Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris
Citizen of Arizona state
c/o general delivery at:
2509 North Campbell Avenue
Tucson, Arizona state

In Propria Persona

All Rights Reserved
Without Prejudice





             PIMA COUNTY CONSOLIDATED JUSTICE COURT


Paul Andrew Mitchell,           )  Case Number #CV-97-3438
          Plaintiff,            )
                                )  DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL AND
     v.                         )  DEMAND TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
                                )  PENDING FINAL REVIEW OF FORMAL
Neil and Evelyn Nordbrock,      )  CHALLENGE TO JUROR AND VOTER
Lawrence E. Condit,             )  REGISTRANT QUALIFICATIONS:
W. U. Weber, and                )
Does 1 to 100,                  )  ARS 21-201, ARS 16-101;
          Defendants.           )  Guarantee Clause
________________________________)


COMES NOW  Paul Andrew  Mitchell,  Sui Juris, Citizen  of Arizona

state, expressly  not a  citizen of  the United  States ("federal

citizen") and Plaintiff in the above entitled matter (hereinafter

"Plaintiff"), to  demand a trial by jury in the instant case, and

also to  demand an  indefinite stay of proceedings, pending final

review of  Plaintiff's formal  challenge to the constitutionality

of Arizona  Revised Statutes 16-101 and 21-201, for violating the

Guarantee Clause  in the  Constitution for  the United  States of

America, as  lawfully amended,  and to  provide formal  Notice of

same to  all interested party(s).  Pursuant to the Full Faith and

Credit Clause,  and Rule 201(d) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence,

Plaintiff incorporates  by reference  the following documents, as

if set  forth fully herein, and demands mandatory judicial notice

of the following related cases, to wit:


       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 1 of 16


     (1)  MOTION TO  STAY PROCEEDINGS  FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH
          GRAND JURY  SELECTION POLICY,  AND NOTICE  OF CHALLENGE
          AND  CHALLENGE   TO   CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF   STATUTE,
          executed, served  and filed  in U.S.A. [sic] v. Wallen,
          United States  District  Court,  District  of  Arizona,
          Tucson,  case  number  #95-484-WDB.    Said  MOTION  is
          attached hereto  as  Exhibit "A"  and  incorporated  by
          reference as if set forth fully.


     (2)  VERIFIED STATEMENT  IN SUPPORT  OF CHALLENGE  TO  GRAND
          JURY  SELECTION   POLICY  AND   ITS  FEDERAL   STATUTE,
          executed, served  and filed  in U.S.A. [sic] v. Wallen,
          United States  District  Court,  District  of  Arizona,
          Tucson, case  number #95-484-WDB.   Said  STATEMENT  is
          attached hereto  as  Exhibit "B"  and  incorporated  by
          reference as if set forth fully.


     (3)  OPENING BRIEF in U.S.A. v. Gilbertson and Gilbertson v.
          U.S. et al.,  filed  on June  18, 1997,  United  States
          Court of  Appeals for  the Eighth  Circuit, case number
          #97-2099-MNST, containing  a formal  challenge  to  the
          federal Jury  Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. 1861
          et  seq.,   for  exhibiting  prohibited  discrimination
          against the  class of  People known  as Citizens of the
          United States of America, also known as state Citizens,
          who are  not also  citizens of  the United States, also
          known  as  federal  citizens,  by  Right  of  Election.
          Confer at "Federal citizenship" in Black's supra.


     (4)  MOTION  TO   STAY  MANDATE   AND  PROCEEDINGS,  PENDING
          DISCOVERY OF  DOCUMENTS REQUESTED  UNDER THE  FOIA, AND
          FINAL RESOLUTION  OF CHALLENGE  TO CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
          THE JURY SELECTION AND SERVICE ACT in U.S.A. v. Pixley,
          filed on  June 25, 1997, United States Court of Appeals
          for  the   Second  Circuit,   case   number   #96-1476,
          containing a  formal  challenge  to  the  federal  Jury
          Selection and  Service Act, 28 U.S.C. 1861 et seq., for
          exhibiting prohibited  discrimination against the class
          of People  known as  Citizens of  the United  States of
          America, also known as state Citizens, who are not also
          citizens of  the United  States, also  known as federal
          citizens, by Right of Election.


     Pursuant to  the Full  Faith and  Credit  Clause,  and  Rule

201(d) of  the  Arizona  Rules  of  Evidence,  Plaintiff  demands

mandatory judicial  notice, and  provides formal  Notice  to  all

interested party(s),  of the  following authorities  and analysis

which prove  that there  is, in  American Law  never repealed,  a

Right of  Election whereby  American  Citizens  are  entitled  to

choose between state Citizenship and/or federal citizenship.


       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 2 of 16


      Additional Citations Establishing a Right of Election


     That the  general principle  of such a right of electing, to
     remain under  the old  or to  contract a new allegiance, was
     recognized, is  apparent from the case of Com. v. Chapman, 1
     Dal., 53,  and other  cases cited.  Those who adhered to the
     new government  and transferred  their  allegiance  thereto,
     became citizens  of the  same.   All who were free, had this
     right of election,  else  they were not free.  No particular
     color  nor  descent was  required to  confer  this  right of
     election.   It resulted  from  freedom,  and  the  necessity
     resting upon all to make an election.  When it was made, and
     the individual determined to adhere to the new state, he was
     necessarily a  member  and  a  citizen  of  the  same.    He
     sustained the same relation to the new government by choice,
     which he had sustained to the old by birth.

                   [44 Maine 528-529 (1859), Appleton concurring]
                                  [emphasis and underlines added]


     Mr. Kelley [of North Carolina]  ... "contended for the broad
     principle that  all men  are entitled  to equal  rights  and
     privileges;   that nothing  but arbitrary  power can  forbid
     their free  exercise, and  that it  is contrary  to all  the
     principles of  free government to tax a man and refuse him a
     right to  vote for a member to the legislature."  Debates on
     the Constitution of North Carolina in 1835, 357.

                       [44 Maine 533 (1859), Appleton concurring]
                                  [emphasis and underlines added]


     Slavery is  therefore regarded  as a  condition imposed upon
     the individual by the municipal law.

                       [44 Maine 525 (1859), Appleton concurring]
                                                 [emphasis added]


     ... [F]or it is certain, that in the sense in which the word
     "citizen" is  used in  the federal constitution, "citizen of
     each  state,"  and  "citizen  of  the  United  States,"  are
     convertible terms;   they  mean the  same thing;   for  "the
     citizens of  each state  are entitled  to all privileges and
     immunities of citizens in the several states," and "citizens
     of the  United States"  are, of  course, citizens of all the
     United States.
                       [44 Maine 518 (1859), Hathaway dissenting]
                          [italics in original, underlines added]


The following  additional citations  prove the  existence of  two

classes of citizenship:

     It does  not by  any means  follow, because  he has  all the
     rights and  privileges of a citizen of a state, that he must
     be a citizen of the United States.

                     [Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 405 (1856)]


       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 3 of 16


     Under our  complex system  of  government  there  may  be  a
     citizen of a state who is not a citizen of the United States
     in the  full sense  of the  term.  This result would seem to
     follow unavoidably  from the  nature of  the two  systems of
     government.
                              [In Re Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 443 (1863)]


     This distinction between citizenship of the state and of the
     United States  is  also  very  clearly  implied  in  several
     provisions both  of the constitution and laws of this state.
     There, wherever  the full right of citizenship of the United
     States is intended, it is so expressed, as in respect to the
     office of  governor, lieutenant  governor or  judge,  it  is
     provided that  no person  shall be  eligible who  is  not  a
     "citizen of  the United  States."   This form  of expression
     would never  have been  used if it had been supposed that no
     person could  be a citizen of the state without being also a
     citizen of  the United  States.   In  that  case,  the  word
     "citizen" alone would have been used.

                       [In Re Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 443 at 474 (1863)]


     ... [T]herefore, the militia law drops the language which is
     used when  a  full  citizenship  of  the  United  States  is
     intended, and provides that all able bodied "citizens" shall
     be liable  to military duty.  This change of phraseology was
     not accidental or unmeaning, but was entirely based upon the
     well understood  distinction between  a citizen of the state
     merely, and a citizen of the United States.

                         [In Re Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 443, 478 (1863)]


     The first  clause of  the fourteenth  amendment made negroes
     citizens of  the United States, and citizens of the State in
     which they  reside,  and  thereby  created  two  classes  of
     citizens, one  of the  United States  and the  other of  the
     state.
                      [Cory et al. v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 (1874)]
                                     [headnote 8, emphasis added]


     Judge  Cooley,   in  his   great  work   on   Constitutional
     Limitations, on  page 54, says:  "A cardinal rule in dealing
     with written  instruments is  that they  are to  receive  an
     unvarying   interpretation,   and   that   their   practical
     construction is to be uniform."

                 [Cory et al. v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 335 (1874)]


     Is a  voter under  the constitution of the State of Indiana,
     though not  a citizen of the United States, eligible to hold
     the office  of township  trustee?   ... The constitution [of
     Indiana], and its fair interpretation, therefore, conduct us
     to the  conclusion that  the contestee  was eligible  to the
     office of  township trustee, and that he is entitled to hold
     it, and exercise its functions.

               [McCarthy v. Froelke, 63 Ind. 507, 509-511 (1878)]


       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 4 of 16


     One may be a citizen of a State and yet not a citizen of the
     United States.   Thomasson  v. State,  15 Ind. 449;  Cory v.
     Carter, 48  Ind. 327  (17 Am. R. 738);  McCarthy v. Froelke,
     63 Ind. 507;  In Re Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 443.

                      [McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320, 323 (1883)]
                                               [underlines added]


     For it  would seem  incompatible with the spirit of our laws
     to exclude  one from the jury box who was eligible to act as
     jury commissioner  in selecting  jurors;   or as  sheriff in
     empanneling a jury;  or as judge to preside at the trial.

                      [McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320, 324 (1883)]


     One may  be a  citizen of  a state, and yet not a citizen of
     the United States -- McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320.

       [4 Dec. Dig. '06 -- Page 1197 (1906), "Citizens", Sec. 11]
                                               [underlines added]


     The first  clause of the fourteenth amendment of the federal
     Constitution made negroes citizens of the United States, and
     citizens of  the state  in which  they reside,  and  thereby
     created two  classes of  citizens, one  of the United States
     and the  other of  the state -- Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327,
     17 Am. Rep. 738.

       [4 Dec. Dig. '06 -- Page 1197 (1906), "Citizens", Sec. 11]
                                  [emphasis and underlines added]


     ... Rights  and privileges  of a  citizen of the state or of
     the United States.
                                [Harding v. Standard Oil Company]
                                   [182 F. 421 (USCC, Ill. 1910)]


     One may  be a  citizen of  the United  States, and yet not a
     citizen of any state.

             [Hough v. Societe Electrique Westinghouse de Russie]
                                    [231 F. 341 (USDC, NY, 1916)]


     The following  letter to  Mr. Ray Feyereisen also contains a

wealth of  additional citations,  which not  only  establish  the

existence of  two classes of citizenship, but they also establish

that an  American may  be a  state Citizen  without also  being a

federal citizen,  by Right  of  Election.    The  letter  to  Mr.

Feyereisen now follows, to wit:


       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 5 of 16


                                     c/o general delivery
                                     San Rafael [zip code exempt]
                                     California state

                                     September 10, 1993

Ray Feyereisen
c/o general delivery
Houston, Texas Republic
Postal Code 77253/tdc

Dear Ray:

     I did some more research today, to explore some of the cases
which support  the position  that one  can  be  a  State  Citizen
without necessarily  being a  citizen of  the United States.  You
already knew about Crosse;  here are the relevant paragraphs:

     Both before  and  after  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the
     federal Constitution, it has not been necessary for a person
     to be  a citizen  of the  United States  in order  to  be  a
     citizen of  his state.  United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
     542, 549,  23 L.Ed.  588 (1875);   Slaughter-House Cases, 83
     U.S. (16  Wall.) 36,  73-74, 21  L.Ed. 394  (1873);  and see
     Short v.  State, 80 Md. 392, 401-402, 31 A. 322 (1895).  See
     also Spear, State Citizenship, 16 Albany L.J. 24 (1877). ...

     [B]ut we  find nothing in Reum [City of Minneapolis v. Reum,
     56 F.  576, 581  (8th Cir.  1893)] or  any other  case which
     requires that a citizen of a state must also be a citizen of
     the United  States, if  no question  of  federal  rights  or
     jurisdiction is involved.  As the authorities referred to in
     the first  portion of  this opinion  evidence, the law is to
     the contrary.
                    [Crosse v. Board of Supervisors of Elections]
             [221 A.2d 431 (1966), emphasis and underlines added]


Corpus Juris  is another source of authorities which support this
position:

     So a person may be a citizen of a particular state and not a
     citizen of the United States46 ....

                                        [11 C.J., Sec. 3, p. 777]


Footnote 46 lists the following cases:

     Harding v. Standard Oil Co., 182 Fed. 421 (1910)
     McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320 (1883)
     State v. Fowler, 41 La. Ann. 380, 6 S. 602 (1889)


     The reference  librarian at  the County  Law Library  and  I
searched in  vain for  McDonel v.  State;   they're going  to put
their special  legal beagle  on that search.  Here's what Harding
said:


       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 6 of 16


     In the  Constitution and  laws of the United States the term
     ["citizenship"] is  generally, if  not  always,  used  in  a
     political sense  to designate  one who  has the  rights  and
     privileges of  a citizen of a state or of the United States.
     Baldwin v.  Franks, 120  U.S. 678,  7 Sup. Ct. 656, 30 L.Ed.
     766.   A person  may be  a citizen of a state but not of the
     United States;   as, an alien who has declared his intention
     to become  a citizen,  and who  is by  local law entitled to
     vote in  the state  of his residence, and there exercise all
     other local  functions of local citizenship, such as holding
     office, right to poor relief, etc., but who is not a citizen
     of the  United States.    Taney,  C.J.,  in  Dred  Scott  v.
     Sandford, 19  How. 405, 15 L.Ed. 691;  Slaughterhouse Cases,
     16 Wall. 74, 21 L.Ed. 394.

       [Harding v. Standard Oil Co. et. al., 182 Fed. 421 (1910)]
                                  [emphasis and underlines added]


I really love the pertinent quote from State v. Fowler, which was
decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1889:

     A  person   who  is  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  is
     necessarily a  citizen of  the particular  state in which he
     resides.   But a  person may  be a  citizen of  a particular
     state and  not a  citizen of  the United  States.   To  hold
     otherwise would be to deny to the state the highest exercise
     of its  sovereignty, --  the right  to declare  who are  its
     citizens.  The sovereignty of the citizens of a republic has
     its highest  assertion in  representative government, and is
     constituted in  its political order in the representation of
     persons, and not of classes or of interests.

                 [State ex rel. Leche v. Fowler, 41 La. Ann. 380]
                                [6 S. 602 (1889), emphasis added]


The Crosse  court cites Short v. State, which came to essentially
the same conclusion in the following long passage:

     And then,  as to  the  objection  that  this  local  law  is
     repugnant to  that clause in the fourteenth amendment of the
     federal constitution  which declares  that "no  state  shall
     make or  enforce any  law which shall abridge the privileges
     or immunities  of citizens  of the  United  States,"  it  is
     sufficient to  say that the interpretation of that clause by
     the supreme  court in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36,
     is a  complete  answer  to  this  objection.    There  is  a
     distinction, says Justice Miller, between citizenship of the
     United States and citizenship of a state.

          [Short v. State, 80 Md. 392, 401-402, 31 A. 322 (1895)]
                                  [emphasis and underlines added]


     The Crosse  court cites  Short v. State, but I could find in
the latter  decision no  statements which took the exact position
we are  seeking;   nevertheless, it  does cite the Slaughterhouse
Cases and  also Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130.  In the Bradwell
case, Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the court, says:

     The  protection   designed  by  that  clause,  as  has  been
     repeatedly held,  has no  application to  a citizen  of  the
     state whose laws are complained of.
                                                 [emphasis added]


       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 7 of 16


     Also, I  think I  have already mentioned this book, but it's
worth mentioning  again.  See if you can get your hands on a copy
of A  Treatise on  Citizenship by Birth and by Naturalization, by
Alexander Porter Morse, Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1881.
Buried near  the end  of this  voluminous treatise  is a  section
entitled "State  Citizenship --  Its Existence".   In addition to
the big  cases like Dred Scott, Slaughterhouse and Cruikshank, he
mentions the following in his footnotes:

     Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C.C. 371
     Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591
     Donovan v. Pitcher, 53 Ala. 411
     Cully v. Baltimore, etc., R.R. Co., 1 Hughes 536
     Prentiss v. Brennan, 2 Blatchf. 162
     Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. Ct. App. 267
     Reilly v. Lamar, 2 Cranch 344


He also  writes, "That there is a state citizenship, see Registry
Act of  California of  1865-1866, sect. 11."  I pulled it;  check
it out.

     So, you  thought you  were caught up with all your work, did
you?

     Carry on, and peace be with you.


Sincerely yours,

/s/ John E. Trumane

[end of letter to Mr. Feyereisen]


            Analysis of California state Constitution

     Plaintiff quotes  here from  the California  Constitution of

1849, signed  by Judge  Pablo De  La Guerra, who later identified

the proper  construction of  the Qualifications  Clauses, in  his

case as  a Respondent  in People  v. De  La Guerra,  40 Cal.  311

(1870).   Here is  a pertinent  paragraph  from  that  California

Constitution of 1849:

     Sec. 5.  Every citizen of California, declared a legal voter
     by this  Constitution,  and  every  citizen  of  the  United
     States, a  resident of  this state  on the  day of election,
     shall be  entitled to  vote at  the first  general  election
     under this Constitution, and on the question of the adoption
     thereof.
                                                 [emphasis added]


       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 8 of 16


     At first  glance, this  section appears  to refer to two (2)

separate classes  of American  citizens:  citizens of California,

and citizens of the United States.

     However, having  reviewed People  v. De  La Guerra,  we  now

understand that,  prior to  the Civil War and its ugly aftermath,

the term  "Citizen of the United States", as that term is used in

the Qualifications  Clauses, means  "Citizen of ONE OF the States

united", that is, Citizen of ONE OF the Union states.

     We also  have the  construction by  the  California  Supreme

Court, soon  after that 1849 Constitution was ratified.  In 1855,

that Court  ruled that there is no such thing as a citizen of the

United States,  if the  latter term refers to a class of citizens

different from Citizens of ONE OF the States united.

     Judge Pablo  De La  Guerra's profound construction is worthy

of very  close scrutiny  and study, because it provides a way out

of the  confusion and controversy that swirls about this subject,

even now.   In  light of  De La  Guerra's pivotal insight, we are

justified in  constructing the  1849 California  Constitution  as

follows:

     Every Citizen  of California state declared a legal voter by
     this Constitution,  and every  Citizen of  ONE OF  the other
     Union states  who is  a resident  of California state on the
     day of election, shall be entitled ....


     In other  words, in  1849, the  lower-case "c"  in "citizen"

appears to  have been  the preferred  convention.   Nevertheless,

this lower-case  "c" did  not render  that term a legal franchise

which was  subject to  the municipal authority of Congress, as is

now the case with federal citizenship.


       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 9 of 16


     On the  contrary, in  the year  1855, the California Supreme

Court, in Ex parte Knowles, 5 Cal. 300 (1855), made it very clear

that there  was no  such thing as a citizen of the United States,

if by  that term  is meant  a second class of citizens, different

from the primary class of state Citizens, i.e. Citizens of ONE OF

the States united.

     The  1849   California  Constitution  is  merely  trying  to

establish who would be entitled to vote in general elections, and

to vote  on the  question of  adopting that  Constitution.  Those

People would  be either Citizens of California state, or Citizens

of ONE  OF the  other states  of the Union, as long as the latter

Citizens were  resident in  California state  on the  day of  the

election.

     This logic  appears to  explain the apparent anomaly that is

found in  Section 5 of the 1849 California Constitution as quoted

above.   Despite appearances  of two  classes of  citizens, which

appearances  arise   from  a   faulty  construction,  the  proper

construction yields  only a single class of state Citizens.  This

proper construction  conforms to  the decisions of the California

Supreme Court  in Ex  parte Knowles  supra and  People v.  De  La

Guerra supra.


             Analysis of Arizona state Constitution

     Now Plaintiff performs a comparable analysis of a noteworthy

provision in the Constitution of Arizona state.

     Under the  section entitled  "Eligibility to state offices",

we find another passage which also appears to acknowledge two (2)

separate  classes   of  citizenship,   but  only   if  a   faulty

construction is  again placed  upon the  language.    Here's  the

pertinent section:

     Section 2.   No  person shall  be eligible  to  any  of  the
     offices mentioned  in section  1 of  this article  except  a
     person of  the age  of not  less than twenty-five years, who
     shall have  been for ten years next preceding his election a
     citizen of  the United  States,  and  for  five  years  next
     preceding his election a citizen of Arizona.


       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 10 of 16


     Clearly, this  section  makes  a  very  obvious  distinction

between being  a citizen  of the  United States  for at least ten

years, and  a citizen  of Arizona for at least five years.  It is

very tempting  to conclude  from this  section that there are two

separate classes of citizenship.  However, using the construction

which was  so well established by the California Supreme Court in

Ex parte  Knowles supra,  we are  again justified  in making  the

following proper  construction of  this section  from the Arizona

state Constitution:

     No person  shall be eligible to any of the offices mentioned
     ... except  a person who shall have been a Citizen of ONE OF
     the Union  states for  at least 10 years, and who shall have
     been a Citizen of Arizona state for at least five years.


     This construction  conforms perfectly  to  the  construction

established in California state, at least by 1855, if not before.


                         REMEDY DEMANDED

     Wherefore, all  premises having been duly considered by this

honorable Court,  Plaintiff hereby  demands a  trial by competent

and qualified  jury, and  also an  indefinite stay of the instant

proceedings, pending final review of Plaintiff's formal challenge

to the  constitutionality of  Arizona Revised Statutes 16-101 and

21-201, and  to the corresponding provisions in the Arizona state

Constitution,  for   violating  the   Guarantee  Clause   in  the

Constitution for  the  United  States  of  America,  as  lawfully

amended.


       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 11 of 16


                          VERIFICATION

I, Paul  Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty

of perjury,  under the  laws of  the United  States  of  America,

without the  "United States" (federal government), that the above

statements of  fact are  true and  correct, to  the  best  of  My

current information,  knowledge, and  belief,  so  help  Me  God,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).  See Supremacy Clause.


Dated:  July 8, 1997


Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell

Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris
Citizen of Arizona state
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)

All Rights Reserved without Prejudice


       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 12 of 16


                        PROOF OF SERVICE


[redacted for privacy]


       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 13 of 16


Executed on July 8, 1997:

/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell

Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris
Citizen of Arizona state
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)

All Rights Reserved without Prejudice


       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 14 of 16


                          Exhibit "A":

        MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS FOR FAILING TO COMPLY
                WITH GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY,
                     AND NOTICE OF CHALLENGE
          AND CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE

                     U.S.A. [sic] v. Wallen
                  United States District Court
                   District of Arizona, Tucson
                     Case Number #95-484-WDB


       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 15 of 16


                          Exhibit "B":

           VERIFIED STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE
     TO GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY AND ITS FEDERAL STATUTE

                     U.S.A. [sic] v. Wallen
                  United States District Court
                   District of Arizona, Tucson
                     Case Number #95-484-WDB


       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 16 of 16


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Mitchell v. Nordbrock