Re: Does 28 U.S.C. 451destroy

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Posted by Dave on April 08, 1998 at 19:00:11:

In Reply to: Does 28 U.S.C. 451destroy posted by Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S. on April 08, 1998 at 14:18:37:

: (snip)

: the DCUS, which clearly existed PRIOR TO
: 1948.

: 6. DCUS for Arizona is created by 28 U.S.C. 82;
: USDC for Arizona is created by 28 U.S.C. 132;
: and so on ....

: 7. The USDC cannot exercise judicial power,
: according to the holding in American
: Insurance, because its constitutional
: authority originates from Article IV,
: NOT Article III; C.J. Marshall held that
: the USDC cannot receive judicial power
: in the first place.

: I hope this helps. My apologies for the
: malfunction in the forum software.

: Sincerely yours,

: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

: Counselor at Law, Federal Witness
: and Private Attorney General


Speaking for those of us who take an interest in these issues, but don't have access to much more than the internet to verify the many claims made on the vast number of websites, I would offer the following suggestion to 'flesh out' your 'karma' argument.

I personally find your assorted facts to be difficult to tie together in a conclusive manner. While each fact may be correct (again, I haven't the resources at hand to check), they each approach the matter in a tangential fashion, making it difficult to grasp the whole as sufficient to prove the point. For example, my reading of 28 USC 81 through 131 would conclude that those sections establish the boundries of the judicial districts within each state/territory, not the courts themselves.

After some digging I came across this old Supreme Court case which provides a starting point for resolving the issue.

In THE GLIDE, 167 U.S. 606 (1897) the Supreme Court stated

"The most convenient way of tracing the development of the law upon this subject will be to consider the principal decisions of this (Supreme) court in chronological order, first referring to the provisions of the constitution and statutes of the United States which lie at the foundation of the whole matter.

By the constitution of the United States (article 3, 2), 'the judicial power shall extend' 'to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.' And by provisions, still in force, of the judiciary act of 1789, the district courts of the United States 'shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several states,' 'original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,' 'saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it.' Act Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, 9; 1 Stat. 76; Rev. St. 563, cl. 8; Id. 711, cl. 3. "

So here we can see that the 'district courts of the United States' existed in 1987 and were established immediately after ratification of the Constitiution, presumeably by some part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and that this particluar section of the act was still in effect in May of 1897.

Now if you can list the changes in the federal law (amending the Judiciary Act of 1789) from 1897 through the present (in cronological order) proving that today's 'United States District Courts' (28 USC 132) do not derive from, or replace, the Judiciary Act in any form or fashion, you will have a straightforward proof of your claims.

Alternatively (additionally?) proof that the pertinent sections of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (and their replacements/amendments) are still in effect, or that they trace to 28 USC 81 - 131, and have not been removed in any way, would prove conclusively that they are separate from the courts created in section 132.

Shift gears for a different topic. . .

Your argument on the subject of whether a particular judge is an article 3 judge based on whether his pay is taxed is also not sound logic.

While the Supreme Court has ruled that an article 3 judge's pay is not taxable under the constitution, doesn't the judge himself have the option to voluntarily self-assess and pay the tax anyway? If he voluntarily chooses to do so, does that mean he is no longer an article 3 judge?

Proof that an article 3 judge is not required to pay, and that this particular judge does pay, does not prove that this particular judge falls outside the group of those not so required (ie. article 3 judges). He could be 'volunteering', (even if he's not aware of it). In order to complete your proof, you must also show that the particular judge is required to pay.

I hope these comments will provide an independent viewpoint which allows you to further strengthen your arguments. Thanks for your prompt response to my previous posts.


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