Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
c/o MBE PMB #332
501 W. Broadway, Suite “A”
San Diego 92101
CALIFORNIA, USA
tel: (619) 234-5252 (msg)
fax: (619) 234-5272
In Propria Persona
All Rights Reserved
without Prejudice
United States Court of Appeals
Ninth Circuit
Paul Andrew
Mitchell, ) Appeal No. 02-15269
and
) 372(c) No. 02-89005
Plaintiff/Appellant, )
v.
)
)
AOL Time Warner, Inc. et
al., )
)
Defendants/Appellees.)
-------------------------------)
)
United States ) MOTION FOR INTERVENTION
OF RIGHT
ex relatione )
AND APPLICATION FOR WRIT
Paul Andrew Mitchell, ) IN THE NATURE OF QUO
WARRANTO:
)
Intervenor.
) 3:2:1 (in judicial
mode);
) 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072(b),
2403(a);
) FRAP Rule 44; and,
) FRCP 24(a), (c) in pari materia
_______________________________)
(United States not a party).
COMES NOW the United States (hereinafter “Intervenor”) ex relatione Paul Andrew Mitchell, Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America and Private Attorney General (hereinafter “Relator”) to exercise its statutory right to intervene in the instant appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2403(a), to apply for a Writ of Quo Warranto in the instant appeal and all other relief which this Court deems just and proper, and to provide timely Notice to all interested parties of same, pursuant to Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (“FRAP”) in pari materia with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 24(c) (United States not yet a party); and Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 (“3:2:1”) in the Constitution for the United States of America, as lawfully amended (hereinafter “U.S. Constitution”). See 28 U.S.C. 2072(b) and the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869 et seq. in full.
OF
CERTAIN ACTS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
Pursuant to the duties imposed upon it by virtue of FRAP Rule 44, the Office of the Clerk of this Court (“Circuit Clerk”) will now please certify to the Office of the United States Attorney General that the constitutionality of certain Acts of Congress affecting the public interest is herein drawn in question.
Likewise, the Circuit Clerk will now please certify Intervenor’s intervention for presentation of all evidence admissible in the instant appeal, and for argument(s) on the question of the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. 2072(b), and of the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869 et seq. presently codified at Title 28 of the United States Code (“U.S.C.”)
Subject to all applicable provisions of Law, the United States hereby expressly reserves all rights of a party and shall be subject to all liabilities of a party as to court costs, to the extent necessary for a proper presentation of the facts and laws relating to the question of the constitutionality of said Acts of Congress.
See Article II, Articles of Confederation (“United States, in Congress Assembled”); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933) (United States as plaintiff); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (a private Citizen may appear on behalf of the United States ex rel.); 3:2:1 (“Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party”). Find “U.S. ex rel.” etc. on the Internet.
The “United States” and the “United States of America” are not one and the same. Congress is expressly prohibited from re‑defining any terms found in the U.S. Constitution. See Preamble (“Constitution for the United States of America”); Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 (“2:1:1”) (“President of the United States of America”); Article VII (“Independence of the United States of America”); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920):
Congress ... cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised.
The U.S. Department of Justice does not enjoy general power(s) of attorney to represent the United States of America. Compare 28 U.S.C. 547(1), (2) (Duties). Willful misrepresentation by officers employed by that Department is actionable under the McDade Act, 28 U.S.C. 530B (Ethical standards for attorneys for the Government).
Whenever the United States proceeds as party plaintiff, an Article III constitutional court, exercising the judicial Power of the United States, is a prerequisite under 3:2:1 (“The judicial Power shall extend ... to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party”). See 28 U.S.C. 1345 (United States as plaintiff).
Whenever the United States proceeds as a party defendant, the sovereign must grant permission to be sued. See 28 U.S.C. 1346 (United States as defendant). In this mode, a legislative court is permitted. See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 577 (1933):
... [C]ontroversies to which the United States may by statute be made a party defendant, at least as a general rule, lie wholly outside the scope of the judicial power vested by article 3 in the constitutional courts. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 645‑646.
A private Citizen may move a federal court on behalf of the United States ex relatione. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955), as cited above.
The Lanham Act at 60 Stat. 440 confers original jurisdiction on the several district courts of the United States (“DCUS”). These courts are Article III constitutional courts proceeding in judicial mode. Compare 15 U.S.C. 1121(a) (uncodified).
See also Mookini v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201, 205 (1938) (term DCUS in its historic and proper sense); and Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley‑Duff & Associates, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987) (RICO statutes bring to bear the pressure of private attorneys general on a serious national problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate).
The United States District Courts (“USDC”) are legislative courts typically proceeding in legislative mode. See American Insurance v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511, 7 L.Ed. 242 (1828) (C.J. Marshall’s seminal ruling); and Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) (The USDC is not a true United States court established under Article III.) See 28 U.S.C. §§ 88, 91, 132, 152, 171, 251, 458, 461, 1367.
Legislative courts are not required to exercise the Article III guarantees required of constitutional courts. See Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923); Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 274 U.S. 145 (1927); Swift v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928); Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U.S. 438 (1929); Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930); Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U.S. 382 (1932); O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982); 49 Stat. 1921.
All guarantees of the U.S. Constitution were expressly extended into the District of Columbia in 1871, and into all federal Territories in 1873. See 16 Stat. 419, 426, Sec. 34; 18 Stat. 325, 333, Sec. 1891, respectively. Compare Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 380 (1901) (paraphrasing the Harvard Law Review: the Constitution of the United States, as such, does not extend beyond the limits of the States which are united by and under it); and Hooven & Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945) (the guaranties [sic] of the Constitution extend into the federal zone only as Congress has made those guaranties applicable).
The United States hereby notoriously exercises its statutory right to intervene, pursuant to the federal statute at 28 U.S.C. 2403(a).
Intervenor now formally incorporates Attachments “A”, “B” and “C” by reference infra, as if set forth fully here.
OF
JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT, 28 U.S.C. 372(c)
Intervenor
also formally incorporates by reference Circuit Clerk’s entire docket number No. 02-89005, as if set forth fully here, and all
documents and other certified evidence contained therein. Said docket number was first assigned when
Appellant filed a timely, proper and lawful COMPLAINT
OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT against Mr. Drozd, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 372(c). Strictly speaking, said COMPLAINT was
filed well within the period allowed by the USDC’s Local Rules (“L.R.”) for
objections to findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Appellant’s MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF USDC’S ORDER.
APPLICATION
FOR WRIT OF QUO WARRANTO
Pursuant to all authorities now cited in Appellant’s recently filed PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENTS, particularly Legerton v. Chambers, 163 P. 678, 32 Cal.App. 601 (1917) and Thompson v. Holt, 52 Ala. 491, the United States now stipulates that a Presidential Commission is the highest and best evidence of a judge’s right to office until, on quo warranto or a proceeding of that nature, that claim is annulled by judicial determination.
Accordingly, in deference to applicable California State laws, the United States hereby moves this honorable Court for a lawful Writ in the nature of Quo Warranto, properly issued by the Circuit Clerk upon Messrs. William B. Shubb and Dale A. Drozd, to demonstrate by what lawful authorities (if any) each claims to preside on the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Judicial District of California (“DCUS”) in Sacramento, California, and by what lawful authorities (if any) each claims to exercise the judicial Power of the United States under Article III in the instant case.
All premises having been duly considered, the United States ex rel. Paul Andrew Mitchell, Private Attorney General, hereby exercises its statutory right to intervene in the instant case and moves this honorable Court for a Writ in the nature of Quo Warranto to issue upon Messrs. William B. Shubb and Dale A. Drozd, to demonstrate by what lawful authorities each claims to preside on the DCUS in Sacramento, California, and by what lawful authorities each claims to exercise the judicial Power of the United States on behalf of Intervenor under Article III in the Constitution for the United States of America, as lawfully amended.
Intervenor also moves this honorable Court for a routine ORDER to the Circuit Clerk, commanding that Office formally to certify to the United States Attorney General Appellant’s formal challenge to the constitutionality of certain Acts of Congress, specifically the Abrogation Clause in the Rules Enabling Act at 28 U.S.C. 2072(b) and the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869 et seq.
Intervenor also moves this Court for a routine ORDER to the Circuit Clerk, commanding that Office formally to certify Intervenor’s intervention for presentation of all evidence admissible in the instant appeal, and for argument(s) on the questions of the constitutionality of the Abrogation Clause in the Rules Enabling Act at 28 U.S.C. 2072(b), and of the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869 et seq. presently codified at Title 28 of the United States Code (“U.S.C.”)
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, Relator and Appellant
in the above entitled action, hereby verify under penalty of perjury, under the
laws of the United States of America, without the “United States”
(federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and
correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and
belief, so help me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).
Dated: December
19, 2002 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul
Andrew Mitchell
__________________________________________________________
Printed: Paul
Andrew Mitchell, Relator/Appellant In Propria Persona
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby certify,
under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America,
without the “United States” (federal government), that I am at least 18
years of age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I personally served the
following document(s):
MOTION FOR
INTERVENTION OF RIGHT AND
APPLICATION FOR
WRIT IN THE NATURE OF QUO WARRANTO:
3:2:1
(in judicial mode); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072(b),
2403(a);
FRAP Rule 44; and,
FRCP 24(a), (c) in pari materia
(United States not a party).
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in
first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to
the following:
Judge Alex Kozinski (supervising) Clerk of Court (51x)
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Attention: Cathy Catterson
P.O. Box 91510 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Pasadena 91109-1510 P.O. Box 193939
CALIFORNIA, USA San Francisco 94119-3939
CALIFORNIA, USA
Ropers, Majeski, Kohn & Bentley DeForest & Koscelnik
(failed to exhibit oaths) (failed to exhibit oath)
1001 Marshall Street 3000 Koppers Building
Redwood City 94063 436 Seventh Avenue
CALIFORNIA, USA Pittsburgh 15219
PENNSYLVANIA, USA
Murphy Austin Adams Schoenfeld LLP Pillsbury Winthrop LLP
(failed to exhibit oaths) (failed to exhibit oaths)
P.O. Box 1319 400 Capitol Mall, Suite 1700
Sacramento 95812-1319 Sacramento 95814-4419
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Curiale Dellaverson Hirschfeld Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart Oliver
Kraemer & Sloan, LLP & Hedges, LLP
(failed to exhibit oaths) (failed to exhibit oaths)
727 Sansome Street 201 Sansome Street, 6th Floor
San Francisco 94111 San Francisco 94104
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Office of the General Counsel Paul
Southworth
(failed to exhibit oaths) 2018 N. New
Hampshire Ave.
University of California Los Angeles 90027
1111 Franklin Street, 8th Floor CALIFORNIA, USA
Oakland 94607-5200
CALIFORNIA, USA
Karl Kleinpaste Ram Samudrala
P.O. Box 1551 UW Micro Box 357242
Beaver Falls 15010 Seattle 98195-7242
PENNSYLVANIA, USA WASHINGTON STATE, USA
Laskin & Guenard Rivkin Radler, LLP
(failed to exhibit oath) (failed to exhibit oaths)
1810 South Street 1330 N. Dutton Ave., #200
Sacramento 95814 Santa Rosa 95401-4646
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Harvey Siskind Jacobs LLP Office of Solicitor General
(failed to exhibit oaths) 950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
3 Embarcadero Center, Ste. 1060 Room 5614
San Francisco 94111 Washington 20530-0001
CALIFORNIA, USA DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Register of Copyrights Steinhart & Falconer LLP
Library of Congress (failed to exhibit oaths)
101 Independence Avenue, S.E. 333 Market Street, 32nd Floor
Washington 20559-6000 San Francisco 94105-2150
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Matheny Sears Linkert & Long LLP Latham & Watkins
(failed to exhibit oaths) (failed to exhibit oaths)
P.O. Box 13711 633 West Fifth St., Ste. 4000
Sacramento 95853-4711 Los Angeles 90071-2007
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
[Please see USPS Publication #221 for “addressing”
instructions.]
Dated: December
19, 2002 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul
Andrew Mitchell
__________________________________________________________
Printed: Paul
Andrew Mitchell, Relator/Appellant In Propria Persona
FINAL NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR
PROOF OF APPOINTMENT
AND DESIGNATION
September 1, 2001 A.D.
FINAL NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR
PROOF OF APPOINTMENT AND DESIGNATION
TO: Mr. Jack L. Wagner, Clerk of Court
District Court of the United States
501 “I” Street, Suite 4-200
Sacramento 95814-2322
CALIFORNIA, USA
Mr. Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Director
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building
One Columbus Circle, N.E.
Washington 20544
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Mr. James. S. Carroll, III, Assistant Director
Executive Office for United States Attorneys
Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Unit
600 “E” Street, N.W., Room 7300
Washington 20530
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Hon. Mary M. Schroeder, Chief Judge
c/o Cathy A. Catterson, Clerk of Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
P.O. Box 193939
San Francisco 94119-3939
CALIFORNIA, USA
FROM: Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Plaintiff/Appellant
Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al.
Ninth Circuit docket #02-15269 and 372(c) #02-89005
DATE: September 1, 2002 A.D.
Ladies and Gentlemen:
To date, neither the office of the Clerk of the federal district court in Sacramento, California, nor the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts in Washington, D.C., nor the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., nor the State Bar of California, nor the Clerk of the California Supreme Court, has been able to produce any of the credentials which Mr. Dale A. Drozd (hereinafter “Mr. Drozd”) must have, in order for him to occupy the office of United States magistrate judge in Sacramento, California State.
I refer all of you specifically to the form letter I received from Mr. James S. Carroll, III, dated April 24, 2002, in which he appeared to err by alleging that My request sought public records which may be obtained from the clerk of the court. This appeared to be an error, because the U.S. Department of Justice (in the Executive Branch) is the legal custodian of all Presidential Commissions appointing federal judges to the bench, not any office in the Judicial Branch.
Thus, the clerk of court is not the legal custodian of any such Presidential Commissions. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 2104(a)(1)(A) and 2902(c).
On April 26, 2002 A.D., Mr. Drozd signed and filed another specious “order” in which he formally acknowledged My allegations that, in his case, no jurisdiction, no license, no oath, no certificate, and no commission have been produced by any personnel employed by any of the above federal offices to which this NOTICE AND DEMAND are now addressed.
And, in that specious “order” of April 26, 2002, Mr. Drozd offered absolutely no rebuttal(s) or denial(s) whatsoever that no (civil) jurisdiction existed, no license (to practice law) existed, no oath (of office) existed, no certificate (of oath) existed, and no (presidential) commission existed. I never consented to civil jurisdiction by any United States magistrate judges.
I refer you now to the cases which have held that a Presidential Commission is required for all judges of the Supreme Court, Circuit Courts, and District Courts. For Mr. Drozd to exercise any lawful authorities of a district judge, such as denying My MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT, the Law requires that he be commissioned by the President, and have a life-time appointment. Neither is the case, based on the official record before the Ninth Circuit at the present time. See the Appointments Clause in the U.S. Constitution (“2:2:2”).
So, I believe that
sufficient evidence has already been certified that Mr. Drozd is not now, and
never was, a district judge.
The question remains, therefore, whether or not Mr. Drozd is now, or ever was, a United States magistrate judge. Please note well the federal statute at 28 U.S.C. 631(a) requires that judges of each United States District Court shall appoint all United States magistrate judges; the statute at 28 U.S.C. 631(b)(1) requires each such magistrate judge to have been ‑‑ for at least five (5) years ‑‑ a member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a State.
Provided that they are qualified and duly appointed, a federal judge may then, and only then, designate such magistrate judges to conduct hearings and to submit to a judge proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to the federal statute at 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(B).
My demand for his certificate of oath, properly indorsed upon his license to practice law, was My earnest and good faith attempt to determine whether or not Mr. Drozd was ever qualified to be appointed to the office of United States magistrate judge, in the first instance. Evidently, Mr. Drozd was not so qualified.
Section 6067 of the California Business and Professions Code mandates that a certificate of oath shall be indorsed upon a license to practice law in the State of California. When no such certificate was produced by Mr. Drozd, nor by the State Bar of California, nor by the Clerk of the California Supreme Court, I was thereby entitled to conclude that Mr. Drozd was never qualified to be appointed to the office of United States magistrate judge, in the first instance.
To date, I have not requested any evidence that Mr. Drozd has been duly appointed or designated under 28 U.S.C. 631(a) or 636(b)(1)(B), respectively, because the matter of his qualifications came first. If he was never qualified, then no appointment or designation by any federal judge could have been valid, or lawful, in the first instance.
Nevertheless, before I satisfy the legal requirements imposed upon me by the federal criminal statute at 18 U.S.C. 4 (misprision of felony), and before I formally charge Mr. Drozd with impersonating a federal officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 912 (a felony), I wish to confirm, once and for all, whether or not certain documentary evidence exists.
Documentary evidence may indicate that a federal judge did attempt to appoint Mr. Drozd to the office of United States magistrate judge, and/or that a federal judge did attempt to designate Mr. Drozd to conduct hearings and submit findings of fact and conclusions of law in My case, now pending before the Ninth Circuit. I would regard such documentary evidence as a factor mitigating the charge I now intend to file against Mr. Drozd, for impersonating a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. 912, and I do intend to supplement My Complaint of Judicial Misconduct with said evidence (if available).
Accordingly, I hereby demand the timely exhibition and certification of any and all documentary evidence that a federal judge did attempt to appoint Mr. Dale A. Drozd to the office of United States magistrate judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 631(a) (or any other lawful authority).
I also demand the timely exhibition and certification of any and all documentary evidence that a federal judge did attempt, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(B) (or any other lawful authority), to designate Mr. Dale A. Drozd to conduct hearings and submit findings of fact and conclusions of law in My case, now pending before the Ninth Circuit.
I am giving each of you a reasonable deadline of thirty (30) calendar days hence, which deadline is 5:00 p.m. on September 30, 2002 A.D., to produce the documentary evidence itemized above. Beyond that deadline, your silence will constitute fraud, pursuant to the court holding in U.S. v. Tweel, and it will also activate estoppel, pursuant to the court holding in Carmine v. Bowen (cites on the Internet).
Please be advised that I intend to file your answer(s), if any, in the Ninth Circuit docket assigned to My Complaint of Judicial Misconduct against Mr. Drozd, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 372(c). That docket number is #02‑89005. I also intend to testify to your silence, in the event that no answers are forthcoming from all of you, or any one of you.
Thank you for your timely professional consideration.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Private Attorney General, Plaintiff and Appellant
Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al.
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/index.htm
copies: Judge Alex Kozinski (supervising)
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
P.O. Box 91510
Pasadena 91109-1510
CALIFORNIA, USA
Hon. Jan Scully, District Attorney
Office of the District Attorney
County of Sacramento
901 “G” Street
Sacramento 95814
CALIFORNIA, USA
U.S. Mail care of:
Dr. John C. Alden, M.D., Eyewitness
350 – 30th Street, Suite 444
Oakland 94609-3426
CALIFORNIA, USA
NOTICE OF DEFAULT
BY AFFIDAVIT
October 6, 2002 A.D.
NOTICE OF DEFAULT
BY AFFIDAVIT
TO: Mr. William B. Shubb
c/o Clerk of Court
501 “I” Street, Suite 4-200
Sacramento 95814-2322
CALIFORNIA, USA
FROM: Paul Andrew Mitchell, Plaintiff/Appellant
Mitchell
v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al.
Case No. #CIV S 01-1480 WBS DAD PS
Ninth Circuit Appeal #02-15269 and
372(c) Complaint No. #02-89005
DATE: October 6, 2002 A.D.
SUBJECT: FINAL NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR CREDENTIALS REQUIRED BY LAW,
June 11, 2002 A.D.
Greetings Mr. Shubb:
On June 11, 2002 A.D., I transmitted to you, via first class U.S. Mail, My FINAL NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR CREDENTIALS REQUIRED BY LAW, specifically demanding that you produce a certified copy of your presidential commission, and that you do so no later than 5:00 p.m. on Monday, June 24, 2002 A.D.
As of that reasonable deadline, I have not received said certified copy, from you or from any one or anything else.
Accordingly, you are now in default.
I hereby incorporate by reference true and correct copies of the attached form letter dated April 24, 2002, from James S. Carroll III, with My refusal for cause, as if both were set forth fully herein.
I also incorporate by reference true and correct copies of My lawful and proper FOIA request, dated January 15, 2002 A.D., and of My lawful and proper FOIA appeal, dated February 4, 2002 A.D., both of which are also attached, as if set forth fully herein.
The attached documents constitute material evidence that, as the legal custodian of the requisite presidential commissions, the U.S. Department of Justice does not have in their custody any presidential commission(s) appointing Mr. William B. Shubb to the office of United States District Judge.
CONCLUSIONS
Now, I therefore proceed on the basis of the above mentioned evidence that no such presidential commission exists for Mr. William B. Shubb, and that any oath of office executed by Mr. William B. Shubb is necessarily counterfeit and fraudulent on its face.
Accordingly, this evidence also forms the basis of My reasonable and objective conclusions that:
(1) Mr. William B. Shubb was not lawfully appointed to occupy the office of United States District Judge;
(2) Mr. William B. Shubb was not lawfully appointed to preside on the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California;
(3) Mr. William B. Shubb was never lawfully appointed to preside on the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Judicial District of California; and,
(4) Mr. William B. Shubb possessed no lawful authority to appoint U.S. magistrate judges, or to refer civil matters to the latter for findings of facts and conclusions of law.
The Undersigned hereby verifies, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).
Dated: October 6, 2002 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
_____________________________________________
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Sui Juris
Author, Damaged Party and Plaintiff/Appellant
U.S. Mail:
c/o Dr. John C. Alden, M.D.
350 – 30th Street, Suite 444
Oakland 94609-3426
CALIFORNIA, USA
copy: Mr. Jack L. Wagner, Clerk of Court
District Court of the United States
501 “I” Street, Suite 4-200
Sacramento 95814-2322
CALIFORNIA, USA
Mr. Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Director
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building
One Columbus Circle, N.E.
Washington 20544
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Mr. James. S. Carroll, III, Assistant Director
Executive Office for United States Attorneys
Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Unit
600 “E” Street, N.W., Room 7300
Washington 20530
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Hon. Mary M. Schroeder, Chief Judge
c/o Cathy A. Catterson, Clerk of Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
P.O. Box 193939
San Francisco 94119-3939
CALIFORNIA, USA
MEMO to Jon Mummolo,
November 9, 2002 A.D.
MEMO
TO: Jon Mummolo
Washington Square News
FROM: Paul Andrew Mitchell
DATE: November 9, 2002 A.D.
SUBJECT: answers to your 2 questions
Greetings Jon,
I appreciate this opportunity to respond to your excellent questions.
Let me begin by laying a summary legal and historical foundation, so that you will be in a much better position to apply the pertinent laws to the relevant facts of my case against AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al.
A correct historical perspective will divide this case into 3 distinct periods of time:
(1) the period prior to enactment of the Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996 (“ACPA”);
(2) the period between enactments of the ACPA and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998(“DMCA”); and,
(3) the period after enactment of the DMCA.
This approach is necessary, because the U.S. Constitution prohibits ex post facto legislation, even in civil matters, and most definitely in criminal matters. See Article I, Section 9, Clause 3.
For your information, we have used the ex post facto Clause to prove that, in 1946 A.D. the Lanham Act conferred original jurisdiction on the constitutional Article III District Court of the United States, and not on the legislative Article IV United States District Court. This tough jurisdictional question necessitated a lot of additional pleadings on my part. I mention this because my case is not simply a copyright infringement case; it is also a trademark infringement case under the Lanham Act; and much more (see COUNT’s ONE thru FIVE).
The ACPA was enacted in July of 1996, in part to stem the flood of copyright complaints and requests for prompt remedial legislation that reached the Congress in response to the release of Netscape Navigator.
You may recall that Microsoft Corporation had delayed their entry into Internet software market, because Bill Gates had not fully appreciated the technological significance of the Internet until after Netscape took off and became the darling of Wall Street.
The ACPA is significant because of its clear legislative intent. See:
http://www.supremelaw.org/copyrite/statutes/anticounterfeiting.htm
Prior to these statutory amendments, the applicable laws were the Copyright Act of 1976 and the Lanham Act, but criminal copyright infringement was not also deemed a racketeering (“RICO”) predicate act until July of 1996. It was still a serious federal offense, however, for violating 17 U.S.C. 506 and 18 U.S.C. 2319 (see COUNT ONE):
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/506.html
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/2319.html
Because the 1976 Copyright Act was written at a time when the Internet did not exist, there were no provisions in that Act for immunizing Internet Service Providers (“ISP’s”) from the criminal conduct of their subscribers. ISP’s did not even exist at that time either!
Our investigation began quite informally in December of 1995, as Netscape began to proliferate. Later our investigation escalated with formal notices to AOL and a few other violators in the Fall of 1997. So, some of the evidence we acquired is dated prior to the ACPA, and most of it is dated after the ACPA was enacted in 1996.
It remains to be seen what the federal courts will do to apply the facts of my case, as they existed prior to July of 1996, to the laws that existed at that time.
Most importantly, strictly applying the 1976 Copyright Act, a 3-year civil statute of limitations is in force prior to August 1, 1998, because I did not file my case until August 1, 2001 A.D.
On the other hand, there are also laws which govern the legal concepts of “accrual” and “tolling”. The statute of limitations is “t