Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris
Citizen of Minnesota state
and federal witness
c/o General Delivery
Battle Lake [zip code exempt]
MINNESOTA STATE
In Propria Persona
Under Protest and
by Special Visitation
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic], ) Case No. 97-2099-MNST
)
Plaintiff [sic]/ ) USDC Minneapolis #CR-4-96-65
Appellee, ) DCUS Minneapolis #4-96-65
v. )
) MOTION FOR REHEARING
EVERETT C. GILBERTSON [sic], ) EN BANC:
) Local FRAP Rule 40A(b)(2);
Defendant [sic]/ ) 28 U.S.C. 1652; Ninth
Appellant. ) and Tenth Amendments;
)
________________________________) REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
COMES NOW Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris, Citizen of Minnesota
state, federal witness, expressly not a citizen of the United
States ("federal citizen"), and Appellant in the above entitled
matter (hereinafter "Appellant") to move this honorable Court,
pursuant to Rule 40A(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure ("FRAP"), for rehearing en banc of Appellant's MOTION
FOR RELEASE PENDING APPEAL. Said MOTION was denied by ORDER of
this Court, which ORDER was dated April 29, 1997.
In support of the instant MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
(hereinafter the "MOTION FOR REHEARING"), Appellant hereby
respectfully requests the entire banc of qualified Judges,
currently assigned to preside upon this honorable Court, to take
formal judicial Notice of the following local Rule, to wit:
Motion for Rehearing En Banc: Page 1 of 16
40A: PETITION FOR REHEARING BY PANEL
(b) Petition for Rehearing.
(2) TREATED AS PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC. On the
request of any judge on the panel, a petition for rehearing
by a panel will be treated as a petition for rehearing en
banc. Every petition for rehearing en banc, however, shall
automatically be deemed to include a petition for rehearing
by the panel.
[emphasis added]
Accordingly, Appellant proceeds on the basis of the
presumption that the panel which denied Appellant's MOTION FOR
RELEASE PENDING APPEAL on April 29, 1997, will separately
consider this MOTION FOR REHEARING and advise the entire banc of
their ruling on same, before the entire banc rules on same.
INCORPORATION OF TRANSCRIPTS
In support of this MOTION FOR REHEARING, Appellant submits
that the grounds for granting same are itemized thoroughly in the
two (2) Reporter's Transcripts ("RT's") of:
(1) the sentencing hearing had before the United States
District Court ("USDC") on April 21, 1997 (hereinafter
"21RT"); and,
(2) the hearing on Appellant's MOTION FOR RELEASE PENDING
APPEAL heard before the USDC on April 23, 1997
(hereinafter "23RT").
Appellant shall quote the 21RT and the 23RT by using bold
type to highlight all quotations taken therefrom.
Appellant therefore incorporates by reference both RT's, as
if set forth fully herein, with the proviso that the 23RT
evidently contains numerous errors which this Court would do well
to consider carefully, to avoid possible prejudice to Appellant's
arguments submitted herein. To this end, Appellant has
previously filed and served a MOTION TO CORRECT TRANSCRIPT OF
SENTENCING HEARING (hereinafter "MOTION TO CORRECT TRANSCRIPT").
Motion for Rehearing En Banc: Page 2 of 16
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to rely upon the
source documents for certain contiguous blocks of text in the
21RT, because Appellant did attempt diligently to read verbatim
from these source documents at the hearing recorded in the 21RT.
These source documents, and corresponding locations in the 21RT,
are itemized as follows:
Allocution at Sentencing Hearing
Subject Matter Location in 21RT
Beginning 21RT 2:9
Allocution 21RT 15:15
Credentials 21RT 19:6
Lack of Jurisdiction 21RT 20:11
Liability Statutes 21RT 23:13
Jury Selection and Service Act 21RT 24:7 ("JSSA")
Withdrawal of Plea 21RT 25:2
Notice of Appeal 21RT 25:6
Clarification of Terms [starts] 21RT 25:10
Clarification of Terms [ends] 21RT 26:4
Urgent Memo (filed by USDC) 21RT 26:20 (not read)
In contrast, Appellant did not attempt to read verbatim from
any source documents at the hearing on April 23, 1997, and for
this reason, at the present time Appellant has no means by which
to correct any errors which may be extant in the 23RT.
In summary, Appellant recommends this honorable Court first
to consider the 23RT infra, then the 21RT supra, and lastly the
source documents for 21RT, relying upon the table supra to locate
corresponding blocks of text in the 21RT proper. This Court is
advised to recognize that the 21RT contains certain matters in
addition to those which are covered in said source documents.
Motion for Rehearing En Banc: Page 3 of 16
ISSUES RAISED AT USDC HEARING ON APRIL 23, 1997
Judicial Incompetence: "sui something"
Appellant submits that the 23RT exhibits evidence of bias
and prejudicial incompetence in the man presiding over the USDC.
Appellant herein highlights this evidence as follows:
23RT:2:16 I now have before me a motion signed by Edward
[sic] C. [sic] Gilbertson sui something [sic].
Appellant argues that pleadings are proper when they exhibit
the phrase "Sui Juris" immediately after Appellant's Proper Name
(not nomme de guerre) at the top, left-hand corner of each face
page. Confer at "Sui juris" in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth
Edition (hereinafter "Black's"), to wit:
Sui juris. Latin. Of his own right; possessing full
social and civil rights; not under any legal disability, or
the power of another, or guardianship.
Having capacity to manage one's own affairs; not under
legal disability to act for one's self.
The bias exhibited by Mr. Rosenbaum in the 23RT is
reinforced by Appellant's finding in the Historical and Statutory
Notes following 28 U.S.C. 451 in Federal Civil Judicial Procedure
and Rules, West Publishing Company, 1996 edition, to wit:
Words "learned in law" were omitted as unnecessary. Such
requirement is not made of United States judges and no
reason appears to make a distinction respecting United
States attorneys.
[emphasis added]
Appellant submits that clear evidence of judicial
incompetence by Mr. Rosenbaum is sufficient ground for this Court
to release Appellant, pending appeal, upon the same terms and
conditions as Appellant's pre-trial release. See 28 U.S.C 372(c).
Further in the 23RT, Mr. Rosenbaum is frank enough to admit
that he did not understand one of Appellant's spoken sentences.
The sentence in question now follows, to wit:
Motion for Rehearing En Banc: Page 4 of 16
23RT 4:21 THE DEFENDANT: ... And I would request this
release due to the fact that I have filed a notice of
petition and intend to proceed with this ... appeal, because
I believe I have done enough ... publishing forth the law
and information about the law and cites, case law, to back
up what I have said. [sic]
THE COURT: Miss Reporter, would you read back his last
sentence, please.
(Read back.)
THE DEFENDANT: I should pull back and strike the word
publish.
THE COURT: That's as -- I will be frank to tell you I
didn't understand what that last sentence meant, and I
thought it would get better if I heard it again.
[emphasis added]
Denial of Right to Assistance of Counsel
Appellant clearly presents the grounds on which the USDC
should have released Appellant. See 23RT:5:11. But, at a key
point in this presentation, Appellant stops, because Appellant
was being denied effective assistance of Counsel at that moment:
23RT:6:9 THE DEFENDANT: ... I don't know anything more
what to say, because I wanted to have opportunity to consult
with this counselor [Paul Andrew Mitchell], but that has
been denied.
[emphasis added]
Despite what follows, up to and including 23RT:7:4,
Appellant submits that the real reasons for Mr. Rosenbaum's
position is found in the dialogue beginning at 23RT:3:1 and
ending at 23RT:3:21, inclusive. Mr. Rosenbaum erred therein by
disqualifying Appellant's chosen Counsel merely because said
Counsel is not a licensed attorney [sic], and He has no intention
of ever becoming a licensed attorney, because of the original
13th Amendment (1819). See Article V; Supremacy Clause; Full
Faith and Credit Clause; records of the Commonwealth of Virginia;
28 U.S.C. 1652; and Minnesota state Constitution.
Motion for Rehearing En Banc: Page 5 of 16
Consequently, Appellant was denied assistance of Counsel,
which is a fundamental Right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938). Such a
deprivation ousted the USDC of any and all jurisdiction which
said USDC might otherwise have had. See Johnson supra.
Moreover, Appellant has relied extensively upon the
published decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on
the question of Counsel, and should not be punished unnecessarily
for doing so. See U.S. v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 399-400 (1973).
See also Appellant's MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
OF CHOICE: Sixth Amendment, previously executed, filed, and
served upon all interested parties, and replete with authorities.
Questions of Law and Fact
Likely to Result in Reversal or New Trial
The United States Attorney opens this question as follows:
23RT:7:6 MR. SHEA: Your Honor, the United States opposes
the motion under Section 3143, Title 18.
One of the requirements for the Court to find, to grant
a motion such as this, is that the defendant has presented a
question of law or a fact that is likely to result in a
reversal and order of new trial. In other words, a
substantial question of law or fact. We believe none exist
[sic] in this case, none have [sic] been identified by the
defendant, and on that ground we feel the motion should be
denied.
Here, Mr. Rosenbaum discusses the statute at 18 U.S.C. 3143, even
quoting this statute verbatim, after which Mr. Rosenbaum says:
23RT:9:1 That's the rule which I'm required to follow. All
right. You may say anything further about that, and that
only, and then I will rule.
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. The law that, or the thing that
I want to appeal, I want to challenge again, is the
jurisdiction of this Court. The constitutional jurisdiction
of this Court.
Motion for Rehearing En Banc: Page 6 of 16
THE COURT: On what basis?
THE DEFENDANT: On the basis that I am not a federal
citizen, nor do I abide or live in a federal zone.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE DEFENDANT: And that ... it is not done to ...
circumvent or to delay this process. And this was the
appeal I did earlier, but I did untimely. In which the
appeals court sent its decision down that it was not, did
not have jurisdiction because sentencing, or the judge had
not certified. So that is one of the things that I --
[unexplained gap here]
And also the constitutionality of the Jury Selection
Act as far as limiting jury members to just federal
citizens, where I've stated in court that I am a Citizen of
Minnesota state. I'm challenging that aspect of the jury
selection act [sic].
I'm also challenging in this appeal the aspect of ...
competent counsel, which was part of the sentencing
guidelines and Rule 32, I think I alluded to that in my
sentencing.
And I'm also challenging ... the ... fact that I have
requested that the Freedom of Information Act credentials of
all the actors. I have not ... you know, that are required
under law to ... have their oaths certified, signatures on
file. Which I've requested and have not obtained any
certified to this point. That includes all the way from the
judicial to the legislative to the agencies that are
involved as well.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
Appellant has thus itemized the specific questions of law
and fact which are likely to result in a reversal and order of
new trial. Appellant argues that these are, indeed, substantial
questions of law and fact, in particular, Appellant's arguments
concerning the Jury Selection and Service Act ("JSSA") and the
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"); but Messrs. Rosenbaum and
Shea appear to claim a superior knowledge of the future here,
providing further evidence of bias and irreversible prejudice in
a hearing at which the USDC ultra vires decided Appellant's
freedom or detention. See Fifth Amendment; 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B).
Motion for Rehearing En Banc: Page 7 of 16
Mr. Rosenbaum's Responses to Issues
At this point, Mr. Rosenbaum responds to these issues as
follows:
23RT:10:18 THE COURT: ... But the primary concern that I
have is, first of all, whether or not you are -- no, you are
a person who adamantly refuses to admit that you are a
citizen of the United States [sic] and that this Court or
the United States has any authority over you. Now, a person
who makes such a statement is not a person who can be
depended upon to return to the court.
Appellant submits that this statement by Mr. Rosenbaum
clearly deprived Appellant of His fundamental Rights to freedom
of speech and to petition government for redress of grievances,
as guaranteed by the First Amendment, in clear violation of 18
U.S.C. 242: deprivation of fundamental Rights under color of law.
See Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907),
in which the high Court held that the Petition Clause is the
Right conservative of all other rights! See also
"Right/Constitutional Rights/Political rights" in Black's supra.
In particular, the Right of state Citizenship [sic] is a
political Right, of which Mr. Rosenbaum clearly has deprived
Appellant here, and in what follows:
23RT:10:23 And the reason is is because if the Court has no
authority over you, you are obviously free, as you have felt
in the past, to disregard the mandates of Congress, and per
force you would also feel free to disregard this Court's
instruction, because you do not recognize this Court. You
have said so in your own statements.
Appellant submits that Mr. Rosenbaum has flatly contradicted
himself here, and elsewhere, by stating that Appellant is not
someone who can be depended upon to return to the USDC when, in
point of fact, staring Mr. Rosenbaum right in the face is the
Person of Appellant, who voluntarily appeared at the sentencing
hearing, when He could have absconded, but at no time ever did!
Motion for Rehearing En Banc: Page 8 of 16
Moreover, Mr. Rosenbaum strongly implies that the USDC is
committing extortion against Appellant, by forcing Appellant to
submit to its "instruction", when the USDC had no lawful
authority over Appellant in the first instance. Paraphrasing Mr.
Rosenbaum now, if the USDC has no jurisdiction, Appellant was
obviously free (as Appellant has felt in the past) to disregard
the USDC's "instruction" [sic] (whatever that is); Mr. Rosenbaum
is ironically correct here, for once. See 18 U.S.C. 872 and 1951.
Appellant submits that the official record of the instant
case exhibits more than sufficient proof that the USDC lacked any
jurisdiction whatsoever over the subject matter. This evidence
is to be found, in particular, in Appellant's AFFIDAVITS OF
DEFAULT AND OF PROBABLE CAUSE executed, served, filed in the
record, and unrebutted to date. There are no regs for IRC 7402.
Moreover, the offices of the U.S. Attorney and Solicitor
General fell totally and completely silent in the face of
Appellant's final NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR PROOF OF POWER, STANDING,
AND JURISDICTION IN THE PARTICULARS, executed, served, and filed.
There are no regs for 28 U.S.C. 1861 et seq. either!
Their silence is, therefore, a fraud upon Appellant, the
American People, and the district courts, when there is a legal
or a moral duty to speak. See U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299
(1977). Moreover, silence activates estoppel. See Carmine v.
Bowen, 64 A. 932 (1906). See also IRC 7401, in pari materia.
Said moral and legal duty arises from evidence that the
requisite Oath of Office has been properly executed and recorded
by each and every government actor who has touched the instant
case in any way, including Mr. Rosenbaum in particular.
Motion for Rehearing En Banc: Page 9 of 16
To this end, Appellant went to exhaustive efforts timely to
request the requisite credentials from all of said actors, under
authority of the FOIA. Appellant also went to the same efforts
timely to appeal their failure to produce certified evidence of
said credentials. Uncertified documents are not admissible.
Last but not least, Appellant went the final mile by
submitting a lawful NOTICE AND DEMAND to the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, and to the Clerk of the USDC,
demanding exhibition of the requisite credentials. Appellant did
this in recognition of the colorable authority to be found in the
blanket FOIA exemption for the entire federal judicial branch.
See 5 U.S.C. 551(1)(A) and (B).
Finally, Appellant has explicitly challenged the
constitutionality of said blanket exemption for being overly
broad, and for violating the Oath of Office provision in the
Constitution for the United States of America, as lawfully
amended (hereinafter "U.S. Constitution"). See Article VI,
Clauses 2 and 3 ("6:2", "6:3"); 28 U.S.C. 453; 5 U.S.C. 3331.
As such, Appellant has raised meritorious and non-frivolous
issues, which separately invoke the original jurisdiction of the
District Court of the United States ("DCUS"), a forum which is
convened under authority of Article III in the U.S. Constitution;
the USDC is a forum convened under Article IV in the U.S.
Constitution. See American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton,
1 Pet. 511, 7 L.Ed 242 (1828); Balzac v. Porto Rico [sic], 258
U.S. 298 at 312, 66 L.Ed 627 (1921); 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B);
ORDER dated May 21, 1996, In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Served on New
Life Health Center Company, USDC Arizona, Tucson, #GJ-95-1-6.
Motion for Rehearing En Banc: Page 10 of 16
Appellant submits that Mr. Rosenbaum either did not bother
to confirm Appellant's numerous citations on this distinction, or
did not understand them, even if he did confirm them. This was
painfully confirmed when the subject of Appellant's COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF came before Mr. Rosenbaum.
Mr. Rosenbaum Was Recused by 28 U.S.C. 455
In general, the presiding judge of any district court is
presumed to have executed the solemn Oath of Office required of
him (her) by Article VI, Clause 3 ("6:3") and by 28 U.S.C. 453.
This Oath is like an on-off light switch in that, per force, its
execution activates all the guarantees in the federal and state
constitutions, without exception. Fiat lux et lux erat in mundo.
This causal connection between those guarantees and a judge's
Oath of Office is tersely expressed as follows:
A district judge is bound by oath of office to uphold the
Constitutions of the United States and the State of Hawaii;
rule excluding illegally seized evidence falls within scope
of such oath as such rule is a sanction essential to
upholding federal and state constitutional safeguards
against unreasonable searches and seizures. State v.
Wilson, 519 P.2d 228.
[American Digest System, Eighth Decennial Digest]
["Judges", page 969, Section 5: "Qualifications"]
[emphasis added]
Therefore, using this elegant logic, all the Rights which
are guaranteed by both the state and federal constitutions are
sanctions which fall within the scope of the Oath of Office. The
guarantee of due process of law is a Right which is on a par with
a multitude of all other Rights which are guaranteed by those
constitutions, whether or not they are enumerated. Together, the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments provide explicit guarantees for that
multitude, without any need to enumerate them.
Motion for Rehearing En Banc: Page 11 of 16
Applying these principles to the instant case is not
difficult. Appellant designed one deadline for exhaustion of all
FOIA remedies, and for production of all certified documents
demanded in Appellant's NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR PROOF OF POWER,
STANDING, AND JURISDICTION IN THE PARTICULARS; NOTICE OF FRAUD.
When this deadline passed without exhibition by any
government employees of any of the documents requested, Appellant
testified to this default in His AFFIDAVITS OF DEFAULT AND OF
PROBABLE CAUSE. Appellant submits that the passage of this
deadline provided Appellant with sufficient probable cause to
remove the criminal case from the USDC into the DCUS, whereupon
Appellant petitioned a three-judge DCUS panel for a Warrant of
Removal. See Appellant's VERIFIED PETITION FOR WARRANT OF
REMOVAL BY THREE-JUDGE PANEL, with a JURY TRIAL DEMANDED; FRCP
Rule 38 in chief; Seventh Amendment; other authorities therein.
At this moment, Appellant filed a separate MOTION TO STAY
PROCEEDINGS [in the DCUS] FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH JURY
SELECTION POLICY (hereinafter "DCUS STAY MOTION"). See 28 U.S.C.
1865(b)(1). As such, this constituted Appellant's third attempt
(1-2-3) to present, and obtain a proper hearing on, Appellant's
challenge to section 1865(b)(1), for exhibiting prohibited class
discrimination against Citizens of Minnesota state who choose not
also to be federal citizens. See Gardina v. Board of Registrars,
48 S. 788, 791 (1909); State v. Fowler, 6 S. 602 (1889); Tenth
Amendment; Guarantee Clause; Right of Election; all citations
in the DCUS STAY MOTION; "Federal citizenship" in Black's supra;
lastly, Appellant's MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, executed, served,
filed in the USDC, and denied ultra vires (1-2).
Motion for Rehearing En Banc: Page 12 of 16
Appellant submits that no single federal judge is qualified
to preside on the DCUS, even for preliminaries, whose judicial
compensation is being diminished by federal income taxes. See
3:1; Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920); Lord v. Kelley, 240
F.Supp. 167, 169 (1965). C.J. Rehnquist has argued, before the
University of Arizona Law School in January of 1997, that Evans
supra was overturned by O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277
(1939). Appellant disputes the main holding in O'Malley supra,
for being predicated upon two false and rebuttable premises:
(1) there is only one class of citizens (there are 2), and
(2) all federal judges are citizens of either class (but no
federal law requires judges to be citizens at all).
Moreover, no single judge is qualified to preside on the
USDC or the DCUS who cannot, or will not, exhibit the Oath of
Office required by 6:3 and 28 U.S.C. 453. There is a strong
presumption in favor of public access to judicial records. See
Valley Broadcasting Co. v. USDC, 798 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1986).
Thus, Appellant argues that Mr. (not "Judge") Rosenbaum
never timely exhibited his requisite credentials, nor did the
USDC Clerk, nor did his employer -- the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts in Washington, D.C. Nobody did! Silence
activates estoppel, Carmine supra; silence is a fraud, Tweel
supra. Failure to qualify by filing bond and taking the oath is
ground for ouster by quo warranto. See 51 C.J. 319; State v.
Bernoudy, 36 Mo. 279; Respublica v. Wray, 2 Yeates (Pa.) 429.
It was at this precise point in the instant case that
Appellant filed a timely and proper COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, specifically to compel Mr. Rosenbaum et al. to
disclose credentials improperly withheld, and permanently to
enjoin Mr. Rosenbaum et al. from improperly withholding same. At
the sentencing hearing, Mr. Rosenbaum was told, in no uncertain
terms, that he had a personal interest in the instant case:
Motion for Rehearing En Banc: Page 13 of 16
21RT:4:16 THE COURT: Can you tell me what personal
interest you feel is involved? Free free to set it out.
THE DEFENDANT: ... And that was for a complaint for
injunctive relief and the fact where I requested credentials
of all the actors in this court.
THE COURT: Okay. [!]
Further, the very same issue arose again during the hearing
on April 21, 1997: 21RT:9:16 and 21RT:10:12. In particular, see
21RT:10:20, recorded as follows:
THE COURT: There was actually a complaint served on
the government? It lists me as a defendant. [emph. added]
MR. SHEA: It also includes a demand for immediate
recusal, I believe. [!]
THE COURT: Well, I will -- I will consider this later,
but at this time ... asking for any present relief, it's
denied. [emphasis added]
THE DEFENDANT: And I would like the record to show
that I object. [!!]
THE COURT: I'm sorry?
THE DEFENDANT: I'd like the record to show that I
object. [!!!]
THE COURT: Objection's noted. [text in brackets added]
Appellant is entirely satisfied that the official court
record now before this honorable Court provides ample
justification to release Appellant, upon the same terms and
conditions as Appellant's pre-trial release, if for no other
reason than the obvious, irrefutable, and adverse conflict of
interest which Mr. Rosenbaum exhibited at both the sentencing
hearing and the hearing had before the USDC to consider
Appellant's timely and proper MOTION FOR RELEASE PENDING APPEAL.
Motion for Rehearing En Banc: Page 14 of 16
REMEDY REQUESTED
Wherefore, all premises having been properly considered,
Plaintiff hereby moves this honorable United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, for an immediate ORDER releasing
Appellant from detention by the Bureau of Prisons, upon the same
terms and conditions as Appellant's pre-trial release, pending
final review of the myriad and substantial issues of law and fact
which have arisen in the instant case, which issues Appellant has
diligently striven to document in perfect form, and in perfect
citations to the pertinent constitutional provisions, laws,
treaties, regulations, and related policies, practices,
procedures, forms, rules and customs of the United States
(federal government), emphasizing Article VI, Clauses 2 and 3.
Thank you all for your careful and considerate attention.
VERIFICATION
I, Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty
of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America,
without (outside) the "United States", that the above statement
of facts and laws is true and correct, to the best of My current
information, knowledge, and belief, so help Me God, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. 1746(1).
Dated: ______________________________
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Everett C. Gilbertson
_____________________________________
Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris
Citizen of Minnesota state, federal witness
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)
Motion for Rehearing En Banc: Page 15 of 16
PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under
penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of
America, without the "United States," that I am at least 18 years
of age, a Citizen of one of the United States of America, and
that I personally served the following document(s):
MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC:
Local FRAP Rule 40A(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. 1652;
Ninth and Tenth Amendments;
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first
class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly
addressed to the following:
Attorney General James M. Rosenbaum
Department of Justice United States District Court
10th & Constitution, N.W. 110 South Fourth Street
Washington [zip code exempt] Minneapolis [zip code exempt]
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MINNESOTA STATE
Solicitor General Henry Shea
Department of Justice United States Attorneys
10th & Constitution, N.W. 110 South Fourth Street
Washington [zip code exempt] Minneapolis [zip code exempt]
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MINNESOTA STATE
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S. William H. Rehnquist, C.J.
Counselor at Law, federal witness U.S. Supreme Court
c/o 2509 North Campbell Ave., #1776 One First Street N.E.
Tucson [zip code exempt] Washington [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA STATE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Dated: __________________________________
/s/ Everett C. Gilbertson
__________________________________________
Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris
Citizen of Minnesota state, federal witness
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
[See USPS Publication 221 for addressing instructions.]
Motion for Rehearing En Banc: Page 16 of 16
# # #
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U.S.A. v. Gilbertson, 8th Circuit