Paul Mitchell's letter to Dan Meador, 9/29/98

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Posted by Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S. on September 30, 1998 at 01:03:30:

In Reply to: LEGISLATIVE COURT, from "Encyclopedia of the American Constitution" posted by Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S. on September 29, 1998 at 16:02:49:

Dear Dan et al.:

You asked readers to speak now, or forever hold our peace.
Although I would agree that this issue is somewhat urgent,
I do not think that rushing us is going to improve the
quality of our arguments, or the quality of any litigation
we may pursue, using this argument for any legitimate purpose.
Haste makes waste; always has; always will.

With that in mind, I would like to provide you with these
immediate comments. I plan to provide more, just as soon
as I can. Here are my immediate comments:

1. 28 U.S.C. 132 is still problematic for me, even after
reading your analysis below. I say this, because I have
carried my own burden of pulling the Statutes at Large,
signed by President Truman on June 25, 1948. The text
of 28 U.S.C. 132 is identical to text in the Act of June 25, 1948,
with the addition of the amendment in 1963 (P.L. 88-176).
It appears from this evidence that the USDC, situated
inside the 50 states, was created by an Act of Congress,
and that Act was the Act of June 25, 1948. Whether that
Act is constitutional, or not, is another matter.

2. 28 U.S.C. 132 thus has all the attributes of Public Law,
because H.R. 3214 was passed by the House, amended by the
Senate, and then the amended version was passed by the
House. President Truman then signed H.R. 3214, and the
resulting statutes are published in the Statutes at Large.
I believe that this historical evidence directly contradicts
your claim that the USDC is a private court; or, put differently,
this historical evidence "gives the appearance" of contradicting
your claim that the USDC is a private court, absent further

Please don't get me wrong; I happen to agree with you,
but I am convinced that, if we are going to make a
persuasive argument, we must make the argument more compelling.

If you had to argue this point to the Supreme Court tomorrow,
do you think you are now prepared to do so, without any
additional study and research, particularly if that high court
was about to issue a major precedent with which we must all
live, for the rest of our lives here on planet earth?

For example, where "Act of Congress" is defined, is
the term "includes" restrictive or expansive, and how
much of your argument depends on a restrictive meaning?
How much of your argument fails, if "includes" there
was intended to be expansive? See Title 1, U.S.C., for
clarification vis--vis "Enacting Clauses". The Act of
June 25, 1948 is a proper Enacting Clause [sic].

3. The U.S. Supreme Court has given us notice that it places
some value in the opinions of experts. I am now busy reading
encyclopedias in a university library, and every single author
agrees that the USDC inside the 50 states is an Article III
court. Thus, our position is contradicted by a significant
number of experts. Accordingly, we must carry a burden which
is that much more difficult to carry, in light of this
"conventional wisdom" (i.e. USDC = Article III). Would either
of us be able to convince a federal court that we are experts,
or expert witnesses? This is not an idle or loaded question.

4. It is not just the opinions of experts which we must overcome.
One obvious consequence of being wrong is that the reputation
of judicial activists like us will be seriously tarnished,
if we are proven wrong on this point. Conversely, one obvious
consequence of being right is that many MANY federal cases
will have been convened in the wrong court, beginning in
See 18 U.S.C. 3231 for proof!! So, there is a great deal
of political pressure which will be brought to bear upon us
(as if there has not already been enough :), to say nothing
of the intense heat this argument will generate (and has already
generated, if my reading of the judicial history on this
point is correct).

5. At this point, I need to make strategic decisions about
how to argue this point, and what to do with those arguments.
Now pending before the 8th Circuit is an Application for
Leave to Intervene by Right, filed by me as Relator on
behalf of the People of the United States of America.
To date, the 8th Circuit has not ruled on this motion.
I can, within the next 30 days, draft and file with
that Clerk, a NOTICE AND DEMAND that they rule on that
Application for Intervention. If they deny it, or if
they ignore it, I have a cause of action before the
U.S. Supreme Court in that case.

My defense of Mr. Gilbertson in that case
was a frontal attack on the vagueness in the IRC,
in addition to an attack on the Jury Selection and
Service Act -- for expressly excluding state Citizens from
eligibility thereon. I believe you have already read his
OPENING BRIEF in that case; if you haven't, please find
it asap in the Supreme Law Library, and study it carefully.

A major pivot point is the existence of two classes of
citizens in America. Subsequently, I discovered a
very dispositive case in Alla v. Kornfeld, a USDC
decision in which that judge held that federal citizens
FIRST ENACTED INTO LAW. This is very valuable,
quite obviously.

6. Based on the belief that the DCUS still existed,
Gilbertson defaulted DOJ when they failed to prove
jurisdiction in the USDC; then he testified to their
default in an Affidavit of Default; finally, he petitioned
a 3-judge DCUS panel, among other things, to adjudicate the
apportionment of Congressional Districts within Minnesota
state. Why? Answer: because federal jury candidates are
pulled from state voter registration lists, and the Minnesota
voter registration form requires registrants to declare,
under penalty of perjury, that they are federal citizens.
Thus, we felt we could prove that the apportionment of
Congressional districts was being skewed by the fact that
state Citizens were not even being registered. After all,
voter registrations are at an all-time low; this may
be part of the reason. This is the ONLY subject matter
which now authorizes a 3-judge federal district court.

7. More to the point of two classes, the cases which have
adjudicated the Diversity Clause, and the corresponding
Diversity statutes, agree completely with our position
that the Citizens mentioned in that Clause are state
Citizens (read "Citizens of ONE OF the States United");
the very same argument can be made for the Qualifications
Clauses. Therefore, these conclusions are inescapable, to wit:

1. those who can make law in Congress, cannot vote; and
2. those who can vote, cannot make law in Congress.

When push comes to shove, we cite Dyett v. Turner to prove
there is no constitutional authority for the proposition
that federal citizens are also Citizens of the states in which
they reside (section 1 of the so-called 14th amendment),
and fight that one on authority of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.

Phrased in this way, it is obvious that voter registration
AND jury selection are BOTH unconstitutional, at the state
AND at the federal levels. This is an astounding conclusion,
but it is fully supported by all the cases which I have
enumerated so painstakenly in Gilbertson's OPENING BRIEF,
and the two companion briefs which he would not sign:
Application for Leave to File Enlarged Brief, and
its First Supplement (both now published in the Supreme Law
Library). Alla v. Kornfeld further substantiates these
inescapable conclusions. The first of these two companion
briefs reiterates the history of how federal courts have
handled the proper Motion to Stay Proceedings, Pending
Final Review of our Challenge to the Constitutionality
of the JSSA. It is a very sorry history, indeed.

8. Because nothing in my subsequent research has invalidated
ANYTHING which we did in Gilbertson's case, I feel that his
case would be an excellent place to bring lots of pressure on
these very points. In other words, Gilbertson had a fundamental
Right to convene the DCUS, if only to adjudicate his many
FOIA requests (some of which went to missing regulations,
such as the regs for 18 U.S.C. 3231), if not also to adjudicate
many other questions which bear directly, and indirectly,
on the federal income tax conviction he was fighting,
such as voter registration affidavits, apportionment of
congressional districts, and all the other Topics listed
in the OPENING BRIEF's Table of Contents.

Remember, we based his appeal, in large part, on Treasury
Decision 2313 and the voluminous documentation in
"The Federal Zone," 7th edition (not yet published).
He had filed a tax return showing as "taxable income"
ONLY the money he had received from the District of
Columbia; so, he did everything right. Only problem was,
when he was incarcerated, he did an inexplicable 180 turn
and threw me off the case. Hence, the Application for
Intervention of Right, filed by me the Relator.

9. I think we can do a much better job of explaining away
the "cheap shots" which many government attorneys will
throw at us. For example, I fully expect that DOJ
will argue that Congress can always "change the name"
of any court, which they have done enough times already,
without being challenged for same. Along this line of
argument, DOJ will just say that the "district court of
the United States" was merely changed to the "United States
District Court", and that everything else remained the
same, for purposes of Article III jurisdiction (e.g.
Diversity Clause and Supremacy Clause matters).

Of course, they do have military flags in every USDC
inside the 50 states, and many proceedings give the
appearance of summary proceedings (I would know; I have
been in enough of them already). There is other evidence,
such as the rule that all Supreme Court process will issue
in the name of the President. Nevertheless, I think that
too much of your argument fails if "Act of Congress"
also includes legislation intended for application within
the several states of the Union; 28 U.S.C. is clearly
intended for application within the several states,
because those states are all listed in Chapter 5 of Title 28.
The territorial extent of that Act is unmistakable.

10. If we are going to prevail with this argument, I believe
we must base it, first of all, on sound constitutional
principles, such as the Separation of Powers Doctrine,
both vertical (state/federal) and horizontal (legislative/
executive/judicial). It is in this context that I believe
I can convince a majority of the Supreme Court (but NOT
Rehnquist) that the holding in Evans v. Gore was correct,
and that the Public Salary Tax Act is unconstitutional as
applied to Article III judges. Remember that Rehnquist has
already admitted, to a large class of law students at the
University of Arizona, that ALL federal judges are currently
paying income taxes on their judicial compensation. Many (most?)
people have failed to understand that I have been trying
my best to make friends out of the entire lot of federal
judges; they would certainly be the first to benefit
from a ruling in my favor, on this point, wouldn't they?

Do we really want to argue that they are all under the gun
(read "subject to IRS undue influence")? How are you
going to prove extortion, if not one judge comes forward
to admit same? Lord v. Kelley may be the very best we
could ever hope for, in this vein.

11. Then, we must show that, what Congress attempted to do,
was far more than a simple, innocuous name change. If that
was all they were trying to do, why didn't Congress use
the colloquial term "Federal District Court," which is a
term with which everyone is already familiar? The theory
we MUST substantiate, because it is OUR BURDEN TO PROVE,
is that Congress was persuaded to treat all 50 states
as federal territories, for purposes of all federal
court jurisdiction within those states, and THAT is the
reason why they extended the USDC into the state zone.

We cannot avoid opening Pandora's Box, however, because
this theory points to an obviously fraudulent intent,
either on the part of Congress, and/or on the part of the
judges and attorneys who perpetrated this ruse on the Congress,
and then on the entire country. Couched in these terms, our proof
necessarily MUST imply a gigantic new liability for the United
States (federal government), because of all the unlawful
arrests and all of the unlawful incarcerations which have
resulted from ultra vires federal courts for over 50 years
(50 years and 3 months, to be exact).

12. Now, you can begin to appreciate why the voter registration
affidavit is relevant. If Congress was innocently proceeding
on the basis of the presumption that every citizen was
already a federal citizen, then it was correct to treat the
entire nation as a legislative democracy, in effect. But,
as you know from the Guarantee Clause, that assumption was
legally incorrect, given the existence of two classes of
citizens, and given a fundamental Right of Election (read
"Freedom of Choice") to choose one, the other, both, or
neither of these classes. Remember, Brushaber was "one of us,"
and he brought his original complaint to the DCUS circa 1916,
five years after the Act of March 3, 1911. Justice White ruled
that repeals by implication are NOT favored, thus upholding
not only 1:2:3 and 1:9:4, but also the prohibition against
taxing federal judicial compensation at 3:1, NOTWITHSTANDING

Thus, the voter registration practices at the federal AND state
levels are clear violations of the Guarantee Clause, and Gilbertson
was indicted AND convicted by "juries" which were not legal
bodies, per force! There is no avoiding this conclusion,
if my facts and laws are straight. Moreover, if Gilbertson's
OPENING BRIEF did anything original (hence "first impression"),
he proved that the Guarantee Clause does not prevent Congress
from creating a legislative democracy inside the federal zone;
just construct that Clause, and you will see what I mean:

The United States shall guarantee to the several states
a Republican Form of government, but it is under no such
obligation to guarantee said Form to territory which is
under its exclusive legislative jurisdiction. After all,
these areas are under federal tutelage, and they were,
originally, intended to become states, at some unspecified
future date. I think we can prevail by arguing that Congress
has erred by attempting to retain these areas under its
exclusive jurisdiction, permanently, rather than to move them
in the direction of statehood. Why should teachers suppress
any student's development to full maturity? DOJ will argue
that Congress is under no such legal obligation, however.

13. If Congress was attempting to perpetrate their legislative
democracy inside the 50 states, because everyone and his brother
was already a federal citizen, it would make sense, in this
important and essential historical context, for Congress to
do more than merely change the name of constitutional courts to
territorial United States District Courts, because this
assumption by Congress, albeit rebuttable, allowed for this
change to do more than merely change the name of the court;
it permitted Congress to treat everyone and every thing
within the 50 states, AS IF everything/everyone were already situated
inside the federal zone, where Congress DOES already have
exclusive legislative jurisdiction, and that exclusive
legislative jurisdiction allows Congress to convene
legislative courts, does it not?

14. For better or worse, the (hidden) Pandora's Box that is
within Pandora's Box, is the existence of (hidden?) Federal Reserve
Bank liens on all assets within the 50 states. Howard Freeman
mentioned this several times in his writings; I have found
evidence of this very thing, in California state laws.
Are you prepared to rebut the assumption which follows
from a $6 trillion federal debt? I am. How? Answer:
Dyett v. Turner recites historical facts PROVING that
section 4 of the so-called 14th amendment is NOT LAW!

THAT is my reason for attacking section 4, because the
validity of the public debt can then be attacked in open
court, thus rebutting "The Grand Assumption" (i.e.
Congress already has a lien on everyone and everything,
albeit a "secret" one). The holding we need, then,
is for the high court to rule that the 50 states are
NOT in the federal zone, defined by 4:3:2, because
those states are NOT territory or other property which
belongs to the United States in any way, shape, or form,
notwithstanding the Federal Reserve and its massive
claims against all of America. The federal zone and
the state zone are perfectly disjoint, geographically,
in law, in fact, and in every conceivable that might
matter in any court of law we might convene, anywhere
in America.

15. Now, we are getting to the essential differences, which
MUST be completely and thoroughly documented. One such is the
which we must be prepared to demonstrate. On this point,
see the most recent additions to the Supreme Law Forum at URL:

See also, for example, the discussions in re "Bad Karma,"
which I believe I have already mailed to you, in hard copy.

We are wading into an area of constitutional law where the
issues have already been hotly debated, ever since Marshall's
dicta in 1828, in American Insurance v. 356 Bales of Cotton.
You will note that the Marathon Pipeline case also shows
a lack of high court unanimity on the basic, underlying
principles, and that is a RECENT case!

You are so right to complain that legislative courts are biased:
Their decisions are influenced (controlled?) by factors which are
outside constitutional guarantees. Thus, the immense significance
of the Brushaber case comes full circle: WE MUST REPRODUCE
going to stand any chance of prevailing, and Brushaber
v. Union Pacific Railroad Company was brought to the
District Court of the United States! YES!!! Neither Downes nor
Hooven have any bearing whatsoever, because we are standing,
quite literally and legally, inside the state zone, where
the U.S. Constitution can and must be enfored against the federal
government, and all of its officers, employees, and agents.

THAT is the "trap" which we created for Gilbertson's trial
judge, and he walked right into it. We even heard,
via the grapevine, that he attempted to edit the official
transcript of that disastrous sentencing hearing, and he got
caught doing it! In case you missed it, it was the U.S.
Attorney who had to bring to that judge's attention, the
fact that this judge had been sued under FOIA -- to compel
exhibition of his oath of office. That complaint was
filed, tactically, BEFORE sentencing, thus giving us a
fundamentally sound reason for recusing him (and every
OTHER federal judge who might try to do the same thing).
Gilbertson was railroaded.

16. Another somewhat technical approach is to show that,
if Congress did elect to create district courts inside
the 50 states, those courts would, per force, be limited to
original jurisdiction over matters listed in the Arising Under
and Supremacy Clauses (which mirror each other). One can
easily infer what subject matters would HAVE to be granted there.
Here's how: itemize the 9 matters listed in 3:2; then,
subtract the ones over which the Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction. What is left are the subject matters over
which the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction,
necessarily implying that the courts of original jurisdiction
are SOME OTHER (INFERIOR) COURTS. The Convention debates reached
a compromise here, with many arguing, forcefully, that the
courts of original jurisdiction should be the courts of
the several states.

We can argue that Article III clearly constrains Congress
to create CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS ONLY within the 50 states,
insofar as those federal courts are given original
jurisdiction over matters arising under the Supremacy Clause.

By the way, this is one way of arguing, through the
back door, that the IRC is municipal law, and
should be treated as "foreign law" under the rubric of
"Conflict of Laws" [sic], with respect to the lawful situs
and domicile of all state Citizens. This is no mean feat,
but most of the necessary work is already done. Gilbertson
would argue that he still deserves his day in the DCUS court,
where he will then subpoena the Legislative Counsel and the
Congressional Research Service, to prove that the IRC
is municipal law, and therefore "foreign" law with respect
to the People of the 50 states. See the Press Release
in the Supreme Law Library entitled "Congresswoman Suspected
of Income Tax Evasion" for details.

17. Here is another fundamental distinction on which we
can prevail, because I know, for a fact, that the issue
is now ripe, more so than it has ever been throughout
any time in American history. Congress has plenary power
over the federal zone, and Congress is not prevented from
creating a legislative democracy there. If Congress
wants to create legislative courts there, so be it.

But, our major concern is to create a high court
precedent which strikes down the IRC for being void
for vagueness. As I wrote in Gilbertson's OPENING BRIEF,
that vagueness is most egregious when it comes to the
territorial application of the IRC.

If the high court will not do this, then we must
persuade the high court that the IRC is a municipal
code, at the very least. It is for this reason that
we MUST put both feet down on the Brushaber case, because
we have now correctly sorted out all of the confusing
and contradictory statements in White's ruling in that case.

See Chapter 13, "Amendment 13 Post Mortem," in
"The Federal Zone" (a chapter now loaded in the Supreme Law

Clearly, Congress could, and did, tax the privilege of
profit generation by a domestic (federal zone) corporation,
and that corporation was the withholding agent,
made liable by the sections currently itemized
in the IRC's definition of withholding agent. Thus,
Treasury Decision 2313 was, and still is, correct:

UPRR was the domestic corporation to which that T.D. referred;
Frank Brushaber was the nonresident alient to which that
T.D. referred. This T.D. was issued by the federal government,
and it has never been overturned.

I think I have rambled enough for now. Please go back over
this long memorandum, and see if you either agree or
disagree, with these major points. Perhaps we need
to do a "moot court" somewhere in your neck of the woods,
to flush out all of these issues before a group of
sympathetic, yet objective, observers (moot jurors?).
That would be fun, indeed!

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

Counselor at Law, Federal Witness,
and Private Attorney General

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