Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris
Citizen of Minnesota state
and federal witness
c/o general delivery
Battle Lake [zip code exempt]
MINNESOTA STATE
 
In Propria Persona
 
Under Protest and
by Special Visitation
 
 
 
 
                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
 
                         EIGHTH CIRCUIT
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic], )  Case No. 97-2099-MNST
                                )
          Plaintiff [sic]/      )  USDC Minneapolis #CR-4-96-65
          Appellees,            )
     v.                         )
                                )
EVERETT C. GILBERTSON [sic],    )
                                )
          Defendant [sic]/      )
          Appellant.            )
________________________________)
                                )
Everett C. Gilbertson,          )  DCUS Minneapolis #4-96-65
                                )
          Plaintiff/Appellant,  )
                                )
     v.                         )  APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
                                )
United States,                  )    (first impression)
James M. Rosenbaum,             )
and Does 2-99,                  )  ON APPEAL FROM CONVICTION
                                )  AND JUDGMENT IN THE USDC
          Respondents.          )
________________________________)
 
                            Prepared
 
                     on Behalf of Appellant
 
                               by
 
                Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
 
                Counselor at Law, federal witness
 
                    and Counsel to Appellant
 
 
                 Appellant’s Opening Brief: Cover Page

Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris
Citizen of Minnesota state
and federal witness
c/o general delivery
Battle Lake [zip code exempt]
MINNESOTA STATE
 
In Propria Persona
 
Under Protest and
by Special Visitation
 
 
 
 
                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
 
                         EIGHTH CIRCUIT
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic], )  Case No. 97-2099-MNST
                                )
          Plaintiff [sic]/      )  USDC Minneapolis #CR-4-96-65
          Appellees,            )
     v.                         )
                                )
EVERETT C. GILBERTSON [sic],    )
                                )
          Defendant [sic]/      )
          Appellant.            )
________________________________)
                                )
Everett C. Gilbertson,          )  DCUS Minneapolis #4-96-65
                                )
          Plaintiff/Appellant,  )     APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF:
                                )
     v.                         )      (first impression)
                                )
United States,                  )  ON APPEAL FROM CONVICTION
James M. Rosenbaum,             )  AND JUDGMENT IN THE USDC
and Does 2-99,                  )
                                )
          Respondents.          )
________________________________)
 
COMES NOW  Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris, Citizen of Minnesota
 
state,  federal witness, expressly  not  a citizen  of the United
 
States (hereinafter  "federal citizen"),  and  Appellant  in  the
 
above entitled  matter (hereinafter  "Appellant") to submit this,
 
His OPENING  BRIEF on  first impression  in  the  above  entitled
 
cases,  and  respectfully to request full appellate review of all
 
proceedings below, with emphasis on the issues discussed herein.
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Preface Page

                          (1)  Summary
 
     The USDC erred  by denying both a motion to stay proceedings
 
and  a motion  to reconsider same.   Appellant's challenge to the
 
Jury Selection and Service Act ("JSSA")  had serious implications
 
for the legality of the indicting grand jury,  and the convicting
 
petit jury.  This challenge deserved final review before trial.
 
     The judge  of the  USDC committed serious errors by alleging
 
to preside  over sentencing  and  by alleging to deny Appellant's
 
MOTION FOR RELEASE PENDING APPEAL,  due to  an  obvious,  adverse
 
conflict of interest, in violation of 28 U.S.C. 455.
 
     Appellant's  civil case  in the DCUS  should be  allowed  to
 
proceed, to obtain  pivotal  declaratory relief  from a competent
 
and qualified  federal petit jury  concerning several substantive
 
questions of law and fact which arose in the record below.
 
     A three-judge  federal panel  presiding over the DCUS should
 
be convened,  enjoined  from issuing summary remands of the cases
 
back to the USDC, and mandated to proceed to trial on the merits.
 
     All of Appellant's constitutional challenges  should also be
 
decided finally  by this  honorable Court,  or  the  U.S. Supreme
 
Court,  before any further proceedings occur  in either the USDC,
 
or the DCUS, due to their obvious impact on matters to be decided
 
in those two forums.
 
                    Request for Oral Argument
 
     Appellant hereby  requests leave  for Appellant's Counselor,
 
Paul Andrew Mitchell, to present oral arguments to this honorable
 
Court,  by allocating  at most  five (5) minutes  to each  of the
 
seven (7) major issues which are itemized infra.  Such a schedule
 
would require  a maximum  of thirty-five  (5 x 7 = 35) minutes of
 
oral arguments by Appellant's Counselor, who authored this Brief.
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 1 of 50

                     (2)  Table of Contents
                                                             Page
 
(1)  Summary .................................................. 1
 
(2)  Table of Contents (this page) ............................ 2
 
     (A)  Table of Cases ...................................... 3
 
     (B)  Statutes ............................................ 4
 
     (C)  Other Authorities ................................... 5
 
(3)  Preliminary Statement .................................... 7
 
          Verification by Appellant ........................... 7
 
(4)  Statement of Issues: ..................................... 8
 
     (A)  Jury Selection and Service Act ("JSSA") ............. 8
 
     (B)  Minnesota Voter Registration Practices ............. 11
 
     (C)  Apportionment of Congressional Districts ........... 15
 
     (D)  Blanket FOIA Exemption for Judiciary ............... 19
 
     (E)  Federal Removal Statutes ........................... 27
 
     (F)  Downes Doctrine Revisited .......................... 40
 
     (G)  Vagueness in the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") ..... 44
 
(5)  Statement of the Case ................................... 48
 
(6)  Summary of Argument ..................................... 49
 
(7)  Proof of Service ........................................ 50
 
(8)  Appendices, by docket date/entry (under separate cover):
 
  5/16/97 MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC (8th Circuit)
  4/17/97 COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
  4/17/97 AFFIDAVIT OF APPLICABLE LAW & DENIAL OF LIABILITY
  4/14/97 PETITION FOR WARRANT OF REMOVAL BY 3-JUDGE PANEL
  4/09/97 AFFIDAVITS OF DEFAULT AND OF PROBABLE CAUSE
  4/02/97 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF STAY MOTION (2 of 3)
  4/02/97 VERIFIED STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE TO JSSA
  3/20/97 NOTICE & DEMAND FOR PROOF OF POWER, STANDING, JURISDIC.
  3/20/97 NOTICE & DEMAND TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF CRIMINAL JURIS.
  3/20/97 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE TO CRIMINAL JURIS.
  2/18/97 NOTICE & DEMAND FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE (FOIA)
 10/31/96 MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS/CHALLENGE TO JSSA (1 of 3)
 10/31/96 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
  7/17/96 MEMORANDUM: CITIZENSHIP STATUS OF USDC JURORS
  6/06/96 STATUS REPORT & CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE FOIA/PRIVACY ACT
  library The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 2 of 50

                       (A)  Table of Cases
 
U.S. Supreme Court:
American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton:........ 30, 31, 33
Akins v. Texas:............................................... 10
Baker v. Carr:................................................ 13
Balzac v. Porto Rico [sic]:............................... 31, 33
Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Company:.................. 25
Cassell v. Texas:............................................. 10
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.:..................... 7
Connally v. General Construction Co.:......................... 45
Downes v. Bidwell:................................ 12, 26, 40, 42
Evans v. Gore:............................................ 40, 41
Gregory v. Ashcroft:.......................................... 12
Helstoski v. Meanor:........................................... 7
Hooven & Allison v. Evatt:................................ 24, 43
International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union
  v. Juneau Spruce Corp.:..................................... 31
Marbury v. Madison:........................................... 13
Miranda v. Arizona:........................................... 13
Mookini v. U.S.:.............................................. 28
New York v. United States:.................................... 12
Norton v. Shelby County:...................................... 13
O'Donoghue v. U.S.:........................................... 28
O'Malley v. Woodrough:........................................ 41
Pierre v. Louisiana:.......................................... 10
Slaughter House Cases:......................................... 8
South Carolina v. Katzenbach:................................. 13
Spreckles Sugar Refining Co. v. McLain:....................... 46
U.S. v. Cruikshank:........................................ 8, 44
U.S. v. Lopez:..................................... 9, 30, 42, 43
U.S. v. Wigglesworth:......................................... 45
Waltz v. Tax Commission of New York City:..................... 27
 
U.S. Court of Appeals:
Denison v. Commissioner (8th Cir.):........................... 23
Graves v. Snead (6th Cir.):................................... 29
Hubbard v. Ammerman (5th Cir.):............................... 29
International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union
  v. Wirtz (9th Cir.):........................................ 31
Lively v. Commissioner (8th Cir.):............................ 23
U.S. v. Griffin (9th Cir.):.................................... 7
U.S. v. Hicks (9th Cir.):..................................... 40
U.S. v. Johnson (4th Cir.):................................... 32
U.S. v. Layton (9th Cir.):..................................... 7
U.S. v. Saunders (9th Cir.):.................................. 29
U.S. v. Tweel (5th Cir.):..................................... 20
U.S. v. Woodley (9th Cir.):................................... 27
U.S. v. Yellows Freight Systems, Inc. (9th Cir.):.............. 7
Valley Broadcasting Co. v. USDC (9th Cir.):................... 20
 
Federal District Courts:
In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Served on New Life Health Center,
  (USDC, D. Arizona):..................................... 18, 43
Lord v. Kelley (USDC, D. Massachusetts):...................... 41
U.S. v. De Cadena (USDC, N.D. California):.................... 44
U.S. v. One 1972 Cadillac Coupe de Ville (USDC, E.D.Ky.):..... 28
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 3 of 50

State Courts:
Alexander v. R.D. Geier & Sons Co. (Maryland Appeals):........ 14
Carmine v. Bowen (Maryland Appeals):...................... 17, 20
Carter v. Commission on Qualifications (California Supreme):.. 13
Crosse v. Board of Supervisors (Maryland Appeals):............. 8
Dyett v. Turner (Utah Supreme):............................... 24
Erdahl v. Spannaus (Minnesota District):...................... 11
Ex parte Knowles (California Supreme):......................... 9
Fort v. Civil Service Commission: (California Supreme):....... 13
Gardina v. Board of Registrars (Alabama Supreme):.......... 8, 10
People v. Boxer (California Supreme):..................... 23, 27
People v. Pablo De La Guerra (California Supreme):............. 9
People v. Washington (California Supreme):................. 13-14
Respublica v. Wray (Pennsylvania Supreme):.................... 20
State v. Bernoudy (Missouri Supreme):......................... 20
State v. Christensen (Utah Supreme):.......................... 20
State v. Fowler (Louisiana Supreme):........................... 8
State v. Jones (Hawaii Supreme):.............................. 10
 
Other Courts:
Roa v. Collector (Philippine Supreme):........................ 11
 
 
                          (B)  Statutes
Federal Statutes:
 1 U.S.C.:.................................................... 44
 1 U.S.C. 1:.............................................. 28, 32
 5 U.S.C. 551(A), (B):........................................ 20
 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq.:........................................ 35
 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B):........................... 18, 35, 36, 38
 5 U.S.C. 552(f):............................................. 19
 5 U.S.C. 3331:........................................... 20, 38
18 U.S.C. 241:................................................ 14
18 U.S.C. 1962:............................................... 32
18 U.S.C. 1964:............................................... 32
18 U.S.C. 3241:............................................... 31
26 U.S.C.:............................................ 29, 44, 45
26 U.S.C. 7206(1):............................................. 7
26 U.S.C. 7401:............................................... 28
28 U.S.C.:........................................ 17, 29, 30, 45
28 U.S.C. 132:............................................ 29, 45
28 U.S.C. 297:................................................ 12
28 U.S.C. 453:............................................ 20, 38
28 U.S.C. 951:............................................ 20, 38
28 U.S.C. 1291:................................................ 7
28 U.S.C. 1346(1):............................................ 22
28 U.S.C. 1441 et seq.:................................... 32, 33
28 U.S.C. 1441(a):............................................ 35
28 U.S.C. 1441(b):.................................... 34, 35, 39
28 U.S.C. 1441(e):.................................... 27, 38, 39
28 U.S.C. 1443:............................................... 37
28 U.S.C. 1446(c)(1):......................................... 36
28 U.S.C. 1447(d):............................ 27, 36, 37, 38, 39
28 U.S.C. 1451(2):........................................ 34, 39
28 U.S.C. 1631:........................................... 22, 39
28 U.S.C. 1652:............................................... 40
28 U.S.C. 1738-1742:.......................................... 19
28 U.S.C. 1746(1):......................................... 7, 21
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 4 of 50

28 U.S.C. 1861:............................................... 16
28 U.S.C. 1865(b)(1):............................... 8, 9, 10, 16
28 U.S.C. 1867(d):........................................ 16, 45
28 U.S.C. 2284:............................................... 15
28 U.S.C. 2402:............................................... 22
Act June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 895:.......................... 29, 30
Act November 13, 1963, 77 Stat. 331:.......................... 29
Act September 13, 1994:....................................... 14
Civil Rights Act (1866):....................................... 9
Expatriation Statute:......................................... 12
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"):.............................
.......................18, 19, 21, 27, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40
Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"):.................... 23, 24, 44, 46
IRC section 1(c):............................................. 23
IRC section 7206:............................................. 44
IRC section 7401:......................................... 27, 44
IRC section 7402:..................................... 28, 29, 44
IRC section 7851(a)(6)(A):.................................... 44
IRC subtitle F:............................................... 44
Jury Selection and Service Act ("JSSA"):.................. 11, 15
P.L. 92-310, P.L. 103-322:................................ 28, 14
 
State Statutes:
Minnesota Statute 201.014:.................................... 11
 
                     (C)  Other Authorities
 
Federal Constitution:
U.S. Constitution:.10, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 28, 29, 40, 42, 43
Article I:................................................ 28, 41
Article I, Section 2, Clause 2 ("1:2:2"):...................... 9
Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 ("1:2:3"):................. 23, 24
Article I, Section 3, Clause 3 ("1:3:3"):...................... 9
Article I, Section 8:......................................... 23
Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 ("1:8:17"):............ 9, 40, 43
Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 ("1:9:4"):................. 23, 24
Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 ("2:1:5"):..................... 9
Article III:.............................. 18, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32
Article III, Section 1 ("3:1"):................... 40, 41, 42, 43
Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 ("3:2:1"):.................... 9
Article IV:........................................... 28, 32, 41
Article IV, Section 1 ("4:1"):............................ 10, 19
   Full Faith and Credit Clause ("4:1"):.................. 10, 19
Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 ("4:2:1"):................. 9, 41
   Privileges and Immunities Clause ("4:2:1"):............. 9, 41
Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 ("4:3:2"):............. 9, 31, 34
   Territory Clause ("4:3:2"):......................... 9, 31, 34
Article IV, Section 4 ("4:4"):.................... 11, 12, 13, 15
   Guarantee Clause ("4:4"):...................... 11, 12, 13, 15
Article VI, Clause 2 ("6:2"):..................... 12, 13, 19, 20
   Supremacy Clause ("6:2"):...................... 12, 13, 19, 20
Article VI, Clause 3 ("6:3"):..................... 19, 20, 21, 38
   Oath of Office Clause ("6:3"):................. 19, 20, 21, 38
Preamble, Bill of Rights:..................................... 14
First Amendment:.......................................... 11, 15
   Petition Clause:....................................... 19, 34
Fifth Amendment:...................................... 21, 34, 37
   Due Process Clause:.................................... 27, 37
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 5 of 50

Sixth Amendment:.............................................. 44
   Nature and Cause Clause:................................... 44
Seventh Amendment:............................................ 22
Ninth Amendment:.......................................... 21, 43
Tenth Amendment:.......................... 11, 15, 16, 21, 34, 43
Thirteenth Amendment (1819):.............................. 10, 20
Fourteenth amendment (1868):.......................... 13, 23, 24
Sixteenth amendment (1913):................... 23, 24, 40, 46, 47
Declaration of Independence:.................................. 14
 
United States Treaties:............................... 27, 35, 40
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:..... 27, 40
Universal Declaration of Human Rights:.................... 27, 40
 
State Constitutions:.......................................... 21
Minnesota state Constitution:............................. 11, 15
   Article VII, Sections 1, 6:................................ 11
 
Code of Federal Regulations:
26 CFR 1.1-1(a)(1):........................................... 23
26 CFR 1.1-1(a) thru (c):..................................... 23
31 CFR 51.2:.............................................. 34, 37
31 CFR 52.2:.............................................. 34, 37
 
Federal Rules of Procedure:
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Local Rule 28A(j):...... 25
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 38:.................... 22
Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 201(d):....................... 19
 
U.S. Treasury Decisions:
Treasury Decision 2313:................................... 24, 25
 
Legal Maxims/Doctrines:
Downes Doctrine:...................................... 24, 40, 43
Equal Footing Doctrine:....................................... 13
Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius:.............. 9, 10, 29, 35
In pari materia:.............................................. 22
Lex non cogit impossibilia:................................... 25
Nunc pro tunc:................................................ 22
Reductio ad absurdum:.......................................... 9
 
Other Sources:
A Citizen's Guide on Using the Freedom of Information Act
  and the Privacy Act of 1974 to Request Government Records,
  1993 Edition, H. Rep. 103-104, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess.:...... 18
American Digest System:....................................... 21
American Jurisprudence:....................................... 13
Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition:.. 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 29
Corpus Juris:................................................. 20
Corpus Juris Secundum:........................................ 20
The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue:.........
............................................... 9, 24, 25, 42, 47
Merritt, "The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism
  for a Third Century," 88 Columbia Law Review 1 (1988):...... 12
Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction:.............. 45
UCLA Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 2, Dec. 1976:................... 41
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 6 of 50

                   (3)  Preliminary Statement
 
     i.   The  instant   appeal  is  taken  from  conviction  and
          judgment by Mr. James M. Rosenbaum, claiming to preside
          on  the  United  States  District  Court,  District  of
          Minnesota, Fourth Division,  at Minneapolis,  Minnesota
          state, for two counts of violating 26 U.S.C. 7206(1).
 
     ii.  Appellant alleges,  and herein proves,  that the United
          States  District   Court  ("USDC")   which   prosecuted
          Appellant lacked any jurisdiction whatsoever,  civil or
          criminal,  over the  subject matters which arose in the
          instant cases.
 
     iii. This United  States Court  of Appeals  for  the  Eighth
          Circuit  has  appellate  jurisdiction  of  the  instant
          Criminal Case [sic],  pursuant  to the  Final Judgments
          Act at 28 U.S.C. 1291.
 
     iv.  This Court  also  has  appellate  jurisdiction  of  the
          instant Civil Case,  pursuant to  decisions of the U.S.
          Supreme Court  in Cohen  v. Beneficial  Industrial Loan
          Corp.,  337  U.S. 541,  69 S.Ct. 1221,  93  L.Ed.  1528
          (1949);   Helstoski v. Meanor,  442 U.S. 500,  99 S.Ct.
          2445, 2449, 61 L.Ed.2d 30 (1979);  U.S. v. Griffin, 617
          F.2d 1342,  1345-46 (9th Cir. 1980),  cert denied,  101
          S.Ct. 167, 66 L.Ed.2d  80;  and U.S. v. Yellows Freight
          Systems, Inc., 637 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1981).  See also
          U.S. v.  Layton, 645 F.2d 681, 682-683 (9th Cir. 1981),
          citing Cohen supra at 682-683.
 
 
                 (A)  Verification by Appellant
 
I, Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty
 
of perjury,  under the  laws of  the United  States  of  America,
 
without (outside) the "United States" (federal government),  that
 
the following statement of facts and laws is true and correct, to
 
the best  of My current information,  knowledge,  and belief,  so
 
help Me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).
 
Dated: ______________________________
 
Respectfully submitted,
 
/s/ Everett C. Gilbertson
_____________________________________
Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris
Citizen of Minnesota state, federal witness
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 7 of 50

                    (4)  Statement of Issues
 
     Appellant hereby gives appropriate priority to the following
 
challenges  to the constitutionality of certain federal statutes,
 
to wit:
 
     (A)  The  Jury Selection and Service Act,  Title 28,  United
          States Code (hereinafter "U.S.C."), section 1865(b)(1),
          is unconstitutional for exhibiting class discrimination
          against  Citizens of Minnesota state who are  not  also
          federal citizens,  in violation  of the First and Tenth
          Amendments, and the Guarantee Clause.
 
     There are  two (2) classes of citizenship under American law
 
never repealed, not one (1).  See Gardina v. Board of Registrars,
 
160 Ala. 155,  48 S. 788, 791 (1909).   A Person may be a Citizen
 
of a  particular state,  and  not  a federal citizen.   Confer at
 
"Federal citizenship"  in Black's Law Dictionary,  Sixth Edition.
 
To hold otherwise would be to deny to Minnesota state the highest
 
exercise of its sovereignty  --  the Right to declare who are its
 
Citizens.  See State v. Fowler, 41 La. Ann. 380, 6 S. 602 (1889);
 
Crosse v. Board of  Supervisors of  Elections,  243 Md. 555,  221
 
A.2d 431,  434 (1966).   Confer  at  "Right"  and  "Election"  in
 
Black's supra, to derive "Right of Election" [sic].
 
     We have  in our political system  a government of the United
 
States  (federal  government),  and a government of each  of  the
 
several states  of the  Union.   Each  of these 51 governments is
 
distinct from the others, and each has citizens of its own.   See
 
United States  v. Cruikshank,  92 U.S. 542 (1875).   It is  quite
 
clear,  then,  that there is  a citizenship  of the United States
 
("federal citizenship"),  and a Citizenship  of  Minnesota  state
 
("state Citizenship"),  which are  distinct from each other,  and
 
which depend upon different characteristics  or circumstances  in
 
the individual.  See Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 8 of 50

     The prohibited  class discrimination  in the  Jury Selection
 
and  Service  Act  ("JSSA")  results  in  a  demonstrably  absurd
 
consequence.   A Citizen of Minnesota  state,  who  is not also a
 
federal citizen  by Right of Election,  is not a "resident alien"
 
by any stretch of the imagination.   A Citizen of Minnesota state
 
is a nonresident alien with respect to the municipal jurisdiction
 
of the District of Columbia,  also  known as  "the federal zone".
 
See  Kennedy concurring in  U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995);
 
1:2:2, 1:3:3,  1:8:17, 2:1:5,  3:2:1, 4:2:1 and 4:3:2 in the U.S.
 
Constitution;  T.D. 2313;  The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of
 
Internal Revenue, electronic Seventh Edition (1997).
 
     Prior to the 1866 Civil Rights Act,  there was no such thing
 
as a "citizen of the United States" [sic].  See Ex parte Knowles,
 
5 Cal. 300 (1855).   The  qualifications  for serving in the U.S.
 
Senate, U.S. House of  Representatives, and the White House,  all
 
refer to Citizens of one of the several states of the Union,  and
 
not  to  federal citizens;   these  provisions  have  never  been
 
amended;   they retain  today the meaning which they had when the
 
U.S. Constitution  was first enacted  into the supreme Law.   See
 
People v. Pablo De La Guerra, 40 Cal. 311, 337 (1870);  Jus soli.
 
     Therefore,  the   federal  JSSA   is  unconstitutional   for
 
deliberately excluding  those very  People who  are  eligible  to
 
serve  in the highest elective offices in the federal government;
 
this  result  is  absurd.  Confer  at  "Reductio ad absurdum"  in
 
Black's supra.   The omission of state Citizens from the JSSA was
 
intentional.  Confer at "Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius" in
 
Black's supra.   An irrefutable inference must be drawn that what
 
was omitted or excluded was intended to be omitted or excluded.
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 9 of 50

     Similarly, since federal citizenship did not even exist,  as
 
such, prior to 1866, the U.S. House, Senate, and White House must
 
have been occupied entirely by impostors between 1789 and 1865 --
 
a period of some 77 years.   This result  is also absurd,  absent
 
further authoritative proof.   See  original Thirteenth Amendment
 
(1819);   Full Faith  and Credit  Clause;   Acts of  the Virginia
 
Legislature circa 1819;  Colorado state Records Custodian.
 
     An intentional  discrimination against  a class  of Persons,
 
solely because  of their  class,  by officers in  charge  of  the
 
selection  and  summoning  of grand or petit jurors in a criminal
 
case, is a violation of the fundamental Rights of the Accused.
 
     See  Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950);  Akins v. Texas,
 
325 U.S. 398 (1945);    Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939).
 
Such a violation is  not  excused  by the fact  that  the persons
 
actually  selected   for  jury   service  otherwise  possess  the
 
necessary qualifications  for jurors  as prescribed  by  statute.
 
See State v. Jones, 365 P.2d 460 (1961).
 
     Discrimination in the selection of a grand or petit jury, as
 
prohibited  by  the  U.S.  Constitution,  means  an  intentional,
 
systematic  non-inclusion  because of  class.  There are  two (2)
 
classes of  citizenship in  American Law  never repealed.    E.g.
 
Gardina supra.   The statute at 28 U.S.C. 1865(b)(1) specifically
 
excludes those classes of Citizens who are not mentioned.  Confer
 
at "Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius" in Black's supra.
 
     Therefore, Appellant was neither  indicted  by a legal body,
 
nor was Appellant  convicted  by a legal body,  thereby depriving
 
the  trial court  of jurisdiction over the subject matter  in the
 
first instance.
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 10 of 50

     (B)  The statutes and practices  of Minnesota state,  and of
          all other 49 states by logical extension,  are likewise
          unconstitutional  for  requiring  that  all  registered
          voters be  federal citizens before they are eligible to
          vote in general elections of U.S. Representatives, U.S.
          Senators,  and the President  of the United States,  in
          violation  of the First  and Tenth  Amendments and also
          the Guarantee Clause.
 
     For reasons  which are identical to the reasons why the JSSA
 
is unconstitutional, the corresponding constitutional provisions,
 
statutes,   and  practices  of   Minnesota  state   are  likewise
 
unconstitutional for  requiring that  all  registered  voters  be
 
federal citizens  before they  are eligible  to vote  in  general
 
elections of U.S. Representatives, Senators, and the President.
 
     A Minnesota state district court has ruled that a person who
 
is eighteen years old,  a citizen of the United States [sic], and
 
a resident  of Minnesota for twenty  days,  is qualified to vote.
 
The decision  was not  appealed.   See Erdahl v. Spannaus et al.,
 
No. 393442,  Ramsey  District  court,  May 9,  1974;    Minnesota
 
Statute 201.014  (Eligibility to Vote);   Minnesota Constitution,
 
Article VII, Section 1, notes thereunder, and Section 6.
 
     Congress therefore  erred  by  adjudging  Minnesota's  state
 
constitution to be  Republican in Form  when  Minnesota was first
 
admitted to the Union,  and  by  neglecting to oversee subsequent
 
amendments to  Minnesota's state  constitution,  because  such  a
 
restriction on  voter eligibility  is  a clear violation  of  the
 
First and Tenth Amendments and also the Guarantee Clause ("4:4").
 
     Citizenship, strictly  speaking, is a term of municipal law.
 
See  Roa v. Collector  of Customs, 23 Philippine 315, 332 (1912).
 
Since  the  federal zone  is,  by definition,  not a Union state,
 
there is  no constitutional  requirement that  its municipal laws
 
and government(s) be Republican in Form [sic].
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 11 of 50

     Federal citizens  are members  of a  political community who
 
owe  their allegiance  to a government which is not Republican in
 
Form, at present;  it is an absolute legislative democracy.   See
 
Downes infra,  Harlan dissenting.  To force Citizens of Minnesota
 
state into this allegiance,  as a condition precedent to electing
 
their  Representatives  in  the  U.S. Congress,  is  to  force  a
 
violation of the Guarantee Clause, at its most basic level.
 
     The Guarantee  Clause must  be construed  by this  honorable
 
Court  to enforce  the  Right of Election among  Citizens  of the
 
several  states,  and  among  federal  citizens  as  well.    See
 
Supremacy Clause;  Jus soli;  Act  July 27, 1868,  15 Statutes at
 
Large, Chapter  CCXLIX  (i.e.  249),  Section  1;   28 U.S.C. 297
 
(Union states  are "countries").   Confer  at  "Expatriation"  in
 
Black's supra (i.e. one's "country" [sic]).
 
     Speaking through  Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court of the
 
United States  ("U.S. Supreme Court") has raised without deciding
 
the possibility that the Guarantee Clause is justiciable and is a
 
constraint upon Congress' power to regulate the activities of the
 
several states.    See New York v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 2408,
 
2432-2433 (1992);  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991).
 
     These opinions  draw support  from a  powerful argument  for
 
utilizing  the Guarantee Clause as a judicially enforceable limit
 
on federal  power.   See Merritt, "The Guarantee Clause and State
 
Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century," 88 Columbia Law Review
 
1 (1988).   The  restriction  that Citizens  of  Minnesota  state
 
cannot vote unless they  also declare,  under penalty of perjury,
 
that they are federal citizens, is a justiciable violation of the
 
Guarantee Clause ("4:4").  See also Supremacy Clause.
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 12 of 50

     Congress should be barred permanently from admitting any new
 
states into  the Union,  and from  ignoring amendments  to  their
 
constitutions,  if said constitutions exhibit such a restriction.
 
Moreover, unconstitutionality dates from the moment of enactment,
 
not from the first decision so branding the act.  See 16 Am. Jur.
 
2d, Sec. 177, p. 568;  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (2 Cranch) 137,
 
174-176 (1803);   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 at 491 (1966);
 
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 at 442 (1886).
 
     All states must be admitted to the Union on an equal footing
 
with the original Thirteen Colonies.   The Equal Footing Doctrine
 
is a limitation  only  upon the  terms by which Congress admits a
 
state into the Union.  See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
 
301 at 328-329 (1966).   There is a broader implication, however,
 
in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 at 226, n. 53 (1962).
 
     The so-called  Fourteenth amendment  is irrelevant  to  this
 
discussion,   and to the instant cases,  because the existence of
 
two (2) classes of  citizenship  was upheld  by courts  after its
 
enactment was declared, as was the Right to choose (read "elect")
 
state Citizenship without also  becoming a federal citizen,  as a
 
necessary  legal   consequence  of  that  election.    Confer  at
 
"Right/Constitutional Rights/Political rights" in Black's supra:
 
     Political  rights  consist  in  the  power  to  participate,
     directly   or    indirectly,   in   the   establishment   or
     administration  of   government,  such   as  the   right  of
     citizenship,  that of suffrage,  the right  to  hold  public
     office, and the right of petition.
                                                 [emphasis added]
 
     The Rights to vote and to hold public office are fundamental
 
Rights.   See Fort  v. Civil  Service  Commission  of  County  of
 
Alameda,  392   P.2d  385   (1964);    Carter  v.  Commission  on
 
Qualifications,  14 Cal.2d 179, 182,  93 P.2d 140 (1939);  People
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 13 of 50

v.  Washington,  36  Cal.  658,  662  (1869).    Deprivations  of
 
fundamental Rights  are felony violations of 18 U.S.C. 241;   the
 
term "inhabitant"  (later "person")  as used  therein  was  never
 
intended  to exclude state  Citizens who  are  not  also  federal
 
citizens.  See Act of September 13, 1994, P.L. 103-322.
 
     If only  federal citizens  can vote  and serve  on grand and
 
petit juries,  then state  Citizens have thereby been deprived of
 
all three (3) voices in the management of their state and federal
 
governments.    This  deprivation  results  in  taxation  without
 
representation, in  violation of the Declaration of Independence.
 
Confer at "Jury trial" in Black's supra:
 
     The right  to "jury trial" of controverted issues  implies a
     trial by an impartial and qualified jury.  Alexander v. R.D.
     Grier & Sons Co., 181 Md. 415, 30 A.2d 757, 759 [1943].
 
                                        [emphasis and year added]
 
     Whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these
 
ends,  it is the fundamental Right of all state Citizens to alter
 
or abolish that form,  and to institute a new government,  laying
 
its foundation on such principles,  and  organizing its powers in
 
such form,  as to Us, the People of the United States of America,
 
shall seem  most likely  to effect  Our safety and Our happiness.
 
These Guarantees are fundamental, inherent, and unalienable.  See
 
Declaration of Independence  and Preamble to the original Bill of
 
Rights,  missing from most of the official, published versions of
 
the U.S. Constitution, to wit:
 
     The conventions of a number of the States having at the time
     of their  adopting the  Constitution, expressed a desire, in
     order  to prevent misconstruction  or  abuse of its  powers,
     that further declaratory  and  restrictive clauses should be
     added:   And as extending the ground of public confidence in
     the Government, will best insure the beneficient ends of its
     institution.
                       [Preamble, Bill of Rights, emphasis added]
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 14 of 50

     (C)  The apportionment  of  congressional  districts  within
          Minnesota state is also unconstitutional,  by virtue of
          the prohibited,  class-based  discrimination  which  is
          exhibited  by the Minnesota  state constitution  and by
          related  statutes and practices,  all of  which require
          that registered voters be federal citizens in Minnesota
          state,  in violation of  the First and Tenth Amendments
          and the Guarantee Clause.
 
     For  all  the  reasons  stated above,  Appellant  sought  to
 
convene a  District Court  of three (3) qualified federal judges,
 
in order  to challenge the constitutionality of the apportionment
 
of congressional districts within Minnesota state and, by logical
 
extension, throughout the other 49 states of the Union.
 
     Appellant submits  that the  obvious discrimination  against
 
state Citizens  extends  from jury selection,  to  voting  booth,
 
outwards to  every Union  state which utilizes voter registration
 
forms requiring registrants to certify, under penalty of perjury,
 
that they are federal citizens.   In other words,  state Citizens
 
must commit perjury if they attempt to vote, by first registering
 
pursuant to the requirements of unconstitutional state statutes.
 
     Appellant sought  to convene  a District Court of the United
 
States (hereinafter "DCUS"), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2284, in order
 
to adjudicate  the full  implications  of  Appellant's  claim  to
 
having been  victimized  by such  an unconstitutional practice in
 
Minnesota state.  Appellant sought thereby to convene a competent
 
and  qualified federal petit jury,   to issue declaratory relief;
 
but  this worthy goal  brought Appellant  squarely  back  to  the
 
obvious  and   unconstitutional  class  discrimination  which  is
 
exhibited by the JSSA.  NO STATE CITIZENS ALLOWED!
 
     Ever  conscious  of  this  fundamental  problem,   Appellant
 
submitted a third  MOTION  TO STAY  PROCEEDINGS  FOR  FAILING  TO
 
COMPLY WITH  THE JURY  SELECTION  POLICY  AND  CHALLENGE  TO  THE
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 15 of 50

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL STATUTE (28 U.S.C. 1865(b)(1)).  The
 
first such  motion was  denied by  Mr. Rosenbaum  in the  instant
 
case.  The  second  such motion  was submitted to the USDC in the
 
form  of  a  MOTION  FOR  RECONSIDERATION,   because  Appellant's
 
paralegal  assistant  had committed  a small,  but very  serious,
 
clerical error  in Appellant's  first STAY  MOTION.   Instead  of
 
displaying the following correct version of this crucial table:
 
            citizen of         Citizen of         Qualified
          United States      Minnesota state      to serve
 
               Yes                Yes                Yes
               Yes                No                 Yes
               No                 No                 No
               No                 Yes                No     **
 
     This  result   ("**")  violates   the  Tenth   Amendment  by
     disqualifying Citizens  of Minnesota  state from  serving on
     federal grand  and petit  juries  when  they  are  not  also
     federal  citizens,  thus  denying  to  accused  Citizens  of
     Minnesota state  a jury  of Their Peers when a jury consists
     only of federal citizens. [sic]
 
Appellant's paralegal assistant produced the following incomplete
 
version of  the above  table instead,  in which the two asterisks
 
"**" were missing:
 
          citizen of         Citizen of            Qualified
          United States      Minnesota state       to serve 
 
               YES                YES                YES
               YES                NO                 YES
               NO                 NO                 NO
               NO                 YES                NO
 
Appellant's   paralegal    assistant   allowed    other   serious
 
typographical errors to creep into said pleading as well.
 
     Appellant  submits  that Mr. Rosenbaum erred  when he denied
 
two (2)  separate motions  to stay  proceedings  for  failing  to
 
comply with the federal jury selection policy at 28 U.S.C. 1861.
 
     Appellant properly  challenged  compliance  with  the  juror
 
selection procedures, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1867(d), in which the
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 16 of 50

duty of the trial court is made abundantly clear, to wit:
 
     If  the court determines  that there  has been a substantial
     failure to  comply with  the provisions of this title [Title
     28, U.S.C.]  in selecting  the grand jury,  the  court shall
     stay the proceedings  pending the selection  of a grand jury
     in conformity with this title [Title 28, U.S.C.]  or dismiss
     the indictment, whichever is appropriate.
 
                                    [emphasis and brackets added]
 
     If  the court determines  that there  has been a substantial
     failure to  comply with  the provisions of this title [Title
     28, U.S.C.]  in selecting  the petit jury,  the  court shall
     stay the proceedings  pending the selection  of a petit jury
     in conformity with this title [Title 28, U.S.C.].
 
                                    [emphasis and brackets added]
 
     The term "shall" as used therein has a mandatory, imperative
 
meaning.   The attorneys  alleging  to  represent  the  Appellees
 
failed  to  rebut   Appellant's  sworn  statement of facts  which
 
provided an  abundance of  evidence proving a substantial failure
 
to comply  with the  intent of  Congress.   That  failure  --  to
 
prepare and  submit any  rebuttal --  resulted in  presenting the
 
USDC with  a clear  and unmistakable preponderance of evidence to
 
justify granting the requested stay.  Silence activates estoppel,
 
pursuant to Carmine v. Bowen, 64 A. 932 (1906).
 
     Appellant's  third  MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS was submitted
 
to the DCUS,  but no valid ruling was ever issued upon this third
 
STAY MOTION,  because  no competent  or  qualified federal judges
 
were  ever appointed to  preside upon the three-judge panel which
 
Appellant requested  for that  forum.   Nor were  any Findings of
 
Fact or Conclusions of Law ever prepared by either forum (USDC or
 
DCUS)  nor  by Mr. Rosenbaum,  thereby denying  to this honorable
 
Court  any  authoritative guidance whatsoever as to the reason(s)
 
why Mr. Rosenbaum denied Appellant's other 2 STAY MOTION's.
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 17 of 50

     Appellant also invoked judicial power available to Appellant
 
by Right under Article III of the U.S. Constitution,  in order to
 
compel production of documents properly requested under the FOIA,
 
and  to enjoin the  improper withholding  of same.   The  federal
 
court of original jurisdiction  to enforce the FOIA  is the DCUS.
 
See  5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B)  and  the ORDER by U.S. District Judge
 
John M. Roll,  dated  May 21, 1996,  In  Re Grand  Jury  Subpoena
 
Served on New Life  Health Center Company,  USDC Arizona, Tucson,
 
case number #GJ-95-1-6 (JMR), to wit:
 
     [T]his [USDC]  is  not the proper forum to  bring  a request
     under the Freedom of Information Act. [!!!]
 
                                    [emphasis and brackets added]
 
     Appellant hereby specifically  complains that Congress knew,
 
or  should  have  known,  that  the  federal  court  of  original
 
jurisdiction to  enforce the FOIA is the DCUS, not the USDC, when
 
Congress published  A Citizen's  Guide on  Using the  Freedom  of
 
Information Act and the Privacy Act of 1974 to Request Government
 
Records,  First Report  by  the  House  Committee  on  Government
 
Operations, Subcommittee on Information, Justice, Transportation,
 
and  Agriculture,  1993  Edition,  House  Report  103-104,  103rd
 
Congress,  1st   Session,  Union  Calendar  No.  53  (hereinafter
 
"Citizen's Guide").  See Appendix "O" (under separate cover).
 
     Said  Citizen's Guide  incorrectly  cited  the  USDC  as the
 
federal court  of original  jurisdiction for judicial enforcement
 
of FOIA requests.  Compare 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B) in pari materia.
 
There is  no  statute of limitations on fraud,  whether actual or
 
constructive.   Specifically,  said Citizen's Guide  contains the
 
following statement about judicial appeals:
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 18 of 50

                  I.  Filing a Judicial Appeal
 
          When  an administrative appeal is  denied,  a requester
     has the right to appeal the denial in court.  An FOIA appeal
     can be filed in  the  United States District Court [sic]  in
     the district  where  the requester lives.  The requester can
     also file  suit in  the district  where  the  documents  are
     located  or  in the  District of Columbia.  When a requester
     goes to court,  the burden  of justifying the withholding of
     documents  is  on  the  government.    This  is  a  distinct
     advantage for the requester.
                                    [emphasis and brackets added]
 
It is  very sad  that this  Citizen's Guide  is no  longer  being
 
published by the U.S. Government Printing Office ("GPO").
 
     (D)  The blanket exemption for the entire judicial branch of
          the United States ("federal government") in the Freedom
          of Information  Act ("FOIA")  at  5 U.S.C. 551(A), (B),
          and 552(f),  is unconstitutional for being overly broad
          and conflicting  with the  Oath of  Office provision in
          the Constitution  for the  United States of America, as
          lawfully  amended  ("U.S. Constitution"),  Article  VI,
          Clause 3 ("6:3"), in violation of the Supremacy Clause.
 
     After   finding    new   Counsel,   Appellant   prepared   a
 
comprehensive set  of FOIA  requests for  certified copies of the
 
official credentials of all government actors who had touched the
 
instant case in any way,  specifically including employees of the
 
judicial  branch  of  the  United  States  (federal  government).
 
Uncertified documents  are not  admissible.   See Full  Faith and
 
Credit Clause;  28 U.S.C. 1738-1742;  Federal Rules of Evidence.
 
     Certified copies  of said  FOIA requests  were entered  into
 
evidence, in Appellant's NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL
 
NOTICE, pursuant to Rule 201(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
 
Again,  the  term  "shall"  as  used  therein  has  a  mandatory,
 
imperative meaning,  over which the USDC could exercise no lawful
 
discretion whatsoever,  except  to rule  upon a proper and timely
 
motion to strike,  submitted by opposing party(s).   See Petition
 
Clause.  No motion to strike was ever made by opposing party(s).
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 19 of 50

     All FOIA  requests for  the credentials  of judicial  branch
 
employees took  careful note  of the  so-called blanket exemption
 
for the  federal judiciary  which is found at 5 U.S.C. 551(A) and
 
(B) (i.e. not an "agency"), and Appellant timely challenged same.
 
     Appellant's  challenge is based,  in part,  upon Appellant's
 
construction  of  the original Thirteenth Amendment (1819), which
 
bars federal officers  and  employees from  exercising privileges
 
which are  not specifically  enumerated in the U.S. Constitution,
 
and, in part,  upon  Appellant's belief  that  the  blanket  FOIA
 
exemption for the Judiciary is overly broad and violates the Oath
 
of Office,   and   Supremacy   Clause,  provisions  in  the  U.S.
 
Constitution.   See Article  VI, Clauses  2 and 3 ("6:2", "6:3");
 
Article V;  28 U.S.C. 453, 951;  5 U.S.C. 3331 in pari materia.
 
     There is  a strong  presumption in favor of public access to
 
judicial records.   See Valley Broadcasting Co. v. USDC, 798 F.2d
 
1289 (9th Cir. 1986).  Silence activates estoppel, Carmine supra;
 
silence is  also a fraud,  where there is a legal or a moral duty
 
to speak.  See U. S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1977).
 
     Appellant argues  that the  Oath of  Office is  a matter  of
 
constitutional importance, and 6:3 activates said legal and moral
 
duties to exhibit requisite credentials, when properly requested.
 
Moreover, failure to qualify by filing a bond and taking the oath
 
of office  is  ground for ouster  [sic]  by Quo Warranto.  See 51
 
C.J. p. 319, n. 65; 74  C.J.S. p. 193, n. 11;  State v. Bernoudy,
 
36 Mo. 279 (1865); Respublica v. Wray, 2 Yeates (Pa.) 429 (1799);
 
State v. Christensen, 35 P.2d 775 at 782, 84 Utah 185 (1934).
 
     In general,  the presiding judge of  any  district court  is
 
presumed  to have executed  the solemn Oath of Office required of
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 20 of 50

him (her) by Article  VI, Clause 3 ("6:3")  and by 28 U.S.C. 453.
 
This Oath is like an on-off light switch in that,  per force, its
 
execution activates  all  the guarantees in the federal and state
 
constitutions, without exception.  Fiat lux et lux erat in mundo.
 
This  causal connection  between those guarantees  and  a judge's
 
Oath of Office is tersely expressed as follows:
 
     A district judge is  bound  by oath of office  to uphold the
     Constitutions of the United States  and the State of Hawaii;
     rule  excluding illegally seized evidence falls within scope
     of such  oath  as such  rule  is  a  sanction  essential  to
     upholding  federal   and  state   constitutional  safeguards
     against  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures.    State  v.
     Wilson, 519 P.2d 228 [1974].
 
                                        [emphasis and year added]
                [American Digest System, Eighth Decennial Digest]
                ["Judges", page 969, Section 5: "Qualifications"]
 
     Therefore,  using this elegant logic,  all  Rights which are
 
guaranteed  by the state  and federal constitutions are sanctions
 
which  fall  within the scope  of the Oath.  The guarantee of Due
 
Process of Law, as found in the Fifth Amendment, is a Right which
 
is  on a par with a  multitude  of all other Rights guaranteed by
 
those  constitutions,   whether  or   not  they  are  enumerated.
 
Together, the 9th and 10th Amendments provide explicit guarantees
 
for that multitude, without any need to enumerate them.
 
     Applying  these  principles  to  the  instant  case  is  not
 
difficult.   Appellant designed  a single deadline for exhaustion
 
of all FOIA administrative  remedies,  and  for production of all
 
certified documents demanded in Appellant's NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR
 
PROOF OF POWER, STANDING, AND JURISDICTION IN THE PARTICULARS.
 
     When  this   deadline  passed   without  exhibition  by  any
 
government actors  of any  of the documents requested,  Appellant
 
testified to  this default  in His  AFFIDAVITS OF  DEFAULT AND OF
 
PROBABLE CAUSE.  See 28 U.S.C. 1746(1) (the "outside" option).
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 21 of 50

     Appellant submits that the passage of this deadline provided
 
Appellant  with sufficient probable cause  to remove the Criminal
 
Case from the USDC into the DCUS,  whereupon Appellant petitioned
 
a three-judge DCUS panel for a Warrant of Removal.
 
     See Appellant's  VERIFIED PETITION FOR WARRANT OF REMOVAL BY
 
THREE-JUDGE PANEL:  JURY TRIAL  DEMANDED;   all other authorities
 
therein;  FRCP Rule 38 in chief;  Seventh Amendment.  See also 28
 
U.S.C. 1631  and 2402, in pari materia.  Appellant's PETITION FOR
 
WARRANT OF REMOVAL properly and timely demanded a jury trial,  in
 
view of the exception which is found in 28 U.S.C. 2402, to wit:
 
     [A]ny action against the United States under section 1346(1)
     shall,  at the request  of either party  to such action,  be
     tried by the court with a jury.
 
The  corresponding section  of 28 U.S.C. 1346,  United States  as
 
defendant, reads as follows:
 
     (a)  The district  courts shall  have original jurisdiction,
     concurrent with  the United  States Court of Federal Claims,
     of:
 
     (1)  Any civil  action against  the United  States  for  the
     recovery of  any internal-revenue  tax alleged  to have been
     erroneously or  illegally  assessed  or  collected,  or  any
     penalty claimed  to have been collected without authority or
     any sum  alleged to  have been  excessive or  in any  manner
     wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws; ....
 
                           [28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1), emphasis added]
 
     Appellant committed a harmless error by failing to cite 1346
 
in His PETITION FOR  WARRANT OF REMOVAL,  and hereby respectfully
 
requests leave of this Court to amend same nunc pro tunc.
 
     At this crucial juncture, Appellant respectfully directs the
 
attention  of this Court  to the following pivotal paragraph from
 
the REPORT & RECOMMENDATION  prepared  and  filed  in the instant
 
case by Mr. Franklin L. Noel on August 9, 1996, quoting verbatim:
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 22 of 50

     9.   Defendant challenges the authority of the United States
     government to  collect income taxes from its citizens [sic].
     Section 1  of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax on the
     income of  "every individual"  (e.g. I.R.C., Section 1 (c)),
     which applies  to "every  individual who  is  a  citizen  or
     resident of  the United  States."    (Treas.Reg.  Sec.  1-1-
     1(a)(1) [sic]).   See,  e.g., Denison  v. Commissioner,  751
     F.2d 241,  242 (8th  Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1069
     (1985);   Lively v.  Commissioner, 705  F.2d 1017  (8th Cir.
     1983).  This is done under the authority of Congress "to lay
     and collect  taxes".   U.S. Const.,  Art. 1,  Sec. 8;   Id.,
     Amend. XVI.  Defendant is a citizen of,  and resides within,
     the United States.  See  U.S. Const. Amend. XIV Sec. 1.  The
     Sixteenth Amendment of the  United States  Constitution  and
     the tax laws pursuant to it represent the law of the land to
     which  the  defendant,  as  a  citizen of the United  States
     [sic], is subject. His motion to quash fails on this ground.
 
     Appellant submits  this paragraph as pivotal evidence of the
 
requisite "authority"  which the  federal judiciary have formally
 
claimed in  the instant  case.   Appellant will  now  demonstrate
 
numerous fatal errors which were made in said paragraph:
 
     (1)  Appellant is  not a citizen of the United States [sic],
          by Right of Election (see thorough discussion supra);
 
     (2)  the regulations  at 26 CFR 1.1-1(a) thru (c) are overly
          broad for  creating specific  liabilities which are not
          authorized by  any statutes within the Internal Revenue
          Code ("IRC");
 
     (3)  IRC section 1(c)  does  not create a specific liability
          either for  "citizens of  the  United  States"  or  for
          "residents of the United States", nor does said section
          impose any  specific liabilities  upon Citizens  of the
          several states of the Union, as such;
 
     (4)  Appellant is  not a  resident  of  the  United  States,
          because the term "United States" as used in 26 CFR 1.1-
          1(c) means the federal zone;
 
     (5)  the regulations  at 26 CFR 1.1-1(a) thru (c) are overly
          broad for  creating specific liabilities  which are not
          authorized by any statutes within the IRC;
 
     (6)  the authority  at  Article  I,  Section  8,  cannot  be
          exercised in violation of other provisions which govern
          the imposition  of  direct  federal  taxes  within  the
          several states of the Union, at 1:2:3 and 1:9:4;
 
     (7)  the so-called  16th amendment  [sic] was never lawfully
          ratified, as  proven by conclusive, unrebutted evidence
          filed in  the  case  of  People  v.  Boxer,  California
          Supreme Court, case number #S-030016, December 1992;
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 23 of 50

     (8)  even if it  had  ever been  lawfully ratified,  the so-
          called   16th  amendment  [sic]   did  not  repeal  the
          prohibitions against  direct federal  taxes within  the
          several states of the  Union at  1:2:3 and  1:9:4,  and
          repeals by implication are not favored;
 
     (9)  the so-called  14th amendment  [sic] was never lawfully
          ratified  either,  as proven by conclusive,  unrebutted
          evidence filed and judicially recognized in the case of
          Dyett v.  Turner,  439  P.2d  266,  270  (1968)  (begin
          reading where "General Lee had surrendered ....");
 
     (10) although the IRC embraces tax laws which appear to have
          been enacted  pursuant to the so-called 16th amendment,
          the constitutional  restrictions on direct and indirect
          taxes do  not operate upon taxes which Congress imposes
          within  the  federal  zone,   pursuant  to  the  Downes
          Doctrine infra;
 
     (11) under the  Downes Doctrine,  the  Constitution  of  the
          United States,  as such,  does not  extend  beyond  the
          limits of the states which are united by and under it;
 
     (12) the Downes  Doctrine was  further extended  in Hooven &
          Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), when the Supreme
          Court ruled  that  the guarantees of  the  Constitution
          extend to the federal zone only as Congress makes those
          guarantees applicable, by statutes;
 
     (13) by opting  to create a legislative democracy within the
          federal zone,  as opposed to a Constitutional Republic,
          Congress has  intentionally  avoided extending into the
          federal zone,  and to  all  federal  citizens  who  owe
          allegiance  to   that  zone,   the  apportionment   and
          uniformity restrictions  which apply within the several
          states  and  immunize  Citizens  of the several states;
          and,
 
     (14) for all  of these  reasons, and  for many  others which
          Appellant has  thoroughly documented  in  the  official
          record of the trial court below, the IRC is a municipal
          Code which is enforceable within the federal zone,  and
          upon the citizens and residents of that zone,  but only
          within the  questionable rubric of the Downes Doctrine,
          or special cases as described in T.D. 2313.
 
     The final proof of point 14 above is found in the exhaustive
 
analysis of the IRC which was accomplished, and published, in the
 
work  entitled  The Federal Zone:  Cracking  the Code of Internal
 
Revenue.  See Appendix "P" (under separate cover).  An electronic
 
Seventh Edition  is submitted as an essential Exhibit appended to
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 24 of 50

this Opening  Brief,  to save paper,  to demonstrate  Appellant's
 
good faith,  and respectfully  to honor  8th Circuit  local  Rule
 
28A(j): Incorporation by Reference, in the instant cases, to wit:
 
     (j)  Incorporation  by   Reference.     A  party   may   not
     incorporate by  reference the  contents  of  a  brief  filed
     elsewhere.
 
     Appellant has no other efficient, or more respectful, way to
 
demonstrate  the vast preponderance  of conclusive evidence which
 
has been amassed in  The Federal Zone,  particularly as that book
 
addresses  the  pivotal decision  of the  U.S. Supreme  Court  in
 
Brushaber v.  Union Pacific  Railroad Company, 240 U.S. 1 (1916),
 
and  the  all important  Treasury Decision  ("T.D.")  2313  which
 
followed immediately upon the decision in Brushaber supra.
 
     Appellant submits  that the  vagueness and ambiguities which
 
were introduced  deliberately into  the federal income tax system
 
have resulted  in a  set of  laws, statutes,  regulations, rules,
 
forms, practices,  policies, procedures, and customs which are so
 
terribly complex and  intentionally  deceptive,  that the average
 
federal citizen  is very  far from ever being able to understand,
 
or decipher,  the real  meaning and intent of it all.  These were
 
the very  same persons who were asked to render a verdict against
 
Appellant in the instant case.  Lex non cogit impossibilia.
 
     The combined  result of this massive fraud is a travesty and
 
a tragedy of the  worst kind,  because Appellant has succeeded in
 
proving herein that there are,  in  fact,  more than  two hundred
 
million Americans  who find  themselves situated in  exactly  the
 
same position  as Appellant.   And  that position is one in which
 
the American People  must  now struggle daily,  hourly, sometimes
 
minute-by-minute,  in  the  face  of  an  ugly  and  premeditated
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 25 of 50

extortion racket which now pervades the entire Land (both zones),
 
in blatant violation of the fundamental principles which were set
 
down more than two centuries ago in the supreme Law of this Land.
 
     Those principles have withstood every single challenge which
 
has been  mounted against  their supremacy  since they were first
 
consecrated  into Law on June 21, 1788,  the first day of summer,
 
the longest day of the year,  Counselor's birthday, and the first
 
day on  which freedom  had, at  long  last,  become  The  Primary
 
Principle upon  which  Our  unique  government  was  founded  and
 
dedicated, the day on which God's generous light from His intense
 
burning Sun would shine the longest, and remain that way forever.
 
     Freedom.  Oh, Freedom!  Quo vadis, Freedom?  Quo vadis?
 
     As against these immensely moving principles,  which federal
 
government employees now shirk at their own great loss, Appellant
 
returns to the incredibly accurate prediction in Justice Harlan's
 
courageous protest to the dangerous perils of the Downes Doctrine
 
in Downes v. Bidwell infra.  Long live protest!  Quoting now:
 
     The idea prevails with some  --  indeed, it found expression
     in arguments  at the  bar   --  that we have in this country
     substantially or practically two national governments;  one,
     to be  maintained  under  the  Constitution,  with  all  its
     restrictions;   the  other  to  be  maintained  by  Congress
     outside and  independently of that instrument, by exercising
     such powers  as other nations of the earth are accustomed to
     exercise.
                  [Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 at 380 (1901)]
                              [Harlan dissenting, emphasis added]
 
To appreciate  how alarmed  Justice Harlan had become as a result
 
of this new "theory", consider the following from His dissent:
 
     I take  leave to  say that  if the principles thus announced
     should ever  receive the  sanction of  a  majority  of  this
     court,  a radical and  mischievous change  in our system  of
     government will be the result.  We will, in that event, pass
     from the era of constitutional liberty guarded and protected
     by  a  written  constitution  into  an  era  of  legislative
     absolutism. ...
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 26 of 50

     It will be an evil day for American liberty if the theory of
     a government  outside of  the supreme law of the land  finds
     lodgment in  our constitutional  jurisprudence.   No  higher
     duty rests  upon this court than to exert its full authority
     to  prevent   all  violation   of  the   principles  of  the
     Constitution.
                     [Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 at 379-382]
                      [(1901), Harlan dissenting, emphasis added]
 
     The United  States will now take  careful note that We,  the
 
People of the United States of America, will not sit idly by, and
 
witness  the systematic destruction and premeditated violation of
 
everything which  We hold  most dear.   The principles  We uphold
 
herein,  have been  upheld  by many courts  of this great Nation;
 
they were reiterated in People v. Boxer supra as follows:
 
     A practice  condemned by the Constitution cannot be saved by
     historical acceptance and present convenience.
 
           [U.S. v. Woodley, 726 F.2d 1328, 1338 (9th Cir. 1984)]
                                                 [emphasis added]
 
     It is  obviously  correct that no  one acquires  a vested or
     protected right  in violation  of the  Constitution  by long
     use,  even when that span of time covers our entire national
     existence and indeed predates it.
 
                       [Walz v. Tax Commission of New York City,]
                     [397 U.S. 664 at 678 (1970), emphasis added]
 
     (E)  The federal  removal statutes at 28 U.S.C. 1441 et seq.
          are  unconstitutional   as  a   group  for  commingling
          references to the United States District Court ("USDC")
          with the  District Court of the United States ("DCUS").
          The summary remands authorized by 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) are
          likewise unconstitutional  for being overly broad,  for
          conflicting  with 28 U.S.C. 1441(e),  and for depriving
          litigants of an essential remedy,  when a federal cause
          of action is clearly present by virtue of the FOIA,  in
          violation of  the  Due  Process  Clause  of  the  Fifth
          Amendment,  and two international human Rights treaties
          which guarantee  courts of  competent jurisdiction  and
          judicial officers with requisite qualifications.
 
     The USDC lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter because
 
the record does  not  exhibit the  authorizations required by IRC
 
7401.  Because specific FOIA requests were not answered, there is
 
no conclusive  evidence  on the record  that  the  U.S.  Attorney
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 27 of 50

General, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, or
 
their lawful delegates, authorized or sanctioned Appellant's case
 
in the USDC.  No such evidence was ever served on Appellant:
 
     Thus,  where the Congress  prohibits the  commencement of  a
     civil action  unless certain  specific acts  are  performed,
     this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter until
     the requisite conditions are met in fact and such compliance
     is shown by the pleadings  and, where necessary, established
     by proof.  ... [B]ut  the mere allegation of facts necessary
     for  jurisdiction   without  supporting   proof  is  fatally
     defective. ...  This Court holds that 26 U.S.C. Section 7401
     requirements constitute  facts  essential  to  jurisdiction.
     The failure  to prove jurisdictional facts when specifically
     denied is fatal to the maintenance of this action.
 
                     [U.S.A. v. One 1972 Cadillac Coupe De Ville]
                    [355 F.Supp. 513, 515 (1973), emphasis added]
 
     Likewise, even if IRC 7402 had ever taken effect, it clearly
 
grants specific authorities to the "district courts of the United
 
States" [sic] ("DCUS") at 7402(a), 7402(b), 7402(c), and 7402(f).
 
The USDC is only mentioned at 7402(e):
 
     (e)  To quiet title.
     The  United   States  district   courts  [sic]   shall  have
     jurisdiction of  any action  brought by  the  United  States
     [sic] to quiet title to property if the title claimed by the
     United States  [sic]  to  such  property  was  derived  from
     enforcement of a lien under this title.     [emphasis added]
 
IRC 7402(d)  was repealed  by  P.L.  92-310,  title  II,  section
 
230(d), June 6, 1972.  See 1 U.S.C. 1 et seq.
 
     The jurisdiction  of federal  courts is  defined in the U.S.
 
Constitution at  Article III  for judicial  courts;  in Article I
 
for legislative  courts;   and  in  Article IV   for  territorial
 
courts.   Some courts  created by  Acts  of  Congress  have  been
 
referred  to  as  "Constitutional  Courts",  whereas  others  are
 
regarded as  "Legislative Tribunals".   O'Donoghue  v. U.S.,  289
 
U.S. 516  (1933),  77 L.Ed. 1356,  53 S.Ct. 74;  Mookini v. U.S.,
 
303 U.S. 201 at 205 (1938), 82 L.Ed. 748, 58 S.Ct. 543.
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 28 of 50

     The   USDC   is   a   legislative,   territorial   tribunal.
 
Legislative court judges  do  not  enjoy Article III  guarantees;
 
"inherently judicial"  tasks must be performed by judges deriving
 
power  under  Article III.   See  U.S. v. Saunders,  641 F.2d 659
 
(1981), cert. den. 101 S.Ct. 3055, 452 U.S. 918, 69 L.Ed. 422.
 
     Creation and composition  of the USDC  were accomplished  by
 
Acts of Congress  on  June 25, 1948 [62 Stat. 895],  and November
 
13, 1963  [77 Stat. 331],  currently  codified  at 28 U.S.C. 132;
 
and  the jurisdiction thereof  is strictly limited by IRC 7402 to
 
actions  brought  by the  United States [sic]  to quiet title  to
 
property if the title claim by the United States to such property
 
was derived from enforcement of a lien under Title 26, U.S.C.
 
     Acts  of  Congress  creating  the  USDC  do  not  vest  said
 
territorial tribunals with general criminal jurisdiction;   these
 
courts have  only such  jurisdiction as is conferred upon them by
 
Act of Congress under the Constitution.  See Hubbard v. Ammerman,
 
465 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1972),  cert. den. 93 S.Ct. 967, 410 U.S.
 
910, 35 L.Ed.2d 272.  See IRC 7402(e) quoted supra, Page 28.
 
     The USDC is not a court of general jurisdiction,  and has no
 
other power bestowed upon it,  except  as prescribed by Congress.
 
See Graves  v. Snead, 541 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. den. 97
 
S.Ct. 1106,  429 U.S. 1093,  51 L.Ed.2d 539.  Confer at "Inclusio
 
unius est exclusio alterius" in Black's supra.
 
     It is  apparent  that the USDC for the District of Minnesota
 
was  created  and  established  under  28  U.S.C.  132,  and  its
 
jurisdiction is defined  and  limited  by Chapter 85 of Title 28,
 
U.S.C.   The  Historical and Statutory Notes  under 28 U.S.C. 132
 
contain  the  following important  qualification,  in the section
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 29 of 50

entitled "Continuation of Organization of Court", to wit:
 
     Section 2(b) of Act June 25, 1948, provided in part that the
     provisions of this title  [sic]  as  set out in section 1 of
     said Act June 25, 1948,  with respect to the organization of
     the court,  shall be construed as a continuation of existing
     law ....
                                                 [emphasis added]
 
     The distinction between the USDC and the DCUS dates at least
 
from  American Insurance  infra  in the year 1828,  and Title 28,
 
U.S.C., expressly  continues that law.  The Act of June 25, 1948,
 
contains the following corresponding language, to wit:
 
     (b)  The  provisions  of title 28,  Judiciary  and  Judicial
     Procedure, of the United  States Code,  set out in section 1
     of this Act, with respect to the organization of each of the
     several courts therein provided for  ...  shall be construed
     as continuations  of existing  law. ...   No loss of rights,
     interruption  of   jurisdiction,  or  prejudice  to  matters
     pending in  any of such courts on the effective date of this
     Act shall result from its enactment.        [emphasis added]
 
Appellant submits the following construction of this provision of
 
the Act of June 25, 1948:
 
     No loss of rights shall result from its enactment;
 
     No  interruption  of  jurisdiction  shall  result  from  its
     enactment;  and,
 
     No prejudice to matters pending in any of such courts on the
     effective date of this Act shall result from its enactment.
 
     The truth is  that the United States District Court ("USDC")
 
is designed  to adjudicate matters  that arise within the federal
 
zone,  and  the District Court of  the United  States ("DCUS") is
 
designed  to adjudicate matters that arise within the state zone.
 
See U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995), Kennedy concurring.
 
     There is  a  distinct  and  definite  difference  between  a
 
"United States District Court" ("USDC")  and a "District Court of
 
the United States"  ("DCUS").   The  words "District Court of the
 
United States"  commonly describe  constitutional courts  created
 
under Article III of the Constitution, not the legislative courts
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 30 of 50

which have  long  been  the  courts  of  the  Territories.    See
 
International Longshoremen's  & Warehousemen's  Union  v.  Juneau
 
Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237 at 241, 96 L.Ed. 275 (1952).
 
     The  term  "District Court of the  United  States"  commonly
 
describes  Article III courts,  or "courts of the United States",
 
and  not  legislative courts  of the  territories.  See  American
 
Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511 (1828),  7 L.Ed.
 
242;   International Longshoremen's  and Warehousemen's  Union v.
 
Wirtz, 170  F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1948), cert. den. 336 U.S. 919, 93
 
L.Ed. 1082, 69 S.Ct. 641, reh. den. 336 U.S. 971, 69 S.Ct. 936.
 
     Though the  judicial system  set up  in a  territory of  the
 
United States  is a  part of  federal  jurisdiction,  the  phrase
 
"court of the United States", when used in a federal statute,  is
 
generally  construed as  not  referring  to "territorial courts".
 
See  Balzac v. Porto Rico [sic],  258 U.S. 298 at 312 (1922),  42
 
S.Ct. 343, 66 L.Ed. 627.  In Balzac supra, the high Court stated:
 
     The United States District Court is not a true United States
     court established  under  Article III of the Constitution to
     administer the  judicial power  of the United States therein
     conveyed.    It  is  created  by  virtue  of  the  sovereign
     congressional faculty,  granted under Article IV, Section 3,
     of  that   instrument,  of  making  all  needful  rules  and
     regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United
     States.  The resemblance of its jurisdiction to that of true
     United  States   courts  in   offering  an   opportunity  to
     nonresidents of resorting to a tribunal not subject to local
     influence,  does   not  change   its  character  as  a  mere
     territorial court.
                                                 [emphasis added]
 
     The distinction  within the dual nature of the federal court
 
system  is  also noted  in 18 U.S.C. 3241,  which states that the
 
United States District Court  ("USDC")  for the Canal Zone  shall
 
have jurisdiction  "... concurrently  with the district courts of
 
the United States  [sic],  of offenses  against the  laws of  the
 
United States  committed  upon  the high  seas" [emphasis added].
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 31 of 50

Singular  and  plural refer  to one  and the same entities.   See
 
1 U.S.C. 1 et seq. for rules of Title construction.
 
     This distinction is the reason why federal jurisdiction over
 
prosecutions  is   more  than   a  technical   concept;  it  is a
 
Constitutional requirement.   See  U.S. v.  Johnson, 337 F.2d 180
 
(4th Cir.  1964),  aff'd  383 U.S. 169 (1966),  86 S.Ct. 749,  15
 
L.Ed.2d 681,  cert. den.  87 S.Ct. 44, 134,  and 385 U.S. 846, 17
 
L.Ed.2d 77, 117.
 
     The distinction  between the  "district courts of the United
 
States"  and  "United States  district courts"  is  also  readily
 
apparent  in the section  of Title 18 dealing with civil remedies
 
for activities  prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 1962 (i.e. racketeering).
 
Subsection (a) of 18 U.S.C. 1964 makes explicit reference  to the
 
Article III "district courts of the United States", as follows:
 
     (a)  The  district courts of the United States   shall  have
     jurisdiction to  prevent and  restrain violations of section
     1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders ....
 
                                                 [emphasis added]
 
Subsection (c) of 18 U.S.C. 1964  makes explicit reference to the
 
Article IV "United States district court", as follows:
 
     (c)  Any person  injured in  his  business  or  property  by
     reason of  a violation  of section  1962 of this chapter may
     sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court
     ....                                        [emphasis added]
 
     The language of these two subsections is almost identical in
 
scope,  with  the important difference resulting from an apparent
 
need to legislate separate and distinct court authorities for the
 
Article  III  and  for  the  Article  IV  forums,   respectively.
 
Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.  See also 28 U.S.C. 1441 et
 
seq.,  in  which Congress  appears to have confused the USDC with
 
the DCUS throughout the removal statutes codified therein.
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 32 of 50

     This finding,  again,  raises the  all important question of
 
original jurisdiction.   The  USDC could  not  sentence Appellant
 
without subject matter jurisdiction.   Appellant was under duress
 
of incarceration when Appellant petitioned the USDC for a release
 
pending  appeal.   Mr. Rosenbaum evidently ignored,  or deferred,
 
Appellant's PETITION  to the DCUS  for a  WARRANT OF REMOVAL BY A
 
THREE-JUDGE PANEL.   The  record shows  that  Mr. Rosenbaum  did,
 
finally,  acknowledge Appellant's  FOIA suit,  which specifically
 
named Mr. Rosenbaum as one of several Respondents in the DCUS.
 
     Appellant hereby  protests the  great lengths  to which  Mr.
 
Rosenbaum evidently went to ignore the removal statutes which are
 
found  at 28 U.S.C. 1441  et seq.   By way of demonstrating newly
 
found evidence  of confusion and duplicity in the federal laws in
 
question,  Appellant submits the following specific citations for
 
the careful consideration of this honorable Court:
 
     28 U.S.C. 1441(a)    "district court of the United States"
     28 U.S.C. 1441(d)    "district court of the United States"
     28 U.S.C. 1442(a)    "district court of the United States"
     28 U.S.C. 1443       "district court of the United States"
     28 U.S.C. 1444       "district court of the United States"
     28 U.S.C. 1445(a)    "district court of the United States"
     28 U.S.C. 1445(b)    "district court of the United States"
     28 U.S.C. 1445(c)    "district court of the United States"
     28 U.S.C. 1445(d)    "district court of the United States"
     28 U.S.C. 1446(a)    "district court of the United States"
     28 U.S.C. 1446(c)(1) "United States district court" [sic]
     28 U.S.C. 1446(c)(2) "United States district court" [sic]
     28 U.S.C. 1446(c)(4) "United States district court" [sic]
     28 U.S.C. 1446(c)(5) "United States district court" [sic]
     28 U.S.C. 1448       "district court of the United States"
     28 U.S.C. 1449       "district court of the United States"
     28 U.S.C. 1450       "district court of the United States"
 
     Appellant hereby challenges all federal removal statutes, as
 
a group,  for being void for vagueness  in violation of the Sixth
 
Amendment, Nature and Cause Clause.  See 28 U.S.C. 1441 thru 1452
 
[emphasis added supra];  Balzac supra;  American Insurance supra.
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 33 of 50

     Said statutes also evidence negligence and fraud on the part
 
of Congress.   The fraud is demonstrated by an unlawful intent to
 
extend the territorial  and  subject matter jurisdictions  of the
 
USDC into the several states  of the Union,   over which the DCUS
 
has original  jurisdiction with  respect to  said  territory  and
 
subject matters.   The  removal statutes evidence  the fraud,  in
 
violation of the Petition Clause, the Fifth and Tenth Amendments.
 
     Recent research  has also  proven that the federal judiciary
 
has  also  sabotaged the  U.S. Constitution  and  corrupted  laws
 
governing the conduct of the federal courts.   This has been done
 
in part  by creating  the false  impression  that  the  USDC  has
 
territorial and  subject matter  jurisdiction within  the several
 
states of the Union,   particularly  over  criminal prosecutions,
 
when it does not.  See Supremacy Clause;  human Rights treaties.
 
     The truth is that the USDC is designed to adjudicate matters
 
that arise  within the federal zone,  and the DCUS is designed to
 
adjudicate  matters  that arise  within the  state zone  (not the
 
"State" zone).  See 31 CFR 51.2 and 52.2 ("State" and "state").
 
     Pursuant to the definition at 28 U.S.C. 1451(2), the USDC is
 
a  "State" court as  defined therein,  because  said  USDC  is  a
 
legislative tribunal  domiciled  in the District of Columbia  and
 
convened under authority of 4:3:2 (i.e. a territorial court).
 
     Appellant respectfully  requests  this  honorable  Court  to
 
compare two important removal statutes which are available to all
 
civil litigants.   28 U.S.C. 1441(b)  contains a  clear,  general
 
restatement of the original jurisdiction of the DCUS, without any
 
requirement  that   the  removing  party(s)  be  defendant(s)  or
 
plaintiff(s), to wit:
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 34 of 50

     (b)  Any civil  action of  which the  district  courts  have
     original jurisdiction  founded on  a claim  or right arising
     under the  Constitution, treaties  or  laws  of  the  United
     States  shall be removable without regard to the citizenship
     or residence of the parties.
 
                              [28 U.S.C. 1441(b), emphasis added]
 
     The above  statute makes absolutely no mention whatsoever of
 
a "defendant",  "defendants",  "plaintiff",  or "plaintiffs".  In
 
clear contrast  to the above statute,  the  companion statute  at
 
section 1441(a) does  explicitly  restrict  its  availability  to
 
civil defendant(s) only, to wit:
 
     (a)  Except  as  otherwise  expressly  provided  by  Act  of
     Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which
     the district  courts of  the  United  States  have  original
     jurisdiction,  may  be  removed  by  the  defendant  or  the
     defendants,  to the  district court of the United States for
     the district  and division  embracing the  place where  such
     action is pending.
                              [28 U.S.C. 1441(a), emphasis added]
 
     Appellant relies  heavily upon  the  rule  of  construction:
 
Inclusio unius  est exclusio alterius,  in  order  to  show  that
 
Congress omitted any references to the "defendant", "defendants",
 
"plaintiff",  or "plaintiffs"  in  section 1441(b),  because  the
 
omission was intentional;   specifically,  it  is the  intent  of
 
Congress  to allow plaintiffs  and  defendants  to  remove  civil
 
action(s)  from "State" courts  into the DCUS,  particularly when
 
the DCUS  has original jurisdiction that is founded on a claim or
 
right arising  under a "law of the United States" [sic].  See the
 
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") at 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq.
 
     The FOIA is  a law of the United States.  Specifically,  see
 
the grant  of original jurisdiction to the DCUS (not to the USDC)
 
at 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B),  to enjoin the withholding of documents
 
properly requested  under FOIA,  and  to order the  production of
 
documents improperly withheld.
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 35 of 50

     The major  problem which  Appellant  wishes  this  honorable
 
Court to  remedy  is  that  there  appears  to  be  no  statutory
 
authority  for a Citizen of Minnesota state  to remove a criminal
 
prosecution into the DCUS,  particularly when  the USDC whence it
 
originated does  not  have any criminal  jurisdiction whatsoever.
 
See 28 U.S.C. 1446(c)(1) thru (5) supra.
 
     It was  for this reason  that Appellant invoked the original
 
jurisdiction of  the DCUS under the  FOIA,  specifically 5 U.S.C.
 
552(a)(4)(B), and petitioned the DCUS for a warrant of removal of
 
a  "criminal" case which  began in  a court which evidently could
 
not demonstrate  any criminal jurisdiction in the first instance.
 
See Appellant's AFFIDAVITS OF DEFAULT AND OF PROBABLE CAUSE.
 
     Furthermore,  Appellant requests  this  honorable  Court  to
 
enjoin any  future summary remand by the DCUS of Appellant's FOIA
 
suit(s)  back  to the USDC.   A summary remand  would effectively
 
deny  a judicial remedy which is Appellant's Right in the instant
 
cases,  because the FOIA creates a federal cause of action in the
 
case  of all documents  properly requested  under the  FOIA,  and
 
improperly withheld  by the government actor(s)  and agency(s) in
 
question.   The burden is  on these same government actor(s)  and
 
agency(s) to justify the withholding (in more ways than one:).
 
     Moreover,  the USDC has  no jurisdiction whatsoever,  either
 
original or appellate,  to  enjoin the  withholding of  documents
 
properly requested by Appellant under the FOIA,  and/or  to order
 
the production of documents improperly withheld from Appellant by
 
the government actor(s) and agency(s) in question.
 
     Appellant also specifically challenges the constitutionality
 
of 28 U.S.C. 1447(d), to wit:
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 36 of 50

     (d)  An order remanding a case to the State court from which
     it was  removed is  not reviewable  on appeal  or otherwise,
     except that  an order  remanding a  case to  the State court
     from which  it was  removed pursuant to section 1443 of this
     title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
 
Appellant hereby  denies  any reliance  whatsoever  upon  section
 
1443,  thus rendering moot  the second  half of  section 1447(d).
 
However, Appellant  argues that the first half of said section is
 
overly broad  for permitting  arbitrary,  capricious,  erroneous,
 
and/or injurious  orders to  be sustained  artificially,  and for
 
depriving litigants  of  remedies  which  are  Their  fundamental
 
Right, under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
 
     It was only  after  the instant  case was filed in the USDC,
 
that Appellant then decided to submit proper FOIA requests to the
 
U.S. Department  of Justice ("DOJ"), to the Administrative Office
 
of the U.S. Courts in Washington, D.C., to the U.S. Department of
 
the Treasury,  and  to other agencies, for the credentials of all
 
government actors  who had  touched the instant cases in any way.
 
When DOJ,  the Judiciary,  Treasury, and  all  other  actors  and
 
agencies failed  to produce  certified copies  of  the  requested
 
documents,  after receipt of proper FOIA requests and appeals for
 
same,  and after expiration  of the statutory deadlines for same,
 
Appellant had then exhausted all administrative remedies, and was
 
then faced with an immediate need to invoke the court of original
 
jurisdiction  over the FOIA.   That  court is the DCUS;  no other
 
court fits the bill.  See 31 CFR 51.2 and 52.2 (pre-E.O.).
 
     Accordingly,  Appellant now faces  the very real prospect of
 
being forever deprived of Appellant's procedural Right to enforce
 
the FOIA upon DOJ,  the Judiciary, and all other FOIA recipients.
 
Should a  summary remand  be permitted  to stand  and thereby  to
 
remove the instant case  back to the USDC,  there will have been,
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 37 of 50

in that event,  no litigation whatsoever on the federal questions
 
which arose  from the  original FOIA requests and appeals.   This
 
result  directly  contravenes the explicit legislative intent  of
 
the FOIA and of 28 U.S.C. 1441(e), to wit:
 
     (e)  The court  to which such civil action is removed is not
     precluded  from hearing and  determining  any claim  in such
     civil action  because  the State court from which such civil
     action is removed did not have jurisdiction over that claim.
 
     Appellant submits,  for the  careful consideration  of  this
 
honorable  Court,  that  section 1441(e)  applies  directly,  and
 
unequivocally, to the instant cases, particularly with respect to
 
judicial enforcement of the FOIA.   This is so, precisely because
 
the USDC  from which  Appellant sought to remove the instant case
 
does not have any jurisdiction whatsoever over FOIA enforcement.
 
     Therefore,  the  DCUS  is  not  precluded  from hearing  and
 
determining Appellant's claim upon judicially compelled discovery
 
of  the documents requested  in the  original FOIA  requests  and
 
appeals,  e.g. credentials, such as Appointment Affidavits, Oaths
 
of Office,  and delegations  of authority to the offices claimed.
 
See, in particular, 6:3; 28 U.S.C. 453, 951;  and 5 U.S.C. 3331.
 
     When examined  against this  clear  and  unequivocal  Right,
 
which is  enforceable by  the  FOIA,  the  restriction  found  at
 
section 1447(d) cannot stand on its own, nor can it be applied in
 
the instant cases, because said section confounds, if it does not
 
directly contradict, the procedural Right(s) which are recognized
 
by section 1441(e), and by 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B).
 
     Section  1447(d)   is  particularly  offensive  in  that  it
 
prohibits review on appeal or otherwise.   Appellant submits that
 
this additional  qualifier --  "or otherwise"  -- would logically
 
prohibit  further judicial review  of  Appellant's  STAY  MOTION,
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 38 of 50

should the  three-judge DCUS  panel decide,  under  authority  of
 
section 1447(d), to remand  instead of  ruling on the STAY MOTION
 
now pending before that panel.
 
     Appellant is  now  entirely  confident  that  Appellant,  as
 
Plaintiff in the DCUS case, has every Right under section 1441(b)
 
to remove the instant proceedings into the DCUS, to enforce FOIA,
 
if nothing else, and to do so  without regard  to the citizenship
 
(or residence) of any of the real parties of interest.
 
     The  second   half  of   section  1441(b)   is  particularly
 
noteworthy  for  containing  a  rare  statutory  reference  to  a
 
"citizen of the State [sic] in which such action is brought".  In
 
federal  laws  which  are  replete  with  references  to  federal
 
citizens (i.e. "citizens of the United States"), such a reference
 
is rare indeed.  See definition at 28 U.S.C. 1451(2), however.
 
     It is also clear  that section 1441(e) contemplates cases in
 
which the  DCUS is  empowered  to remove and hear Minnesota state
 
cases  in which there is a federal cause of action over which the
 
DCUS has original jurisdiction,  and to transfer all other causes
 
of action  which properly  belong in a Minnesota state court,  if
 
any.  See 28 U.S.C. 1631:  Transfer to cure want of jurisdiction.
 
     As applied  to the instant cases,  it would  be proper,  for
 
example,  for the DCUS  to transfer  certain judicial remedies to
 
the proper Minnesota state court,  with a recommendation  to stay
 
that  proceeding,   pending  final  judgment  in  the  matter  of
 
compelling discovery  of the credentials  and all other documents
 
which Appellant has properly requested.  See 28 U.S.C. 1631.
 
     In that way,  the  outcome of  the instant  cases could then
 
pivot on  whether,  or not,  the requested credentials existed in
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 39 of 50

the first  instance  and,  if  they  did,  whether  or  not  said
 
credentials should be enforced in equity;  if they did not exist,
 
then a  Minnesota state  court would  then be the proper forum to
 
adjudicate probable  violations  of  applicable  Minnesota  state
 
criminal laws,  e.g. trespass,  extortion, kidnap,  perjury,  and
 
impersonating an officer,  under legal standing expressly granted
 
to "localities"  (e.g. Minnesota state) by the reservations which
 
Congress attached to two international human Rights treaties   --
 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  See 28 U.S.C. 1652.
 
     But,  such a  pivotal  determination  would  necessarily  be
 
required to await FOIA enforcement in the DCUS, in any event,  if
 
not also the other relief for which Appellant petitioned the DCUS
 
(e.g. to  review the apportionment of congressional districts and
 
state voter registration practices).
 
     (F)  The  Downes Doctrine [sic],  established  by a  minimal
          majority of  the Supreme  Court of the United States in
          Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), is obsolete and
          unconstitutional,  for the prescient reasons  stated by
          Justice Harlan  in His  eloquent dissent  in that case.
          The limitations of the U.S. Constitution  extend to the
          farthest reaches  of the  known  Universe,  as  far  as
          United States (federal government) officers, employees,
          and  contract   agents  are   concerned.     The   term
          "exclusive" at 1:8:17 does not mean "unrestricted."
 
     Appellant  expressly claims  the fundamental Right to courts
 
of competent jurisdiction, with presiding judge(s) who qualify by
 
Law.   The prohibition  against taxing  judicial pay  is one such
 
qualification.   See 3:1.  Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920), is
 
now controlling,  notwithstanding the  so-called  16th amendment,
 
because  said   "amendment"  never  repealed  3:1.    Repeals  by
 
implication are  not favored.   See U.S. v. Hicks, [cite omitted]
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 40 of 50

(9th Cir. 1991).  The only reference to "Immunity",  as such,  is
 
found in the Clause which guarantees Privileges and Immunities to
 
Citizens in the several states, like Appellant.  See 4:2:1.
 
     Appellant  argues   that  no   federal  judge  is  presently
 
qualified  to   preside  on   the   instant   cases,   even   for
 
preliminaries, whose  pay is  being diminished  by federal income
 
taxes.   See also  Lord v. Kelley,  240  F.Supp. 167, 169 (1965),
 
which admitted undue influence upon federal judges by the IRS.
 
     Evans has never been  overturned  (see Shepard's Citations),
 
notwithstanding  a UCLA Law  Review  article  which  alleges  the
 
contrary:  "The Constitutional  Guaranty  against  Diminution  of
 
Judicial Compensation," Vol. 24, Dec. 1976, p. 308 at 332, n. 94.
 
C.J. William H. Rehnquist  has  argued,  before the University of
 
Arizona Law  School in  January of  1997,  that  Evans supra  was
 
overturned  by  O'Malley  v.  Woodrough,  307  U.S.  277  (1939).
 
Appellant disputes the main holding in O'Malley supra,  for being
 
predicated upon the following two false and rebuttable premises:
 
     (1)  there is only one class of citizens (there are 2); and,
 
     (2)  all federal judges are citizens of either class (but no
          federal law requires judges to be citizens at all).
 
     The authority  in  Evans supra is particularly poignant.  It
 
is apparent  to Appellant,  because of exhaustive research  which
 
His Counselor has shared with Him, that all sitting U.S. District
 
Judges are  appointed to serve in  either an Article I,  or in an
 
Article IV,  capacity at  the present  time.  In either capacity,
 
said judges do not enjoy the explicit prohibition at 3:1, to wit:
 
     The Judges,  both of the supreme and inferior Courts,  shall
     hold  their Offices  during good Behaviour,  and  shall,  at
     stated Times,  receive  for their Services,  a Compensation,
     which  shall not be diminished  during  their Continuance in
     Office.
                         [Article III, Section 1, emphasis added]
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 41 of 50

     Appellant argues that the major reason why federal judges do
 
not now enjoy the explicit prohibition at 3:1  is the doctrine of
 
territorial heterogeneity.  Confer in The Federal Zone:  Cracking
 
the Code of Internal Revenue,  electronic  Seventh Ed.;  see also
 
U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995):
 
     Each of these  [schools]  now has  an invisible federal zone
     [sic] extending  1,000 feet  beyond  the  (often  irregular)
     boundaries of the school property.
                                                 [emphasis added]
 
Here, the U.S. Supreme Court utilized this term as a common noun,
 
without any  citations or  footnotes.   As a consequence of Lopez
 
supra, the term "federal zone" now has a  permanent  place in the
 
history of  American constitutional jurisprudence.   The doctrine
 
of territorial heterogeneity,  as such,  is summarized as follows
 
in the Conclusions of the book The Federal Zone, to wit:
 
     In exercising its exclusive authority over the federal zone,
     Congress  is   not  subject   to  the   same  constitutional
     limitations  that  exist inside  the 50  States.    For this
     reason, the  areas that  are inside  and outside the federal
     zone are  heterogeneous with  respect to  each other.   This
     difference   results   in   a   principle   of   territorial
     heterogeneity:   the  areas  within  the  federal  zone  are
     subject to one set of rules;  the areas without (or outside)
     the federal  zone are  subject to  a different set of rules.
     The Constitution  rules outside  the zone  and inside the 50
     States.   The Congress rules inside the zone and outside the
     50 States.   The  50 States  are, therefore,  in one general
     class,  because  all constitutional restraints upon Congress
     are in force throughout the 50 States,  without prejudice to
     any one  State.   The areas within the federal zone are in a
     different general class,  because  these same constitutional
     restraints simply do not limit Congress inside that zone.
 
      [The Federal Zone, electronic Seventh Edition, Conclusions]
 
     In  the  pivotal  case  of Downes v. Bidwell,  182  U.S. 244
 
(1901) (discussed supra at Page 26 et seq.  and at several places
 
in the book),  the  U.S. Supreme  Court  established  a  doctrine
 
whereby the Constitution of the United States,  as such, does not
 
extend  beyond the limits  of the states  which are united by and
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 42 of 50

under it.   This  doctrine of  territorial heterogeneity  is  now
 
commonly identified as the "Downes Doctrine" [sic].
 
     This doctrine has been reinforced by subsequent decisions of
 
the U.S. Supreme Court,  notably, the case of Hooven & Allison v.
 
Evatt, 324  U.S. 652 (1945),  in which  the high Court ruled that
 
the guarantees  of the  U.S. Constitution  extend to  the federal
 
zone only as Congress has made those guarantees applicable.
 
     The one basis remaining for taxing the pay of federal judges
 
is the Downes Doctrine,  which cannot be extended  into the state
 
zone, nor to the judges who preside on federal courts established
 
for the state zone.  See 3:1;  Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
 
     The  Downes   Doctrine  is  obsolete  and  unconstitutional.
 
Harlan was  correct in  his eloquent dissent;  the limitations of
 
the U.S. Constitution extend to the farthest reaches of the known
 
Universe,  as far as United States (federal government) officers,
 
employees, and contract agents are concerned.
 
     The Downes Doctrine has also permitted a serious tear to rip
 
the entire  fabric of  the Republic.   See  Lopez supra,  Kennedy
 
concurring.  This rip is manifest in the controversy now swirling
 
about the proper distinction between the USDC and the DCUS, their
 
respective subject matter(s) and territorial jurisdiction(s).
 
     The Downes Doctrine was attacked  properly  In re Grand Jury
 
Subpoena Served on New Life Health Center Company supra, but U.S.
 
District Judge John M. Roll  exceeded his discretion in that case
 
by failing  to  rule  on  numerous  proper  and  timely  motions,
 
including  a formal challenge  to the  constitutionality  of  the
 
Downes Doctrine.   Appellant  now brings the same challenge here.
 
The term "exclusive" at 1:8:17 does not mean "unrestricted".
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 43 of 50

     (G)  The  Internal  Revenue  Code  ("IRC")  as  a  whole  is
          unconstitutional and  void  for  exhibiting  deliberate
          vagueness with  respect to its territorial application.
          IRC 7851(a)(6)(A) is likewise  void for vagueness,  for
          exhibiting a recursive self-reference,  and for leaving
          doubt as  to the  meaning of the term "this title" with
          respect to the legal force and effect of all provisions
          within subtitle F:  Procedure  and  Administration,  of
          Title 26, U.S.C., notably sections 7206, 7401, and 7402
          in chief.   Such  doubt should  be resolved in favor of
          those upon  whom the  tax is  sought to  be laid.   See
          Nature and Cause Clause in the Sixth Amendment.
 
     Appellees allege original jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C.
 
sections 7401 and 7402 [sic].  Title 26, U.S.C., and the Internal
 
Revenue Code  ("IRC") are not one and the same,  because Title 26
 
as such has never been enacted into positive law.   See pertinent
 
rules for  prima facie  and conclusive  evidence of  the law,  as
 
defined in  Title 1,  U.S.C.   Both sections  7401 and  7402 fall
 
within subtitle F,  which contains all the enforcement mechanisms
 
of the  IRC.   As such,  said sections  have never  taken effect,
 
because IRC 7851(a)(6)(A) is controlling, to wit:
 
     General rule.   The  provisions  of  subtitle F  shall  take
     effect on  the day after the date of enactment of this title
     [sic] ....
                                                 [emphasis added]
 
     To make matters worse,  IRC 7851(a)(6)(A)  also falls within
 
subtitle F,  raising the  specter of  vagueness for  exhibiting a
 
recursive self-reference.  It takes effect when it takes effect!
 
     Appellant enjoys and hereby asserts His fundamental Right to
 
clear and  unambiguous laws.   See "Void for Vagueness" doctrine;
 
Cruikshank supra.  U.S. v. De Cadena, 105 F.Supp. 202, 204 (1952)
 
lists  a number of excellent authorities  for the origin  of this
 
doctrine (see Lanzetta v.  New Jersey,  306 U.S. 451 (1939))  and
 
for its development  (see  Screws v.  United States,  325 U.S. 91
 
(1945),  Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, and Jordan v. De
 
George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951)).  Connally infra sets the rule:
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 44 of 50

     And  a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of
     an act  in terms  so vague  that men  of common intelligence
     must necessarily  guess at  its meaning and differ as to its
     application,  violates the first essential of due process of
     law.
                    [Connally et al. v. General Construction Co.]
                        [269 U.S 385, 391 (1926), emphasis added]
 
     Appellant reminds  this honorable  Court of  the  discussion
 
supra concerning the term  "this title"  at 28 U.S.C. 1867(d) and
 
in the  Historical and Statutory Notes  after 28 U.S.C. 132  (see
 
Page 30  et seq.).   There is no question but that the consistent
 
legislative practice is  to use the term "this title" to refer to
 
Titles of the United States Codes (whether enacted or not).
 
     The average  American cannot  be expected  to have the skill
 
required to  navigate the journey We just took through the verbal
 
swamps in Titles 26 and 28, U.S.C., nor does the average American
 
have  the time  and motivation  required to make  such a journey.
 
Chicanery  does  not make  good law.    The  rules  of  statutory
 
construction fully support this unavoidable conclusion:
 
     ... [I]f  it is  intended  that regulations  will  be  of  a
     specific  and  definitive nature  then it will be clear that
     the only  safe method  of interpretation  will be  one  that
     "shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to
     suppress subtle  inventions and evasions for the continuance
     of the mischief ...."
 
       [Statutes and Statutory Construction, by J. G. Sutherland]
           [3rd Edition, Volume 2, Section 4007, page 280 (1943)]
 
The  Supreme Court  has  also agreed,  in no uncertain terms,  in
 
Cruikshank supra  (a seminal authority in at least two respects),
 
and as follows:
 
     In the  interpretation of  statutes levying  taxes it is the
     established  rule   not   to  extend  their  provisions,  by
     implication,  beyond the clear import  of the language used,
     or to  enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not
     specifically pointed  out.    In  case  of  doubt  they  are
     construed most strongly against the Government, and in favor
     of the citizen.
                     [United States v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story 369]
                                                 [emphasis added]
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 45 of 50

     ... [K]eeping  in mind  the  well  settled  rule,  that  the
     citizen is exempt from taxation,  unless the same is imposed
     by clear  and  unequivocal  language,  and  that  where  the
     construction of  a tax  law is doubtful,  the doubt is to be
     resolved in favor of those upon whom the tax is sought to be
     laid ....
                         [Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McLain]
                     [192 U.S. 397 at 416 (1904), emphasis added]
 
     On what basis,  then, should the Internal Revenue Service be
 
allowed to  extend the  provisions of  the IRC  beyond the  clear
 
import of the language used?  On what basis can the IRS act, when
 
that language  has no  clear import?   On  what basis  is the IRS
 
justified in  enlarging their operations so as to embrace matters
 
not specifically  pointed out?   The  answer  is  tyranny.    The
 
"golden" retriever has broken his leash and is now tearing up the
 
neighborhood -- to fetch the gold.  What a service!
 
     Consider  for a moment the sheer size of the class of People
 
now  affected  by the fraudulent  16th amendment.   First of all,
 
take into  account all those Americans who have passed away,  but
 
paid taxes  into the Treasury  after  1913.   How many  of  those
 
correctly understood  all the  rules,  when People  like Frank R.
 
Brushaber were confused as early as 1914?  Add to that number all
 
those Americans  who are  still alive today,  and  who have  paid
 
taxes to  the IRS because they thought there was a law,  and they
 
thought  that law  was the 16th amendment.  After all,  they were
 
told  as much  by numerous federal officials,  and  possibly also
 
their  parents,   friends,  relatives,   school  teachers,  scout
 
masters, colleagues,  and news anchors.  Don't high school civics
 
classes now spend a lot of time teaching students how to complete
 
IRS forms and schedules, instead of teaching the Constitution?
 
     Donald C.  Alexander,  when he was  Commissioner of Internal
 
Revenue,  published an official statement in the Federal Register
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 46 of 50

that the  16th amendment  was the  federal  government's  general
 
authority to  tax the  incomes of  individuals and  corporations.
 
See Chapter 1 and Appendix J in The Federal Zone.  Sorry, Donald,
 
you were  wrong.  At this point in time,  it is impossible for Us
 
to determine  whether you  were lying,  or whether you too were a
 
victim  of the fraud.   Just  how many People  are  in  the  same
 
general class of those affected by the fraudulent 16th amendment?
 
Is it 200 million?   Is it 300 million?  Whatever it is,  it just
 
boggles the  imagination.   It certainly does involve also a very
 
large number  of federal employees who went to work for Uncle Sam
 
in good faith.  The tax is voluntary!  Ask Senator Barbara Boxer.
 
     It is clear,  there is  a  huge  difference between the area
 
covered by the federal  zone,  and  the area  covered by  the  50
 
states.   Money is a powerful motivation for all of us.  Congress
 
had literally  trillions of  dollars  to gain  by convincing most
 
Americans they were inside its revenue base  when,  in fact, most
 
Americans were outside its revenue base,  and remain outside even
 
today.  This is deception on a grand scale, and the proof of this
 
deception is  found in  the Code  itself.   It is  no wonder  why
 
public relations  "officials" of  the IRS  cringe  in  fear  when
 
dedicated Americans admit, out loud and in Person, that They have
 
read the  law.  It is  quite stunning  how  the carefully crafted
 
definitions of "United States" do appear to unlock a Code that is
 
horribly complex and  deliberately  so.   As fate  would have it,
 
these carefully  crafted  definitions  also  expose  perhaps  the
 
greatest fiscal  fraud that  has ever  been perpetrated  upon any
 
People  at any time  in the history of the world.  It is now time
 
for a shift in the wind.  Amen.
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 47 of 50

                   (5)  Statement of the Case
 
     Appellant,  a Citizen of Minnesota state and expressly not a
 
federal citizen,  was indicted by a federal grand jury of federal
 
citizens  on two counts  of filing  a false  federal  income  tax
 
return, alleging violations of 26 U.S.C. 7206(1).
 
     Prior to trial,  Appellant  filed a proper and timely MOTION
 
TO STAY PROCEEDINGS, with the requisite verified statement.  This
 
MOTION was denied.  Appellant was then convicted on both counts.
 
     Appellant then appealed to the 8th Circuit,  but that appeal
 
was denied for lack of jurisdiction.
 
     Appellant then retained new Counsel,  who assisted Appellant
 
in submitting  requests under the Freedom of Information ("FOIA")
 
for the requisite credentials of government actors, and for other
 
relevant evidentiary documents, to confirm requisite authorities.
 
     Appellant also submitted a FINAL NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR PROOF
 
OF POWER,  STANDING, AND  JURISDICTION, IN  THE  PARTICULARS,  to
 
which  all  government  actors  fell  silent.    At that  moment,
 
Appellant testified to their default,  petitioned the DCUS  for a
 
warrant of removal by a 3-judge panel,  and sued these government
 
actors under the FOIA for their failure to exhibit credentials.
 
     Appellant also requested the DCUS  to adjudicate Appellant's
 
formal challenges to the voter registration practices, and to the
 
apportionment of congressional districts, within Minnesota state.
 
     Appellant was sentenced and incarcerated, despite government
 
attempts to bring the FOIA suit to the attention of the presiding
 
judge, who had already been named as a Respondent in that suit!
 
     Jurisdiction  of these two cases  was transferred  from  the
 
district courts  to this  honorable U.S. Court of Appeals,  which
 
now proceeds with full appellate review of all proceedings below.
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 48 of 50

                    (6)  Summary of Argument
 
     The USDC erred  by denying both a motion to stay proceedings
 
and  a motion  to reconsider same.   Appellant's challenge to the
 
Jury Selection and Service Act  had  serious implications for the
 
legality  of the indicting  grand jury,  and the convicting petit
 
jury.  This challenge deserved final review before trial.
 
     Appellant was  also  correct to request  credentials of  all
 
government actors  who  touched  the Criminal Case,  under  FOIA.
 
Their total silence gave Appellant probable cause to presume that
 
the  requisite  credentials did  not  exist,  and  to remove  the
 
proceedings into  the DCUS,  in order  to  compel  production  of
 
documents improperly  withheld,  and to enjoin the withholding of
 
documents properly requested.  See 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B);  6:3.
 
     Mr. Rosenbaum  also  committed  two serious errors:  (1)  by
 
alleging to preside over sentencing,  and (2) by alleging to deny
 
Appellant's  MOTION FOR RELEASE PENDING APPEAL,  when an obvious,
 
adverse conflict of interest existed, violating 28 U.S.C. 455.
 
     Appellant's civil  case in  the DCUS  should be  allowed  to
 
proceed,  to obtain  pivotal declaratory relief  from a competent
 
and qualified federal petit jury,  concerning several substantive
 
questions of law and fact which arose in the record below.
 
     A three-judge  federal panel  presiding over the DCUS should
 
be convened,  enjoined  from issuing summary remands of the cases
 
back to the USDC, and mandated to proceed to trial on the merits.
 
     All  of Appellant's constitutional challenges should also be
 
decided  finally  by this  honorable Court,  or  the U.S. Supreme
 
Court,  before  any further proceedings occur in either the USDC,
 
or the DCUS, due to their obvious impact on matters to be decided
 
in those two forums.
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 49 of 50

                      (7)  Proof of Service
 
I,  Everett C.  Gilbertson,  Sui  Juris,  hereby  certify,  under
 
penalty of  perjury, under  the laws  of  the  United  States  of
 
America, without the "United States," that I am at least 18 years
 
of age, a Citizen  of  one of  the United States of America,  and
 
that I personally served the following document(s):
 
                    APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
 
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first
 
class U.S. Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to:
 
Attorney General                   James M. Rosenbaum
Department of Justice              United States District Court
10th & Constitution, N.W.          110 South Fourth Street
Washington [zip code exempt]       Minneapolis [zip code exempt]
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA               MINNESOTA STATE
 
Solicitor General                  Henry Shea
Department of Justice              United States Attorneys
10th & Constitution, N.W.          110 South Fourth Street
Washington [zip code exempt]       Minneapolis [zip code exempt]
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA               MINNESOTA STATE
 
Courtesy copies to:
 
William H. Rehnquist, C.J.         Clarence Thomas, J.
U.S. Supreme Court                 U.S. Supreme Court
One First Street N.E.              One First Street N.E.
Washington [zip code exempt]       Washington [zip code exempt]
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA               DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
 
Paul Andrew Mitchell               Alex Kozinski (supervising)
Counselor at Law, federal witness  Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
c/o 2509 N. Campbell Ave., #1776   125 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 200
Tucson [zip code exempt]           Pasadena [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA STATE                      CALIFORNIA STATE
 
[See USPS Publication 221 for addressing instructions.]
 
 
Dated:  __________________________________
 
/s/ Everett C. Gilbertson
__________________________________________
Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris
Citizen of Minnesota state, federal witness
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)
 
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
 
 
               Appellant’s Opening Brief:  Page 50 of 50

 

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U.S.A. v. Gilbertson, 8th Circuit