Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 37 
>S.Ct. 387 (1917): Power company built structures upon federal lands and 
>claimed right through prior approval of government agents; held: 
>	Of this it is enough to say that the United States is neither 
>bound nor estopped by acts of its officers or agents in entering into an 
>arrangement or agreement to do or cause to be done what the law does not 
>sanction or permit, 243 U.S., at 409.
>
>	Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 49 S.Ct. 
>129 (1929): The mills and subordinate revenue agent entered into 
>informal compromise agreement regarding tax liability, the validity of 
>which was at issue here. That agreement was held invalid:
>	We think that Congress intended by the statute to prescribe the 
>exclusive method by which tax cases could be compromised, requiring 
>therefor the concurrence of the Commissioner and the Secretary, and 
>prescribing the formality with which, as a matter of public concern, it 
>should be attested in the files of the Commissioner's office; and did 
>not intend to intrust the final settlement of such matters to the 
>informal action of subordinate officials of the Bureau. When a statute 
>limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative 
>of any other mode, 278 U.S., at 288, 289.
>	It is plain that no compromise is authorized by this statute 
>which is not assented to by the Secretary of the Treasury... For this 
>reason, if for no other, the informal agreement made in this case did 
>not constitute a settlement which in itself was binding upon the 
>Government or the Mills, 278 U.S., at 289.
>See also Brubaker v. United States, 342 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1965).
>
>	United States v. Mott, 37 F.2d 860, 862 (10th Cir. 1930): Indian 
>leased land and got a million in royalties, which were held by Sec. 
>Agreement made to disburse funds held to be without authority: 
>	Where an executive officer, under his misconstruction of the 
>law, has acted without or beyond the powers given him, the courts have 
>jurisdiction to restore the status quo ante insofar as that may be done 
>(cites omitted).
>Affirmed, Mott v. United States, 283 U.S. 747, 51 S.Ct. 642 (1931).
>
>Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 51 S.Ct. 587 
>(1931): Battle over advertising of obesity cure. 
>	Official powers cannot be extended beyond the terms and 
>necessary implications of the grant. If broader powers be desirable, 
>they must be conferred by Congress. They cannot be merely assumed by 
>administrative officers; nor can they be created by the courts in the 
>proper exercise of their judicial functions, 283 U.S., at 649. 
>
>	State ex rel McConnell v. First State Bank, 22 Tenn. App. 577, 
>124 S.W.2d 726, 733 (1938): Bank insolvency case:
>	All persons dealing with public officers are bound to take 
>notice of the law prescribing their authority and powers. 
>
>	Continental Casualty Co. v. United States, 113 F.2d 284 (5th 
>Cir. 1940):
>	Public officers are merely the agents of the public, whose 
>powers and authority are defined and limited by law. Any act without the 
>scope of the authority so defined does not bind the principal, and all 
>persons dealing with such agents are charged with knowledge of the 
>extent of their authority, 113 F.2d, at 286.
>
>	Department of Ins. of Indiana v. Church Members Relief Ass'n., 
>217 Ind. 58, 26 N.E.2d 51 (1940):
>	When the right to do a thing depends upon legislative authority, 
>and the Legislature has failed to authorize it, or has forbidden it, no 
>amount of acquiescence, or consent, or approval of the doing of it by a 
>ministerial officer, can create a right to do the thing which is 
>unauthorized or forbidden, 26 N.E.2d, at 52. 
>
>	United States v. Hawthorne, 31 F.Supp. 827, 829 (N.D. Tex. 
>1940):
>	A regulation dies with the statute from which it gains its life.
>
>	Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289, 61 S.Ct. 995 
>(1941): A bond was given for taxes, the collector released that bond, 
>but government sued on the bond. Held:
>	Power to release or otherwise dispose of the rights and property 
>of the United States is lodged in the Congress by the Constitution. Art. 
>IV, § 3, Cl. 2. Subordinate officers of the United States are 
>without that power, save only as it has been conferred upon them by Act 
>of Congress or is to be implied from other powers so granted. [cites 
>omitted]. Collectors of internal revenue are subordinate officers 
>charged with the ministerial duty of collecting taxes... There is no 
>statute in terms authorizing them to remit taxes, to pass upon the 
>claims for abatement of taxes or to release any obligation for their 
>payment. Only the Commissioner, with the consent of the Secretary of the 
>Treasury, is authorized to compromise a tax deficiency for a sum less 
>than the amount lawfully due...
>	There is thus no basis in the statutes of the United States for 
>implying an authority in a collector to release a bond for the payment 
>of the tax which the Commissioner alone is permitted to reduce by way of 
>compromise when the Secretary of the Treasury consents, 313 U.S., at 
>294, 295.  
>
>	Quaker Oats Co. v. Fed. Security Administrator, 129 F.2d 76, 80 
>(7th Cir. 1942), reversed on other grounds at 318 U.S. 218, 63 S.Ct. 589 
>(1943):
>	We assume there could be no dissent from the proposition that an 
>administrative agency has only such authority in the administration of a 
>Congressional enactment as is expressly conferred, or as may be 
>reasonably implied.
>
>	Youngblood v. United States, 141 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1944): 
>Action to compel recorder to record tax liens.
>	[T]he authority of ministerial officers is to be strictly 
>construed as including only such powers as are expressly conferred, or 
>necessarily implied, 141 F.2d, at 913.
>See also United States v. Watashe, 102 F.2d 428, 431 (10th Cir. 1939).
>
>	Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 64 S.Ct. 559 (1944): Milk price 
>control act administered by Ag. Sec. was subject to challenge: 
>	When Congress passes an Act empowering administrative agencies 
>to carry on governmental activities, the power of those agencies is 
>circumscribed by the authority granted.... The responsibility of 
>determining the limits of statutory grants of authority in such 
>instances is a judicial function entrusted to the courts, 321 U.S., at 
>309, 310.
>See also Garvey v. Freeman, 397 F.2d 600, 605 (10th Cir. 1968).
>
>
>	Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 68 S.Ct. 1 
>(1947):
>	Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone 
>entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of 
>having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the 
>Government stays within the bounds of his authority. The scope of this 
>authority may be explicitly defined by Congress or be limited by 
>delegated legislation, properly exercised through the rule-making power. 
>And this is so even though, as here, the agent himself may have been 
>unaware of the limitations upon his authority, 332 U.S., at 384.
>
>	United States v. Jones, 176 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1949): U.S. 
>brought action to set aside sale of surplus WWII items, but Jones 
>prevailed in both the District Court and on appeal. The court held:
>	This means that a public officer, in exercising powers conferred 
>upon him by statute and regulation, is bound to follow the mode or 
>manner prescribed. One who deals with such official is on his notice of 
>possible limitations of authority. And no estoppel can arise against the 
>Government from the performance of unauthorized acts or from authority 
>exercised in a manner forbidden, 176 F.2d, at 281.
>
>	Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 
>69 S.Ct. 1457 (1949): suits agent govt agents: personal if without 
>authority.
>
>	Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 
>S.Ct. 863 (1952): Truman's takeover of the steel mills held 
>unconstitutional.
>
>	Sittler v. Board of Control of Michigan College of Mining and 
>Technology, 333 Mich. 681, 53 N.W.2d 681 (1952):
>	 'The extent of the authority of the people's public agents is 
>measured by the statute from which they derive their authority, not by 
>their own acts and assumption of authority.'
>	 'Public officers have and can exercise only such powers as are 
>conferred on them by law...'
>	 'The powers of State officers being fixed by law, all persons 
>dealing with such officers are charged with knowledge of the extent of 
>their authority,'  53 N.W.2d, at 684.
>
>	Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 75 S.Ct. 790 (1955): A doctor was 
>cleared twice of loyalty charges, but the Board on its own reconsidered 
>those charges and debarred him from federal service for such; in 
>reversing, the Court held:
>	Agencies, whether created by statute or Executive Order, must of 
>course be free to give reasonable scope to the terms conferring their 
>authority. But they are not free to ignore plain limitations on that 
>authority, 349 U.S., at 345.
>
>	Phillips v. Fidalgo Island Packing Co., 238 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 
>1956):
>	Here the jurisdiction of the old commission over the subject 
>matter had expired by abolition of the agency. The delegated power to 
>the Executive Director of the old commission expired when it went out of 
>existence. The rulings may be explained upon principles of agency as 
>well as upon grounds of lack of jurisdiction. If the new commission 
>desired to delegate power to the Executive Director, it could not act 
>before its creation and assumption of authority. His purported action in 
>the interim between the expiration of his delegation of power by the old 
>commission and the organization of the new commission was void, not 
>voidable, because no body had jurisdiction of the subject matter at the 
>time and he had no delegated authority to act in the premises. The fact 
>that the acts abolishing one body and creating another were passed 
>simultaneously is without significance, 238 F.2d, at 235.
>But, see contra authority at Pentheny, Ltd. v. Gov't. of Virgin Islands, 
>360 F.2d 786, 790 (3rd Cir. 1966): repeal and re-enactment considered as 
>a substitution.  
>
>	Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gordon, 244 F.2d 818 (3rd 
>Cir. 1957): Defendant and endorser gave note to government as result of 
>loan, and upon suit, District Attorney extended terms, for which 
>endorser argued that he had been released. Court held act of DA void as 
>lacking authority:
>	It is well settled that no consideration of public policy can 
>properly induce a court to reject the statutory definition of the powers 
>of an officer, and that anyone dealing with such officer is required to 
>take notice of the extent of authority conferred by law upon him, 244 
>F.2d, at 820, 821.
>
>	Board of Comm. of Peace Officers Annuity and Benefit Fund v. 
>Clay, 214 Ga. 70, 102 S.E.2d 575 (1958):
>	The powers of all public officers are defined by law... Where 
>the law creates an office, one holding such office has no authority to 
>perform any act not legitimately within the scope of such authority, 102 
>S.E.2d, at 577. 
>
>	Flavell v. Dept. of Welfare, City and County of Denver, 355 P.2d 
>941 (Colo. 1960):
>	It follows that a collateral attack may be made here for 'acts 
>or orders [of administrative officers or agencies] which do not come 
>clearly within the powers granted or which fall beyond the purview of 
>the statute granting the agency or body its powers [such orders] are not 
>merely erroneous, but are void'....'They [officers or agencies] are 
>without power to act contrary to the provisions of the law or the clear 
>legislative intendment, or to exceed the authority conferred on them by 
>statute, 355 P.2d, at 943.
>
>	Ledgering v. State of Washington, 385 P.2d 522 (Wash. 1963): 
>Driver's license revocation case. 
>	We do not believe, however, that when the legislature vested in 
>the director discretionary power to suspend... it, absent express 
>declaration, intended the power of executive decision in this area be 
>delegated by the director to assistants, or relegated to a simple 
>mechanical process.
>	Gathering, collating, and presenting such facts as may be 
>required by the director, together with making appropriate 
>recommendations, preparing, signing, and mailing notices and orders in 
>the name of the director are without doubt delegable duties. But, the 
>basic responsibility and authority of exercising the discretion and 
>power of decision...rests exclusively with the director, 385 P.2d, at 
>526. 
>
>	Independent School District #639, Vesta v. Independent School 
>District #893, Echo, 160 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1968):
>	To allow one to take official action simply by giving oral 
>approval to a letter which does not recite the action and which does not 
>go out under one's name is to extend permissible delegation beyond 
>reasonable bounds, 160 NW 2d, at 689.
>
>	Country Gas Service, Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 147 (1st 
>Cir. 1969): Taxpayers entered into compromise with revenue agent to 
>settle tax liability in beneficial manner. In holding the agent's 
>agreement void, the court stated:
>	The narrow issue presented by this case is whether the revenue 
>agent had authority to make a binding agreement ... The exclusive 
>procedure for compromising tax liabilities is set forth in Int. Rev. 
>Code of 1954 § 7122. This section explicitly reposes such authority 
>in 'the Secretary or his delegate', and such delegation stops at the 
>district level. Since the exclusive means of compromise established by 
>§ 7122 was not utilized in this case, any arrangement taxpayer made 
>with agent McInnis had no legal standing, 405 F.2d, at 149, 150.
>Court cited delegation orders in this case.
>See also Brooks v. United States, 833 F.2d 1136, 1145 (4th Cir. 1987), 
>and excellent list of cases cited therein. 
>
>	California School Employees Ass'n. v. Personnel Comm. of 
>P.V.U.S.D., 89 Cal. Rptr. 620, 474 P.2d 436 (1970):
>	As a general rule, powers conferred upon public agencies and 
>officers which involve the exercise of judgment or discretion are in the 
>nature of public trusts and cannot be surrendered or delegated to 
>subordinates in the absence of statutory authorization [cites omitted]. 
>Under normal circumstances and absent statutory provisions to the 
>contrary the dismissal of employees involves the exercise of judgment or 
>discretion.
>	On the other hand, public agencies may delegate the performance 
>of ministerial tasks, including the investigation and determination of 
>facts preliminary to agency action [cites omitted]. Moreover, an 
>agency's subsequent approval or ratification of an act delegated to a 
>subordinate validates the act, which becomes the act of the agency 
>itself, 474 P.2d, at 439. 
>
>	Tulsa Exposition and Fair Corp. v. Board of County 
>Commissioners, 468 P.2d 501 (Ok. 1970):
>	Counties have only such authority as is granted by statute 
>[cites omitted]. The Board of County Commissioners in exercising 
>corporate powers is limited to those fields expressly assigned to such 
>subdivisions of the state by the legislature [cites omitted]. Public 
>officers possess only such authority as is conferred upon them by law 
>and such authority must be exercised in the manner provided by law, 468 
>P.2d, at 508.
>See also Brown v. State Election Board, 369 P.2d 140 (Ok. 1962). 
>
>	Baker v. Deschutes County, 498 P.2d 803 (Or.App. 1972): Contract 
>to sell county land held void:
>	It is fundamental law that government entities and their 
>officers must find sanction for their actions in the statute itself. 
>There is no apparent authority in a public officer whose duties are 
>prescribed by law as there would be in the case of an agent for a 
>private party [cites omitted].
>	Persons contracting with a public officer acting under a public 
>law must, at their peril, ascertain the scope of the officer's authority 
>[cites omitted] and are chargeable with notice of the contents of the 
>enactment conferring that authority. A contract by a public officer in 
>excess of the provisions of the statute authorizing such contract is 
>void, so far as it departs from or exceeds the terms of the law under 
>which it was attempted to be negotiated, 498 P.2d, at 805. 
>
>	Soriano v. United States, 494 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1974):
>	[A]n administrative agency is a creature of statute, having only 
>those powers expressly granted to it by Congress or included by 
>necessary implication from the Congressional grant, 494 F.2d, at 683.
>
>	Steele v. Gray, 64 Wis.2d 422, 219 N.W.2d 312 (1974): Question 
>regarding delegation of authority to revoke good time credits of 
>prisoners:
>	[A]n officer in whom discretionary power is vested cannot 
>delegate that power without statutory authority to do so, 219 N.W.2d, at 
>316.
>
>	United States v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1976): Indians 
>convicted of trespass had convictions reversed due to lack of delegated 
>authority of Forest Service officials to close part of national forest:
>	Absent an explicit delegation from the Secretary, the boundaries 
>of the Forest Supervisors' authority should not be extended into areas 
>the regulations have clearly reserved for higher officials.
>	By immediately closing the entire area, the Supervisor went 
>beyond the limits of his authority and exercised a power that had not 
>been granted to him. The closure orders were invalid and the trespass 
>convictions cannot stand,  535 F.2d, at 1152.
>Court referenced organizational structure and delegation orders 
>published in the CFR.
>
>	Lopez-Telles v. I.N.S., 564 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1977): Deportee 
>alleged that administrative law judge could refuse to deport for 
>humanitarian reasons. In rejecting this argument, it was stated:
>	Immigration judges, or special inquiry officers, are creatures 
>of statute, receiving some of their powers and duties directly from 
>Congress... and some of them by subdelegation from the Attorney 
>General... These statutes and the regulations implementing them... 
>contain a detailed and elaborate description of the authority of 
>immigration judges. Nowhere is there any mention of the power of an 
>immigration judge to award the type of discretionary relief that was 
>sought here, 564 F.2d, at 1303. 
>
>	Churchill v. S.A.D. No. 49 Teachers Ass'n., 380 A.2d 186 (Me. 
>1977):
>	[P]ublic bodies or officers may exercise only that power which 
>is conferred upon them by law. The source of that authority must be 
>found in the enabling statute either expressly or by necessary inference 
>as an incidence essential to the full exercise of the powers 
>specifically granted, 380 A.2d, at 192.
>
>	Champaign County, Illinois v. United States Law Enforcement 
>Assistance Administration, 611 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1979): 
>	[A] delegation of authority survives the resignation of the 
>person who issued the delegation, 611 F.2d, at 1207.
>See also Railroad Yardmasters of America v. Harris, 721 F.2d 1332, 1343 
>(D.C. Cir. 1983): Delegations are not affected by change in personnel 
>but continue until revoked; cites several cases; United States v. Morton 
>Salt Co., 216 F.Supp. 250, 255-56 (D. Minn. 1962); and In re Subpoena of 
>Persico, 522 F.2d 41, 62 (2nd Cir. 1975).
>
>	Hoppe v. King County, 95 Wash.2d 332, 622 P.2d 845 (1980): 
>	Public officers have only those powers expressly granted or 
>necessarily implied by statute,  622 P.2d, at 848. 
>
>	Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1981): Retirement 
>benefits case. Court stated:
>	Persons dealing with the government are charged with knowing 
>government statutes and regulations, and they assume the risk that 
>government agents may exceed their authority and provide misinformation, 
>644 F.2d, at 1383. 
>
>	Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 650 F.2d 1093 
>(9th Cir. 1981): Employment contract action involving charge of age 
>discrimination. Court held:
>	All persons in the United States are chargeable with knowledge 
>of the Statutes-at-Large....[I]t is well established that anyone who 
>deals with the government assumes the risk that the agent acting in the 
>government's behalf has exceeded the bounds of his authority, 650 F.2d, 
>at 1100.
>
>	American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees v. 
>Olson, 338 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 1983): Union action to compel state to pay 
>wage increase via union agreement:
>	It is well settled that public officials have only such 
>authority as is expressly given them by the constitution and statutes 
>together with those powers and duties which are necessarily implied from 
>the express grant of authority, 338 N.W.2d, at 100.
>
>	In re Benny, 29 B.R. 754, 762 (N.D. Cal. 1983):
>	[A]n unlawful or unauthorized exercise of power does not become 
>legitimated or authorized by reason of habitude. 
>See also Umpleby, by and through Umpleby v. State, 347 N.W.2d 156, 161 
>(N.D. 1984).
>
>	Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1523 (D.C. 
>Cir. 1984):
>	[W]hen an officer acts wholly outside the scope of the powers 
>granted to him by statute or constitutional provision, the official's 
>actions have been considered to be unauthorized.
>
>	Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 610 F.Supp. 1234, 1242 (N.D. 
>Ill. 1985): 
>	Acting without statutory power at all, or misapplying one's 
>statutory power, will result in a finding that such action was ultra 
>vires.
>(On appeal: 773 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1985), and 107 S.Ct. 638.
>
>	Boulez v. C.I.R., 810 F.2d 209 (D.C.Cir. 1987): Oral compromise 
>held invalid as contrary to regulations. Court relied upon delegation 
>orders.
>	United States v. Providence Journal Company, 485 U.S. 693, 108 
>S.Ct. 1502 (1988): District judge appointed a private attorney to pursue 
>contempt charge against a party in judge's court. On appeal, contempt 
>vacated, and attorney pursued writ, which was granted. In vacating writ, 
>the Supremes held that only the Solicitor General had authority to apply 
>for writ on behalf of the United States, a power not possessed by the 
>attorney. United States v. Solomon, 563 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir. 1977): AG 
>has no right to sue without authority in statute.
>
>	United States v. Plesinski, 912 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1990): State 
>Attorney General appointed special U.S. prosecutor. His authority was 
>upheld. 
>Cases concerning proposition that agencies must act within their 
>statutory authority:
>	(a) Regents of University System of Georgia v. Carroll, 338 U.S. 
>586, 597, 598, 70 S.Ct. 370 (1950): As an administrative body, the 
>Commission must find its powers within the compass of the authority 
>given it by Congress; 
>	(b) F.T.C. v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 428, 77 S.Ct. 502 
>(1957): the Commission may exercise only the powers granted it by the 
>Act;
>	(c) Civil Aeronautics Board v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 
>316, 322, 81 S.Ct. 1611 (1961): the fact is that the Board is entirely a 
>creature of Congress and the determinative question is not what the 
>Board thinks it should do but what Congress has said it can do.
>
>Excellent summary of law and principles regarding delegations: 
>Shreveport Engraving Co. v. United States, 143 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1944), 
>and Krug v. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co., 245 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 
>1957).
>
>Authority of public officials limited by statute:
>
>	City of Los Angeles v. Industrial Accident Comm., 8 Cal. App. 2d 
>580, 47 P.2d 1096 (1935);
>
>	Davis v. Pelley, 230 Ind. 248, 102 N.E.2d 910 (1952); 
>
>	Blue Boar Cafeteria Co. v. Hackett, 312 Ky. 288, 227 S.W.2d 199 
>(1950);
>
>	J.S. Bradley Co. v. Squire, 65 Ohio App. 186, 29 N.E.2d 430 
>(1939);
>
>	Probasco v. Sikes, 77 Wyo. 108, 307 P.2d 817, 821 (1957).
>
>	Crosthwait v. State, 135 Tex. 119, 138 S.W.2d 1060, 1061 (1940).
>
>	Thornton v. United States, 73-1 USTC 9232 (E.D.Pa. 1973): no 
>delegated authority to make jeopardy.
>
>	The American public should know the functions and delegated 
>authority of federal agencies because it is charged with the knowledge 
>of the scope and limitations upon the authority of federal agents, who 
>can only act within the scope of such authority; see Federal Crop 
>Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384, 68 S. Ct. 1, 3 (1947); 
>Dade Park Jockey Club v. Commonwealth, 253 Ky. 314, 69 S.W.2d 363, 365 
>(1934); Morris Plan Bank of Georgia v. Simmons, 201 Ga. 157, 39 S.E.2d 
>166, 175 (1946); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 
>837, 860 (D.Minn. 1946); Sunshine Dairy v. Peterson, 183 Or. 305, 193 
>P.2d 543, 552 (1948); United States v. Jones, 176 F.2d 278, 281 (9th 
>Cir. 1949); Patten v. State Personnel Board, 234 P.2d 987, 990 (Cal. 
>App. 1951); State ex rel Young v. Niblack, 99 N.E.2d 839, 841 (Ind. 
>1951); State v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 138 Conn. 334, 84 
>A.2d 579, 581 (1951); Davis v. Pelley, 102 N.E.2d 910, 912 (Ind. 1952); 
>Lien v. Northwestern Engineering Co., 54 N.W.2d 472, 476 (S.D. 1952); 
>Sittler v. Board of Control of Michigan College, 333 Mich. 681, 53 
>N.W.2d 681, 684 (1952); Bear River Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Placer 
>County, 258 P.2d 543, 546 (Cal. App. 1953); Rogers v. County Comm. of 
>New Haven County, 141 Conn. 426, 106 A.2d 757 (1954); Mason County Civic 
>Research Council v. County of Mason, 343 Mich. 313, 72 N.W.2d 292, 296 
>(1955); Government of Virgin Islands v. Gordon, 244 F.2d 818, 821 (3rd 
>Cir. 1957); Joseph A. Cicci, Inc. v. Allanson, 187 N.Y.S.2d 911, 913 
>(1959); Atlantic Co. v. Moseley, 215 Ga. 530, 111 S.E.2d 239, 242 
>(1959); Flavell v. Dept. of Welfare, City and County of Denver, 355 P.2d 
>941, 943 (Colo. 1960); City of Calhoun v. Holland, 222 Ga. 817, 152 
>S.W.2d 752, 754 (1966); Gray v. Johnson, 395 F.2d 533, 537 (10th Cir. 
>1968); Gammill v. Shackelford, 480 P.2d 920, 922 (Okl. 1970); Baker v. 
>Deschutes County, 498 P.2d 803, 805 (Or.App. 1972); City of Mercer 
>Island v. Steinmann, 9 Wash. App. 479, 513 P.2d 80, 83 (1973); United 
>States v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1976); Lopez-Telles v. 
>I.N.S., 564 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1977); Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank, 
>650 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 1981); Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F.2d 1378, 1383 
>(9th Cir. 1981); Smith v. Sorensen, 748 F.2d 427, 432 (8th Cir. 1984); 
>and Watrel v. Commonwealth Dept. of Education, 488 A.2d 378, 381 (Pa. 
>Comwlth. 1985). And acts of federal agents without delegated authority 
>are void; see Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357, 62 S.Ct. 651 
>(1942); United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 94 S.Ct. 1820 (1
>
>
>With Love, Liberty and Justice for All,    
>Alex                                      
>http://www.drbraces.com         
>e-mail: drbraces@drbraces.com
>
>"When the people fear their government you have tyranny.  
>When the government fears the People, you have liberty."
>                                        Thomas Jefferson
>
>Liberty is NEVER an option... only a condition to be lost!
>
>

========================================================================
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.    : Counselor at Law, federal witness
email:       [address in tool bar]   : Eudora Pro 3.0.2 on Intel 586 CPU
web site:  http://www.supremelaw.com : library & law school registration
ship to: c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776 : this is free speech,  at its best
             Tucson, Arizona state   : state zone,  not the federal zone
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========================================================================


      


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