Time: Sat Nov 02 12:49:08 1996
To: Bob Tiernan <zulu@teleport.com>
From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar]
Subject: Karma and the Federal Courts
Cc: 
Bcc: 


  "Karma and the Federal Courts"

             by

     Paul Andrew Mitchell
     All Rights Reserved
       (November 1996)


The law of karma is this:
what goes around, comes around.

And so, we have come to this point
in decoding Title 28 of the United
States Codes:  there are two classes 
of federal "District Courts"
in the federal court system.

One class is for the federal zone;
the other class is for the state zone.

Using a very powerful rule of statutory
construction, "inclusio unius est 
exclusio alterius," we show that the
phrase "District Court of the United States"
refers to federal courts for the state zone;

            -and-

the phrase "United States District Court"
refers to federal courts for the federal zone.

We have this on the authority of the Supreme Court
of the United States, most notably in the cases
of American Insurance Company v. 356 Bales of
Cotton, and Balzac v. Porto Rico [sic].

Now, here's the rub:  Since federal courts are
creatures of statutes only, they can only 
cognize subject matters which are assigned to
them expressly by statutes.  

When it comes to criminal jurisdiction, the
controlling statute is 18 U.S.C. 3231.

This statute grants original jurisdiction 
to the District Courts of the United States (DCUS),
but does not mention the United States District
Courts (USDC)!  

How about them apples?

Remember this carefully:

Inclusio  unius  est exclusio  alterius  (in Latin).
Inclusion of one is  exclusion of others (in English).

Since the USDC is not mentioned, its omission
can be inferred as intentional. (Read that again,
then confirm it in Black's Law Dictionary, any
edition).

So, from the historian's point of view, Congress
has permitted the limited territorial and subject
matter jurisdiction of the USDC to be extended,
unlawfully, into the state zone, and into subject
matters over which said court has no jurisdiction
whatsoever.  

This deception was maintained as long as
nobody noticed, but now it is obvious, and
quite difficult to change, without bringing 
down the whole house of cards (which is happening, 
by the way.  The Liege firemen are literally 
hosing their own corrupt court buildings, 
so we're not alone in this department of 
judicial tyranny.)

By the way, the famous Belgian Firemen from Liege
have been invited, via the Internet, to discharge
the Belgian debt to the United States by moving
their talents state-side.  They should return
home debt free, in about ten years or so, 
depending on available supplies of soap and
water.

Imagine a sheet of Saran Wrap, which has been
yanked too far, by pulling it beyond the
strict territorial boundaries which surround
the federal zone.

This is the United States District Court (USDC),
in all its limited Honors and tarnished glory.

Further proof of this bad karma can be found
by comparing 18 U.S.C. 1964(a) and 1964(c).
Both statutes grant authority to issue remedies
to restrain racketeering activities prohibited
by 18 U.S.C. 1962.  1964(a) grants civil jurisdiction
to issue injunctive relief to the DCUS;  1964(c)
grants civil jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief
to the USDC.  Both refer to the exact same subject
matter, namely, RICO (Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations) activities.  

So, when these two statutes are otherwise identical, 
why did Congress need to enact two separate statutes? 

The answer is simple:  one authority was needed 
for the DCUS, and the other was needed for the USDC.
Simple, really, when the sedition by syntax is 
explained in language which penetrates the deception.

Now, if this is truly the case, and nobody has been
able to prove us wrong about this matter, the United
States (federal government) is in a heap of trouble here,
because it has been prosecuting people in the wrong 
courts ever since the Civil War;  furthermore, those
courts have no criminal jurisdiction whatsoever, because
such an authority is completely lacking from Titles 18
and 28, both of which have been enacted into positive law,
unlike Title 26, which has not been enacted into positive
law.  See Title 1 for details.

What do we do with this earth-shaking discovery?  Well,
when any federal case is filed, the criminal defendant
should submit a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request
immediately, for such things as any regulations which
have been published in the Federal Register, pursuant
to the Federal Register Act, for 18 U.S.C. 3231. 

It won't hurt to send submit similar FOIA requests 
for the credentials of all federal employees 
who have "touched" the case in any way. 

Since we already know that there are no regulations
for 18 U.S.C. 3231, and that federal employees will
usually refuse to produce their credentials, your FOIA 
requests will be met with silence, whereupon you will file a
FOIA appeal.  Once the appeal deadline has run, you are
in court.    

But which court?  Guess ...

... the answer is the District Court of the United States.
What an amazing discovery, yes?  A United States District
Judge in Arizona, in late Spring of 1996, ruled that the
United States District Court (USDC) is not the proper forum
to litigate a request under the FOIA.  That can only be
because FOIA requests must be litigated in the District
Court of the United States (DCUS).

Now we have the United States checkmated.  The proper forum
for FOIA is now res judicata.  If the DCUS is the proper
forum for FOIA, and if the USDC is NOT the proper forum
for FOIA, THEN the USDC is not the proper forum for 
prosecuting violations of Title 18 either, because the
USDC does not show up in 5 USC 552 or in 18 USC 3231!

Read that paragraph again, and again, until you get it.
It's okay to admit that you must read it several times;
this writer once read a paragraph from Hooven and Allison
v. Evatt some 20 different times, until the meaning was
finally clear.

Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.  The omission by
Congress of the USDC from 18 USC 3231 must have been
intentional;  the maxim certainly allows us to infer
that it was intentional.  Use of this maxim allows for
us to exploit one of the most powerful techniques in
American jurisprudence.  It is called "collateral attack" 
-- a broadside, rather than a head-on, collision.  

Knowledge is power, and power is freedom ...

... freedom.  Freedom!  FREEDOM!!!

Love it.


Common Law Copyright
Paul Andrew Mitchell
Counselor at Law, federal witness
and Citizen of Arizona state
All Rights Reserved Without Prejudice
November 2, 1996

      


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