Time: Thu May 29 22:22:31 1997 by primenet.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id WAA13111; Thu, 29 May 1997 22:13:26 -0700 (MST) by usr02.primenet.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id WAA27080; Thu, 29 May 1997 22:13:09 -0700 (MST) Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 22:18:15 -0700 To: (Recipient list suppressed) From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar] Subject: SLS: Stratton v. Howbert (1 of 2) (fwd) >Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 00:38:49 -0400 >From: "Dr. Braces" <drbraces@smart1.net> >Organization: SouthFlorida Orthodontics >To: pmitch@primenet.com >Subject: stratton v howbert part 1 > >-- (Cite as: 231 U.S. 399, 34 S.Ct. 136) > > STRATTON'S INDEPENDENCE, Limited, > v. > F. W. HOWBERT, Collector of Internal Revenue in and for the >District of > Colorado. > No. 457. > Argued October 21, 1913. > Decided December 1, 1913. > ON A CERTIFICATE from the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth >Circuit > presenting questions as to the liability of a mining corporation to the >Federal > corporation tax, and as to the right to deduct the value of ore in >place as > depreciation. The last question answered in the negative. The others >in the > affirmative. > The facts are stated in the opinion. > > INTERNAL REVENUE (s 9*)--EXCISE ON CORPORATION--MINING COMPANIES. > 1. Mining corporations engaged solely in mining upon their own >premises are > subject to the excise tax imposed by the act of August 5, 1909 (36 >Stat. at L. > 11, chap. 6, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 741), s 38, upon the >carrying on > or the doing of business in a corporate or quasi corporate capacity, >such > corporations being within the general description of that section, >which > comprises every corporation organized for profit and having a capital >stock > represented by shares, and engaged in business, and not being among the >classes > of corporation specified in that section as exempt from its operation. > [Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Internal Revenue, Cent. Dig. ss >13-28; Dec. > Dig. s 9.*] > * For other cases see same topic & s NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 >to > date, & Rep'r Indexes > > INTERNAL REVENUE (s 9*)--EXCISE ON CORPORATION--'INCOME'--PROCEEDS OF >ORE. > 2. The proceeds of ore mined by a corporation from its own premises >are > 'income' within the meaning of the act of August 5, 1909, s 38, >imposing an > excise tax measured by net annual income upon the carrying on or the >doing of > business in a corporate or quasi corporate capacity. > [Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Internal Revenue, Cent. Dig. ss >13-28; Dec. > Dig. s 9.* > For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 4, pp. 3501-3507; >vol. 8, > p. 7685.] > * For other cases see same topic & s NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 >to > date, & Rep'r Indexes > > INTERNAL REVENUE (s 9*)--EXCISE OF MINING CORPORATIONS. > 3. Treating the proceeds of ore mined by a corporation upon its own >premises > as 'income' within the meaning of the act of August 5, 1909, s 38, >which > imposes an excise tax measured by net annual income upon the carrying >on or the > doing of business in a corporate or quasi corporate capacity, does not >make > such excise the equivalent of a direct tax upon the property, and >therefore > invalid, because not apportioned to population, as prescribed by the >Federal > Constitution. > [Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Internal Revenue, Cent. Dig. ss >13-28; Dec. > Dig. s 9.*] > * For other cases see same topic & s NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 >to > date, & Rep'r Indexes > > INTERNAL REVENUE (s 9*)--EXCISE UPON CORPORATION--DEPRECIATION--'VALUE >OF ORE > IN PLACE.' > 4. Assuming that the depletion of the mineral supply from the process >of > mining is an element to be considered in determining the reasonable > depreciation that, under the act of August 5, 1909, s 38, is to be >deducted > from the net annual income of a mining company when assessing the >excise > imposed by that section upon the doing or carrying on of a business in >a > corporate or quasi corporate capacity, the difference between the gross > proceeds of the sales of ores during the year, and the amount expended >in > extracting, mining, and marketing such ores, cannot be treated as the >value of > the ore in place for such purpose. > [Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Internal Revenue, Cent. Dig. ss >13-28; Dec. > Dig. s 9.*] > * For other cases see same topic & s NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 >to > date, & Rep'r Indexes > > COURTS (s 384*)--CASES CERTIFIED--SCOPE OF INQUIRY. > 5. Only the several propositions of law that are certified by a >circuit court > of appeals under the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. at L. 828, chap. >517, U. S. > Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 549), s 6, will be answered by the Federal Supreme >Court. > Questions of fact or of mixed law and fact will not be considered. > [Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. s 1021; Dec. Dig. >s 384.*] > * For other cases see same topic & s NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 >to > date, & Rep'r Indexes > *400 **137 Messrs. William V. Hodges, A. A. Hoehling, Jr., and John R. > Van Derlip for Stratton's Independence. > *404 Assistant Attorney General Graham for Howbert, Collector. > *406 Messrs. Charles S. Thomas, W. H. Bryant, George L. Nye, William >P. > Malburn, William Story, William Story, Jr., and *405 William D. Guthrie >as > amici curiae. > > *406 Mr. Justice Pitney delivered the opinion of the court: > This action was brought in the district court of the United States by > Stratton's Independence, Limited, a British corporation carrying on >mining > operations in the state of Colorado upon mining lands owned by itself, >to > recover certain moneys paid under protest for taxes assessed and levied >for the > years 1909 and 1910 under the provisions of the corporation tax act, >being s 38 > of the act of August 5, 1909 (36 Stat. at L. 11, 112, chap. 6, U. S. >Comp. > Stat. Supp. 1911, pp. 741, 946). The case was tried upon an agreed >statement > of facts, from which it appears, as to the year 1909, that the company > extracted from its lands during the year certain ores bearing gold and >other > precious metals, which were sold by it for sums largely in excess of >the cost > of mining, extracting, and marketing the same; that the gross sales >amounted > to $284,682.85, the cost of extracting, mining, and marketing amounted >to > $190,939.42, and 'the value of said ores so extracted in the year 1909, >when in > place in said mine and before extraction thereof, was $93,743.43.' >With > respect to the operations of the company for the year 1910, the agreed >facts > were practically the same, except as to dates and amounts. It does not >appear > that the so-called 'value of the ore in place,' or any other sum, was >actually > charged off upon the books of the company as depreciation. Upon this >state of > facts each party moved the court for a directed verdict, at the same >time > presenting for consideration certain questions of law, and among them >the > following: > '1. Is the value of the ore in place that was extracted *407 from the > mining property of the plaintiff during the years in question properly > allowable as depreciation in estimating the net income of the plaintiff >subject > to taxation under the act of Congress of August 5, 1909 (36 Stat. at L. >chap. > 6, p. 11, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 741)? > '2. Is the right to such credit affected by the fact that the >plaintiff does > not carry such items on its books in a depreciation account?' > The court directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff with respect to >certain > amounts **138 that were undisputed and concerning which no question is >now > raised; but directed a verdict in favor of the defendant with respect >to so > much of the taxes paid as represented the value in place of the ore >that was > extracted during the years in question, overruling the contention that >such > value was properly allowable as depreciation in estimating the net >income of > the plaintiff. To this ruling proper exceptions were taken. The >resulting > judgment having been removed by writ of error to the circuit court of >appeals, > that court certifies that the following questions of law are presented >to it, > the decision of which is indispensable to a determination of the cause, >and > upon which it therefore desires the instruction of this court: > 'I. Does s 38 of the act of Congress entitled, 'An Act to Provide >Revenue, > Equalize Duties, and Encourage the Industries of the United States, and >for > Other Purposes,' approved August 5, 1909 (36 Stat. at L. p. 11, chap. >6, U. S. > Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 741), apply to mining corporations? > 'II. Are the proceeds of ores mined by a corporation from its own >premises > income within the meaning of the aforementioned act of Congress? > 'III. If the proceeds from ore sales are to be treated as income, is >such a > corporation entitled to deduct the value of such ore in place and >before it is > mined as depreciation within the meaning of s 38 of said act of >Congress?' > *408 The provisions of s 38 are set forth in the margin. [FN] > The principal grounds upon which it is contended that the questions >ought to > receive answers favorable to the company are expressed in various >forms; viz., > that mining corporations are sui generis, because the *409 natural >enjoyment > of mining lands necessarily results in the waste of the estate; that >the true > value thereof is impossible of accurate determination, and hence mining > corporations are not included in general classifications of >corporations as > such classifications are employed in other legislation; that the >provisions > of s 38 do not fit *410 the conditions of a mining corporation; that >such > corporations are not in truth engaged in 'carrying on business' within >the > meaning of the act; that the application of the act to them results in >a tax > upon the capital, while as applied to other corporations it does not >result in > such a tax, the result being an inequality of operation that is > *411 inherently unjust; that the proceeds of mining operations do not > represent values created by or incident to the business activities of >such a > corporation, and therefore cannot be a bona fide measure of a tax >leveled at > such corporate business activities; that the proceeds of mining > *412 operations result from a conversion of the capital represented by >real > estate into capital represented by cash, and are in no true sense >income; and > that to measure the tax by the excess of receipts for one marketed over >the > cost of mining, extracting, and marketing the same, is *413 equivalent >to a > direct tax upon the property, and hence unconstitutional. Next, >assuming the > proceeds of ore are to be treated as income **139 within the meaning of >the > act, it is yet insisted that such proceeds result solely from the >depletion of > capital, and are pari passu; and hence that a mining the provisions of >the act. > We do not think it necessary to follow the argument through all its > refinements. The pith of it is that mining corporations engaged solely >in > mining upon their own premises have but one kind of assets, and that in >the > ordinary use of them the enjoyment of the assets and the wasting >thereof are in > direct proportion, and proceed pari passu; and hence that a mining >corporation > is not engaged in business, properly speaking, but is merely occupied >in > converting its capital assets from one form into another, and that a >tax upon > the doing of such a business, where the tax is measured by the value of >the > property owned by the corporation, would be in excess of the >constitutional > limitations that existed at the time of the passage of the act of 1909, >as laid > down in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 157 U. S. 429, 39 L. ed. 759, >15 > Sup. Ct. Rep. 673, s. c., 158 U. S. 601, 39 L. ed. 1108, 15 Sup. Ct. >Rep. > 912. > The peculiar character of mining property is sufficiently obvious. >Prior to > development it may present to the naked eye a mere tract of land with >barren > surface, and of no practical value except for what may be found >beneath. Then > follow excavation, discovery, development, extraction of ores, >resulting > eventually, if the process be thorough, in the complete exhaustion of >the > mineral contents so far as they are worth removing. Theoretically, and > according to the argument, the entire value of the mine, as ultimately > developed, existed from the beginning. Practically, however, and from >the > commercial standpoint, the value--that is, the exchangeable or market >value-- > depends upon different considerations. Beginning from little, when the > existence, character, and extent of *414 the ore deposits are >problematical, > it may increase steadily or rapidly so long as discovery and >development outrun > depletion, and the wiping out of the value by the practical exhaustion >of the > mine may be deferred for a long term of years. While not ignoring the > importance of such considerations, we do not think they afford the sole >test > for determining the legislative intent. > As has been repeatedly remarked, the corporation tax act of 1909 was >not > intended to be and is not, in any proper sense, an income tax law. >This court > had decided in the Pollock Case that the income tax law of 1894 >amounted in > effect to a direct tax upon property, and was invalid because not >apportioned > according to populations, as prescribed by the Constitution. The act >of 1909 > avoided this difficulty by imposing not an income tax, but an excise >tax upon > the conduct of business in a corporate capacity, measuring, however, >the amount > of tax by the income of the corporation, with certain qualifications >prescribed > by the act itself. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. 220 U. S. 107, 55 L. ed. >389, > 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 1312; McCoach v. Minehill & S. >H. R. > Co. 228 U. S. 295, 57 L. ed. 842, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 419; United States >v. > Whitridge **140 (decided at this term, 231 U. S. 144, 58 L. ed. ----, >34 > Sup. Ct. Rep. 24. > For this and other obvious reasons we are little aided by a discussion >of > theoretical distinctions between capital and income. Such refinements >can > hardly be deemed to have entered into the legislative purpose. Of >course, if > it were demonstrable that to read the act according to its letter would >render > it unconstitutional, or glaringly unequal, or palpably unjust, a >reasonable > ground would exist for construing it according to its spirit rather >than its > letter. But in our opinion the act is not fairly open to this >criticism. It > is not correct, from either the theoretical or the practical >standpoint, to say > that a mining corporation is not engaged in business, but is merely >occupied in > converting its capital assets from one form into another. The sale >outright of > a mining property might be fairly described as a mere conversion of the >capital > from land *415 into money. But when a company is digging pits, sinking > shafts, tunneling, drifting, stoping, drilling, blasting, and hoisting >ores, it > is employing capital and labor in transmuting a part of the realty into > personalty, and putting it into marketable form. The very process of >mining > is, in a sense, equivalent in its results to a manufacturing process. >And, > however the operation shall be described, the transaction is >indubitably > 'business' within the fair meaning of the act of 1909; and the gains >derived > from it are properly and strictly the income from that business; for >'income' > may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from >both > combined, and here we have combined operations of capital and labor. >As to the > alleged inequality of operation between mining corporations and others, >it is > of course true that the revenues derived from the working of mines >result to > some extent in the exhaustion of the capital. But the same is true of >the > earnings of the human brain and hand when unaided by capital, yet such >earnings > are commonly dealt with **141 in legislation as income. So it may be >said of > many manufacturing corporations that are clearly subject to the act of >1909, > especially of those that have to do with the production of patented >articles; > although it may be foretold from the beginning that the manufacture >will be > profitable only for a limited time, at the end of which the capital >value of > the plant must be subject to material depletion, the annual gains of >such > corporations are certainly to be taken as income for the purpose of >measuring > the amount of the tax. > It seems to us that the first two questions certified must be answered >in the > affirmative principally for two reasons. First, because mining >corporations > are within the general description of s 38, which comprises 'every >corporation, > joint stock company, or association organized for profit, and having a >capital > stock represented by shares, . . . and engaged in business in any state >or > territory of the United *416 States;' and, secondly, because the act > specific those classes of corporations that are to be exempt from its > operation, and mining corporations are not among them. Those exempted >are > labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, fraternal >beneficiary > societies, orders or associations operating under the lodge system, >domestic > building and loan associations, corporations and associations organized >and > operated for religious, charitable, or educational purposes, etc. >Moreover, > the section imposes 'a special excise tax with respect to the carrying >on or > doing business by such corporation,' etc. That mining companies are >doing > business, within the fair intent and meaning of this clause, seems to >us > entirely plain, for reasons already given. The conduct of such >business > results in profit, for it cannot be seriously contended that the ores >are not > worth more at the mine mouth than they were worth in the ground, plus >the cost > of mining. Corporations engaged in such business share in the benefits >of the > Federal government, **142 and ought as reasonably to contribute to the > support of that government as corporations that conduct other kinds of > profitable business. > As to what should be deemed 'income' within the meaning of s 38, it of >course > need not be such an income as would have been taxable as such, for at >that > time (the 16th Amendment not having been as yet ratified) income was >not > taxable as such by Congress without apportionment according to >population, and > this tax was not so apportioned. Evidently Congress adopted the income >as the > measure of the tax to be imposed with respect to the doing of business >in > corporate form because it desired that the excise should be imposed, > approximately at least, with regard to the amount of benefit presumably >derived > by such corporations from the current operations of the government. In >Flint > v. Stone Tracy Co. 220 U. S. 107, 165, 55 L. ed. 107, 419, 31 Sup. Ct. > Rep. 342, Ann. Cas. 1912 B. 1312, it was held that Congress, in >exercising > the right to tax a legitimate subject of taxation as a franchise *417 >or > privilege, was not debarred by the Constitution from measuring the >taxation by > the total income, although derived in part from property which, >considered by > itself, was not taxable. It was reasonable that Congress should fix >upon gross > income, without distinction as to source, as a convenient and >sufficiently > accurate index of the importance of the business transacted. And from >this > point of view, it makes little difference that the income may arise >from a > business that theoretically or practically involves a wasting of >capital. > Moreover, Congress evidently intended to adopt a measure of the tax >that > should be easy of ascertainment and simply and readily applied in >practice. > The act prescribed that the tax should be 'equivalent to one per centum >upon > the entire net income over and obove $5,000 received by it from all >sources > during such year, exclusive of amounts received by it as dividends upon >stock > of other corporations,' etc., or, with respect to foreign corporations, >'upon > the amount of net income over and obove $5,000, received by it from >business > transacted and capital invested within the United States,' etc. And >the net > income was to be ascertained by taking, first, the 'gross amount of the >income > of such corporation . . . received within the year from all sources,' >or, in > the case of foreign corporations, 'from business transacted and capital > invested within,' etc., and deducting therefrom losses sustained, >interest > paid, etc. And the return was to be made under oath by the president >and > treasurer, or other officers having like duties, indicating in the >clearest > manner that it was to set forth data that with proper accounting would >appear > upon the books of the corporation. We have no difficulty, therefore, >in > concluding that the proceeds of ores mined by a corporation from its >own > premises are to be taken as a part of the gross income of such >corporation. > Congress no doubt contemplated that such corporations, amongst others, >were > doing business *418 with a wasting capital, and for such wastage they >made > due provision in declaring that from the gross income there should be >deducted > (inter alia) 'all losses actually sustained within the year,' including >'a > reasonable allowance for depreciation of property, if any,' etc. > This brings us to the third question, which is whether such a mining > corporation is entitled to deduct the value of ore in place and before >it is > mined, as depreciation within the meaning of s 38. This question, >however, is > to be read in the light of the issue that is presented to the circuit >court of > appeals for determination, as recited in the certificate. From that > certificate it appears that the case was submitted to the trial court >and a > verdict directed upon an agreed statement of facts, and in that >statement the > gross proceeds of the sale of the ores during the year were diminished >by the > moneys expended in extracting, mining, and marketing the ores, and the >precise > difference was taken to be the value of the ores when in place in the >mine. > That we do not misconstrue the certificate, and that, on the contrary, >the > parties advisedly adopted this definition of 'value of the ore in >place,' is > apparent not only from the form of the agreed statement of facts, but >from the > arguments presented here in behalf of the plaintiff. The contention is >that if > the proceeds of ore sales are to be treated as income, the value of the >ore in > place and before it is mined is to be deducted as depreciation, and >that such > value is to be arrived at by the process indicated. Briefs submitted >in behalf > of amici curioe have suggested other modes for determining >depreciation; but > plaintiff stands squarely upon the ground indicated by the certificate, >as the > following excerpts from the brief will show: 'Assuming, then, that the > proceeds of ore are to be treated as income within the meaning of the >act, we > submit that such proceeds result solely from depletion of capital, and >are > therefore deductible as depreciation under the *419 provisions [of the >act] > set out above. . . . And we contend that if a part of the capital >assets are > removed and sold, the property, as it originally stood, is actually >depreciated > in value to the exact extent of **143 such removal. As an actual >matter of > experience, the original cost of the property must, from its very >nature, be > highly speculative. The values in the property are invisible and >impossible of > determination. They may be worth many times the cost, or they may be >worth > nothing. . . . The value of the ore in sight does represent a part of >the > capital, but there is no warrant for limiting it to this amount, nor is >there > any warrant for limiting the value of ore bodies thereafter discovered >in any > case to a standard fixed before their discovery, and therefore, of >necessity, > purely conjectural. . . . The true capital of a mining corporation is >the true > value of the minerals within the limits of its properties, irrespective >of > developed ore bodies or those known to exist at any one moment. >Investigation > or development may demonstrate the existence of values theretofore >unknown, but > this results in no addition to the actual capital. It remains the same >as it > was before. . . .' And again: 'With every dollar's worth removed, the >land > from which it is taken contains that much less of value; the >corporation owns > precisely that much less real property than it possessed before; for >every > dollar of cash received it relinquishes an equivalent amount of ore in >place, > and makes no gain or profit by the exchange.' > Reading these extracts in connection with what is contended respecting >the > first and second questions,--to the effect that mining corporations are >not > 'doing business,' but are merely converting their capital assets from >one form > into another,--it is clear that a definition of the 'value of the ore >in place' > has been intentionally adopted that excludes all allowance of profit >upon the > process of mining, and attributes the entire profit upon the mining > *420 operations to the mine itself. In short, the parties propose to > estimate the depreciation of a mining property attributable to the >extraction > of ores according to principles that would be applicable if the ores >had been > removed by a trespasser. > It is at the same time obvious that any method of stating the account >that > excludes all element of gain from the process of mining must, through >one > process or another, exempt mining companies from liability to tax under >the act > of 1909 with respect to their mining operations. And so, an >affirmative answer > to the third question as propounded would be the same in effect as an > affirmative answer to the first or the second. For it is a matter of >little or > no moment whether it is to be said (a) that mining corporations are not > 'engaged in business' at all, or (b) that they are engaged in business, >but the > proceeds of ore mined are not income, or (c) that such proceeds are >income, but > that there must be allowed as depreciation all that part of the >proceeds which > remains after paying the bare outlays of the business. In either case >mining > corporations would be exempt from the tax. > In our opinion, there are at least two insuperable obstacles in the >way of > returning an affirmative answer to the third question as certified. > In the first place, it is fallacious to say that, whatever may have >been the > original cost of a mining property or the cost of developing it, if in >fact it > afterwards yield ores aggregating many times its original cost or >market value, > this result merely proves and at the same time measures the intrinsic >value > that existed from the beginning. We are here seeking the correct > interpretation and construction of an act of legislation that was, at >least, > designed to furnish a practicable mode of raising revenue for the >support of > the government, and to do this in part by imposing annual taxes upon > corporations organized for profit, and by measuring the amount of the > contribution *421 to be required from each corporation according to its > annual income. The act deals with corporations engaged in actual >business > transactions, and presumably conducted according to ordinary business > principles. It was of course contemplated that the income might be >derived > from the employment of property in business, and that this property >might > become more or less exhausted in the process; and because of this, a >reasonable > allowance was to be made for depreciation of it, if any. But plainly, >we think, > the valuation of the property and the amount of the depreciation were >to be > determined not upon the basis of latent and occult intrinsic values, >but upon > considerations that affect market value and have their influence upon >men of > affairs charged with the management of the business and accounting of > corporations that are organized for profit and are engaged in business >for > purposes of profit. > And, secondly, assuming the depletion of the mineral stock is an >element to be > considered in determining the reasonable depreciation that is to be >treated as > a loss in the ascertainment of the net income of a mining company under >the > act, we deem it quite inadmissible to estimate such depletion as if it >had been > done by a trespasser, to whom all profit is denied. > With respect to the proper measure of damages where ore has been >unlawfully > mined by one person upon the land of another, there is much conflict of > authority. Different modes of determining the damages have been >resorted to, > dependent sometimes **144 upon the form of the action, whether trespass >or > trover; sometimes upon whether the case arose at law or in equity; and >often > upon whether the trespass was willful or inadvertent. See E. E. Bolles > Woodenware Co. v. United States, 106 U. S. 432, 27 L. ed. 230, 1 Sup. >Ct. > Rep. 398, and cases cited; Benson Min. & Smelting Co. v. Alta Min. & >Smelting > Co. 145 U. S. 428, 434, 36 L. ed. 762, 765, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 877, 17 >Mor. > Min. Rep. 488; Pine River Logging & Improv. Co. v. United States, 186 >U. S. > 279, 293, 46 L. ed. 1164, 1171, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 920; United States v. >St. > Anthony R. Co. 192 U. S. 524, 542, 48 L. ed. 548, 555, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. >333; > Martin v. Porter (1839) 5 Mees. & W. *422 352, 2 Horn. & H. 70, 17 Eng. > Rul. Cas. 841, 10 Mor. Min. Rep. 75; Jegon v. Vivian (1871) L. R. 6 Ch. >742, > 760, 40 L. J. Ch. N. S. 389, 19 Week. Rep. 365, 17 Eng. Rul. Cas. 843, >8 > Mor. Min. Rep. 628; Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co. (1880) L. R. 5 >App. Cas. > 25, 34, 42 L. T. N. S. 334, 28 Week. Rep. 357, 44 J. P. 392, 10 M > > >With Love, Liberty and Justice for All, >Alex >http://www.drbraces.com >e-mail: drbraces@drbraces.com > >"When the people fear their government you have tyranny. >When the government fears the People, you have liberty." > Thomas Jefferson > >Liberty is NEVER an option... only a condition to be lost! > > ======================================================================== Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S. : Counselor at Law, federal witness email: [address in tool bar] : Eudora Pro 3.0.2 on Intel 586 CPU web site: http://www.supremelaw.com : library & law school registration ship to: c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776 : this is free speech, at its best Tucson, Arizona state : state zone, not the federal zone Postal Zone 85719/tdc : USPS delays first class w/o this ========================================================================
Return to Table of Contents for
Supreme Law School: E-mail