Paul Andrew Mitchell

c/o P.O. Box 370

Sunset Beach 90742

CALIFORNIA, USA

 

tel:  (562) 592-9047

fax:  (562) 592-4917

 

In Propria Persona

 

All Rights Reserved

without Prejudice

 

 

 

United States Court of Appeals

 

Ninth Circuit

 

 

Paul Andrew Mitchell,          )  Appeal No. 02-15269

                               )

          Plaintiff/Appellant, )  APPELLANT’S INFORMAL

     v.                        )  OPENING BRIEF

                               )

AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al.,  )

                               )

          Defendants/Appellees.)

_______________________________)

1.   Jurisdiction

 

1(a)  Timeliness of Appeal or Petition:

 

      (i)  Date of entry of judgment or order of district court:

 

  #168     01/25/02:  ORDER adopting Magistrate’s ORDER [sic] &

                      FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 

  #169     01/25/02:  JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

 

  #170     01/23/02:  MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER [sic] & FINDINGS AND

                      RECOMMENDATIONS OF MAGISTRATE ‑‑ PART I

 

      (ii) Date of service of any motion made after judgment

(other than for fees and costs):

 

  #176     01/31/02:  MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF USDC’S ORDER

                      FILED IN ERROR ON JANUARY 25, 2002 A.D.

 

  #288     01/31/02:  MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER [sic] & FINDINGS AND

                      RECOMMENDATIONS OF MAGISTRATE ‑‑ PART II

 

  #289     01/31/02:  MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER [sic] & FINDINGS AND

                      RECOMMENDATIONS OF MAGISTRATE – PART III

 

     (iii) Date of entry of order deciding motion:

 

  #286     02/05/02:  ORDER denying Plaintiff’s MOTION TO STRIKE

                      FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 

           02/22/02:  MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying Plaintiff’s

                      MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

 

           02/28/02:  Magistrate’s ORDER [sic] vacating Defendant

                      Telalink’s motion to quash subpoena

 

     (iv)  Date notice of appeal or petition filed:

 

  #177     02/01/02:  Plaintiff’s NOTICE OF APPEAL

 

           03/15/02:  Plaintiff’s FIRST AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

 

     (v)   For prisoners, date you gave notice of appeal

           to prison authorities:  (not applicable)

 

 

1(b) Please attach one copy of each of the following:

1.   The order(s) from which you are appealing:

 

(See EXCERPTS attached.)

 

2.   The district court’s entry of judgment:

 

(See EXCERPTS attached.)

 

3.   The district court docket sheet:

 

(See EXCERPTS attached.)

 

 

2.   What are the facts of your case?

 

Answer:  See BACKGROUND FACTS in Appellant’s VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND INJUNCTION FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND RELATED CLAIMS: JURY DEMANDED (Docket #1) (hereinafter “Initial COMPLAINT”), specifically Pages 5‑24 of 43, as supplemented by:

 

(1)  FIRST SUPPLEMENT TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND INJUNCTION FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND RELATED CLAIMS: JURY DEMANDED (filed with Initial COMPLAINT);

 

(2)  SECOND SUPPLEMENT TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND INJUNCTION FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND RELATED CLAIMS: JURY DEMANDED (filed with Initial COMPLAINT);

 

(3)           THIRD SUPPLEMENT TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND INJUNCTION FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND RELATED CLAIMS: JURY DEMANDED (filed with Initial COMPLAINT);

 

(4)  Exhibits “A‑1” (Docket #6) thru “L‑11” (Docket #23);

 

(5)  AUTHOR’S FOURTH SUPPLEMENT TO COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY (Docket #45); and,

 

(6)  FIFTH SUPPLEMENT TO COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT (Docket #86).

 

 

3.   What did you ask the district court to do (for example, award damages, give injunctive relief, order your release from prison, etc.)?

 

Answer:  See full details at the SUMMARY in the Initial COMPLAINT, Pages 25‑26 of 43, and at the RELIEF REQUESTED and the SUMMARY OF DAMAGES in the Initial COMPLAINT, Pages 36‑42 of 43, and all other relief which the DCUS decides is just and proper, under the circumstances.

 

See also section 4 infra:  claims raised at the district court:

 

4(a) In the Initial COMPLAINT;

4(b) In MOTIONS;

4(c) In SUBPOENAS;  and,

4(d) In Miscellaneous Pleadings.

 

 

4.   State the claim or claims you raised at the district court.

 

 

4(a) In the Initial COMPLAINT:

 

      COUNT ONE:   copyright infringements,

                   violating Copyright Act of 1976, as amended

                   (see Initial COMPLAINT, Pages 27‑28 of 43)

 

      COUNT TWO:   false designations of origin,

                   violating Lanham Act, § 43(a)

                   (see Initial COMPLAINT, Pages 29‑30 of 43)

 

      COUNT THREE: deprivations of fundamental Rights, and

                   federal witness/victim retaliations,

                   violating 18 U.S.C. 242, 1512, 1513

                   (see Initial COMPLAINT, Pages 31‑33 of 43)

 

      COUNT FOUR:  conspiracy to deprive fundamental Rights,

                   conspiracy against the United States, and

                   federal witness/victim retaliations,

                   violating 18 U.S.C. 241, 371, 1512, 1513

                   (see Initial COMPLAINT, Pages 33‑34 of 43)

 

      COUNT FIVE:  unfair competition under California State law,

                   violating California Business and Professions

                   Code, §§ 17200 et seq.

                   (see Initial COMPLAINT, Page 35 of 43)

 

 

4(b) In MOTIONS:

 

To declare, as a matter of law, that the statute at 28 U.S.C. 2072(a), strictly construed, does not authorize the U.S. Supreme Court to prescribe rules of practice and procedure, or rules of evidence, for the Article III District Courts of the United States (“DCUS”).  See:

 

(1)  Appellant’s verified MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT AND CHALLENGE TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN ACT OF CONGRESS (Docket #79);  and,

 

(2)  Appellant’s FIRST SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT AND CHALLENGE TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN ACT OF CONGRESS (Docket #100).

 

To declare, as a matter law, that the second sentence of the statute at 28 U.S.C. 2072(b) is unconstitutional, for violating the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the ex post facto prohibition at Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 (“1:9:3”) in the U.S. Constitution.  See:

 

(1)  Appellant’s verified MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT AND CHALLENGE TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN ACT OF CONGRESS (Docket #79);

 

(2)  Appellant’s FIRST SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT AND CHALLENGE TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN ACT OF CONGRESS (Docket #100);  and,

 

(3)  Appellant’s NOTICE OF CHALLENGE TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN ACT OF CONGRESS timely filed in this appeal pursuant to FRAP Rule 44 (incorporating Docket #79 and #100 supra).

 

To grant Appellant leave to serve SUMMONSES via Priority U.S. Mail with U.S. Postal Service Delivery Confirmation.  See:

 

(1)  Appellant’s verified STATUS REPORT OF SUMMONS SERVICE, NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO SERVE VIA PRIORITY U.S. MAIL (Docket #32);  and,

 

(2)  Appellant’s verified FIRST SUPPLEMENT TO STATUS REPORT OF SUMMONS SERVICE (Docket #34).

 

To strike all pleadings by attorneys lacking the credentials required by § 6067 of the California Business and Professions Code.  See:

 

(1)  Appellant’s verified MOTION TO STRIKE ALL PLEADINGS BY ATTORNEYS LACKING CREDENTIALS (Docket #78);  and,

 

(2)           AUTHOR’S AFFIDAVIT CONTESTING DECLARATION OF WESLEY C.J. EHLERS (Docket #164).

 

To take mandatory judicial notice of the following (·):

 

·     “Samples of Modifications in Derivative Files”:

 

http://www.supremelaw.org/copyrite/mods.htm

 

See AUTHOR’S FIRST NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE (Docket #116) and all electronic files linked to it.

 

·     Miranda Warnings issued to nine (9) attorneys:

(1)           Brian S. Crone            November 4, 2001 A.D.

(2)           Walter P. DeForest        November 4, 2001 A.D.

(3)           Wesley C.J. Ehlers        November 4, 2001 A.D.

(4)           Geoffrey A. Goodman       November 4, 2001 A.D.

(5)           Jeffrey M. Hamerling      November 4, 2001 A.D.

(6)           Susan H. Handelman        November 4, 2001 A.D.

(7)           Eugene J. Majeski         November 4, 2001 A.D.

(8)           Nancy J. Newman           November 4, 2001 A.D.

(9)           Benjamin L. Webster       November 4, 2001 A.D.

See AUTHOR’S SECOND NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE (Docket #117).

 

·     Four (4) Notices of Judicial Default as mailed to:

 

(1)  Indiana University

(2)  Northeastern University

(3)  Princeton University

(4)  University of Arkansas

 

See AUTHOR’S THIRD NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE (Docket #118).

 

·     Three (3) documents including:

 

(1)           Appellant’s Partial Invoice to Lonnie G. Schmidt,

dated November 10, 2001 A.D. (Docket #85);

 

(2)  Appellant’s verified FIFTH SUPPLEMENT TO COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT (Docket #86);  and,

 

(3)  AUTHOR’S FOURTH SUPPLEMENT TO COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY (Docket #45).

 

See AUTHOR’S FOURTH NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE (Docket #119).

 

·     Seventeen (17) documents including:

 

(1)           NOTICE OF JUDICIAL DEFAULT, as mailed to Defendant California Institute of Technology, Nov. 1, 2001 A.D.;

(2)           NOTICE OF JUDICIAL DEFAULT, as mailed to Defendant AOL Time Warner, Inc., care of James Barksdale, Director, Nov. 5, 2001 A.D.;

(3)           NOTICE OF JUDICIAL DEFAULT, as mailed to Defendant University of California, Dec. 3, 2001 A.D.;

(4)           NOTICE OF JUDICIAL DEFAULT, as mailed to Defendant Todd R. Eigenschink, Dec. 3, 2001 A.D.;

(5)           NOTICE OF JUDICIAL DEFAULT, as mailed to Defendant David Feustel, Dec. 3, 2001 A.D.;

(6)           NOTICE OF JUDICIAL DEFAULT, as mailed to Defendant Dan Turkette, Dec. 3, 2001 A.D.;

(7)           NOTICE OF JUDICIAL DEFAULT, as mailed to Defendant Midwest Internet Exchange, Inc., Dec. 3, 2001 A.D.;

(8)           NOTICE OF JUDICIAL DEFAULT, as mailed to Defendant Four Peaks Technology Groups, Dec. 3, 2001 A.D.;

(9)           NOTICE OF JUDICIAL DEFAULT, as mailed to Defendant Floyd W. Shackelford, Dec. 3, 2001 A.D.;

(10)      NOTICE OF JUDICIAL DEFAULT, as mailed to Defendant Dave Alexander, Dec. 3, 2001 A.D.;

(11)      NOTICE OF JUDICIAL DEFAULT, as mailed to Defendant Cosmic Awareness Communications, Dec. 3, 2001 A.D.;

(12)      NOTICE OF JUDICIAL DEFAULT, as mailed to Defendant Telecode, Dec. 3, 2001 A.D.;

(13)      NOTICE OF JUDICIAL DEFAULT, as mailed to Defendant Desert Video Production, Dec. 3, 2001 A.D.;

(14)      NOTICE OF JUDICIAL DEFAULT, as mailed to Defendant Leander Pearson, Dec. 3, 2001 A.D.;

(15)      NOTICE OF JUDICIAL DEFAULT, as mailed to Defendant Burntfork Rural Systems, Dec. 3, 2001 A.D.;

(16)      NOTICE OF JUDICIAL DEFAULT, as mailed to Defendant James H. Daugherty, Dec. 3, 2001 A.D.;  and,

(17)      NOTICE OF JUDICIAL DEFAULT, as mailed to Defendant James Daugherty ‑‑ AA Research, Dec. 3, 2001 A.D.

 

See AUTHOR’S FIFTH NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE (Docket #134) and verified NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR PROOF OF FRAUD (Docket #165).

 

To strike the ORDER [sic] AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE.  See:

 

(1)  Appellant’s verified MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE ‑‑ PART I

(Docket #170);

 

(2)  Appellant’s verified MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE ‑‑ PART II

(Docket #288);  and,

 

(3)  Appellant’s verified MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE ‑‑ PART III

(Docket #289).

 

To reconsider the USDC’s ORDER filed in error on January 25, 2002 A.D.  See:

 

Appellant’s verified MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF USDC’S ORDER FILED IN ERROR ON JANUARY 25, 2002 A.D. (Docket #176) and REMEDY REQUESTED therein.

 

 

4(c) In SUBPOENAS:

 

To compel discovery of the identities of certain subscribers suspected of copyright infringements, and discovery of the computer activity logs of certain Internet Service Providers (“ISP”) whose computers are shown, by verified evidence, to have transmitted stolen and/or counterfeit copies of the subject book via the Internet.  17 U.S.C. 512(c)(3)(A), 512(h).  See:

 

(1)  AUTHOR’S DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF ALL SUBPOENAS FOR SUBSCRIBER IDENTITIES (Docket #42) as supplemented by Exhibits D‑42 (Docket #12), D‑45 (Docket #12), and J‑1 thru J‑97 inclusive (Docket #20 and #21);  and,

 

(2)  PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENAS IN A CIVIL CASE

(Docket #220‑#287 inclusive).

 

To compel discovery of the licenses to practice law, with certificates of oath properly endorsed thereon, as required by § 6067 of the California Business and Professions Code, of all attorneys who appeared claiming to have powers of attorney to represent certain named Defendants in the instant case.  See:

 

(1)  Appellant’s verified MOTION TO STRIKE ALL PLEADINGS BY ATTORNEYS LACKING CREDENTIALS (Docket #78);

 

(2)  AUTHOR’S VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT (Docket #99);  and,

 

(3)  AUTHOR’S AFFIDAVIT CONTESTING DECLARATION OF WESLEY C.J. EHLERS (Docket #164).

 

 

4(d) In Miscellaneous Pleadings:

 

Appellant’s NOTICE OF COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION, BY AFFIDAVIT (Docket #2) as supplemented by Appellant’s MOTION FOR ORDER ENJOINING FURTHER INACTION BY THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS timely filed in this appeal pursuant to FRAP Rule 8 and FREv Rule 201(d), verified pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1), and incorporating Attachments “A” thru “G” as follows:

 

(A)  Appellant’s Completed Application Form TX and Related Documents (not filed in the district court);

 

(B)           Docket #2 (Appellant’s NOTICE OF COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION, BY AFFIDAVIT);

 

(C)  Docket #168 (USDC’s ORDER adopting Magistrate’s FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS) and Docket #169 (JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE);

 

(D)  Docket #142 (Magistrate’s FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS);

 

(E)  Docket #170 (Appellant’s verified MOTION TO STRIKE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ‑‑ PART I);

 

(F)  Docket #176 (Appellant’s verified MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of #168 supra);

 

(G)  Docket #286 (USDC’s ORDER denying (E) Docket #170 supra), and USDC’S MEMORANDUM AND ORDER filed February 22, 2002 (not yet docketed by district court);

 

Appellant’s verified NOTICE OF REFUSAL FOR CAUSE AND OF SIGNATURE WITHDRAWAL, BY AFFIDAVIT (Docket #71);

 

Appellant’s verified NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT OF A JUDGE OF THE COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE TO PRESIDE OVER THIS DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, as served on Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski (Docket #98, incorrectly showing “USDC”);

 

AUTHOR’S VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT (Docket #99);  see California Business and Professions Code, §§ 6126 and 6127, and 18 U.S.C. 242;

 

Appellant’s SECOND NOTICE OF REFUSAL FOR CAUSE, BY AFFIDAVIT (Docket #101);

 

AUTHOR’S THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE (Docket #102);

 

Appellant’s MIRANDA WARNING TO DALE A. DROZD (Docket #125);

 

Appellant’s verified COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AGAINST U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE DALE A. DROZD, executed January 11, 2002 A.D. (not docketed by district court);  see 28 U.S.C. §§ 372(c) and 454, and Docket #162 infra;

 

Appellant’s PROOF OF SERVICE OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT COMPLAINT (Docket #162);  and,

 

Appellant’s verified FIRST SUPPLEMENT TO NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR CERTIFICATE OF NECESSITY (Docket #163).

 

 

5.   What issues are you raising on appeal?

 

Appellant now incorporates nearly verbatim Pages 11-13 of 22 from His MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF USDC’S ORDER FILED IN ERROR ON JANUARY 25, 2002 A.D. (Docket #176).  See 5(a)‑5(k) as follows:

 

 

5(a) The Magistrate’s recommendation to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is based on plain errors that are fully documented in Appellant’s verified MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER [sic] AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE ‑‑ PARTS I, II, and III.

 

 

5(b) The Magistrate’s recommendation to dismiss for failure to state a claim is based on further plain errors that are also fully documented in Appellant’s verified MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER [sic] AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE ‑‑ PARTS I, II, and III.

 

 

5(c) The United States District Court (“USDC”) has no original jurisdiction over the specific subject matter raised in Appellant’s Initial COMPLAINT.  The Lanham Act statute at 60 Stat. 440, Sec. 39, corresponding to 15 U.S.C. 1121 (never codified), conferred original jurisdiction on the District Courts of the United States (“DCUS”), i.e. “The district courts ... of the United States shall have original jurisdiction ... of all actions arising under this Act ....”  Statutes granting original jurisdiction must be strictly construed (elaborated below).  For example, compare 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B) conferring original jurisdiction on the DCUS, with 17 U.S.C. 512(h) conferring original jurisdiction on the USDC.  In particular, see:

 

36 C.J.S. 55:  Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442 (1942);  City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat. Bank of the City of New York, 314 U.S. 63 (1941);  Harris v. American Legion, 162 F.Supp. 700 (S.D. Ind.);  Detres v. Lions Bldg. Corp., 136 F.Supp. 699 (N.D. Ill. 1955);  Blair Holdings Corp. v. Rubinstein, 133 F.Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1955);  Scarborough v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 45 F.Supp. 176 (W.D. Texas 1942);  and,

 

36 C.J.S. 4‑5:  Joy v. City of St. Louis, 122 Fed. 524 (1906);  Carroll v. U.S., 354 U.S. 394 (1957);  Aetna Insurance Co. v. Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co., 229 F.2d 584 (10th Cir. 1956);  Tsang v. Kan, 173 F.2d 204 (9th Cir.);  Central Mexico Light & Power Co. v. Munch, 116 F.2d 85 (2nd Cir. 1940);  The Emma Giles, 15 F.Supp. 502;  Sweet v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 68 F.Supp. 782.

 

 

5(d) United States District Judge William B. Shubb was never commissioned to preside on the District Court of the United States (“DCUS”).  See Appellant’s proper and lawful request (Docket #159) and appeal under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) for a certified copy of Mr. Shubb’s Presidential commission.  By law, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) is the legal custodian of this commission.  DOJ have now failed to exhibit a certified copy of said commission.

 

 

5(e) Motions to dismiss were never filed in the District Court of the United States (“DCUS”), because the attorneys in question failed to exhibit the credentials required by § 6067 of the California Business and Professions Code.  Such motions assumed facts not in evidence, i.e. valid certificates of oath endorsed upon licenses to practice law in California (read “physical documents”).  Said motions also attempted to move the wrong court with rules that do not apply to the DCUS.  As such, said motions failed to state any claim upon which relief could be granted by the DCUS.

 

 

5(f) The DCUS never ruled, and therefore committed plain error by failing to hear and rule, on Appellant’s proper and timely MOTION TO STRIKE ALL PLEADINGS FILED BY ATTORNEYS LACKING CREDENTIALS.  This obvious omission was prejudicial to Appellant.  A proper hearing on this MOTION is required finally to establish whether or not the attorneys in question did have the requisite credentials, in fact.  See Clark v. Willett, 35 Cal. 534, 539 (courts have the power to inquire into the existence of an attorney’s license, and to dispose the question summarily).

 

 

5(g) On December 14, 2001 A.D., the Clerk of Court issued SUBPOENAS to certain attorneys for exhibition of their licenses to practice law, with certificates of oath endorsed on those licenses, as required by § 6067 of the California Business and Professions Code.  Said SUBPOENAS are still pending before the DCUS, and they must be answered.  If those SUBPOENAS are not obeyed, the attorneys in question risk court sanction(s) for obstructing lawful discovery and contempt of court.  See PROOFS OF SERVICE of said SUBPOENAS (Docket #220‑#287 inclusive).

 

 

5(h) No motion to quash said SUBPOENAS has been heard by the DCUS, and no lawful ORDER to quash any of said SUBPOENAS has been issued by the DCUS.  Again, to grant any attorney’s motion to quash or any other motion (for that matter), absent the requisite credentials, assumes facts not in evidence.  On the contrary, a summary judgment would logically be in order against each named Defendant whose attorney(s) failed to exhibit the said credentials.  See U.S. v. High Country Broadcasting Co., 3 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1993) (entry of default judgment was appropriate when unlicensed corporate president attempted to represent his corporation in court).

 

 

5(i) Similarly, the DCUS also never ruled, and therefore committed plain error by failing to hear and rule, on all of Appellant’s other proper and timely MOTIONS, e.g. MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT AND CHALLENGE TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN ACT OF CONGRESS.  This latter MOTION by Appellant is pivotal to the instant case, because it will finally establish the exact scope of rule-making authority granted to the U.S. Supreme Court by 28 U.S.C. 2072.  Without that judgment, the legal relations of all parties will remain unsettled, resulting in prejudice to Appellant.

 

 

5(j) It is evident from the record that the DCUS was legally vacant when Appellant filed the instant case on August 1, 2001 A.D., and has remained vacant right up to the present time.  As such, no motions by any party can be ruled on, and no motions by any party have been ruled on, strictly speaking.  Both Judge Shubb and Magistrate Drozd are paying taxes on their compensation, in clear violation of Article III, Section 1 (never amended).  This diminution of their compensation strictly bars them from exercising the judicial Power of the United States over matters itemized in the Arising Under Clause in the U.S. Constitution (“3:2:1”).  Compare Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920) with Lord v. Kelley, 240 F.Supp. 167, 169 (1965).

 

 

5(k) Appellant timely petitioned Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski for a Certificate of Necessity to certify the vacancy in the DCUS, and this petition is presently pending before the Ninth Circuit.  Appellant awaits a proper ruling by Judge Kozinski, or other qualified judge(s), on this essential step.

 

 

Appellant now incorporates nearly verbatim Pages 6‑7 of 12 from His MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE ‑‑ PART III.  See 5(l)‑5(v), as follows:

 

 

5(l) Statutes granting original jurisdiction to federal courts must be strictly construed.  Confer at “Construction, Strict” in Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, citing Warner v. King, 267 Ill. 82, 107 N.E. 837, 839.  (See 5(c) above, and further discussion below.)

 

 

5(m) Strictly construed, 28 U.S.C. 2072(a) does not authorize the U.S. Supreme Court to promulgate rules of evidence or civil procedure for the constitutional District Court of the United States (“DCUS”), but only for the legislative United States District Court (“USDC”).

 

 

5(n) No sanction can or would be appropriate under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”), until such time as the Congress of the United States expressly authorizes the U.S. Supreme Court to promulgate such rules specifically for the DCUS.  See Article I, Section 1 (“1:1”) in the U.S. Constitution: “All legislative Powers ... shall be vested in a Congress of the United States ....”

 

 

5(o) Mr. Drozd is barred from exercising any civil jurisdiction, due, in chief, to Appellant’s voluntary refusal to consent to civil jurisdiction by any U.S. Magistrate Judge.  The Clerk’s “CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 01-CV-1480” exhibits no Consent Forms whatsoever (see Excerpts attached hereto).  See also:

 

(1)  USDC‑EDCA Form.8 (“NOTICE OF RIGHT TO CONSENT TO THE EXERCISE OF CIVIL JURISDICTION BY A MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND APPEAL OPTION”);

 

(2)  FRCP Form 33 (“Notice of Availability of Magistrate Judge to Exercise Jurisdiction”);

 

(3)  USDC‑EDCA Form.9 (“CONSENT TO PROCEED BEFORE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE”);  and,

 

(4)  all authorities cited therein.

 

Likewise, said CIVIL DOCKET does not exhibit any Form 34A (“ORDER OF REFERENCE”) duly executed by an Article III judge commissioned by the President of the United States of America to preside on the DCUS for the Eastern Judicial District of California.

 

 

5(p) To date, all attorneys have failed to exhibit the requisite credentials mandated by § 6067 of the California Business and Professions Code.

 

 

5(q) Appellant has filed a proper VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT against Mr. Drozd, for practicing law from the bench in violation of 28 U.S.C. 454, and against certain attorneys lacking credentials, for practicing law without valid licenses and willful misrepresentations in violation of §§ 6126 and 6127 of the California Business and Professions Code, respectively.

 

 

5(r) The named Defendants allegedly represented by those attorneys have a right to know if (and when) they are being damaged by the unlawful practice of law and/or willful misrepresentation by the attorneys they retained.

 

 

5(s) Any named Defendants who are damaged by their attorneys’ unlawful practice of law and/or willful misrepresentation, have cause to file a claim against those attorneys’ malpractice insurance policies (if any).

 

 

5(t) Appellant never waived, nor consented to any competent waiver of, His fundamental Rights to freedom of speech and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances, as guaranteed by the First Amendment and the Petition Clause, respectively.  Waivers of fundamental Rights will never be presumed.  See Ohio Bell v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292 (1937) (“We do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.”)  See also the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Declaration”) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“Covenant”), violations of which have already been alleged in COUNTS THREE and FOUR of Appellant’s Initial COMPLAINT.

 

 

5(u) It appears that the threat by Mr. Drozd [of probable sanctions against Appellant for contacting the attorneys’ clients] was uttered specifically to infringe Appellant’s fundamental Rights to freedom of speech and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances, as guaranteed by the First Amendment and the Petition Clause.  Again, see the Declaration and Covenant supra.

 

 

5(v) Appellant therefore believes that this threat constitutes probable cause to charge Mr. Drozd also with threatening a qualified federal witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1512 (one count), and deprivation of Appellant’s fundamental Rights to freedom of speech and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 242 (one count).

 

 

6.   Did you present all these issues to the district court?

Answer:  Yes.  Issues 5(a) thru 5(v) supra were presented to the District Court of the United States (“DCUS”).

 

SUBPOENAS for subscriber identities and computer activity logs were issued by the Clerk of the United States District Court (“USDC”), pursuant to the statute at 17 U.S.C. 512(h) conferring original jurisdiction on the USDC to issue said qualifying SUBPOENAS to Internet Service Providers (“ISP”).  See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”).

 

 

7.   What law supports these issues on appeal?

(You may, but need not, refer to cases and statutes.)

 

Appellant hereby incorporates by reference all constitutional provisions, statutes, and cases already quoted and/or cited in the Excerpts attached to this OPENING BRIEF, as if all were set forth fully herein.

 

Appellant further elaborates pertinent provisions, statutes and cases, as follows:

 

 

7(a) 28 U.S.C. 636 mandates the consent of all parties before any U.S. Magistrate Judge can exercise civil jurisdiction:

 

See Form 33: “Notice of Availability of Magistrate Judge to Exercise Jurisdiction” in Federal Civil Judicial Procedure and Rules, published by West Group (2000 Edition):

 

Exercise of this jurisdiction by a magistrate judge is, however, permitted only if all parties voluntarily consent.

 

You may, without adverse substantive consequences, withhold your consent, but this will prevent the court’s jurisdiction from being exercised by a magistrate judge.

 

[underlines and bold emphasis added]

 

 

The Advisory Committee Notes for Form 33, 1993 Amendments, state:

 

... [T]he exercise of jurisdiction by a magistrate judge remains dependent on the voluntary consent of the parties ... they are “free to withhold consent without adverse substantive consequences.”  The parties may be advised if the withholding of consent will result in a potential delay in trial.

 

[underlines and bold emphasis added]

 

 

See also Form 34A: “Order of Reference” in Federal Civil Judicial Procedure and Rules, by West Group (2000 Edition):

 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-captioned matter be referred to United States Magistrate Judge for all further proceedings and entry of judgment in accordance with Title 28, U.S.C. § 636(c) and the consent of the parties.  (Added Apr. 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993.)

 

[bold emphasis added]

 

 

Appellant never consented to the exercise of civil jurisdiction by any U.S. Magistrate Judge.

 

No Form 34A: Order of Reference was ever issued, filed, or served in the instant case.  Furthermore, Form 34A is captioned “UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT” and not the “District Court of the United States”.

 

A Clerk of Court did properly issue SUMMONSES, and SUBPOENAS for the requisite licenses to practice law, each captioned “District Court of the United States” [sic].

 

 

7(b) Statutes of limitation and accrual are favorable to Appellant’s copyright enforcement claims:

 

See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106121, 501, 507;  Exhibit “D‑13” (Notice of Default on August 2, 1998 A.D.) and Exhibit “K” as incorporated by reference into Appellant’s SECOND and THIRD SUPPLEMENT TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND INJUNCTION FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND RELATED CLAIMS: JURY DEMANDED (filed with Initial COMPLAINT).

 

Pertinent cases now follow:

 

In copyright infringement actions, the period of limitation begins on the date of the last infringing act.  Baxter v. Curtis Industries, Inc., 201 F.Supp. 100 (N.D. Ohio 1962).

 

[U.S. v. Shabazz, 724 F.2d 1536, 1540]

[(11th Cir. 1984) bold emphasis added]

 

 

The statute of limitations is tolled until plaintiff learned, or by reasonable diligence could have learned, that he had a cause of action.

 

The statute of limitations is tolled by fraudulent concealment (read “active misconduct”).

 

Only the last infringing act need be within the statutory period of copyright statute of limitations to permit recovery for all infringing acts, so long as infringement amounts to a continuing wrong.

 

[Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1118-1119]

[(7th Cir. 1983) underlines and bold emphasis added]

 

 

See also Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F.Supp. 1013, 1018 (DCUS, S.D. Calif. 1942), decided six (6) years before the Act of June 25, 1948.

 

The last act of alleged infringement in plaintiff’s use of a copyrighted manual occurred less than 3 years before defendant brought first counterclaim alleging infringement; therefore, counterclaim alleging infringement was not barred by the 3-year limitations period.

 

The discussion in Taylor [supra] is quite impressive.  It observes that copyright infringement is a continuing wrong, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run in such a case until the wrong is over and done with. ... [L]egal proceedings must be commenced within three years of the last unlawful act ....

 

[Eisenman Chemical Co. v. N.L. Industries, Inc.]

[595 F.Supp. 141 (D.C. Nev. 1984)]

[underlines and bold emphasis added]

 

 

In the case of continuing copyright infringements, action may be brought for all acts that accrued within 3 years preceding filing of suit.

 

[Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479]

[(9th Cir. 1994) bold emphasis added]

 

 

7(c) The Rules Enabling Act at 28 U.S.C. 2072 cannot extend or restrict original jurisdiction conferred by statute:

 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) do not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right, and do not enlarge the jurisdiction of federal courts.

 

[Brennan v. Silvergate Dist. Lodge No. 50]

[Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers]

[503 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1974), bold emphasis added]

 

 

Statutes are superseded by conflicting federal rules.  28 U.S.C. 2072.

 

[Griffith Co. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 1194]

[(9th Cir. 1976) footnote 3]

 

 

In adopting rules, federal courts are not free to extend or restrict jurisdiction conferred by statute.

 

The FRCP must be deemed to apply to a particular Federal District Court civil proceeding only if the application of the rules will not impermissibly expand the judicial authority conferred on federal courts by the Federal Constitution’s Article III ‑‑ which describes the subjects over which federal courts have jurisdiction ‑‑ because the caveat that federal courts, in adopting rules, are not free to extend or restrict the jurisdiction conferred by a statute applies a fortiori to any effort to extend by rule the judicial power described in Article III of the Constitution.

 

[Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 112 S.Ct. 1076]

[117 L.Ed.2d 280 (USDC, S.D. Texas 1992), headnote 3]

[underlines and bold emphasis added]

 

 

Where the subject concerns enforcement of rules which by law it is the duty of the Supreme Court to formulate and put in force, the Supreme Court may deal directly with the district court.

 

[Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 85 S.Ct. 234]

[13 L.Ed.2d 152 (S.D. Ind. 1964)]

 

 

The Supreme Court has power to prescribe the practice and procedure of district courts in civil actions, so long as these rules do not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.

 

[Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co. v. Pillsbury]

[259 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1958)]

 

 

Although the Supreme Court has the power to prescribe rules of procedure for federal district and appellate courts, it may not adopt rules which abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.

 

[Matter of C.A.P., 356 A.2d 335 (D.C. App. 1976)]

 

 

Delegation of rule-making power to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. 2072 does not authorize the expansion or contraction of jurisdiction conferred by statute.

 

[Collins v. Bolton, 287 F.Supp. 393]

[(USDC Ill. 1968) bold emphasis added]

 

 

The Supreme Court may not by its rules increase or diminish jurisdiction of federal district courts prescribed by laws enacted by Congress in pursuance of the Constitution, though the Supreme Court may regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in any manner not inconsistent with the laws of the United States.

 

[Hartley Pen Co. v. Lindy Pen Co., 16 F.R.D. 141]

[(USDC, S.D. Calif. 1954) bold emphasis added]

 

 

Court must not apply the FRCP if application violates either the Constitution or the Rules Enabling Act.

 

[Douglas v. NCNB Texas Nat. Bank]

[979 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1992)]

 

 

The Supreme Court, in adopting the federal rules, did not intend to establish jurisdictional limitations on the power of district courts.

 

[United Press Ass’ns v. Charles, 245 F.2d 21 (1957)]

 

 

The Supreme Court may not, by adoption of the FRCP, alter the jurisdiction of federal district courts or the courts of appeals.

 

[Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass]

[195 F.2d 267 (3rd Cir. 1952)]

[bold emphasis added]

 

 

There are 2 limits to Congress’ power to amend the FRCP:  first is the Rules Enabling Act’s “abrogation clause,” which provides that statutes passed before the effective date of the rule in question are trumped, and that a statute passed after a federal rule’s effective date repeals the rule to the extent that it actually conflicts;  second is general disfavor with which courts view implicit amendments or repeal of statutes.

 

[Jackson v. Stinnett, 102 F.3d 132 (5th Cir. 1996)]

[underlines and bold emphasis added]

 

 

Under former Sec. 723b of this title, authorization was limited to provision solely for adjective matters in the course of litigation in controversies of a civil nature, as distinguished from substantive ones which remained secure to all litigants.

 

[Melekov v. Collins, 30 F.Supp. 159 (D.C. Calif. 1939)]

 

 

Former Sec. 723b of this title authorizing the Supreme Court to prescribe rules of procedure in civil actions gave it no authority to modify, abridge, or enlarge the substantive rights of litigants, or to enlarge or diminish the jurisdiction of federal courts.

 

[U.S. v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (DCUS 1941)]

[Wyker v. Willingham, 55 F.Supp. 105 (1944)]

[Lowe v. U.S., 37 F.Supp. 817 (1941)]

[underlines and bold emphasis added]

 

 

Congressional inaction on promulgated rule of civil procedure gives rule the status of a regulation.

 

[In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979)]

 

 

Rules acquired the force of federal statutes controlling all federal district courts after they went into effect on Sept. 16, 1938, and since that date all conflicting laws ceased to have further force.

 

[C.J. Wieland & Son Dairy Products Co. v. Wickard]

[4 F.R.D. 250 (D.C. Wisc. 1945)]

[bold emphasis added]

 

 

The Federal Rules supersede inconsistent statutes by virtue of the rule‑making act under which the rules were promulgated.

 

[James William Moore, Yale Univ. Professor of Law]

[in “Revision of Title 28, United States Code”]

[House Report No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Session]

[28 USCA 2461 to End, page 766]

 

 

The justice of a nation is as strong as its Judicial Code.

 

[ibid., page 766]

 

 

7(d) The abrogation clause at 28 U.S.C. 2072(b) cannot retroactively amend federal statutes conferring original jurisdiction on the Article III District Court of the United States (“DCUS”):

 

This honorable Court of Appeals will please take formal judicial Notice of Appellant’s proper and timely challenge now filed in this appeal against 28 U.S.C. 2072(b), for violating the Separation of Powers Doctrine and the ex post facto prohibition.

See legislative history of 1988 amendments, Rep. Kastenmeier: “unwise and potentially unconstitutional”.

The U.S. Supreme Court has defined “separation of powers” as follows:

 

... [A] power definitely assigned by the Constitution to one department can neither be surrendered nor delegated by that department, nor vested by statute in another department or agency.

 

[Williams v. United States]

[289 U.S. 553, 580 (1933)]

 

However, the high Court in that case erred by defining “Party” in Article III to mean Plaintiff only.  This definition contradicts the definition of “Party” as found in Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856) (“Party” embraces both plaintiffs and defendants).

Accordingly, an FRCP amendment effective October 20, 1949, was strictly limited to those rules and could never have altered any existing federal statutes, whether retroactively or otherwise.  See further discussion at 7(e) infra.

In particular, see Mookini v. United States, 303 U.S. 201, 58 S.Ct. 543, 82 L.Ed. 748 (1938) (term “District Courts of the United States” in its historic and proper sense);  Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 985 to 991, § 2(b) (“continuations of existing law”) and § 9 (“the jurisdiction of district courts of the United States”).

 

7(e) The Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869 et seq., is vague and deceptive in several of its key provisions and is, therefore, unconstitutional.

 

By way of introduction, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia has no jurisdiction whatsoever over the instant case, nor do any of the courts situated in any of the federal Territories or Possessions.

California is neither a United States Territory acquired under Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 (“4:3:2”), nor is it an enclave acquired under Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 (“1:8:17”) in the Constitution for the United States of America, as lawfully amended (“U.S. Constitution”).

It is clear from the original Statute at Large quoted above (60 Stat. 440, Sec. 39) that the DCUS is the only federal court with original jurisdiction competent to hear claims arising under the Lanham Act, when the venue is a judicial district of California (or any other State of the Union, for that matter).  See 28 U.S.C. 84(b).

The DCUS and the USDC are decidedly not one and the same.

Appellant now supplies further conclusive proof.

The Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869 et seq., contains provisions deliberately written and implemented to foster the false and misleading conclusion that ‑‑ in all matters arising under the Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the United States ‑‑ these two courts are synonymous and identical in all respects whatsoever.  See Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 (“3:2:1”) and the Supremacy Clause in pari materia with 28 U.S.C. 1331.

Appellant honestly trembles at the mere thought of challenging a comprehensive revision, codification, and enactment of all laws that have governed the conduct of the federal courts in this great nation for 54 years.

However, a careful review of the relevant evidence, as found in various sections of Title 28, U.S.C., has rendered that challenge necessary and inevitable.

That careful review now follows:

It is now abundantly evident to Appellant, and Appellant hereby offers to prove, that:

(1)  the Article III DCUS inside the several States were never expressly abolished by Congress;

(2)  Congress knows how to abolish federal courts when it intends to do so;  and,

(3)  the Act of June 25, 1948, attempted fraudulently to conceal the DCUS, and to create the false impressions that they had been re‑defined as, replaced by, and/or rendered synonymous with, the USDC.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 132, 451, 610.

It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are decidedly not favored.  See U.S. v. United Continental Tuna, 425 U.S. 164, 168 (1976), for example.

As of this writing, Appellant has assembled an exhaustive list of all statutes in Title 28 that expressly mention either the USDC, the DCUS, or both.  For the convenience and edification of all, Appellant now advises this honorable Court, and all interested parties, that the results of this research have been published at Internet URL’s:

 

http://www.supremelaw.org/rsrc/dcus.in.28usc.bold.htm

http://www.supremelaw.org/rsrc/usdc.in.28usc.bold.htm

In any Act of Congress, words importing the plural include the singular, and words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things.  See 1 U.S.C. 1.

Therefore, the rules of statutory construction strictly bar intermingling of “United States District Courts” with “District Courts of the United States”.  Confer also at “Noscitur a sociis” in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition.

On the other hand, the term “district courts” [sic] does embrace both the DCUS and the USDC, since there appears to be a hierarchical relationship between this term and the courts constituted by Chapter 5 of Title 28.  See 28 U.S.C. 451.

This Court is respectfully requested to recognize, and to take formal judicial notice, that the ex post facto restriction in the U.S. Constitution (“1:9:3”) emphatically bars Congress from retroactively re-defining the meaning of “district courts of the United States” as that term was used in all federal legislation prior to June 25, 1948 A.D.  See, in particular, the Lanham Act at 60 Stat. 440, Sec. 39;  other examples abound.

Appellant’s Immunity from ex post facto legislation is a fundamental Right.  See the Privileges and Immunities Clause (“4:2:1”).  Federal copyright and trademark laws protect Appellant’s Rights uniformly in every State of the Union.

 

7(f) The Article III District Court of the United States (“DCUS”) was never expressly abolished inside the several States by any Act(s) of Congress, or by any rule changes:

 

The Act of June 25, 1948, expressly changed the name of the “District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia” to “United States District Court for the District of Columbia”, but only in the District of Columbia [underlines and bold added].  See § 32(b) in said Act, 62 Stat. 985 to 991.

However, no such comprehensive amendments were ever enacted for statutes conferring original jurisdiction on the DCUS located within the several States of the Union.

§ 39 of the Act of June 25, 1948, contained an explicit “Schedule of Laws Repealed,” and the legislative history of this Act is equally explicit:

 

This method of specific repeal will relieve the courts of the burdensome task of ferreting out implied repeals.

 

[“Revision of Title 28, United States Code”]

[House Report No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Session]

[28 USCA 2461 to End, page 709]

[underlines and bold emphasis added]

 

 

In this bill we have set up a new section of the bill ... listing chronologically all of the laws which we repeal.

 

[“Revision of Title 28, United States Code”]

[House Report No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Session]

[28 USCA 2461 to End, page 731]

[underlines and bold emphasis added]

 

 

The statute at 28 U.S.C. 132 likewise did not abolish the Article III DCUS inside the several States.  See 62 Stat. 895.  For example, compare the Lanham Act at 60 Stat. 440, Sec. 39;  the Sherman Act;  and the Securities and Exchange Acts.

The Lanham Act statute at 60 Stat. 440, Sec. 39, conferring original jurisdiction on the DCUS, was likewise never repealed by 28 U.S.C. 132 or otherwise.  Compare 15 U.S.C. 1121 (still uncodified).

In effect, 28 U.S.C. 132 appears to have broadcasted an extra legislative tribunal from the federal Territories into the several States of the Union, but without expressly abolishing the constitutional Article III DCUS inside those States.

For example, see all predecessor statutes of 28 U.S.C. 132 for its territorial origins, i.e. § 641 of Title 48, U.S.C, 1940 ed., Territories and Insular Possessions.

Think of it as a clear plastic overlay.

Also, see further discussion on this crucial point in AUTHOR’S AFFIDAVIT CONTESTING DECLARATION OF WESLEY C.J. EHLERS, Page 6 of 10, lines 3‑27 inclusive (Docket #164), concluding:

 

Plaintiff has carefully reviewed the history of amendments to this latter statute [60 Stat. 440, Sec. 39], and believes He is legally correct to conclude that the federal court with original jurisdiction of Lanham Act claims has remained unchanged in California and is still the constitutional Article III District Court of the United States (“DCUS”), and not the legislative Article IV United States District Court (“USDC”).

 

A rules amendment effective December 29, 1948, amended the titleRules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States” to read “Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts” [underlines and bold added].

And, a rules amendment effective October 20, 1949, substituted the words “United States district courts” for the words “district courts of the United Statesthroughout the FRCP.

However, the exact scope of these substitutions was limited to the FRCP and could not have affected any federal statutes.  See Notes to FRCP Rule 1.

The Lanham Act statute at 60 Stat. 440, Sec. 39, conferring original jurisdiction on the DCUS, was likewise unaffected by these rule changes, and could not have been affected by these rule changes, notwithstanding the abrogation clause supra.

Moreover, repeals by implication are decidedly not favored by the courts.  See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 442 (1987);  74 Am.Jur.2d 21-22 citing  Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309 (1907) and U.S. v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213 (1902);  Jackson v. Stinnett supra, 102 F.3d 132 (5th Cir. 1996);  also “Separation of Powers and Delegation of Authority to Cancel Statutes in the Line Item Veto Act and the Rules Enabling Act,” by Leslie M. Kelleher, George Washington Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 3, Feb. 2000.

 

7(g) In the opinions of recognized constitutional scholars, such as Justice Story, the Congress has affirmative obligations to create and to maintain constitutional district courts, proceeding in judicial mode.

 

The reasons for this proposition are simple, if not immediately obvious:

The original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court is quite limited under Article III, as compared to its appellate jurisdiction under Article III.

The Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction under Article III embraces matters that arise under the Supremacy Clause (Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the United States).  See also the Arising Under Clause at 3:2:1 in pari materia with 28 U.S.C. 1331 supra.

Cases that arise under the Supremacy Clause, as mirrored by 3:2:1 and by 28 U.S.C. 1331, would need to originate first in an inferior constitutional court, before those cases could ever reach the U.S. Supreme Court on appeal.

The exact same argument can be extended to this Court’s appellate jurisdiction: specifically, civil litigation under the Lanham Act must first originate in an inferior constitutional court, before such a case could ever reach the Ninth Circuit on appeal!  In this appeal, the Ninth Circuit must proceed in constitutional mode.

The conclusion is inescapable, therefore, that Congress must first create constitutional courts proceeding in judicial mode, and then it must also perpetuate them, in order to satisfy Article III and the Fifth Amendment.

To do otherwise would constitute a clear violation of the Fifth Amendment, which mandates due process of law (among other things).  This mandate is also embodied in numerous provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a United States treaty rendered supreme Law by the Supremacy Clause.  See Article 14 in that Covenant, for example.

The entire thrust of that Covenant is to guarantee independent, impartial and qualified judicial officers presiding upon courts of competent jurisdiction (and not Star Chambers, or other tribunals where summary proceedings are the norm, and where due process is not a fundamental Right (read “shall”) but a privilege granted at the discretion of those tribunals (read “may”)).

In pari materia, compare the language in Rules 201(c) and 201(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (“FREv”):  the former is discretionary (“may”);  the latter is mandatory (“shall”).  Confer at “Fundamental right” in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition (analogous to “shall”).

(Incidentally, Appellant is protesting the Seventh Edition of Black’s, because it has conspicuously omitted any definition of the term “United States” ‑‑ a term which figures prominently throughout federal laws and throughout the U.S. Constitution!)

 

7(h) Appellant therefore asserts a fundamental Right to due process of law, which necessarily mandates courts of competent jurisdiction in the first instance.  Within the 50 States of the Union, these are the DCUS and only the DCUS.

 

The District Courts of the United States (“DCUS”) are constitutional courts vested by law with competent jurisdiction over controversies arising under the Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the United States.

Statutes granting original jurisdiction to the federal district courts must be strictly construed [cites 5(c) supra].

Appellant argues that statutes granting appellate jurisdiction must be strictly construed as well.  See 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1) in the context of interlocutory orders.

Inside the several States of the Union, the United States District Courts (“USDC”) are not constitutional courts vested by law with original jurisdiction to hear cases or controversies that arise under the Lanham Act.  Confer at “Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius” in Black’s Sixth.

Inside the several States of the Union, the courts vested by law with competent, original jurisdiction to hear cases or controversies that arise under the Lanham Act are the DCUS.

Statutes granting original jurisdiction to these courts have used language and terminology that enjoy a well established historic meaning.  See Mookini v. United States, 303 U.S. 201, 205 (1938) (the term DCUS in its historic and proper sense).  Confer at “Noscitur a sociis” in Black’s Sixth.

Within California State, therefore, the DCUS is the only federal court with competent jurisdiction to originate the instant case.

 

7(i) Federal municipal law cannot be usurped to switch the instant proceedings from constitutional mode to legislative mode.

 

The 50 States of the Union are not “United States Districts” [sic];  they are judicial districts!  Federal municipal law does not operate, of its own force, inside those judicial districts.  See 1:8:17 and 4:3:2 (the federal zone).

Even though the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico are likewise judicial districts, federal municipal law can operate there because neither is a Union State.  28 U.S.C. §§ 88, 119.

Nevertheless, federal municipal law is likewise bound by all pertinent restrictions in the U.S. Constitution, because the U.S. Constitution was expressly extended into D.C. in 1871, and into all federal Territories in 1873.  See 16 Stat. 419, 426, Sec. 34;  18 Stat. 325, 333, Sec. 1891, respectively (hereinafter “extension statutes”).

In this context, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled:

 

 

It is obviously correct that no one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span of time covers our entire national existence and even predates it.

 

[Walz v. Tax Commission of New York City]

[397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970)]

 

 

A practice condemned by the Constitution cannot be saved by historical acceptance and present convenience.

 

[U.S. v. Woodley, 726 F.2d 1328, 1338]

[(9th Cir. 1984) bold emphasis added]

 

Appellant alleges that the nomenclature “United States District” [sic], as found on the caption pages of all federal court orders today, is now being used to trigger legislative mode without adequate notice to litigants, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Amendments (read “fraud”).

This dubious mechanism is called “silent judicial notice” [sic] ‑‑ surely a misnomer, if ever there was one.  It would be entirely more accurate to call it “silent legislative notice”, since this practice is a deceptive device now rampant within legislative courts, and the DCUS are currently vacant.

But, has Congress been silent, or merely vague?

 

7(j) The extension statutes are monumentally important, in light of highly successful efforts by the federal government, since the year 1866 A.D., to create an absolute legislative democracy within the several States of the Union.

 

The Guarantee Clause does not require the United States to guarantee a Republic Form of government to itself, but only to the 50 States.

Strictly speaking, Congress was free to create such a democracy, but only within the federal zone, and not within the State zone.  See 1:8:17 and 4:3:2.  The territorial reach of such a democracy is necessarily limited to the federal zone, and not beyond.  See also the 1866 Civil Rights Act (an early example of federal municipal law) and IRC 3121(e).

Legally speaking, the population of federal citizens now “residing” within the several States of the Union is an absolute legislative democracy, by Congressional intent.  Confer at “Federal citizenship” in Black’s Sixth.

Federal citizenship is a municipal franchise domiciled in the District of Columbia.  Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885).  In this context, the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” is correctly understood to mean “subject to the municipal jurisdiction of Congress”.

The U.S. Supreme Court has acquiesced to this questionable legislative intent.  Under the Downes Doctrine, the Constitution of the United States, as such, does not extend beyond the limits of the States that are united by, and under, it.  See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), Harlan dissenting.  This Doctrine is demonstrably specious, because it is contrary to Law.

Another deceptive device, perhaps?

The Downes Doctrine was later extended in the case of Hooven & Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), in which the high Court ruled that the guaranties [sic] of the U.S. Constitution extend into the federal zone only as Congress makes those guaranties applicable ‑‑ by enacting federal statutes.  Under this Doctrine, the guarantees of the U.S. Constitution would not extend into the federal zone without specific legislative action.

This latter presumption is conclusively rebutted by the extension statutes, however.  Clearly, all guarantees in the U.S. Constitution have already been expressly extended into D.C. and into all federal Territories, without exception, effectively destroying the Downes Doctrine 30 years before the fact.

Ignorance of the Law is no excuse for violating the Law.

It would only compound the ubiquitous errors that have already been made under the Downes Doctrine to treat the States of the Union as federal Territories in any manner whatsoever, least of all by convening territorial courts inside those States.

In this context, therefore, legislative tribunals like the USDC are entirely out of place, and wholly lacking jurisdiction, to entertain any cases that arise under the Lanham Act when States of the Union are the “judicial districts” where the violations are alleged to have occurred.

For now, California is a judicial district, not a legislative district, and original jurisdiction over such cases is clearly vested in courts specifically created to exercise the judicial Power of the United States.

This latter phrase is controlling, because it introduces Article III and forms the basis for all Clauses that Article contains.

Accordingly, for all of the substantive reasons stated above, the District Courts of the United States (“DCUS”) still remain the only federal courts with original jurisdiction legally competent to hear cases arising under the Lanham Act, when violations of that Act are alleged to have occurred inside States of the Union and across State lines.

 

7(k) Vagueness, once fully documented wherever it occurs, will be shown to conflict directly with the stated legislative intent of the Act of June 25, 1948.

 

The stated legislative intent of that Act is clear enough:  “The provisions of title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, of the United States Code, set out in section 1 of this Act, ... shall be construed as continuations of existing law ...”  [bold emphasis added].

Moreover, “No loss of rights, interruption of jurisdiction, or prejudice to matters pending in any of such courts on the effective date of this Act shall result from its enactment.”  [bold emphasis added]

See Miscellaneous Provisions, Act of June 25, 1948, C. 646, §§ 2 to 39, 62 Stat. 985 to 991, as amended.

In good faith, Appellant constructs these Miscellaneous Provisions to read:  “No loss of Rights and no interruption of jurisdiction shall result from its enactment.”

What, then, is meant by the term “existing law”?

If Congress had intended to abolish the DCUS, they would (and they should) have said so.  The period between 1789 A.D. and 1948 A.D. spans 159 years of judicial history!  Hiding a herd of elephants under a rug would be easier than hiding the DCUS under a pretense.

To reiterate these all important points:  Statutes granting original jurisdiction must be strictly construed.  Repeals by implication (or magic carpets) are decidedly not favored.  The law of jurisdiction is fundamental law.  Jurisdiction is the power to declare the law;  without it, courts cannot proceed at all in any cause.  Ruhrgas v. Marathon Oil Co., __ U.S. __ (1999), No. 98‑470, May 17, 1999 A.D.

In 1946 A.D., two years before the Act of June 25, 1948, the Lanham Act conferred original jurisdiction on the several DCUS.  These courts are Article III constitutional courts proceeding in judicial mode.  Inside the several States of the Union, the DCUS are the only federal courts with original jurisdiction to hear cases that arise under the Lanham Act.

This is the existing law!

The USDC are legislative courts typically proceeding in legislative mode.  See American Insurance v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511, 7 L.Ed. 242 (1828) (C.J. Marshall’s seminal ruling);  Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) (the USDC is not a true United States court established under Article III!);  and 28 U.S.C. §§ 88, 91, 132, 152, 171, 251, 458, 461, 1367.

Legislative courts are not required to exercise the Article III guarantees required of constitutional courts.  See Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923);  Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 274 U.S. 145 (1927);  Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928);  Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U.S. 438 (1929);  Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930);  Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U.S. 382 (1932);  O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933);  Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962);  Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).

To the extent that the Act of June 25, 1948, was written and enacted to justify or otherwise foster the notion that all violations of Congressional acts predating that year can now be prosecuted in the USDC ‑‑ a legislative court that was broadcasted from the federal Territories into the several (48) States on that date ‑‑ then that Act is demonstrably unconstitutional for at least four reasons:

(1)  it exhibits vagueness on this obviously important point;

 

(2)  it violates the ex post facto prohibition;

 

(3)  it violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine at 28 U.S.C. 2072(b) and elsewhere;  and,

 

(4)           it violates the well established principle that statutes granting original jurisdiction to federal courts must be strictly construed.

 

Prof. Emeritus Kenneth L. Karst, on the faculty of the UCLA Law School, summed it up nicely as follows:

 

In essence a legislative court is merely an administrative agency with an elegant name.  While Congress surely has the power to transfer portions of the business of the federal judiciary to legislative courts, a wholesale transfer of that business would work a fundamental change in the status of our independent judiciary and would seem vulnerable to constitutional attack.

 

[Discussion of “Legislative Court”]

[in Encyclopedia of the American Constitution]

[New York, MacMillan Publishing Company (1986)]

[underlines and bold emphasis added]

 

 

7(l) There are essential facts in this case which were either too subtle, or too voluminous, for the Magistrate and Judge Shubb to appreciate fully;  neither has read and understood the whole docket file.  Appellant now highlights these essential facts, to ensure that they are not also overlooked by this honorable Court:

 

(1)  On August 2, 1998 A.D., certain Defendants defaulted in response to Appellant’s DEMANDS FOR AUTHORIZATION (Exhibit “K”), thus satisfying the 3-year statute of limitations in the Copyright Act.  Others defaulted after that date.

 

(2)  The acts of removing Appellant’s README file, containing His SHAREWARE POLICY, were acts of fraudulent concealment (“active misconduct”) and false designation of origin that resulted in tolling all pertinent statutes of limitation.

 

(3)  Withholding the identities of subscribers suspected of infringing Appellant’s exclusive copyrights was also an act of fraudulent concealment, making it impossible for the district court to assess actual damages.  See Exhibit “J”.

 

(4)  Withholding the computer activity logs of ISP’s, in response to valid SUBPOENA’s issued under 17 U.S.C. 512(h), was tantamount to further fraudulent concealment and probable cause for contempt of court, and sanctions.

 

(5)  Counterfeits of the subject book remain on the Internet to this day, e.g. at Internet domain 9X.TC, proving conclusively that the threat of continuing wrong is substantial, premeditated and malicious.  See Taylor supra.

 

(6)           Further retaliations against Appellant, e.g. denial of service attacks on Appellant’s website, physical assault and breach of the contract to serve SUMMONSES, justify immediate relief in the form of preliminary injunctions during pendency of this action (see RELIEF REQUESTED in the Initial COMPLAINT).

 

(7)  Appellant’s primary emphasis in preparing the Initial COMPLAINT was to organize the electronic evidence, to preserve it intact, and to make it readily accessible via the Internet and its most popular search engines, e.g. the View | Source option in Microsoft Internet Explorer.

 

(8)  Printing hard copies of electronic evidence, particularly files coded in HTML, results in hiding the underlying markup codes where crucial evidence of hyperlinks and associated domains is to be found.

 

(9)  Appellant’s hard copy files contain many additional documents which Appellant has not had time to enter and which should be entered into evidence in the district court, e.g. the written amnesty offers that were mailed to certain suspects in the summer of 1999 A.D.

 

(10) The Lanham Act was enacted expressly to enforce treaties like the Declaration and the Covenant:  “The intent of this chapter is ... to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition entered into between the United States and foreign nations.”  See 15 U.S.C. 1127, last paragraph (uncodified).

 

(11) Appellant’s Common Law Rights are expressly reserved by the Seventh and Tenth Amendments, the terms of which Congress is barred from re-defining.  Thus, to suggest that Congress has abolished common law copyrights necessarily results in infringing Rights guaranteed by those Amendments, in this case.  See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).

 

(12) To refer to any of the issues discussed above as “frivolous” is an obnoxious insult to Appellant.  Matters that arise under the Supremacy Clause are never frivolous.  Why would State and federal laws impose solemn oaths of office on all public officials, if the State and Federal Constitutions were frivolous?  Reductio ad absurdum.

 

 

8.   Do you have any other cases pending in this court?  If so, give the name and docket number of each case.

 

Answer:  No

 

 

9.   Have you filed any previous cases which have been decided by this court?  If so, give the name and docket number of each case.

 

Answer:  No

 

 

10.  For prisoners, did you exhaust all administrative remedies for each claim prior to filing your complaint in the district court?

 

Answer:  (not applicable in this civil case)

 

REMEDY REQUESTED

All facts and laws having been amply considered, Appellant now respectfully requests this honorable United States Court of Appeals to take mandatory judicial notice of the official record now before it, and accordingly to issue ORDERS, JUDGMENTS and DEGREES, consistent with those facts and laws:

(1)           enjoining preliminarily, during pendency of this action, the continuing wrongs now being inflicted on Appellant by ongoing copyright, trademark and treaty violations, and the unfair competition sufficiently documented in that record;

(2)           vacating all actions by the U.S. Magistrate Judge taken without the required consent of all parties, without jurisdiction, and without the required ORDER OF REFERENCE from a competent and qualified Article III judge;

(3)           vacating the ORDER by U.S. District Judge William B. Shubb, alleging in error to adopt the Magistrate’s FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS in full;

(4)           vacating the ORDER by U.S. District Judge William B. Shubb alleging in error to deny Appellant’s MOTION TO STRIKE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS;

(5)           vacating the ORDER AND MEMORANDUM by U.S. District Judge William B. Shubb alleging in error to deny Appellant’s MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF USDC’S ORDER FILED IN ERROR ON JANUARY 25, 2002 A.D.;

(6)           issuing a proper and lawful Certificate of Necessity that a competent and qualified Article III judge be assigned to the instant case;

(7)           serving said Certificate of Necessity formally on the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, with all deliberate speed;

(8)           staying all further proceedings in the instant case, pending temporary assignment of a competent and qualified Article III judge to the instant case by said Chief Justice;

(9)           enjoining all U.S. District Judges and all U.S. Magistrate Judges from presiding on the instant case without proper Presidential commissions and in violation of the Compensation Clause at Article III, Section 1;

(10)      enjoining the Register of Copyrights from any further inaction in the matter of Appellant’s APPLICATION FOR COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION, U.S. Copyright Office Form TX;

(11)      holding in a PUBLISHED opinion that, as matter of law:

(a)           the Article III District Court of the United States, in its historic and proper sense and proceeding in constitutional mode, has original jurisdiction to hear claims arising under the Lanham Act, pursuant to 60 Stat. 440, Sec. 39, when the violations are alleged to have occurred inside a State of the Union;

(b)           by expressed legislative intent, the Lanham Act is available to Appellant to enforce Rights guaranteed by the Treaties cited in COUNTS THREE and FOUR of Appellant’s Initial COMPLAINT, which Treaties are otherwise not self‑executing;

(c)           the Rules Enabling Act at 28 U.S.C. 2072(a), strictly construed, does not authorize the Supreme Court of the United States to issue rules of evidence and civil procedure for the Article III District Courts of the United States;

(d)           the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of Evidence, and Local Rules for the Eastern District of California, are not enforceable on civil litigants in the District Court of the United States, absent their voluntary contractual consent to proceed according to those rules;

(e)           the Abrogation Clause at 28 U.S.C. 2072(b), strictly construed, is unconstitutional for violating the Separation of Powers Doctrine and the ex post facto prohibition in the U.S. Constitution;

(f)           the Act of June 25, 1948, is also unconstitutional for vagueness and for violating the ex post facto prohibition, the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the principle that statutes granting original jurisdiction to federal courts must be strictly construed;

(g)           the District Court of the United States may inquire into the existence and validity of attorneys’ licenses to practice law, and to dispose the matter summarily;  and,

(12)      holding in a PUBLISHED opinion that, as a matter of fact:

(a)           the official record before this Court fails to evidence any certificates of oath properly endorsed upon licenses to practice law, as required by Section 6067 of the California Business and Professions Code;

(b)           all attorneys alleging to appear on behalf of certain named Defendants in the instant case have done so without admission by the District Court of the United States, Eastern Judicial District of California, and without the requisite credentials;

(c)           said attorneys were properly served but failed to obey timely the SUBPOENAS issued by the Clerk of the district court for certified copies of their certificates of oath properly endorsed upon licenses to practice law in California;

(d)           certain named Defendants were properly served but failed to answer timely Appellant’s Initial COMPLAINT and REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS;

(e)           certain named Defendants were properly served but failed to answer timely Appellant’s Initial COMPLAINT and SUMMONSES issued by the Clerk of Court;  and,

(f)           named Defendants were properly served but failed to obey timely the SUBPOENAS issued by the Clerk of the district court for the identities of subscribers suspected of infringing Appellant’s exclusive copyrights, and for the activity logs of Internet Service Providers who owned or operated computers implicated in copyright and trademark violations;  and,

to issue all other relief which this Court deems just and proper, under the circumstances which have occasioned this action.

 

VERIFICATION

I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, Appellant in the above entitled action, hereby verify under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).

 

Dated:   March 25, 2002 A.D.

 

Signed:  /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell

         ___________________________________________

Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Sui Juris

         Appellant In Propria Persona (notPro Se”)


PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that I am at least 18 years of age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I personally served the following document(s):

 

APPELLANT’S INFORMAL OPENING BRIEF

 

by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to the following:

 

Judge Alex Kozinski                Clerk of Court (15x)

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals     Attention:  Cathy Catterson

P.O. Box 91510                     Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Pasadena 91109-1510                P.O. Box 193939

CALIFORNIA, USA                    San Francisco 94119-3939

                                   CALIFORNIA, USA

 

Ropers, Majeski, Kohn & Bentley    DeForest & Koscelnik

(failed to exhibit oaths)         (failed to exhibit oath)

1001 Marshall Street               3000 Koppers Building

Redwood City 94063                 436 Seventh Avenue

CALIFORNIA, USA                    Pittsburgh 15219

                                   PENNSYLVANIA, USA

 

Murphy Austin Adams Schoenfeld LLP  Pillsbury Winthrop LLP

(failed to exhibit oaths)          (failed to exhibit oaths)

P.O. Box 1319                       400 Capitol Mall, Suite 1700

Sacramento 95812-1319               Sacramento 95814-4419

CALIFORNIA, USA                     CALIFORNIA, USA

 

Curiale Dellaverson Hirschfeld     Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Oliver

Kraemer & Sloan, LLP               & Hedges, LLP

(failed to exhibit oaths)          (failed to exhibit oaths)

727 Sansome Street                 201 Sansome Street, 6th Floor

San Francisco 94111                San Francisco 94104

CALIFORNIA, USA                    CALIFORNIA, USA

 

Office of the General Counsel      Paul Southworth

(failed to exhibit oaths)          2018 N. New Hampshire Ave.

University of California           Los Angeles 90027

1111 Franklin Street, 8th Floor    CALIFORNIA, USA

Oakland 94607-5200

CALIFORNIA, USA

 

Karl Kleinpaste                    Ram Samudrala

P.O. Box 1551                      UW Micro Box 357242

Beaver Falls 15010                 Seattle 98195-7242

PENNSYLVANIA, USA                  WASHINGTON STATE, USA

 

Laskin & Guenard                   Rivkin Radler, LLP

(failed to exhibit oath)           (failed to exhibit oaths)

1810 South Street                  1330 N. Dutton Ave., #200

Sacramento 95814                   Santa Rosa 95401-4646

CALIFORNIA, USA                    CALIFORNIA, USA

 

Harvey Siskind Jacobs LLP          Office of Solicitor General

(failed to exhibit oaths)          950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

3 Embarcadero Center, Ste. 1060    Room 5614

San Francisco 94111                Washington 20530-0001

CALIFORNIA, USA                    DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA

 

Register of Copyrights             Steinhart & Falconer LLP

Library of Congress                (failed to exhibit oaths)

101 Independence Avenue, S.E.      333 Market Street, 32nd Floor

Washington 20559-6000              San Francisco 94105-2150

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA          CALIFORNIA, USA

 

Matheny Sears Linkert & Long LLP

P.O. Box 13711

Sacramento 95853-4711

CALIFORNIA, USA

 

 

[Please see USPS Publication #221 for “addressing” instructions.]

 

 

Dated:   March 25, 2002 A.D.

 

Signed:  /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell

         __________________________________________________

Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, Appellant In Propria Persona

         (notPro Se” [sic])