Time: Sat Nov 09 05:08:22 1996
To: Jack Hammer <jh@teleport.com>
From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar]
Subject: Is a demand for Common Law 'Due Process" common law process?

All the courts which have ruled on this
question have said that you cannot
waive defects in jurisdiction;  in federal
courts, jurisdiction requires an Act of
Congress.  Remember how we used to joke
that "this or that is going to take an
Act of Congress"?  Well, curing defects
in jurisdiction requires an Act of Congress.
Nothing else will do.  So, wearing a 
tie with a certain color, saying something
the "wrong way," or "crossing the bar," 
none of these will waive jurisdiction 
when it is lacking, as a matter of law.

/s/ Paul Mitchell

At 01:30 AM 11/9/96 -0800, you wrote:
>Dear Patriot Z:
>Isn't the problem here, with the demand for common law process (attached
>below), that you are traversing out of common law by making a demand in a
>statutory court? How can one invoke common law in a statutory court by
>entering a demand (plea) in response to the court's charge?
>In other words, isn't the argument of propia persona moot once you have
>engaged the court to judge your demand?  Doesn't the judge simply have to
>say overruled, dismissed, denied? Haven't you already invoked his or her
>power by issuing a demand to be ruled on? If you, the proper person,
>aren't the statutory person named in the charge, then why are you asking
>for certioari to common law? Doesn't such a demand contradict your claim
>of persona propia?
>Is not the ultimate issue that the court cannot address your proper
>person? Once you respond as the respondent named by the court, aren't you
>dead meat?
>Isn't it much better to simply stand on the ultimate issue of propia
>persona, with an affidavit of truth, that you are not the person as named
>in statutory process, and refuse to say more? Aren't we usually hung by
>our own admissions?
>Does this make any sense to you? Couldn't your friend stand to have a
>little more coaching, perhaps?
>-jac ;-)
> On Fri, 8 Nov 1996
>PATRIOTZ@aol.com wrote:
>>     A friend, Jerry Simmons, sent me the following "Demand for
>>     Common Law 'Due Process'". How did we lose our guaranteed
>>     and secured rights to common law due process and become
>>     subject to "administrative process"?? The following offers important
>>     insights into that question and the differences between the two.
>>     I will be adapting some of these arguments into one or more of my
>>     own cases.
>>                             *****************************************
>>     Comes now the accused, in propria persona appearing specially and
>>     not generally or voluntarily herein, to demand all rights under the
>>     common law based upon the status of the accused as a matter of due
>>     process of law and to determine what legal rights the accused has in
>>     this court and what rights will be denied, if any, to enable the
>>     accused to determine what jurisdiction the State of Connecticut is
>>     attempting to apply to this person as:
>>          "No change in ancient procedure can be made which disrupts
>>          those fundamental principles ... which ... protect the
>>          citizen in his private right and guard him against the
>>          arbitrary action of the government."
>>                                          Ex Parte Young, 209 US 123
>>     When summoned into any court, the first thing a party must do is
>>     analyze and identify the nature of the charges, jurisdiction of the
>>     court, and the status of the accused (* presumed to be sui juris),
>>     to determine if the status of the accused falls within the statute
>>     and the jurisdiction of the court. The State and the Court are
>>     obviously proceeding based upon Civil Law statutes, and therfore,
>>     are using an Admiralty/maritime/equity/administrative jurisdiction
>>     to proceed rather than the principles and modes of the common law.
>>     (See Davison v. New Orleans, 96 US 97; Dartmouth College Case, 4
>>     Wheat 518). Facts supporting this conclusion are:
>>                              I JURISDICTION
>>     The accused recognizes that when jurisdiction is not squarely
>>     challenged it is presumed to exist (Burks v. Lasker, 441 US 471).
>>     This includes supposed duties, liabilities, and sanctions ---
>>     attached by way of statutes --- for violations of said duties
>>     (U.S. v. Grimaud, 220 US 506). In this court there is no meaningful
>>     opportunity to challenge jurisdiction, as the court merely proceeds
>>     summarily. However, once jurisdiction has been challenged in the
>>     courts, it becomes the responsibility of the Plaintiff to assert and
>>     prove said jurisdiction (Hagans v. Lavine, 415 US 533, note 5), as
>>     mere good faith assertions of power and authority (jurisdiction)
>>     have been abolished. (Owens v. City of Independence, 100 SCt. 1398,
>>     1980).
>>     The state functions in two capacities: 1. In behalf of the "People
>>     of the State" in common law actions; and 2. As a person in a
>>     corporate capacity to protect and enforce its interests through
>>     summary proceedings. But the State in either capacity is still bound
>>     by the U.S. Constitution, (Martin v. Hunter's Lesses, 1 Wheat 304)
>>     Since the Plaintiff is the "State of Connecticut", it is acting in
>>     its own interest and is, therefore, the person who is allegedly
>>     complaining. The State is attempting to bring a personal action and
>>     is seeking a remedy for an alleged injury of non-existent rights, as
>>     rights only exist between moral beings. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary,
>>     1914, p. 2960)
>>                         III PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
>>     In order for the Court to be properly set in a common law criminal
>>     action, there must be a member of: 1. The judiciary (the judge);
>>     2. The executive (the public prosecutor); and 3. The accused. In
>>     this case the State is proceeding with a State official (State's
>>     Attorney or Assistant) who is a member of the Judiciary, not an
>>     appointed member of the executive branch of State government. The
>>     functions of the state's attorney are not even outlined or
>>     authorized by Code, and he is neither appointed by nor works for the
>>     executive branch of government. Therefore, this person is
>>     functioning under a statutory Civil Law jurisdiction and not under
>>     the provisions of the Common Law. The governor of the state is not
>>     discharging his duty to execute the laws of the state, by and
>>     through an appointed prosecutor. Instead, the laws of the state are
>>     being prosecuted by a municipal state (judicial) officer. Such
>>     judicial proceedings are only found in proceedings under the Civil
>>     Law.
>>     A principle of the Common Law is that the People are the party of
>>     the action in a felonious, or public offence. Public offences are
>>     either felonies or misdemeanors (the offence charged in this case).
>>     Misdemeanors comprehend all indictable offences (l Brish. Cr. L.
>>     Section 624; Bouvier's p. 2222) and, therefore, the charges must be
>>     brought forth by the people in the form of a Grand jury indictment.
>>     The original jurisdiction in this case is with the United States
>>     Supreme Court because: 1. The State is a party; 2. The magistrate
>>     court is operating in a jurisdiction alien to the Common Law.
>>     The State by statute is attempting to compel a performance and the
>>     state's attorney and the local police are applying said statutes
>>     without having to prove whether or not the statute applies to the
>>     accused. Due process of law is not necessarily satisfied by any
>>     process which the legislature may prescribe. (See Abrams v. Jones,
>>     35 Idaho 532, 207 P. 724).
>>          "There can be no constructive offences, and before a man
>>          can be punished, his case must be plainly and unmistakably
>>          within the statute."
>>                                         U.S. v. Lacher, 134 US 624
>>     An action under the Common Law only exists after there has been a
>>     loss or a damage, and it cannot compel a performance. The charges
>>     against the accused are because he did not show a driver's licence
>>     and display licence plates. Punishing a person for not doing a thing
>>     is tantamount to compelling a person to do the thing. Therefore the
>>     nature of the action and the kind of relief sought is compelling in
>>     nature and not an action under the Common Law. Under the Common Law
>>     a person cannot be compelled "to purchase, through a licence fee or
>>     licence tax, the privilege freely granted by the Constitution" Blue
>>     Island v. Kozul, 41 N.E. 2d. 515 (As quoted in Murdock v.
>>     Pennsylvania (City of Jeanette) 319 US 105, 114. In addition: "A
>>     State may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted
>>     (secured) by the Federal Constitution. Thus it may not exact a
>>     licence tax for the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce."
>>     Mc Goldrick v. Bewind-White Co., 309 US 33, 56-58. "Although it may
>>     tax the property used in. or the income derived from that commerce,
>>     so long as those taxes are not discrimination." Id., p.47. As
>>     repeatedly stated, this person is not enfranchised by any state nor
>>     engaged in any form of trade, commerce, or industry that makes him
>>     subject to any licensing requirement, and therefore, travels on the
>>     rights-of-way as a matter of right and: "Where rights secured by the
>>     Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or
>>     legislation which would abrogate them." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US
>>     436, 491. Also see Marbury v. Madison, 1803. The power to tax is the
>>     power to destroy and this person claims that the taxing power of the
>>     state if it were to pertain to this person in this case would not
>>     only control but also suppress and/or abrogate his absolute right to
>>     personal liberty (locomotion) as: "The power to tax the exercise of
>>     a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment."
>>     Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 US 40, 44-45.
>>     Since the state is attempting to control or suppress the accused's
>>     actions by taxing through the vehicle registration program and
>>     operator's license, the state is proceeding in some kind of
>>     administrative law not the common law. This type of action is an
>>     equitable action brought on by some enfranchisement, license, or
>>     contract, which must be shown to establish jurisdiction over this
>>     person. As stated by Blackstone: "Let a man therefore be ever so
>>     abandoned in his principles, or vicious in his practice, provided he
>>     keeps his wretchedness to himself, and does not offend against the
>>     rules of public decency, he is out of reach of human laws."
>>     Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol I, p. 113. Since no such conditions
>>     exist in this case, no jurisdiction exists in this Court.
>>                               VII COUNSEL
>>     The accused demands unlicensed Counsel of choice. The right to
>>     counsel at a criminal trial is deemed so fundamental to the
>>     interests of justice that denial thereof automatically vitiates any
>>     conviction obtained (the automatic reversal rule). This is true even
>>     though there is no showing of any prejudice or unfairness in the
>>     proceedings or even any need for counsel. Gideon v. Wainright, 372
>>     US 335. A conviction obtained where the accused was denied counsel
>>     is treated as void for all purposes. Lack of counsel of choice can
>>     be conceivably even worse than no counsel at all, or having to
>>     accept counsel beholden to one's adversary. Burgett v. Texas, 309 US
>>     109.
>>     The right to counsel exists not only at the trial thereof, but also
>>     at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of
>>     an accused may be affected. Mempha v. Rhay, 389 US 128. A state or
>>     federal court which arbitrarily refuses to hear a party by counsel,
>>     denies the party a hearing and, therefore, denies him due process of
>>     law in a constitutional sense. Reynolds v. Cochran, 365 US 525.
>>                             VIII NO COMPLAINT
>>     The state is proceeding without any formal complaint. Since no
>>     "proper plaintiff" exists who can bring the action for a violation
>>     of rights in a common law action, the state is proceeding on the
>>     face of a citation which is a proceeding under a Civil Law
>>     jurisdiction (probate or admiralty) of licenses and contracts, and
>>     which are not applicable to this natural person. The Uniform
>>     Citation "tickets" fail as complaints for the following reasons: 1.
>>     No Corpus Delecti is established upon the face of the "tickets". 2.
>>     No criminal intent is alleged, nor shown by apparent circumstances
>>     surrounding this case. 3. No offer of proof is made that the
>>     defendant is subject to Title 14, and thereby subject to these
>>     summary proceedings for lesser offenses. Where no Corpus Delecti is
>>     shown, a conviction cannot be supported.
>>                              IX NO INTENT
>>     The formal complaint must allege 2 elements of any crime, to be
>>     valid and sustain a case. Idaho Code 18-114: Union of Act and Intent
>>     -- "In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or
>>     joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence." The
>>     Plaintiff does not have to prove intent in this case as the only
>>     issue before the court is whether petitioner committed the act or
>>     not. Experience has proven that in like cases before this court,
>>     there is no presumption of innocence, and there is no presumption of
>>     sui juris status. Since intent will not be a matter of fact before
>>     the jury, intent must be a matter of law. Therefore, the state
>>     legislature has legislated guilt and the court is proceeding in a
>>     summary process under the Civil Law to regulate corporations and
>>     regulated industry. (Almeida-Sanchez, 413 US 266; Colonnade Catering
>>     Corp. v. United States, 397 US 72; United States v. Biswell, 406 US
>>     311) Under the Common Law, "intent" is a matter of status and
>>     conduct and must be a matter of fact before the jury, and if not so,
>>     the proceedings are alien to the common law.
>>                            X COMMON LAW JURY
>>     The accused demands a common law struck jury of twelve of his peers.
>>     A trial by jury at the Common Law consists of twelve men, neither
>>     more or less. Patton et al v. U.S., 281 US 276.
>>     The accused demands a jury that would be able to determine the law
>>     and evidence in this case as well as the facts. This is a Common Law
>>     right. State v. Croteau, 23 Vt 14, 54; State v. Meyer, 58 Vt 457;
>>     Appeal of Lowe, 46 Kan 255; Lynch v. State, 9 Ind 541; Hudelson v.
>>     State, 94 Ind 426; People v. Videto, 1 Parker, Gr R. 603; Pleasant
>>     v. State, 14 Ark 360; Wohlford v. People, 45 Ill App 188;
>>     Commonwealth v. Porter, 51 Mass 263; U.S. v. Watkins, Fed Case No.
>>     16, p. 649 (3 Cranch, C.C. 4411); 4 L.R.A. 675; Beard v. State, 71
>>     Md 275.
>>      State has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. The
>>      complaint naming the State of Connecticut as Plaintiff, by the word
>>      "Plaintiff" alleges a Cause of Action which is: "Matter for which
>>      an action may be brought." "A cause of action implies that there is
>>      some person in existence who can bring suit and also a person who
>>      can lawfully be sued". "When a wrong has been committed, or a
>>      breach of duty has occured, the cause of action has accrued,
>>      although the claimant may be ignorant of it". A cause of action
>>      consists of those facts as to two or more persons entitling at
>>      least some one of them to a judicial remedy of some sort against
>>      the other, or others, for the redress or prevention of a wrong. It
>>      is essential to the existence of such facts that there should be a
>>      right to be violated and a violation thereof. In this case, no
>>      evidence or testimony can be brought before the court to establish
>>      any natural person or persons who have suffered a loss of rights
>>      and therefor, there can be no cause of action or criminal
>>      causation.
>>                           XII MEANINGFUL HEARING
>>     This court has repeatedly stated on the record that it will not even
>>     read or hear any constitutional issues brought before it much less
>>     rule on such issues, therefore the Court has denied the accused due
>>     process of law.
>>                          XIV THEORY OF THE CASE
>>     Proceedings in the Court during trial will not allow the accused to
>>     address issues of law nor will petitioner be allowed to express her
>>     theory of the law and the case to the jury. The accused is
>>     restricted by the form of the proceedings to restrict his defense
>>     solely upon the basis of whether or not he committed the acts, and
>>     substantive issues cannot be related to the jury. This clearly shows
>>     that the jury proposed by the state is not a common law jury but one
>>     operating under statutory and judicial restrictions to satisfy the
>>     conscience of the King and his court. This type of jury is
>>     prescribed in admiralty/maritime/equity/administrative jurisdictions
>>     foreign to the common law.
>>                                CONCLUSION
>>     In this case:
>>     1. The accused is a Free and natural person who has claimed all of
>>     his rights at the common law and has denied all other jurisdictions
>>     until asserted and proved.
>>     2. The Plaintiff has brought forth charges that, in this case, are
>>     not within the jurisdiction of the court.
>>     3. The court is proceeding in a summary fashion and not according to
>>     the rules and procedures of the Common Law.
>>     4. The Plaintiff and the Court are apparently conspiring to defeat
>>     the legal/civil rights of the accused.
>>     5. The Plaintiff and the Court are proceeding in a jurisdiction
>>     foreign to the Common Law.
>>                              REMEDY SOUGHT
>>     Since the action and the proceedings in this case do not conform to
>>     the rules and procedures of the common law, the accused demands that
>>     the court dismiss the charges.
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