John E. Trumane, Sui Juris
Sovereign California Citizen
c/o General Delivery
San Rafael, California state
NON-DOMESTIC zip code exempt
In His Own Stead, under Protest,
and by Special Appearance only,
In Propria Persona
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and ) No. Cxx-xxxx-xxx
MARK EXTORT, Revenue Officer, )
) Supplemental Application
Petitioners, ) to Intervene and
) Statement of Causes and
v. ) Objections to Court's Order
) dated October 8, 1993,
JOHN E. TRUMANE, ) with Points and Authorities
)
Respondent. )
________________________________)
Comes now Sovereign California Citizen, John E. Trumane
(hereinafter "Respondent"), by birth a non-taxpayer, a white
male, and a free Person, appearing specially and not generally,
to protest timely this Court's original Order to Show Cause,
dated October 8, 1993; to supplement Respondent's Application
for Intervention of Right; and to show the following causes why
this Court cannot issue a valid order compelling Respondent to
produce records and other documents as commanded by the summonses
alleged to have been served upon Him, to wit:
Respondent's Supplement, Causes and Objections:
Page 1 of 21
1. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because
the record does not exhibit the authorization required by Section
7401 of the Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter "IRC"). The
summonses in question are entitled "Collection Summons", and IRC
7401 makes explicit reference to civil actions for "collection".
There is no evidence on the record that the Secretary of the U.S.
Department of the Treasury, or his delegate, authorized or
sanctioned these proceedings. No such evidence was ever served
on Respondent:
Thus, where the Congress prohibits the commencement of a
civil action unless certain specific acts are performed,
this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter until
the requisite conditions are met in fact and such compliance
is shown by the pleadings and, where necessary, established
by proof. ... [B]ut the mere allegation of facts necessary
for jurisdiction without supporting proof is fatally
defective. ... This Court holds that 26 U.S.C. Section 7401
requirements constitute facts essential to jurisdiction.
The failure to prove jurisdictional facts when specifically
denied is fatal to the maintenance of this action.
[USA v. One 1972 Cadillac Coupe De Ville]
[355 F.Supp. 513, 515 (1973), emphasis added]
2. IRC 7401 requires that the "Secretary" authorize or
sanction such proceedings. The term "Secretary" means the
Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate, IRC 7701(a)(11)(B).
Since January of 1993, lawful delegation by Mr. Lloyd Bentsen to
any subordinates has been impossible. During his latest Senate
term beginning in January of 1989, Mr. Bentsen voted to increase
the pay for the office of the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, see
P. L. 101-194, 5 U.S.C. 5318. His vote now bars Him from
occupying that office until the end of his latest Senate term
(January 3, 1995). This bar is found in Article 1, Section 6,
Respondent's Supplement, Causes and Objections:
Page 2 of 21
Clause 2 ("1:6:2") of the Constitution for the United States of
America (hereinafter "U.S. Constitution"), as lawfully amended.
Congress cannot cure this bar, because it cannot by legislation
alter the U.S. Constitution, from which alone it derives its
power to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power
can be lawfully exercised, see Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189,
206 (1920) and U.S. v. Twenty-Two Firearms, 463 F.Supp. 730
(1979). Unlawful exercise of power is a violation of Law.
3. The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) for Title 31,
U.S.C., exhibits two (2) separate treasuries, see 31 CFR 51.2 and
52.2. Specifically, compare definitions of "Governor" at 31 CFR
51.2(i) and 52.2(f), of "Secretary" at 51.2(o) and 52.2(n), and
of "State government" at 51.2(q) and 52.2(o). The parallel
definitions therein describe a "Secretary of the Treasury" and a
"Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury", in addition
to de facto corporate "States" and de jure Republic "states".
Since His birth on June 21, 1948, Respondent has been domiciled
within the latter jurisdiction (a/k/a the state zone), wherein
all restraints of the U.S. Constitution remain in full force and
effect upon all agents of the federal government in their
interactions with Citizens of the 50 states, see jus soli. The
doctrine of "Two United States" admits to the existence of a
second federal jurisdiction (a/k/a the federal zone), wherein
these same restraints are not in full force and effect, see
Justice Harlan's eloquent dissent in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244 (1901); see also 1:8:17 and 4:3:2 and Hooven & Allison Co.
v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945). The "Internal Revenue Service" is
Respondent's Supplement, Causes and Objections:
Page 3 of 21
not listed among the bureaus and other departments which are
authorized by Congress and comprise the U.S. Department of the
Treasury, see 31 U.S.C., Chapter 3, Subchapter I, Organization,
which has been enacted into positive law; Solicitor General's
certified waiver of right to answer, under Rule 15.5, and
Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" in Lake v. IRS et al., U.S. Supreme Court
case No. 91-8488; see also Foreign Agents Registration Act.
Silence creates estoppel by acquiescence infra.
4. Petitioners are attempting to compel Respondent's
performance in a setting which is 100% voluntary for a Sovereign
California Citizen, see Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 176
(1960); Bothke v. Fluor, 713 F.2d 1405, 1414 (1983); and 26 CFR
601.103(a). Title 26, U.S.C., as such has not been enacted into
positive law. Respondent objects to Petitioners' evident
presumption that Title 26 and the IRC are one and the same. All
IRC provisions cited in their petition fall within subtitle F.
The provisions of subtitle F shall take effect on the day after
the date of enactment of this title, see IRC 7851(a)(6)(A).
Thus, none of the procedural and administrative provisions of
subtitle F has taken effect and, therefore, they impose no
obligation upon Respondent without His consent, which must be
knowing, intentional and voluntary to be real and free.
Respondent waives no rights for revealing the ambiguity and
recursive effect which IRC 7851(a)(6)(A) has upon IRC 7401.
Respondent's Supplement, Causes and Objections:
Page 4 of 21
5. By importing the California Civil Code, see 28 U.S.C.
1652, this Court must recognize the Common Law as the rule of
decision, see CCC 22.2, and acknowledge that an obligation arises
either from the operation of law, or from the contract of the
parties, and nothing else, see CCC 1427, 1428. The only
obligation that arises from the operation of law is to abstain
from injuring the person or property of another, or infringing
upon any of his rights, see CCC 1708. Petitioners have failed to
identify any damage or injury and thus have failed to state any
claim upon which relief can be granted. Consent is one of the
elements that is essential to a valid contract, see CCC 1550.
Apparent consent is neither real nor free when obtained by
duress, menace, fraud, undue influence, or mistake, see CCC 1567.
Respondent denies the existence of any valid contract with
Petitioners, either express or implied in fact (i.e. assumpsit),
and denies voluntary participation in the government scheme known
as "public policy", see The Federal Zone, Appendix I: "Notice to
50 Governors"; Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The
printed second edition of The Federal Zone is incorporated by
reference as if set forth fully herein, see Exhibit "A".
6. Respondent again protests the direct and indirect
involvement of Petitioners and all of their agencies, assigns or
instrumentalities in any joint stock association, on a joint
venture for profit, see Federal Reserve Act of 1913; People v.
Boxer, California Supreme Court case No. S030016, December 1992,
to which Senator-elect Barbara Boxer fell silent; see also 4:1;
Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901); Lewis v. U.S., 680
F.2d 1239 (1982); Constitution of the State of California
(1849), Article 4, Sections 34-35; House Congressional Record,
September 29, 1941, Wright Patman re: "idiotic system", p. 7583;
H.J.R. 192, June 5, 1933; Perry v. U.S., 294 U.S. 330, 361
(1935); 31 U.S.C. 5112, 5119; 22 U.S.C. 286 et seq.
Respondent's Supplement, Causes and Objections:
Page 5 of 21
7. The right of the People to be secure in their Persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, see 4th Amendment in the U.S.
Constitution. As a California Citizen and one of the free
People, Respondent asserts complete and unqualified immunity from
unreasonable searches and seizures, because of the explicit
restraint which is operating upon Petitioners by virtue of the
4th Amendment in the Bill of Rights, see U.S. Constitution. The
rights guaranteed by the 4th Amendment are fundamental, because
the 1787 federal and 1849 state constitutions cooperate as the
supreme fundamental Law in the California Republic, see 4:4, 6:2.
Fundamental rights are those which are explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed in the federal and state constitutions, see Black's
Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition (hereinafter Black's).
8. An Individual may refuse to exhibit His books and
records for examination on the ground that compelling Him to do
so might violate His right not to be a witness against Himself,
under the 5th Amendment in the U.S. Constitution. As a Sovereign
California Citizen, Respondent asserts complete and unqualified
immunity from being compelled to submit testimony and to be a
witness against Himself, because of the explicit restraint which
is operating upon Petitioners by virtue of the 5th Amendment in
the Bill of Rights, see U.S. Constitution and U.S. v. Vadner, 119
F.Supp. 330 (1954), a "taxpayer" case. The rights guaranteed by
the 5th Amendment are fundamental, because the 1787 federal and
1849 state constitutions cooperate as the supreme fundamental Law
in the California Republic, see 4:4, 6:2. Fundamental rights are
those which are explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the
federal and state constitutions, Black's supra.
Respondent's Supplement, Causes and Objections:
Page 6 of 21
9. Moreover, the "void for vagueness" doctrine is deeply
rooted in our right to due process of law under the 5th Amendment
and in our right to know the nature and cause of any accusation
under the 6th Amendment. The latter right goes far beyond the
contents of any criminal indictment or information. The right to
know the nature and cause of any accusation starts with the
statute which a defendant is accused of violating. A statute
must be sufficiently specific and unambiguous in all its terms,
in order to define and give adequate notice of the kind of
conduct which it forbids or requires.
The essential purpose of the "void for vagueness doctrine"
with respect to interpretation of a criminal statute, is to
warn individuals of the criminal consequences of their
conduct. ... Criminal statutes which fail to give due
notice that an act has been made criminal before it is done
are unconstitutional deprivations of due process of law.
[U.S. v. De Cadena, 105 F.Supp. 202, 204 (1952)]
[hn. 1, fn. 3, emphasis added]
10. If it fails to indicate with reasonable certainty just
what conduct the legislature forbids or requires, a statute is
necessarily void for uncertainty, or "void for vagueness" as the
doctrine is called. In the De Cadena case, the U.S. District
Court listed a number of excellent authorities for the origin of
this doctrine, see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939),
and for the development of the doctrine, see Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), Williams v. United States, 341 U.S.
97 (1951), and Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951). Any
criminal prosecution or civil action which is based upon a vague
statute must fail, together with the statute itself. A vague
statute is unconstitutional for violating the 5th and 6th
Amendments. The U.S. Supreme Court has emphatically agreed:
[1] That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense
must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are
subject to it what conduct on their part will render them
liable to its penalties is a well-recognized requirement,
consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the
settled rules of law; and a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application violates the first
essential of due process of law.
[Connally et al. v. General Construction Co.]
[269 U.S 385, 391 (1926), emphasis added]
Respondent's Supplement, Causes and Objections:
Page 7 of 21
11. The debate that is currently raging over the scope and
application of the IRC is obvious, empirical proof that men of
common intelligence are differing with each other. Where the
construction of a tax law is doubtful, doubt is to be resolved in
favor of those upon whom a tax is sought to be laid, see Treasury
Decision 3980, page 64 (1927). The Citizen is exempt from
taxation unless the same is imposed by clear and unequivocal
language, see Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McLain, 192 U.S.
397 (1904), public policy notwithstanding. In case of doubt,
statutes levying taxes are construed most strongly against the
Government, and in favor of the Citizen, see U.S. v.
Wigglesworth, 2 Story 369, public policy notwithstanding.
Respondent's Supplement, Causes and Objections:
Page 8 of 21
12. The Hooven case supra is standing proof that the term
"United States" has three separate meanings, all different from
each other. Federal courts had an excuse before this decision,
e.g. Shaffer infra; but after Hooven, courts had no excuse for
failing to specify which of these three meanings they intended,
with each and every use of the term. This lack of specificity
leads to uncertainty, which leads in turn to court decisions
which are also void for vagueness. The 6th Amendment guarantees
our right to ignore vague and ambiguous laws with impunity, and
this must be extended to vague and ambiguous case law. The
rights guaranteed by the 6th Amendment are fundamental rights,
because the 1787 federal and 1849 state constitutions cooperate
as the supreme fundamental Law in the California Republic, see
4:4, 6:2. All laws which are repugnant to the Constitution are
null and void, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (2 Cranch) 137,
174, 176 (1803).
13. Respondent has not been charged with any crime, nor has
He ever been convicted of any crime. Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction, see
Thirteenth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution; Dyett v. Turner,
439 P.2d 266 (1968). The very idea that one Man may be compelled
to hold His life, or the means of living, or any material right
essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another,
seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as
being the essence of slavery itself, see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
Respondent's Supplement, Causes and Objections:
Page 9 of 21
14. Being compelled to testify against Himself, and being
compelled to produce books and records, would force Respondent to
be a witness against Himself and to hold His fundamental rights
at the mere will of another, thus forcing Him into the essence of
slavery itself. The rights guaranteed by the 13th Amendment are
fundamental, because the 1787 federal and 1849 state
constitutions cooperate as the supreme fundamental Law in the
California Republic, see 4:4, 6:2, ever since California was
admitted to the Union on terms of equal footing with the original
13 States in all respects whatever, see 9 U.S. Stat. 452 (1850).
In contrast, the District of Columbia never joined the Union.
Respondent reserves His right to incorporate and argue the
relevance of evidence indicating that the so-called 13th
Amendment is actually the 14th Amendment.
15. The enumeration in the U.S. Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the People, see the 9th Amendment. The powers not
delegated to the "United States" by the U.S. Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States United, are reserved to the States
United, or to the People, see the 10th Amendment. The
sovereignty of the States United and of their Citizens is
guaranteed by the 10th Amendment, see Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S.
82, 89-90 (1985); State v. Fowler, 6 S. 602 (1889); Gardina v.
Board of Registrars, 48 S. 788, 791 (1909). The U.S.
Constitution is a contract binding government agents, purposely
provided and declared upon consideration of all the consequences
which it prohibits and permits, making restraints upon the agents
of the federal government the rights of the governed. The U.S.
Constitution is a "bill of rights" for all American government.
"The distribution of authority between legislative, executive,
and judicial branches was a boldly original attempt to create an
energetic central government at the same time that the
sovereignty of the people was preserved," see The Constitution of
the United States of America As Amended, House of Representatives
Document No. 102-188, Historical Note, page vii, Feb. 6, 1992.
Respondent's Supplement, Causes and Objections:
Page 10 of 21
16. Respondent has not given His consent to any waivers of
His fundamental rights. Waivers of rights not only must be
voluntary, but also must be knowing, intelligent acts done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences, see Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742 at 748 (1970).
Respondent has committed no voluntary and intelligent acts, done
with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences, which could or might have resulted in the
loss of any of these fundamental rights. Acquiescence in the
loss of fundamental rights will not be presumed, see Ohio Bell v.
Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292 (1937). No one can be
cunningly coerced into waiving His rights because such a concept
("coerced waiver") is an oxymoron, see 16 Am Jur 2d, 211. A
Citizen is a member of a community included within the protection
of all the guarantees of the U.S. Constitution, see U.S. v.
Minker, 350 U.S. 179 at 186, 197 (1956), decided after public
policy was instituted in 1938.
Respondent's Supplement, Causes and Objections:
Page 11 of 21
17. Respondent's immunities from unreasonable search and
seizure, from being a witness against Himself, from vague and
ambiguous law, from slavery and involuntary servitude, and from
unapportioned direct taxation, are the immunities of a Sovereign,
see Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895);
4:2:1; People v. Boxer supra. They are unalienable, fundamental,
and inherent. Accordingly, Respondent invokes the doctrine of
Sovereign immunity to demonstrate that this Court cannot compel
Him to do anything which would result in abrogating any of His
fundamental rights. Any order compelling testimony and/or the
production of books and records, with the unavoidable consequence
of compelling Respondent into slavery and involuntary servitude,
if only for a moment, is necessarily null and void for violating
the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 4th, 5th, 6th and 13th
Amendments in the U.S. Constitution. Where rights secured by the
U.S. Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or
legislation which would abrogate them, see Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966), decided after public policy was
instituted in 1938. Court orders which abrogate fundamental
rights are null and void on their face ab initio, see 16 Am Jur
2d, Secs. 157, 256; Bryars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927);
obsta principiis; see also 6:2, 6:3.
18. Respondent has transmitted a large volume of
correspondence to Petitioners, in which He has, among other
things, explicitly reserved all His rights with language
sufficient to place Petitioners on actual notice that:
Respondent's Supplement, Causes and Objections:
Page 12 of 21
(1) He explicitly rejects any and all benefits of the
Uniform Commercial Code, absent a valid commercial agreement
which is in force and to which He and Petitioners are parties,
and cites its provisions herein only to serve notice upon ALL
agencies of government, whether international, national, state or
local, that they are, and He is not, subject to, and bound by,
all of its provisions, whether cited herein or not;
(2) His explicit reservation of rights has served notice
upon ALL agencies of government of the "Remedy" which they must
provide for Him under Article 1, Section 207 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, whereby He has explicitly reserved His Common
Law right not to be compelled to perform under any contract or
commercial agreement into which He has not entered knowingly,
voluntarily, and intentionally;
(3) His explicit reservation of rights has served notice
upon ALL agencies of government that they are ALL limited to
proceeding against Him only in harmony with the Common Law and
that He does not, and will not, accept the liability associated
with the compelled benefit of any unrevealed commercial
agreements; and
(4) His valid reservation of rights has preserved all His
rights and prevented the loss of any such rights by application
of the concepts of waiver or estoppel.
This valid reservation of rights was retroactive nunc pro
tunc to His date of majority, due to His continuous discovery of
numerous government frauds instituted before His birth (e.g.
California Elections Code and voter registration affidavit).
Respondent's large volume of correspondence is incorporated by
reference as if set forth fully herein (see Exhibit "B").
Respondent's Supplement, Causes and Objections:
Page 13 of 21
19. Petitioners come to this Court in bad faith with
unclean hands, by virtue of their failure to answer Respondent's
lawful requests and appeal filed under the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA); by virtue of their failure to answer specific lawful
demands made in His volume of correspondence, see Rebuttal to
Presentment Form 6638; by virtue of their failure to exhibit His
volume of correspondence to this Court; and by virtue of their
evident refusal to transmit any answers via U.S. Mail exhibiting
Respondent's correct, lawful mailing location within the
California Republic, as evidenced on the record by their repeated
APPLICATION TO CONTINUE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND ORDER, see policy
at 31 CFR 0.735-3(a). Petitioners have not honored the guarantee
of a Republican Form of Government, see 4:4. In stark contrast,
this was done by the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United
States in his recent written communication to Respondent, in
answer to Respondent's NOTICE AND DEMAND TO CEASE AND DESIST
served on all Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court on December 29,
1993 (see Exhibit "C"). Silence creates estoppel by acquiescence.
Silence is a species of conduct, and constitutes an implied
representation of the existence of the state of facts in
question, and the estoppel is accordingly a species of estoppel
by misrepresentation. Carmine v. Bowen, 64 A. 932 (1906).
20. Silence can also be equated with fraud, where there is
a legal or a moral duty to speak, or where an inquiry left
unanswered would be intentionally misleading, see U. S. v. Tweel,
550 F.2d 297, 299 (1977) quoting U.S. v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021,
1032 (1970). The 50 state Governors, the Congress, and
Petitioners had a legal duty to answer all of Respondent's
written requests and demands, and to honor the Respondent's
stated domicile within the California Republic. Petitioners are
under a general obligation of good faith, see UCC 1-203, UCC
1-201(19), and Slodov v. U.S., 436 U.S. 238, 257, fn. 22 (1978).
"Bad faith" is synonymous with fraud; Petitioners have concealed
that which should have been disclosed to this Court, thus
suppressing truth, see Black's.
Respondent's Supplement, Causes and Objections:
Page 14 of 21
21. Respondent denies the existence of any real national
emergency which could or might authorize the Congress to suspend
any provisions of the U.S. Constitution, or to delegate such a
power to the President, see 16 Am Jur 2d, 71. Respondent is
neither an enemy nor a subject of the "United States", see
Trading with the Enemy Act; 12 U.S.C. 95a.
22. Respondent is neither a "citizen of the United States"
nor a "resident of the United States", see IRC 7701(b)(1)(A),
because He was never lawfully admitted for permanent residence,
because He has never satisfied the substantial presence test, and
because He never elected to be treated as a resident by means of
knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences, see Treasury
Decision 2313; Brushaber's original pleadings; Shaffer v. Carter,
252 U.S. 37, 54, fn. 1 (1920); noscitur a sociis.
23. As a Sovereign California Citizen, Respondent is one of
the People of the States United, by whom and for whom all
government exists and acts, see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
370 (1886). As such, Respondent is not subject to the municipal
laws of the District of Columbia or any other enclaves,
territories, or possessions which are subject to the exclusive
legislative authority of Congress, see 1:8:17, 4:3:2, Buck Act.
The term "internal" means "municipal", see 52A C.J.S. "Law", pgs.
741, 742. Slavery, being contrary to natural right, is created
only by municipal law, see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393, Curtis dissenting (1856). The U.S. Constitution
refers to a slave as a "Person held to Service in one State,
under the Laws thereof", see 4:2:3. Respondent is not held to
the Service of Municipal Revenue codes. Municipal law does not
operate on Respondent, because He does not reside in a
constitutionally delegated office wherein municipal law operates,
nor does He reside in any undelegated office.
Respondent's Supplement, Causes and Objections:
Page 15 of 21
24. Respondent hereby protests the Petitioners' unqualified
use of United States Postal Service (USPS) ZIP codes in their
petition. ZIP code use is voluntary, except where a ZIP+4
discount is claimed, see Domestic Mail Services Manual, Section
A010.1.2d, formerly Section 122.32. The USPS cannot by law
discriminate against the non-use of ZIP codes, see P.L. 91-375,
Sec. 403, although it does anyway. Respondent rebuts any
presumption and denies any allegation that He resides in any
federal area or federal venue by virtue of Petitioners'
exhibition of ZIP codes and/or two-letter federal abbreviations
(e.g. "CA") in documents presented to this Court. The Union
States, as agents for the People, delegated to Congress the power
to establish Post Offices and post Roads, see 1:8:7, 7:1. The
use of these Post Offices was never intended to subject Citizens
to the municipal jurisdiction of the United States, even if
Congress later decided to create the USPS as a municipal
corporation and to underwrite its debts by selling bonds to
international banks and by securing those bonds with future
postal revenues.
Respondent's Supplement, Causes and Objections:
Page 16 of 21
25. Respondent hereby denies ever having elected to reside
within any fictional "State within a state" created by the Buck
Act, see 4 U.S.C. 104-113, Howard v. Sinking Fund of Louisville,
344 U.S. 624 (1953), Schwartz v. O'Hara TP. School Dist., 100
A.2d 621, 625 (1953). There are no regulations in the CFR
imposing these statutes, see CFR Index and Finding Aids, 1/1/93,
p. 937, "Referrals to Department of Justice or GAO". Respondent
has never been a federal employee and denies being subject in any
way to the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939. All acts of Congress
are territorial in nature and apply only within its territorial
jurisdiction, see American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213
U.S. 347, 356-357 (1909); U.S. v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 222
(1949); New York Central R.R. Co. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29,
31-32, (1925); and Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185 (1918).
Respondent has gone to great lengths to revoke all elections
which, in his belief, might appear to create a loss of rights or
a grant of jurisdiction to the Petitioners, or to any of their
agencies, assigns, or instrumentalities, see IRC 871.
26. If the doctrine of stare decisis has any meaning at
all, it requires that People in their everyday affairs be able to
rely on decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and not be needlessly
penalized for such reliance, see U.S. v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391,
399-400 (1973). Respondent has studied intensely and relied at
great length upon the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in his
actions, in his published writings, and herein. It will be an
Respondent's Supplement, Causes and Objections:
Page 17 of 21
evil day for American liberty if the theory of a government
outside of the supreme Law of the Land finds lodgment in our
constitutional jurisprudence. No higher duty rests upon this
Court than to exert its full authority to prevent all violation
of the principles of the U.S. Constitution, see Downes v.
Bidwell, Harlan dissenting, supra. Has this evil day now
arrived?
27. Respondent hereby protests the Order of this Court
signed on October 8, 1993 (hereinafter "Order"), for failing to
give Respondent adequate time to prepare this Statement and to
answer the Petitioners' response to this Statement, if any. The
federal government has had many months, in some cases years, to
answer Respondent's several petitions, only to fall silent.
Respondent is a poor man with very limited resources, placing Him
at an enormous disadvantage when the federal government elects to
become His adversary, albeit civil.
28. The Order requires respondent to appear "by his
authorized representative". To represent a person is to stand in
his place, to speak or act with authority on behalf of such
person, to supply his place, to act as his substitute or agent,
see Black's. Respondent has not authorized anyone or anything to
stand as His substitute or agent, nor does He consent now to such
a substitute or agent, rendering the Order impossible to obey on
its face, see "The Merchant of Venice" by William Shakespeare.
Respondent hereby rebuts the presumption that the fictional
persona of "JOHN E. TRUMANE" exists now or has ever existed, see
reference to Respondent as "it" in Petitioners' verified
petition, page 3, line 22. Respondent objects to the use of the
term "it" to refer to any proper Person.
Respondent's Supplement, Causes and Objections:
Page 18 of 21
29. Respondent hereby objects strenuously to the existence
of any contract, either verbal or written, either expressed or
implied in fact, between the presiding Judge in this Court and
the "Internal Revenue Service" or any other controlling interest,
on grounds of conflict of interest. A completed IRS Form 1040 is
an expressed, written contract. Respondent is guaranteed the
fundamental right to an independent and unbiased judiciary. The
existence of a contract between the presiding Judge and the IRS
is evidence of a conflict of interest and proof of a dependent
and biased judiciary, see Lord v. Kelley, 240 F.Supp. 167, 169
(1965).
30. The vivid pattern that has now painfully emerged is
that "citizens of the United States" and "residents of the United
States", as defined in federal tax codes, are the intended
victims of a new, statutory slavery that was predicted by the
infamous Hazard Circular soon after the Civil War began. These
statutory slaves are now burdened with a bogus federal debt which
is spiralling out of control, see paragraph 6 supra re: "idiotic
system". The White House budget office recently invented a new
kind of "generational accounting" so as to project a tax load of
seventy-one percent on future generations of these "citizens of
the United States" and these "residents of the United States".
It is our duty to ensure that this statutory slavery is soon gone
with the wind, just like its grisly and ill-fated predecessor,
see Steiner v. Darby, 88 C.A.2d 481, 199 P.2d 429 (1948), the
year of Respondent's birth as a free Person, a white male, and a
non-taxpayer in Worcester, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, on June
21, the very day on which the Constitution for the United States
of America became the supreme Law of this Land, see 7:1.
Respondent's Supplement, Causes and Objections:
Page 19 of 21
31. The IRC is unconstitutional to the extent that it can
be construed to enforce the violation of any fundamental rights
not otherwise waived, see Brady supra. Respondent hereby
reserves the right to question the constitutionality of any
provision of the IRC, even though specific provisions are cited
herein. In a code as complex as the IRC, with a multitude of
interconnected cross-references, each provision must be viewed in
light of its relation to the whole.
32. Respondent hereby denies allegations set forth as
paragraphs 1 thru 10 in Petitioners' verified petition, for all
the reasons set forth above in paragraphs 1 thru 31 supra, which
are incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein.
I have read and know the entire contents of the foregoing
statement, and all statements of fact contained in said statement
are true and correct, to the best of my own Personal knowledge
and recollection, and as to those facts stated upon information
and belief, I believe them to be true and correct.
I declare under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the
United States of America, without the "United States", that the
foregoing is true and correct, per 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).
Respondent's Supplement, Causes and Objections:
Page 20 of 21
Executed on March 26, 1994 Anno Domini.
/s/ John E. Trumane
________________________________
John E. Trumane, Sui Juris
Sovereign California Citizen
In His Own Stead, under Protest,
and by Special Appearance Only,
In Propria Persona
All Rights Reserved Without Prejudice
Respondent's Supplement, Causes and Objections:
Page 21 of 21
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John E. Trumane