Re: Bad Karma?


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Posted by Dave on April 07, 1998 at 15:59:10:

In Reply to: Bad Karma Paul Mitchell? posted by Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S. on April 02, 1998 at 21:32:03:

: : : : I response was posted on an email service I subscribe to after your article on karma and the courts was distributed there. Can you make a rebuttle to the issue?

: : : : Mitchell is so far behind times it is a shame. We discovered this over three years ago and it don't mean a blame thing. Foia or privacy cannot be heard in ANY district court. Its all administrative and so are districts courts administrative agencies of Congress. So when you approach either district court the matter is res judicata for the other agency has had its court hearing. Now for the remedy that the administrative agency can't give you, the only place to get judicial review of an administrative agency is founfd in Title 5 United Stated Code Service at section 706 NOTE 6. Read it and see for yourself. Now you can see how far Mitchell is off base. HE ASSUMED it was the "other "district court, huh? Not so when reading the forementioned Title.

: : : : Big Al

: : :
: : : Dear Al et al.,

: : : No, bad karma federal judiciary!!

: : : I respectfully disagree. Many pertinent
: : : court authorities have held that statutes
: : : granting original jurisdiction to federal
: : : courts must be STRICTLY construed. Confer
: : : at "Federal Courts" in C.J.S., for example.

: : : Title 1, U.S.C. controls the construction
: : : of singular versus plural; i.e., they refer
: : : to one and the same entities, always, without
: : : exception. The American Insurance and
: : : Balzac v. Porto Rico holdings clearly
: : : distinguish the USDC from the DCUS. And,
: : : the federal statute at 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B)
: : : expressly mentions the DCUS, NOT the USDC!!

: : : Such was the essence of John M. Roll's ORDER
: : : In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Served on New Life
: : : Health Center Company, to wit:

: : : This [USDC] is not the proper forum to
: : : bring a request under the Freedom of
: : : Information Act.

: : : See exact wording in Gilbertson's OPENING BRIEF.

: : : For this reason, the matter is res judicata.
: : : Confer also at:

: : : Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.

: : : in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition.
: : : The inference can be made that, what was omitted,
: : : was intended to be omitted. Congress, therefore,
: : : INTENDED to omit the USDC from said statute.

: : : Likewise, compare 18 U.S.C. 1964(a) and 1964(c).

: : : Your use of ad hominem argumentation is
: : : properly ignored -- for being frivolous.

: : :
: : : Respectfully submitted,

: : : /s/ Paul Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

: : : Counselor at Law, Federal Witness
: : : and Private Attorney General

: : Yes Virginia, there is a sandy claws.....
: : Thanks Paul. We've been wondering exactly where that cite was at regarding the difference between the venues of the different courts, and had lost track of the 1 USC reference somewhere in the shuffle of tall piles of poorly indexed misfilings on our office floor, or wherever.
: : One additional point to Big Al AKA New kid on the Block: Do the statutes mean exactly what they say, or is that up to some judge having a (pardon the expresion please) 'brain fart' to decide? Check out the info on Law 101 at www.taxgate.com and see what ol' Thurston Bell has turned up.
: : It looks like you'll find that, even though your favorite Congress-critter may be an idiot, legislative counsel and the lawyers that prepare the statutes are pretty sharp cookies. Ergo, the statutes say what they mean, and mean what they say; no more, no less.
: : One citation or one statute does not the law make, just like one verse from the Bible is a lousy basis on which to establish a doctrine, but many violate that most basic of principles, in both cases. So sad.

:
: Dear Friends,

: Here are the pertinent cites which I could find
: on the subject of strict construction of
: federal jurisdictional statutes:

: "The general policy of the Judiciary Act of
: 1887 and 1888, as has been recognized repeatedly,
: was to contract [reduce] the jurisdiction of the
: federal courts, and accordingly all doubts as to
: jurisdiction must be resolved against it."

: 25 C.J. 4 [emphasis added]

: "Jurisdiction of inferior federal courts, see
: supra Sec. 4(1), based on diversity of citizenship
: is entirely statutory, and the rule stated supra
: that statutes conferring jurisdiction on the
: federal courts are to be strictly construed
: applies to the statute conferring diversity
: jurisdiction."

: 36 C.J.S. 55

: cites:

: Thomson v. Gaskill, Neb.,
: 62 S.Ct. 673, 315 U.S. 442, 86 L.Ed. 951

: City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat. Bank of
: City of New York, Ind.,
: 62 S.Ct. 15, 314 U.S. 63, 86 L.Ed. 47,
: reh. den. 62 S.Ct. 355, 356, three cases
: 314 U.S. 714, 86 L.Ed. 569

: Trust Co. of Chicago v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
: C.A.Ill., 183 F.2d 640

: Seidman v. Hamilton, D.C.Pa.,
: 173 F.Supp. 641

: Garfield Local 13-566 Oil, Chemical and Atomic
: Workers Intern. Union, AFL-CIO v. Heyden Newport
: Chemical Corp., D.C.N.J.,
: 172 F.Supp. 230

: Harris v. American Legion, D.C.Ind.,
: 162 F.Supp 700

: Detres v. Lions Bldg. Corp., D.C.Ill.,
: 136 F.Supp 699, reversed on other grounds,
: C.A., 234 F.2d 596

: Blair Holdings Corp. v. Rubinstein, D.C.N.Y.,
: 133 F.Supp. 496

: Asbury v. New York Life Insurance Co., D.C.Ky.,
: 45 F.Supp. 513

: Scarborough v. Mountain States Telephone
: & Telegraph Co., D.C.Tex., 45 F.Supp. 176

: Continental Min. & Mill. Co. v. Migliaccio,
: D.C.Utah, 16 F.R.D. 217

: "... [J]urisdiction must be based on a clear
: statutory mandate." 36 C.J.S. 5

: cites:

: Carroll v. U.S., App.D.C.,
: 77 S.Ct. 1332, 354 U.S. 394, 1 L.Ed.2d 1442

: "A strict construction of statutes conferring
: jurisdiction on federal courts and prescribing
: jurisdictional requirements is called for by
: the policy of the statutes and due regard for
: the rightful independence of state governments;
: and, accordingly, all doubts as to jurisdiction
: must be resolved against it."

: 36 C.J.S. 5

: cites:

: Aetna Ins. Co. v. Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co.,
: C.A.Kan., 229 F.2d 584

: Tsang v. Kansas, C.A.Cal.,
: 173 F.2d 204, cert. den. 69 S.Ct. 1515,
: 337 U.S. 939, 93 L.Ed. 1744

: Kresberg v. International Paper Co., C.C.A.N.Y.,
: 149 F.2d 911, cert. den. 66 S.Ct. 146,
: 326 U.S. 764, 90 L.Ed. 460

: Downing v. Howard, D.C.Del.,
: 68 F.Supp 6, aff'd C.C.A.,
: 162 F.2d 654, cert. den. 68 S.Ct. 155,
: 332 U.S. 818, 92 L.Ed. 395

: Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp.
: v. Third Nat. Bank of Nashville,
: D.C.Tenn., 60 F.Supp. 110, reversed
: on other grounds, C.C.A., 153 F.2d 678,
: cert. den. 67 S.Ct. 49, 329 U.S. 718,
: 91 L.Ed. 622, and 67 S.Ct. 50,
: 329 U.S. 718, 91 L.Ed. 623

: U.S. v. Forness, D.C.N.Y.,
: 37 F.Supp. 337

: "Jurisdictional statutes are construed narrowly."

: cites:

: Mozingo v. Consolidated Const. Co.,
: D.C.Va., 171 F.Supp. 396

: Central Mexico Light & Power Co.
: v. Munch, C.C.A.N.Y.,
: 116 F.2d 85

: Humphrey v. U.S. Fidelity &
: Guaranty Co., D.C.Or.,
: 38 F.Supp. 224

: 25 C.J. p. 691, note 55

: "Presumption against jurisdiction
: see Federal Civil Procedure, Sec. 449."

: "Policy generally is to disclaim
: jurisdiction in doubtful cases."

: The Emma Giles, D.C.Md., 15 F.Supp 502

: "A grant of jurisdiction must appear
: by clear and unambiguous provision."

: 36 C.J.S. 5

: cite:

: Sweet v. B.F. Goodrich Co., D.C.Ohio,
: 68 F.Supp. 782

: "...[A]ll doubts as to jurisdiction must
: be resolved against it."

: 25 C.J. 4, p. 691, n. 55

: cites:

: St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. Davis,
: 132 Fed 629, 632

: Joy v. St. Louis,
: 122 Fed. 524, aff'd 201 U.S. 332,
: 26 S.Ct. 478, 50 L.Ed. 776

:
: Resectfully submitted,

: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

: Counselor at Law, Federal Witness
: and Private Attorney General


Paul,

I respectfully raise the following issue concerning the argument you present asserting the existance of separate district courts. Quoting from 'Karma and the Federal Courts':

"And so, we have come to this point in decoding Title 28 of the United States Codes: there are two classes of federal "District Courts" in the federal court system."

In summary, you contend that the 'district courts of the United States' and the 'United States District Courts' are different entities. Yet armed with nothing more than internet access to Cornell's US Code one can easily find the following cites from Title 28 which would seem to place your theory on an unsound base.

To wit:

Section 132 'creates' the "United States District Courts" ---

Title 28 Chapter 5. District Courts

28 132. Creation and composition of district courts

(a) There shall be in each judicial district a district court which shall be a court of record known as the United States District Court for the district.


Then if you work your way further along in Title 28 you come to the always important definitions in Section 451 ---


Title 28 Chapter 21. General provisions applicable to courts and judges

28 451. Definitions
. . .
The terms "district court" and "district court of the United States" mean the courts constituted by chapter 5 of this title.


Based on these cites, it seems pretty clear to me that the two names refer to the same court. Further, the Balzac v. Porto Rico ruling does not mention the District Court of the United States (DCUS) in any manner. It merely states that the United States District Court is a legislative tribunal of limited jurisdiction. I do not see how this 'proves' that the DCUS does have general jurisdiction. This argument is valid only if you presume the existence of two courts to begin with, resulting in chase-your-tail circular logic. (ie. If there are two courts, and the Supreme Court said #1 didn't have general jurisdiction, then #2 must have it, so there must be two courts.)

A closer look at 18 USC 1962(a) shows that the exact same words are used to identify the court as in 28 USC 451 above.


1964. Civil remedies
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
. . .
c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee, except that no person may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of section 1962. The exception contained in the preceding sentence does not apply to an action against any person that is criminally convicted in connection with the fraud, in which case the statute of limitations shall start to run on the date on which the conviction becomes final.


Upon a close reading of a) and c) it appears that the reason for the two different sub-sections is that the first authorizes the court to act pre-emptively to stop violations while c) authorizes the court to settle disputes arising as a result of such violations.

For completeness, it is noted that both Title 18 and Title 28 were enacted into positive law simultaneously.

Title 18
THIS TITLE WAS ENACTED BY ACT JUNE 25, 1948, CH. 645, SEC. 1, 62 STAT. 683

Title 28
THIS TITLE WAS ENACTED BY ACT JUNE 25, 1948, CH. 646, SEC. 1, 62 STAT. 869


Note: This argument does not attempt to address the extent or applicability of the power of any district court(s), merely their existence and identification.


As an exercise, let's reach just a little further.

Article 3 Section 1 of the Constitution vests the Supreme Court with 'the judicial power of the United States'. All other courts vested with such power are to be 'ordained' and 'established' by Congress. If your 'dual-court' theory is true, where exactly does Congress 'ordain and establish' the second type of 'district court'? Cites please.

In summary, it appears to me that there is only one type of district court, called by two names. This court is a legislative tribunal (per Balzac) of limited jurisdiction.


If you can spare the time, I humbly request that you enlighten me as to any errors or omissions in the above argument. There are limits as to what one pair of eyes can find and I am always ready to admit that the error may be mine. If many eyes review a thing closely, the errors can be dispelled and the truth will remain.

Respectfully,

Dave





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