Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness,
Counselor at Law, and Relator
c/o 2509 N. Campbell Avenue, #1776
Tucson [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA STATE
Under Protest, Necessity, and
by Special Visitation
DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF MONTANA
BILLINGS DIVISION
People of the United States ) Case No. CV-96-163-BLG
of America, ex relatione )
Paul Andrew Mitchell, ) NOTICE OF MOTION AND
) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION;
Petitioners, ) NOTICE OF CHALLENGE AND
) CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONALITY
vs. ) OF FEDERAL REMOVAL STATUTES:
) 28 U.S.C. 1441 thru 1451;
United States et al., ) Sixth Amendment:
) Nature and Cause Clause;
Respondent. ) human rights treaties (2)
____________________________)
COME NOW the People of the United States of America (hereinafter
"Petitioners"), ex relatione Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.,
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness, and Counselor at Law
(hereinafter "Relator"), to request formal reconsideration by
this honorable Court of the ORDER of Chief Judge Jack D.
Shanstrom, dated and filed in the instant case on April 8, 1997.
Petitioners submit that the multitude of issues which have
already arisen in the instant case are likely to generate
controversy, at times intense, concerning the correct sequence in
which this Court should address said issues. Accordingly,
Petitioners have herein chosen to address issues in the order in
which they have arisen in the ORDER of April 8, 1997.
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At the very top of said ORDER is found the nomenclature
"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT" [sic] (hereinafter "USDC").
Petitioners submit that this nomenclature refers specifically to
an Article IV territorial tribunal, and not to the Article III
judicial forum which Petitioners have specifically petitioned in
the instant case. See caption supra. Petitioners are entitled
to relief that is issued from courts of competent jurisdiction;
likewise, Petitioners are not entitled to any relief from courts
which do not have competent jurisdiction. See International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; due process clause in the Fifth Amendment.
Petitioners also submit, for the careful consideration of
this honorable Court, all pleadings previously filed in the
instant case, as sufficient and meritorious grounds for keeping
this all important distinction foremost in the minds of all
interested parties, of all qualified judges who may preside in
the instant case, and of all representatives of the interested
parties. See Reservations enacted with human rights treaties.
In particular, the authorities in American Insurance Co. v.
356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511 (1828), 7 L.Ed 242, and Balzac v.
Porto Rico [sic], 42 S.Ct. 343, 258 U.S. 298 at 312, 66 L.Ed 627
(1921), should provide more than enough proof to this honorable
Court that the USDC has territorial jurisdiction within the
federal zone, and the DCUS has territorial jurisdiction within
the state zone. Montana state is within the state zone.
Numerous other court authorities have already been cited in
the instant case, and the Respondents have failed to rebut, or
even to respond in any way. Petitioners now argue that the total
silence by Respondents on this point now activates estoppel
against Respondents. See Carmine v. Bowen, 64 A. 932 (1906).
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Accordingly, it is apparent to Petitioners that any ORDER's
which may be issued from the USDC in the instant case are null
and void ab initio and ultra vires, solely by virtue of the fact
that the District Court of the United States (hereinafter "DCUS")
was petitioned in the instant case, and not the USDC.
More to the point, one of the original reasons for invoking
federal judicial power(s) in the instant case is the existence of
an outstanding Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request for
the official credentials of all six hundred thirty-three (633)
alleged federal agents who rotated in and out of the standoff
with the so-called Montana Freemen in Garfield county, Montana
state (hereinafter "Freeman Standoff"). Said FOIA request has
not been answered to date with the credentials of any of said
agents. Petitioners have, therefore, already exhausted their
administrative remedies in the matter of said FOIA request.
The court of original jurisdiction to enjoin the withholding
of documents properly requested, and to compel the production of
documents improperly withheld, is the DCUS. See 5 U.S.C.
552(a)(4)(B). The court of original jurisdiction to litigate
FOIA requests is res judicata. See the ORDER of United States
District Judge John M. Roll, dated May 21, 1996, In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Served on New Life Health Center Company, Case No. GJ-
95-1-6 (JMR), USDC, Tucson, Arizona state, to wit:
... [T]his [USDC] is not the proper forum to bring a request
under the Freedom of Information Act.
[emphasis added]
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And so, it is with no small degree of concern that
Petitioners read Judge Shanstrom's ORDER of April 8, 1997, which
alleges that "petitioner's [sic] contentions lack merit and do
not provide any basis for reconsideration of the October Order."
On a technical point, Petitioners wish to remind this
honorable Court that Paul Andrew Mitchell is the Relator in the
instant case. The stated Petitioners are the People of the
United States of America. For this reason alone, said ORDER errs
by referring to the Relator as the "petitioner" who submitted the
"contentions" in question.
More importantly, however, to suggest that the contentions
of Petitioners lack merit and do not provide any basis for
reconsideration, is to promote the absurd proposition that
identifying the court of competent jurisdiction for any judicial
proceeding is a matter of no consequence. Confer at Reductio ad
absurdum in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, to wit:
Reductio ad absurdum. Latin. In logic, the method of
disproving an argument by showing that it leads to an absurd
consequence.
Further on in the USDC's ORDER of April 8, 1997, the USDC
discusses Petitioners' NOTICE OF INTENT TO PETITION FOR LEAVE TO
INSTITUTE QUO WARRANTO PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE "INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE" [sic]. That court found that said NOTICE OF INTENT
contemplates a new future lawsuit [sic] which cannot be filed in
this action and does not warrant review by the USDC until filed
as a separate action.
Petitioners object to this finding. Without the benefit of
discovering the true identity(s) of all 633 alleged federal
agents who rotated in and out of the Freeman Standoff, it is
quite possible, and also highly likely, that one or more of said
agents were actually employed by the Internal Revenue Service.
The organizational situs of the Internal Revenue Service would
then become a salient issue, in the instant case, and should be
litigated in this action and not in a separate action.
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Petitioners also object to this finding because they have
already paid two (2) separate filing fees. The requirement that
Petitioners must now pay a third filing fee, in order to
institute a separate "new future lawsuit," as that term was
utilized in the USDC's ORDER of April 8, 1997, raises the specter
of barratry, which is the offense of frequently exciting and
stirring up quarrels and suits, either at law or otherwise.
Confer at "Barratry" in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition.
Petitioners submit that the added expense of a third filing fee
constitutes barratry.
On the second page of the USDC's ORDER of April 8, 1997,
said ORDER again finds that Petitioners' document requesting
removal lacks merit and remains denied by the USDC. This
finding, again, raises the all important question of original
jurisdiction. The USDC cannot deny any motion which is not
properly before it. Petitioners have not submitted any motions
whatsoever to the USDC in the instant case. For a federal judge
to issue orders from a court which has never been moved nor
otherwise petitioned, is to practice law in violation of the
prohibition against same at 28 U.S.C. 454: Practice of law by
justices and judges, to wit:
Any justice or judge appointed under the authority of the
United States who engages in the practice of law is guilty
of a high misdemeanor.
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The USDC's ORDER of April 8, 1997, also goes on to hold that
the removal statutes do not afford a petitioner/plaintiff the
power to remove a case to federal court. Petitioners applaud the
efforts to which the USDC has evidently gone to explore the
removal statutes which are found at 28 U.S.C. 1441 et seq.
Nevertheless, by way of demonstrating newly found evidence of
confusion and duplicity in the federal laws in question,
Petitioners submit the following specific citations for the
careful consideration of this honorable Court:
28 U.S.C. 1441(a) "district court of the United States"
28 U.S.C. 1441(d) "district court of the United States"
28 U.S.C. 1442(a) "district court of the United States"
28 U.S.C. 1443 "district court of the United States"
28 U.S.C. 1444 "district court of the United States"
28 U.S.C. 1445(a) "district court of the United States"
28 U.S.C. 1445(b) "district court of the United States"
28 U.S.C. 1445(c) "district court of the United States"
28 U.S.C. 1445(d) "district court of the United States"
28 U.S.C. 1446(a) "district court of the United States"
28 U.S.C. 1446(c)(1) "United States district court" [sic]
28 U.S.C. 1446(c)(2) "United States district court" [sic]
28 U.S.C. 1446(c)(4) "United States district court" [sic]
28 U.S.C. 1446(c)(5) "United States district court" [sic]
28 U.S.C. 1448 "district court of the United States"
28 U.S.C. 1449 "district court of the United States"
28 U.S.C. 1450 "district court of the United States"
Petitioners hereby challenge all federal removal statutes,
as a group, for being void for vagueness in violation of the
Sixth Amendment nature and cause clause. See 28 U.S.C. 1441 thru
1452; See Balzac and American Insurance supra.
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Said statutes also evidence negligence and fraud on the part
of Congress. Said fraud is demonstrated by an unlawful intent to
extend the territorial and subject matter jurisdictions of the
USDC into the several states of the Union, over which the DCUS
has original jurisdiction with respect to said territory and
subject matters. The removal statutes evidence the fraud, in
violation of the Tenth Amendment.
Recent research has also proven that the federal judiciary
has also sabotaged the U.S. Constitution and corrupted laws
governing the conduct of the federal courts. This has been done
in part by creating the false impression that the USDC has
territorial and subject matter jurisdiction within the several
states of the Union, particularly over criminal prosecutions,
when it does not.
The truth is that the USDC is designed to adjudicate matters
that arise within the federal zone, and the DCUS is designed to
adjudicate matters that arise within the state zone.
This honorable Court will please take formal judicial notice
of the fact that the USDC is named on the ORDER of April 8, 1997,
by Chief United States District Judge Jack D. Shanstrom,
allegedly ordering the instant case remanded back to State Court.
This is a fraud upon Petitioners, and upon all American People,
who enjoy the fundamental guarantee of due process of law.
Sedition by syntax is not due process of law. See Title 28,
United States Code, in toto; see also Act of June 25, 1948:
"... [P]rovisions of this title [28 U.S.C.] ... with respect to
the organization of the court, shall be construed as a
continuation of existing law ..." [emphasis added].
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The USDC's ORDER of April 8, 1997, also attempts to remand
the instant case back to the Montana Sixteenth Judicial District
Court, Garfield County, and attempts to order the Clerk of Court
to return the file in cause number #2721 back to said Sixteenth
Judicial District Court. If this remand is allowed to proceed,
Petitioners will have been denied due process of law, in clear
violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Petitioners began the instant case in the Montana Sixteenth
Judicial District Court in Garfield County (hereinafter "State
Court"). The instant case was ordered removed into federal
court. Petitioners paid a second filing fee to the Clerk of the
DCUS, under protest, due to the fact that the Clerk of the DCUS
refused a tender of lawful money (gold) in payment for said fee.
Now, Judge Shanstrom is attempting to remand the case back
to State Court, before the fate of the credentials of all 633
alleged federal agents has been determined, and before all other
federal questions have been properly adjudicated.
Once again, it is painfully evident to Petitioners that the
State Court has absolutely no jurisdiction whatsoever to litigate
the original FOIA request for said credentials.
Accordingly, Judge Shanstrom's ORDER has the unnecessary and
unlawful result of forcing Petitioners into a vicious circle,
from which there is no exit.
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For this reason, among all others mentioned above,
Petitioners strenuously object to the USDC's ORDER of April 8,
1997, and hereby petition this honorable DCUS for an ORDER to
Chief United States District Judge Jack D. Shanstrom to
reconsider his alleged ORDER of April 8, 1997, in light of all
the substantive and meritorious issues which have been well
documented in the instant Motion and in previous pleadings --
most notably the American Insurance opinion of Chief Justice John
Marshall supra, arguably the greatest Chief Justice ever to
preside on the Supreme Court of the United States. To repeat:
... [P]rovisions of this title as set out in section 1 of
said Act June 25, 1948, with respect to the organization of
the court, shall be construed as a continuation of existing
law ...."
[Historical and Statutory Notes, 28 U.S.C. 132]
[West Publishing Company, 1996 Edition]
In closing, Petitioners respectfully request formal Judicial
Notice of the essay entitled "Karma and the Federal Courts," by
Relator Paul Andrew Mitchell, which essay is attached hereto and
incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein.
REMEDY REQUESTED
All premises having been carefully considered, Petitioners
hereby petition this honorable District Court of the United
States for an ORDER compelling Chief United States District Judge
Jack D. Shanstrom to reconsider his ORDER, dated April 8, 1997,
and filed erroneously in the instant case under a caption which
exhibits the legal nomenclature "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT",
in apparent contradiction to, and outside the lawful jurisdiction
of, the judicial powers of this District Court of the United
States which have been invoked in the instant case.
Petitioners respectfully request that Judge Shanstrom give
close and deliberate attention to the distinction, now thoroughly
documented, between the Article III District Court of the United
States, and the Article IV United States District Court, with
particular application of this distinction to the instant case.
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Dated: April 14, 1997
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness,
(expressly not a citizen of the United States),
Counselor at Law, and Relator on behalf of
the People of the United States of America
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Citizen of Arizona state,
federal witness, and Counselor at Law, do hereby certify, under
penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of
America, without the "United States", that I am at least 18 years
of age, a Citizen of one of the United States of America, and
that I personally served the following document(s):
NOTICE OF MOTION AND
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION;
NOTICE OF CHALLENGE AND CHALLENGE TO
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL REMOVAL STATUTES:
28 U.S.C. 1441 thru 1451; Sixth Amendment:
Nature and Cause Clause; human rights treaties (2)
by placing one true and correct copy of same in first class U.S.
Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to:
Attorney General William H. Rehnquist, C.J.
Department of Justice Supreme Court of the U.S.
10th and Constitution, N.W. 1 First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C.
Solicitor General Warren Christopher
Department of Justice U.S. Secretary of State
10th and Constitution, N.W. Department of State
Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C.
James M. Burns LeRoy Michael; Schweitzer
United States District Court c/o Yellowstone County Jail
316 North 26th Street 3165 King Avenue, East
Billings, Montana state Billings, Montana state
Office of the U.S. Attorneys Judge J. Clifford Wallace
United States District Court Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Federal Building c/o P.O. Box 193939
Billings, Montana state San Francisco, California
Chief Judge Judge Alex Kozinski
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
c/o P.O. Box 193939 125 South Grand Avenue, #200
San Francisco, California state Pasadena, California state
Executed on April 14, 1997:
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness,
Counselor at Law, and Relator
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For Immediate Release November 2, 1996
"Karma and the Federal Courts"
by
Paul Andrew Mitchell
All Rights Reserved
(November 1996)
The law of karma is this: what goes around, comes around.
When you begin with freedom, freedom comes back to dwell in your
house.
And so, we have come to this point in decoding Title 28 of
the United States Codes: there are two classes of federal
"District Courts" in the federal court system.
One class is for the federal zone; the other class is for
the state zone.
Using a very powerful rule of statutory construction,
"inclusio unius est exclusio alterius," we show that the phrase
"District Court of the United States" refers to federal courts
for the state zone; and the phrase "United States District
Court" refers to federal courts for the federal zone.
We have this on the authority of the Supreme Court of the
United States, most notably in the cases of American Insurance
Company v. 356 Bales of Cotton, and Balzac v. Porto Rico [sic].
Now, here's the rub: Since federal courts are creatures of
statutes only, they can only cognize subject matters which are
assigned to them expressly by statutes.
When it comes to criminal jurisdiction, the controlling
statute is 18 U.S.C. 3231.
This statute grants original jurisdiction to the District
Courts of the United States (DCUS), but does not mention the
United States District Courts (USDC)!
How about them apples?
Remember this carefully:
Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (in Latin ).
Inclusion of one is exclusion of others (in English).
Since the USDC is not mentioned, its omission can be
inferred as intentional. (Read that again, then confirm it in
Black's Law Dictionary, any edition).
So, from the historian's point of view, Congress has
permitted the limited territorial and subject matter jurisdiction
of the USDC to be extended, unlawfully, into the state zone, and
into subject matters over which said court has no jurisdiction
whatsoever.
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This deception was maintained as long as nobody noticed, but
now it is obvious, and quite difficult to change, without
bringing down the whole house of cards (which is happening, by
the way. The Liege firemen are literally hosing their own
corrupt court buildings, so we're not alone in this department of
judicial tyranny.)
By the way, the famous Belgian Firemen from Liege have been
invited, via the Internet, to discharge the Belgian debt to the
United States by moving their talents state-side. They should
return home debt free, in about ten years or so, depending on
available supplies of soap and water.
Imagine a sheet of Saran Wrap, which has been yanked too
far, by pulling it beyond the strict territorial boundaries which
surround the federal zone.
This is the United States District Court (USDC), in all its
limited Honors and tarnished glory.
Further proof of this bad karma can be found by comparing 18
U.S.C. 1964(a) and 1964(c). Both statutes grant authority to
issue remedies to restrain racketeering activities prohibited by
18 U.S.C. 1962. Section 1964(a) grants civil jurisdiction to
issue injunctive relief to the DCUS; Section 1964(c) grants
civil jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief to the USDC. Both
refer to the exact same subject matter, namely, RICO
(Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) activities.
So, when these two statutes are otherwise identical, why did
Congress need to enact two separate statutes?
The answer is simple: one authority was needed for the
DCUS, and the other was needed for the USDC. Simple, really,
when the sedition by syntax is explained in language which
penetrates the deception.
Now, if this is truly the case, and nobody has been able to
prove us wrong about this matter, the United States (federal
government) is in a heap of trouble here, because it has been
prosecuting people in the wrong courts ever since the Civil War;
furthermore, those courts have no criminal jurisdiction
whatsoever, because such an authority is completely lacking from
Titles 18 and 28, both of which have been enacted into positive
law, unlike Title 26, which has not been enacted into positive
law. See Title 1 for details.
What do we do with this earth-shaking discovery? Well, when
any federal case is filed, the criminal defendant should submit a
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request immediately, for such
things as any regulations which have been published in the
Federal Register, pursuant to the Federal Register Act, for 18
U.S.C. 3231.
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It won't hurt to send submit similar FOIA requests for the
credentials of all federal employees who have "touched" the case
in any way.
Since we already know that there are no regulations for 18
U.S.C. 3231, and that federal employees will usually refuse to
produce their credentials, your FOIA requests will be met with
silence, whereupon you will file a FOIA appeal. Once the appeal
deadline has run, you are in court.
But which court? Guess ...
... the answer is the District Court of the United States.
What an amazing discovery, yes? A United States District Judge
in Arizona, in late Spring of 1996, ruled that the United States
District Court (USDC) is not the proper forum to litigate a
request under the FOIA. That can only be because FOIA requests
must be litigated in the District Court of the United States
(DCUS).
Now we have the United States checkmated. The proper forum
for FOIA is now res judicata. If the DCUS is the proper forum
for FOIA, and if the USDC is NOT the proper forum for FOIA, then
the USDC is not the proper forum for prosecuting violations of
Title 18 either, because the USDC does not show up in 5 U.S.C.
552 or in 18 U.S.C. 3231!
Read that last paragraph again, and again, until you get it.
It's okay to admit that you must read it several times; this
writer once read a paragraph from Hooven and Allison v. Evatt
some 20 different times, until the meaning was finally clear.
Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. The omission by
Congress of the USDC from 18 U.S.C. 3231 must have been
intentional; the maxim certainly allows us to infer that it was
intentional. Use of this maxim allows for us to exploit one of
the most powerful techniques in American jurisprudence. It is
called "collateral attack" -- a broadside, rather than a head-
on, collision.
Knowledge is power, and power is freedom ...
... freedom. Freedom! FREEDOM!!!
Love it.
Common Law Copyright
Paul Andrew Mitchell
Counselor at Law, federal witness
and Citizen of Arizona state
All Rights Reserved Without Prejudice
November 2, 1996
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# # #
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People v. United States et al.