Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris
c/o General Delivery
Battle Lake [zip code exempt]
MINNESOTA STATE
In Propria Persona
Under Protest and
by Special Visitation
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic], ) Case No. 97-2099-MNST
Plaintiff [sic]/ )
Appellees, ) USDC Minneapolis #CR-4-96-65
v. )
)
EVERETT C. GILBERTSON [sic], )
Defendant [sic]/ )
Appellant. )
________________________________)
)
Everett C. Gilbertson, ) DCUS Minneapolis #4-96-65
Plaintiff/Appellant, )
v. ) NOTICE OF MOTION,
) MOTION FOR DISCRETIONARY
United States, ) JUDICIAL NOTICE, AND
James M. Rosenbaum, ) APPLICATION FOR LEAVE
and Does 2-99, ) TO FILE ENLARGED BRIEF:
Respondents. ) FRAP Local Rule 28A(e),(j);
) Rule 201(c), Federal Rules
________________________________) of Evidence
COMES NOW Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris, Citizen of Minnesota
state, expressly not a citizen of the United States ("federal
citizen"), and Appellant in the above entitled matter
(hereinafter "Appellant"), to provide formal Notice to all
interested party(s), to move this honorable Court for
discretionary judicial notice, pursuant to Rule 201(c) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and to apply for leave to file an
enlarged REPLY BRIEF, pursuant to Local Rules 28A(e) and (j) of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ("FRAP").
Requests for Judicial Notice/Leave to File Enlarged Brief:
Page 1 of 6
Appellant respectfully requests judicial notice by this
honorable Court of the pleading entitled DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
AND DEMAND TO STAY PROCEEDINGS PENDING FINAL REVIEW OF FORMAL
CHALLENGE TO JUROR AND VOTER REGISTRANT QUALIFICATIONS, as filed
July 8, 1997, in Mitchell v. Nordbrock, Pima County Consolidated
Justice Court, Tucson, Arizona, case number #CV-97-3438. Said
pleading (hereinafter "Arizona Pleading") is attached hereto and
incorporated by reference, as if set forth fully herein. Arizona
state is in the Ninth Circuit.
The two exhibits attached to the Arizona Pleading are nearly
identical in form, and substance, to the corresponding MOTION TO
STAY PROCEEDINGS and the VERIFIED STATEMENT, as previously filed
by Appellant, more than once, in the trial court below.
The Complaint of Judicial Misconduct which follows the
VERIFIED STATEMENT infra was filed by Paul Andrew Mitchell,
Counselor at Law, against U.S. District Judge William D.
Browning, who presided over the trial of Sheila T. Wallen in
U.S.A. v. Wallen, USDC, Arizona, case number #95-484-WDB.
Appellant requests discretionary judicial notice of said
Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, in part to demonstrate the
consistent lack of professionalism which the federal judiciary
has exhibited, when presented with the uncontested facts and laws
previously documented, under penalty of perjury and outside the
United States, in Appellant's MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS and
requisite VERIFIED STATEMENT. See 28 U.S.C. 1746(1) in chief.
Appellant hereby directs the attention of this honorable
Court to the following key points of law which are elaborated in
some detail in the Arizona Pleading, to wit:
Requests for Judicial Notice/Leave to File Enlarged Brief:
Page 2 of 6
(1) The "Right of Election" is established and recognized
by the Maine Supreme Court, Appleton concurring at 44
Maine 528-529 (1859). The Maine Legislature had
requested that court's judicial opinion, in response to
the holding in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393
(1856).
(2) The existence of two (2) classes of citizenship under
American law, never repealed, is also recognized by
numerous authorities infra, both state and federal.
(3) The proper construction and common understanding of the
Qualifications Clauses are also explored thoroughly,
with pertinent citations dating back to the California
Constitution of 1849, and subsequently in People v. De
La Guerra, 40 Cal. 311, 337 (1870) infra.
(4) The cases recognize that one may be a citizen of the
United States ("federal citizen") without also being a Citizen of any particular Union state. See e.g. Hough
v. Societe Electrique Westinghouse de Russie, 231 F.
341, (USDC, NY, 1916).
(5) The cases also recognize that Americans may be Citizens
of a Union state without also being federal citizens.
See McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320 (1883); Crosse v.
Board of Supervisors of Elections, 221 A.2d 431 (1966);
11 C.J., Section 3, page 777 and cases cited therein
(Harding, McDonel, Fowler).
(6) The cases also recognize that, both before and after
the so-called Fourteenth amendment [sic], it has not
been necessary for one to be a federal citizen in order
to be a Citizen of a Union state.
(7) The failure to capitalize the "C" in "Citizen", as that
term is used in the Qualifications Clauses, has created
an immense, nearly immeasurable, amount of confusion
among references to state and federal citizenship in
all federal and state laws which utilize the phrase
"citizen of the United States" [sic].
(8) It is also clear that this confusion was intentional,
in order to co-opt the American People into associating
with a political jurisdiction which is not protected by
the Guarantee Clause. The United States (federal
government) is not required to guarantee a Republican
Form of Government to the federal zone, only to the
state zone [sic]. See Guarantee Clause.
(9) Congress cannot by legislation alter the Constitution,
from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and
within whose limitations alone that power can be
lawfully exercised. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S.
189 (1919) (holding predicated on ratification of the
16th amendment [sic] as applied to the term "income").
Requests for Judicial Notice/Leave to File Enlarged Brief:
Page 3 of 6
(10) The Qualifications Clauses have never been amended,
despite recent efforts to impose limits on the terms of
federal Representatives and/or Senators. Appellant
agrees that limits upon the terms of federal lawmakers
would require an amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S.Ct. 1842,
131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995).
(11) It is a cardinal rule in dealing with written
instruments that they are to receive an unvarying
interpretation, and that their practical construction
is to be uniform. See Cory et al. v. Carter, 48 Ind.
327, 335 (1874); Qualifications Clauses, 3:2:1, 4:2:1.
(12) Citizenship is a term of municipal law. Prior to the
1866 Civil Rights Act, which legislated federal
citizenship into existence as a municipal franchise,
one and only one class of citizenship was recognized by
the U.S. Constitution. Thus, prior to 1866, all
constitutional references to "Citizen of the United
States" and "citizen of the United States" were
identical in all respects. See Roa v. Collector of
Customs, 23 Philippine 315, 332 (1912); Murphy v.
Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885); People v. De La Guerra, 40
Cal. 311, 342 (1870) infra.
REMEDY REQUESTED
Appellant respectfully requests this honorable Court to take
formal judicial Notice of all authorities cited herein, pursuant
to Rule 201(c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and to grant
Appellant leave to file an enlarged REPLY BRIEF, pursuant to FRAP
Local Rules 28A(e) and (j). Appellant also requests leave to
incorporate the instant application into Appellant's REPLY BRIEF,
now in preparation, as if set forth fully therein.
VERIFICATION
I, Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty
of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America,
without the "United States", that the above statement of facts is
true and correct, to the best of My current information,
knowledge, and belief, so help Me God, per 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).
Requests for Judicial Notice/Leave to File Enlarged Brief:
Page 4 of 6
Dated: ______________________________
Respectfully submitted,
______________________________________________
Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris
Citizen of Minnesota state, federal witness
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
Requests for Judicial Notice/Leave to File Enlarged Brief:
Page 5 of 6
PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under
penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of
America, without the "United States," that I am at least 18 years
of age, a Citizen of one of the United States of America, and
that I personally served the following document(s):
NOTICE OF MOTION, MOTION FOR DISCRETIONARY JUDICIAL NOTICE,
AND APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE ENLARGED BRIEF:
FRAP Local Rules 28A(e), (j);
Rule 201(c), Federal Rules of Evidence
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first
class U.S. Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to:
Attorney General James M. Rosenbaum
Department of Justice United States District Court
10th & Constitution, N.W. 110 South Fourth Street
Washington [zip code exempt] Minneapolis [zip code exempt]
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MINNESOTA STATE
Solicitor General Henry Shea
Department of Justice United States Attorneys
10th & Constitution, N.W. 110 South Fourth Street
Washington [zip code exempt] Minneapolis [zip code exempt]
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MINNESOTA STATE
Courtesy copies to:
William H. Rehnquist, C.J. Clarence Thomas, J.
U.S. Supreme Court U.S. Supreme Court
One First Street N.E. One First Street N.E.
Washington [zip code exempt] Washington [zip code exempt]
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Paul Andrew Mitchell Alex Kozinski (supervising)
Counselor at Law, federal witness Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
c/o 2509 N. Campbell Ave., #1776 125 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 200
Tucson [zip code exempt] Pasadena [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA STATE CALIFORNIA STATE
[See USPS Publication 221 for addressing instructions.]
Dated: ______________________________________
______________________________________________
Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris
Citizen of Minnesota state, federal witness
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)
Requests for Judicial Notice/Leave to File Enlarged Brief:
Page 6 of 6
Attachment "A":
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL AND
DEMAND FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS
PENDING FINAL REVIEW OF FORMAL CHALLENGE
TO JUROR AND VOTER REGISTRANT QUALIFICATIONS:
ARS 21-201, ARS 16-101; Guarantee Clause
Mitchell v. Nordbrock
Pima County Consolidated Justice Court
Pima County, Arizona state
Case Number #CV-97-3438
Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris
Citizen of Arizona state
c/o General Delivery at:
2509 North Campbell Avenue
Tucson, Arizona state
In Propria Persona
All Rights Reserved
Without Prejudice
PIMA COUNTY CONSOLIDATED JUSTICE COURT
Paul Andrew Mitchell, ) Case Number #CV-97-3438
Plaintiff, )
) DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL AND
v. ) DEMAND TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
) PENDING FINAL REVIEW OF FORMAL
Neil and Evelyn Nordbrock, ) CHALLENGE TO JUROR AND VOTER
Lawrence E. Condit, ) REGISTRANT QUALIFICATIONS:
W. U. Weber, and )
Does 1 to 100, ) ARS 21-201, ARS 16-101;
Defendants. ) Guarantee Clause
________________________________)
COMES NOW Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, Citizen of Arizona
state, expressly not a citizen of the United States ("federal
citizen") and Plaintiff in the above entitled matter (hereinafter
"Plaintiff"), to demand a trial by jury in the instant case, and
also to demand an indefinite stay of proceedings, pending final
review of Plaintiff's formal challenge to the constitutionality
of Arizona Revised Statutes 16-101 and 21-201, for violating the
Guarantee Clause in the Constitution for the United States of
America, as lawfully amended, and to provide formal Notice of
same to all interested party(s). Pursuant to the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, and Rule 201(d) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence,
Plaintiff incorporates by reference the following documents, as
if set forth fully herein, and demands mandatory judicial notice
of the following related cases, to wit:
Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
Page 1 of 16
(1) MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH
GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY, AND NOTICE OF CHALLENGE
AND CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE,
executed, served and filed in U.S.A. [sic] v. Wallen,
United States District Court, District of Arizona,
Tucson, case number #95-484-WDB. Said MOTION is
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated by
reference as if set forth fully.
(2) VERIFIED STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE TO GRAND
JURY SELECTION POLICY AND ITS FEDERAL STATUTE,
executed, served and filed in U.S.A. [sic] v. Wallen,
United States District Court, District of Arizona,
Tucson, case number #95-484-WDB. Said STATEMENT is
attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated by
reference as if set forth fully.
(3) OPENING BRIEF in U.S.A. v. Gilbertson and Gilbertson v.
U.S. et al., filed on June 18, 1997, United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, case number
#97-2099-MNST, containing a formal challenge to the
federal Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. 1861
et seq., for exhibiting prohibited discrimination
against the class of People known as Citizens of the
United States of America, also known as state Citizens,
who are not also citizens of the United States, also
known as federal citizens, by Right of Election.
Confer at "Federal citizenship" in Black's supra.
(4) MOTION TO STAY MANDATE AND PROCEEDINGS, PENDING
DISCOVERY OF DOCUMENTS REQUESTED UNDER THE FOIA, AND
FINAL RESOLUTION OF CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE JURY SELECTION AND SERVICE ACT in U.S.A. v. Pixley,
filed on June 25, 1997, United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, case number #96-1476,
containing a formal challenge to the federal Jury
Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. 1861 et seq., for
exhibiting prohibited discrimination against the class
of People known as Citizens of the United States of
America, also known as state Citizens, who are not also
citizens of the United States, also known as federal
citizens, by Right of Election.
Pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and Rule
201(d) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence, Plaintiff demands
mandatory judicial notice, and provides formal Notice to all
interested party(s), of the following authorities and analysis
which prove that there is, in American Law never repealed, a
Right of Election whereby American Citizens are entitled to
choose between state Citizenship and/or federal citizenship.
Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
Page 2 of 16
Additional Citations Establishing a Right of Election
That the general principle of such a right of electing, to
remain under the old or to contract a new allegiance, was
recognized, is apparent from the case of Com. v. Chapman, 1
Dal., 53, and other cases cited. Those who adhered to the
new government and transferred their allegiance thereto,
became citizens of the same. All who were free, had this
right of election, else they were not free. No particular
color nor descent was required to confer this right of
election. It resulted from freedom, and the necessity
resting upon all to make an election. When it was made, and
the individual determined to adhere to the new state, he was
necessarily a member and a citizen of the same. He
sustained the same relation to the new government by choice,
which he had sustained to the old by birth.
[44 Maine 528-529 (1859), Appleton concurring]
[emphasis and underlines added]
Mr. Kelley [of North Carolina] ... "contended for the broad
principle that all men are entitled to equal rights and
privileges; that nothing but arbitrary power can forbid
their free exercise, and that it is contrary to all the
principles of free government to tax a man and refuse him a
right to vote for a member to the legislature." Debates on
the Constitution of North Carolina in 1835, 357.
[44 Maine 533 (1859), Appleton concurring]
[emphasis and underlines added]
Slavery is therefore regarded as a condition imposed upon
the individual by the municipal law.
[44 Maine 525 (1859), Appleton concurring]
[emphasis added]
... [F]or it is certain, that in the sense in which the word
"citizen" is used in the federal constitution, "citizen of
each state," and "citizen of the United States," are
convertible terms; they mean the same thing; for "the
citizens of each state are entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states," and "citizens
of the United States" are, of course, citizens of all the
United States.
[44 Maine 518 (1859), Hathaway dissenting]
[italics in original, underlines added]
The following additional citations prove the existence of two
classes of citizenship:
It does not by any means follow, because he has all the
rights and privileges of a citizen of a state, that he must
be a citizen of the United States.
[Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 405 (1856)]
Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
Page 3 of 16
Under our complex system of government there may be a
citizen of a state who is not a citizen of the United States
in the full sense of the term. This result would seem to
follow unavoidably from the nature of the two systems of
government.
[In Re Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 443 (1863)]
This distinction between citizenship of the state and of the
United States is also very clearly implied in several
provisions both of the constitution and laws of this state.
There, wherever the full right of citizenship of the United
States is intended, it is so expressed, as in respect to the
office of governor, lieutenant governor or judge, it is
provided that no person shall be eligible who is not a
"citizen of the United States." This form of expression
would never have been used if it had been supposed that no
person could be a citizen of the state without being also a
citizen of the United States. In that case, the word
"citizen" alone would have been used.
[In Re Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 443 at 474 (1863)]
... [T]herefore, the militia law drops the language which is
used when a full citizenship of the United States is
intended, and provides that all able bodied "citizens" shall
be liable to military duty. This change of phraseology was
not accidental or unmeaning, but was entirely based upon the
well understood distinction between a citizen of the state
merely, and a citizen of the United States.
[In Re Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 443, 478 (1863)]
The first clause of the fourteenth amendment made negroes
citizens of the United States, and citizens of the State in
which they reside, and thereby created two classes of
citizens, one of the United States and the other of the
state.
[Cory et al. v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 (1874)]
[headnote 8, emphasis added]
Judge Cooley, in his great work on Constitutional
Limitations, on page 54, says: "A cardinal rule in dealing
with written instruments is that they are to receive an
unvarying interpretation, and that their practical
construction is to be uniform."
[Cory et al. v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 335 (1874)]
Is a voter under the constitution of the State of Indiana,
though not a citizen of the United States, eligible to hold
the office of township trustee? ... The constitution [of
Indiana], and its fair interpretation, therefore, conduct us
to the conclusion that the contestee was eligible to the
office of township trustee, and that he is entitled to hold
it, and exercise its functions.
[McCarthy v. Froelke, 63 Ind. 507, 509-511 (1878)]
Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
Page 4 of 16
One may be a citizen of a State and yet not a citizen of the
United States. Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 449; Cory v.
Carter, 48 Ind. 327 (17 Am. R. 738); McCarthy v. Froelke,
63 Ind. 507; In Re Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 443.
[McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320, 323 (1883)]
[underlines added]
For it would seem incompatible with the spirit of our laws
to exclude one from the jury box who was eligible to act as
jury commissioner in selecting jurors; or as sheriff in
empanneling a jury; or as judge to preside at the trial.
[McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320, 324 (1883)]
One may be a citizen of a state, and yet not a citizen of
the United States -- McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320.
[4 Dec. Dig. '06 -- Page 1197 (1906), "Citizens", Sec. 11]
[underlines added]
The first clause of the fourteenth amendment of the federal
Constitution made negroes citizens of the United States, and
citizens of the state in which they reside, and thereby
created two classes of citizens, one of the United States
and the other of the state -- Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327,
17 Am. Rep. 738.
[4 Dec. Dig. '06 -- Page 1197 (1906), "Citizens", Sec. 11]
[emphasis and underlines added]
... Rights and privileges of a citizen of the state or of
the United States.
[Harding v. Standard Oil Company]
[182 F. 421 (USCC, Ill. 1910)]
One may be a citizen of the United States, and yet not a
citizen of any state.
[Hough v. Societe Electrique Westinghouse de Russie]
[231 F. 341 (USDC, NY, 1916)]
The following letter to Mr. Ray Feyereisen also contains a
wealth of additional citations, which not only establish the
existence of two classes of citizenship, but they also establish
that an American may be a state Citizen without also being a
federal citizen, by Right of Election. The letter to Mr.
Feyereisen now follows, to wit:
Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
Page 5 of 16
c/o General Delivery
San Rafael [zip code exempt]
California state
September 10, 1993
Ray Feyereisen
c/o General Delivery
Houston, Texas Republic
Postal Code 77253/tdc
Dear Ray:
I did some more research today, to explore some of the cases
which support the position that one can be a State Citizen
without necessarily being a citizen of the United States. You
already knew about Crosse; here are the relevant paragraphs:
Both before and after the Fourteenth Amendment to the
federal Constitution, it has not been necessary for a person
to be a citizen of the United States in order to be a
citizen of his state. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542, 549, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1875); Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73-74, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873); and see
Short v. State, 80 Md. 392, 401-402, 31 A. 322 (1895). See
also Spear, State Citizenship, 16 Albany L.J. 24 (1877). ...
[B]ut we find nothing in Reum [City of Minneapolis v. Reum,
56 F. 576, 581 (8th Cir. 1893)] or any other case which
requires that a citizen of a state must also be a citizen of
the United States, if no question of federal rights or
jurisdiction is involved. As the authorities referred to in
the first portion of this opinion evidence, the law is to
the contrary.
[Crosse v. Board of Supervisors of Elections]
[221 A.2d 431 (1966), emphasis and underlines added]
Corpus Juris is another source of authorities which support this
position:
So a person may be a citizen of a particular state and not a
citizen of the United States46 ....
[11 C.J., Sec. 3, p. 777]
Footnote 46 lists the following cases:
Harding v. Standard Oil Co., 182 Fed. 421 (1910)
McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320 (1883)
State v. Fowler, 41 La. Ann. 380, 6 S. 602 (1889)
The reference librarian at the County Law Library and I
searched in vain for McDonel v. State; they're going to put
their special legal beagle on that search. Here's what Harding
said:
Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
Page 6 of 16
In the Constitution and laws of the United States the term
["citizenship"] is generally, if not always, used in a
political sense to designate one who has the rights and
privileges of a citizen of a state or of the United States.
Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 7 Sup. Ct. 656, 30 L.Ed.
766. A person may be a citizen of a state but not of the
United States; as, an alien who has declared his intention
to become a citizen, and who is by local law entitled to
vote in the state of his residence, and there exercise all
other local functions of local citizenship, such as holding
office, right to poor relief, etc., but who is not a citizen
of the United States. Taney, C.J., in Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 19 How. 405, 15 L.Ed. 691; Slaughterhouse Cases,
16 Wall. 74, 21 L.Ed. 394.
[Harding v. Standard Oil Co. et. al., 182 Fed. 421 (1910)]
[emphasis and underlines added]
I really love the pertinent quote from State v. Fowler, which was
decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1889:
A person who is a citizen of the United States is
necessarily a citizen of the particular state in which he
resides. But a person may be a citizen of a particular
state and not a citizen of the United States. To hold
otherwise would be to deny to the state the highest exercise
of its sovereignty, -- the right to declare who are its
citizens. The sovereignty of the citizens of a republic has
its highest assertion in representative government, and is
constituted in its political order in the representation of
persons, and not of classes or of interests.
[State ex rel. Leche v. Fowler, 41 La. Ann. 380]
[6 S. 602 (1889), emphasis added]
The Crosse court cites Short v. State, which came to essentially
the same conclusion in the following long passage:
And then, as to the objection that this local law is
repugnant to that clause in the fourteenth amendment of the
federal constitution which declares that "no state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States," it is
sufficient to say that the interpretation of that clause by
the supreme court in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36,
is a complete answer to this objection. There is a
distinction, says Justice Miller, between citizenship of the
United States and citizenship of a state.
[Short v. State, 80 Md. 392, 401-402, 31 A. 322 (1895)]
[emphasis and underlines added]
The Crosse court cites Short v. State, but I could find in
the latter decision no statements which took the exact position
we are seeking; nevertheless, it does cite the Slaughterhouse
Cases and also Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130. In the Bradwell
case, Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the court, says:
Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
Page 7 of 16
The protection designed by that clause, as has been
repeatedly held, has no application to a citizen of the
state whose laws are complained of.
[emphasis added]
Also, I think I have already mentioned this book, but it's
worth mentioning again. See if you can get your hands on a copy
of A Treatise on Citizenship by Birth and by Naturalization, by
Alexander Porter Morse, Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1881.
Buried near the end of this voluminous treatise is a section
entitled "State Citizenship -- Its Existence". In addition to
the big cases like Dred Scott, Slaughterhouse and Cruikshank, he
mentions the following in his footnotes:
Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C.C. 371
Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591
Donovan v. Pitcher, 53 Ala. 411
Cully v. Baltimore, etc., R.R. Co., 1 Hughes 536
Prentiss v. Brennan, 2 Blatchf. 162
Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. Ct. App. 267
Reilly v. Lamar, 2 Cranch 344
He also writes, "That there is a state citizenship, see Registry
Act of California of 1865-1866, sect. 11." I pulled it; check
it out.
So, you thought you were caught up with all your work, did
you?
Carry on, and peace be with you.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ John E. Trumane
[end of letter to Mr. Feyereisen]
Analysis of California state Constitution
Plaintiff quotes here from the California Constitution of
1849, signed by Judge Pablo De La Guerra, who later identified
the proper construction of the Qualifications Clauses, in his
case as a Respondent in People v. De La Guerra, 40 Cal. 311
(1870). Here is a pertinent paragraph from that California
Constitution of 1849:
Sec. 5. Every citizen of California, declared a legal voter
by this Constitution, and every citizen of the United
States, a resident of this state on the day of election,
shall be entitled to vote at the first general election
under this Constitution, and on the question of the adoption
thereof.
[emphasis added]
Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
Page 8 of 16
At first glance, this section appears to refer to two (2)
separate classes of American citizens: citizens of California,
and citizens of the United States.
However, having reviewed People v. De La Guerra, we now
understand that, prior to the Civil War and its ugly aftermath,
the term "Citizen of the United States", as that term is used in
the Qualifications Clauses, means "Citizen of ONE OF the States
united", that is, Citizen of ONE OF the Union states.
We also have the construction by the California Supreme
Court, soon after that 1849 Constitution was ratified. In 1855,
that Court ruled that there is no such thing as a citizen of the
United States, if the latter term refers to a class of citizens
different from Citizens of ONE OF the States united.
Judge Pablo De La Guerra's profound construction is worthy
of very close scrutiny and study, because it provides a way out
of the confusion and controversy that swirls about this subject,
even now. In light of De La Guerra's pivotal insight, we are
justified in constructing the 1849 California Constitution as
follows:
Every Citizen of California state declared a legal voter by
this Constitution, and every Citizen of ONE OF the other
Union states who is a resident of California state on the
day of election, shall be entitled ....
In other words, in 1849, the lower-case "c" in "citizen"
appears to have been the preferred convention. Nevertheless,
this lower-case "c" did not render that term a legal franchise
which was subject to the municipal authority of Congress, as is
now the case with federal citizenship.
Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
Page 9 of 16
On the contrary, in the year 1855, the California Supreme
Court, in Ex parte Knowles, 5 Cal. 300 (1855), made it very clear
that there was no such thing as a citizen of the United States,
if by that term is meant a second class of citizens, different
from the primary class of state Citizens, i.e. Citizens of ONE OF
the States united.
The 1849 California Constitution is merely trying to
establish who would be entitled to vote in general elections, and
to vote on the question of adopting that Constitution. Those
People would be either Citizens of California state, or Citizens
of ONE OF the other states of the Union, as long as the latter
Citizens were resident in California state on the day of the
election.
This logic appears to explain the apparent anomaly that is
found in Section 5 of the 1849 California Constitution as quoted
above. Despite appearances of two classes of citizens, which
appearances arise from a faulty construction, the proper
construction yields only a single class of state Citizens. This
proper construction conforms to the decisions of the California
Supreme Court in Ex parte Knowles supra and People v. De La
Guerra supra.
Analysis of Arizona state Constitution
Now Plaintiff performs a comparable analysis of a noteworthy
provision in the Constitution of Arizona state.
Under the section entitled "Eligibility to state offices",
we find another passage which also appears to acknowledge two (2)
separate classes of citizenship, but only if a faulty
construction is again placed upon the language. Here's the
pertinent section:
Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
Page 10 of 16
Section 2. No person shall be eligible to any of the
offices mentioned in section 1 of this article except a
person of the age of not less than twenty-five years, who
shall have been for ten years next preceding his election a
citizen of the United States, and for five years next
preceding his election a citizen of Arizona.
Clearly, this section makes a very obvious distinction
between being a citizen of the United States for at least ten
years, and a citizen of Arizona for at least five years. It is
very tempting to conclude from this section that there are two
separate classes of citizenship. However, using the construction
which was so well established by the California Supreme Court in
Ex parte Knowles supra, we are again justified in making the
following proper construction of this section from the Arizona
state Constitution:
No person shall be eligible to any of the offices mentioned
... except a person who shall have been a Citizen of ONE OF
the Union states for at least 10 years, and who shall have
been a Citizen of Arizona state for at least five years.
This construction conforms perfectly to the construction
established in California state, at least by 1855, if not before.
REMEDY DEMANDED
Wherefore, all premises having been duly considered by this
honorable Court, Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by competent
and qualified jury, and also an indefinite stay of the instant
proceedings, pending final review of Plaintiff's formal challenge
to the constitutionality of Arizona Revised Statutes 16-101 and
21-201, and to the corresponding provisions in the Arizona state
Constitution, for violating the Guarantee Clause in the
Constitution for the United States of America, as lawfully
amended.
Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
Page 11 of 16
VERIFICATION
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty
of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America,
without the "United States" (federal government), that the above
statements of fact are true and correct, to the best of My
current information, knowledge, and belief, so help Me God,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1). See Supremacy Clause.
Dated: July 8, 1997
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris
Citizen of Arizona state
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
Page 12 of 16
PROOF OF SERVICE
[redacted for privacy]
Executed on July 8, 1997:
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris
Citizen of Arizona state
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
Page 14 of 16
Exhibit "A":
MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS FOR FAILING TO COMPLY
WITH GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY,
AND NOTICE OF CHALLENGE
AND CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE
U.S.A. [sic] v. Wallen
United States District Court
District of Arizona, Tucson
Case Number #95-484-WDB
Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris
c/o General Delivery
Arivaca [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA STATE
In Propria Persona
Under Protest, Necessity, and
by Special Visitation Only
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Case No. 95-484-WDB
)
Plaintiff, ) NOTICE OF MOTION AND
) MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
v. ) FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH
) GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY,
Sheila Terese, Wallen, ) AND NOTICE OF CHALLENGE AND
) CHALLENGE TO
Defendant. ) CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE
) 28 U.S.C. 297, 517, 518,
) 1861, 1865, and 1867(d),(e),
________________________________) F.R.Cr.P. Rule 6(b)(2)
COMES NOW Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris, Citizen of Arizona
state and Defendant in the above entitled matter (hereinafter
"Defendant"), to Petition this honorable Court for a stay of the
instant proceedings, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
1867(d), pending proper review of the Defendant's challenge to
the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. 1865, to wit:
1865. Qualifications for jury service
(a) The chief judge of the district court, or such other
district court judge as the plan may provide ... shall
determine solely on the basis of information provided
on the juror qualification form and other competent
evidence whether a person is unqualified for, or
exempt, or to be excused from jury service. ...
(b) In making such determination the chief judge of the
district court, or such other district court judge as
the plan may provide, shall deem any person qualified
to serve on grand and petit juries in the district
court unless he --
Motion to Stay Proceedings:
Page 1 of 8
(1) is not a citizen of the United States eighteen
years old who has resided for a period of one
year within the judicial district; ....
[28 U.S.C. 1865, emphasis added]
In stark contrast, it is the policy of the United States
that all citizens shall have the opportunity to be considered
for service on grand juries in the district courts of the United
States. To be constitutional, and to be consistent with its
legislative intent, the term "all citizens", as that term is
used in 28 U.S.C. 1861, must be construed to include also
Citizens of the freely associated compact states who are not
also citizens of the United States (a/k/a "federal citizens"):
1861. Declaration of policy
It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in
Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the
right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a
fair cross section of the community in the district or
division wherein the court convenes. It is further the
policy of the United States that all citizens shall have
the opportunity to be considered for service on grand and
petit juries in the district courts of the United States,
and shall have an obligation to serve as jurors when
summoned for that purpose.
[28 U.S.C. 1861, emphasis added]
Defendant hereby provides notice to all interested parties
of Her sworn (verified) statement of law and facts which
constitute a substantial failure to comply with the Constitution
for the United States of America, as lawfully amended
(hereinafter "U.S. Constitution"), and with the provisions of
Title 28, United States Code, Section 1861: Declaration of
Policy. See 28 U.S.C. 1867(d) and (e). The indicting Grand
Jury consisted of members all of whom were citizens of the
United States, not necessarily Citizens of Arizona state. See
Dyett v. Turner and State v. Phillips infra; Right of Election;
voter registration affidavits.
Motion to Stay Proceedings:
Page 2 of 8
By way of introduction to the crucial matters of fact and
law which are discussed at length in Defendant's sworn
(verified) statement, which is hereby incorporated by reference
as if set forth fully herein, this honorable Court is hereby
respectfully requested to take formal judicial notice of the
additional standing authorities on this question:
We have in our political system a Government of the United
States and a government of each of the several States.
Each one of these governments is distinct from the others,
and each has citizens of its own .... Slaughter-House
Cases
[United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)]
[emphasis added]
A person who is a citizen of the United States** is
necessarily a citizen of the particular state in which he
resides. But a person may be a citizen of a particular
state and not a citizen of the United States. To hold
otherwise would be to deny to the state the highest
exercise of its sovereignty, -- the right to declare who
are its citizens.
[State v. Fowler, 41 La. Ann. 380]
[6 S. 602 (1889), emphasis added]
There are, then, under our republican form of government,
two classes of citizens, one of the United States and one
of the state. One class of citizenship may exist in a
person, without the other, as in the case of a resident of
the District of Columbia; but both classes usually exist in
the same person.
[Gardina v. Board of Registrars, 160 Ala. 155]
[48 S. 788, 791 (1909), emphasis added]
There are over 100,000 elementary and secondary schools in
the United States. ... Each of these now has an invisible
federal zone extending 1,000 feet beyond the (often
irregular) boundaries of the school property.
[U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995)]
Motion to Stay Proceedings:
Page 3 of 8
As a Party to the instant case, the Defendant hereby
challenges the indicting Grand Jury on the ground that such jury
was not selected in conformity with section 1861 of Title 28,
because Citizens of Arizona state who are not also citizens of
the United States (a/k/a federal citizens) are disqualified from
serving by virtue of their chosen Citizenship status. See 28
U.S.C. 1867(e); Right of Election; 15 Statutes at Large,
Chapter 249 (Section 1), enacted July 27, 1868; jus soli; jus
sanguinis. Specifically, the offensive statute forces the
following unconstitutional result upon Citizens of Arizona state
who choose not also to be citizens of the United States (a/k/a
federal citizens):
citizen of Citizen of Qualified
United States Arizona state to serve
Yes Yes Yes
Yes No Yes
No No No
No Yes No **
This result ("**") violates the Tenth Amendment by disqualifying
Citizens of Arizona state from serving on federal grand juries
when they are not also federal citizens, thus denying to accused
Citizens of Arizona state a grand jury of Their Peers when a
grand jury consists only of federal citizens.
An intentional discrimination against a class of persons,
solely because of their class, by officers in charge of the
selection and summoning of grand jurors in a criminal case, is a
violation of the fundamental Rights of an accused. See Cassell
v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282; Atkins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398; Pierre
v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354. Such a violation is not excused by
the fact that the persons actually selected for jury service
otherwise possess the necessary qualifications for jurors as
prescribed by statute. See State v. Jones, 365 P.2d 460.
Motion to Stay Proceedings:
Page 4 of 8
Discrimination in the selection of a grand jury, as
prohibited by the U.S. Constitution, means an intentional,
systematic noninclusion because of class. There are two (2)
classes of citizenship in America. E.g. Gardina supra. The
statute 28 U.S.C. 1865(b)(1) specifically excludes those classes
of Citizens who are not mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. The following statute dramatically demonstrates that
Congress appreciates the difference between the two classes, and
knows how to discriminate between "white citizens" (read "state
Citizens") and "citizens of the United States" (a/k/a federal
citizens). The Act of Congress called the Civil Rights Act, 14
U.S. Statutes at Large, p. 27, which was the forerunner of the
so-called 14th Amendment, amply shows the intent of Congress, as
follows:
... [A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject
to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are
hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and
such citizens, of every race and color ... shall have the
same right, in every State and Territory in the United
States ... to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is
enjoyed by white citizens.
[emphasis added]
Once a prima facie case for the existence of purposeful
discrimination is made out, the burden shifts to the prosecution
to prove otherwise. See Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545.
Reliance on the so-called Fourteenth Amendment to resolve this
matter is moot, because the Fourteenth Amendment was never
lawfully ratified, and because the authorities cited supra allow
for the possibility that a Person can be a state Citizen without
also being a federal citizen, whether or not the Fourteenth
Amendment was lawfully ratified. See State v. Phillips, 540
P.2d 936, 941 (1975); Dyett v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 403, 439 P.2d
Motion to Stay Proceedings:
Page 5 of 8
266, 270 (1968); Full Faith and Credit Clause; 28 Tulane Law
Review 22; 11 South Carolina Law Quarterly 484; House
Congressional Record, June 13, 1967, p. 15641 et seq.
As such, there is no constitutional provision which makes a
federal citizen also a citizen of the Union state in which s/he
resides, nor is there any constitutional provision which states
that the validity of the public debt shall not be questioned.
The judicial history of American citizenship is a subject
which is rich in nuance and detail, as demonstrated in
Defendant's sworn (verified) statement. For example, at a time
when those Islands were in the federal zone, the Supreme Court
of the Philippine Islands found that "citizenship," strictly
speaking, is a term of municipal law and, according to that
Court, it is municipal law which regulates the conditions on
which citizenship is acquired:
Citizenship, says Moore on International Law, strictly
speaking, is a term of municipal law and denotes the
possession within the particular state of full civil and
political rights subject to special disqualifications, such
as minority, sex, etc. The conditions on which citizenship
are [sic] acquired are regulated by municipal law. There
is no such thing as international citizenship nor
international law (aside from that which might be contained
in treaties) by which citizenship is acquired.
[Roa v. Collector of Customs]
[23 Philippine 315, 332 (1912)]
Indeed, international law is divided roughly into two groups:
(1) public international law and (2) private international law.
Citizenship is a term of private international law (also known
as municipal law) in which the terms "state", "nation" and
"country" are all synonymous:
Motion to Stay Proceedings:
Page 6 of 8
Private international law assumes a more important aspect
in the United States than elsewhere, for the reason that
the several states, although united under the same
sovereign authority and governed by the same laws for all
national purposes embraced by the Federal Constitution, are
otherwise, at least so far as private international law is
concerned, in the same relation as foreign countries. The
great majority of questions of private international law
are therefore subject to the same rules when they arise
between two states of the Union as when they arise between
two foreign countries, and in the ensuing pages the words
"state," "nation," and "country" are used synonymously and
interchangeably, there being no intention to distinguish
between the several states of the Union and foreign
countries by the use of varying terminology.
[16 Am Jur 2d, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 2]
[emphasis added]
Congress does refer to the Union states as "countries." See 28
U.S.C. 297.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Wherefore, Defendant petitions this honorable Court for an
indefinite stay of the proceedings in the instant case, pending
proper review of the substantial issues of law and fact which
are alleged in this Motion and which are contained in
Defendant's sworn (verified) statement which is attached hereto
and incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein.
Executed on: _________________________
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Sheila Wallen
Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris
Citizen of Arizona state
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
Motion to Stay Proceedings:
Page 7 of 8
PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under
penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of
America, without the "United States," that I am at least 18
years of age, a Citizen of one of the United States of America,
and that I personally served the following document(s):
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY,
AND NOTICE OF CHALLENGE AND CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF STATUTE: 28 U.S.C. 297, 517, 518, 1861, 1865, and 1867(d)
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in
first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and
properly addressed to the following:
Office of the United States Attorney
110 South Church Avenue, Suite 8310
Tucson [85701]
ARIZONA STATE
Attorney General
Department of Justice
10th and Constitution, N.W.
Washington
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
10th and Constitution, N.W.
Washington
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Executed on: _____________________________
/s/ Sheila Wallen
__________________________________________
Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris
Citizen of Arizona state
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
Motion to Stay Proceedings:
Page 8 of 8
Exhibit "B":
VERIFIED STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE
TO GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY AND ITS FEDERAL STATUTE
U.S.A. [sic] v. Wallen
United States District Court
District of Arizona, Tucson
Case Number #95-484-WDB
Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris
c/o General Delivery
Arivaca [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA STATE
In Propria Persona
Under Protest, Necessity, and
by Special Visitation Only
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic], ) Case No. 95-484-WDB
)
Plaintiff, ) VERIFIED STATEMENT
) IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE TO
v. ) GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY
) AND ITS FEDERAL STATUTE:
Sheila Terese, Wallen, ) 28 U.S.C. 1746(1), 1861,
) 1865
Defendant. )
________________________________)
COMES NOW Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris, Citizen of Arizona
state and Defendant in the above entitled matter (hereinafter
"Defendant"), to record Her Verified Statement in Support of
Challenge to Grand Jury Selection Policy and its Federal
Statute. "We are no longer subjects of a government." See "The
Meaning of American Citizenship" by the Commissioner of
Immigration and Naturalization infra and EXHIBIT "A" attached.
VERIFICATION
The Undersigned hereby verifies, under penalty of perjury,
under the laws of the United States of America, without the
"United States," that the following Statement is true and
correct, to the best of My current information, knowledge, and
belief, so help Me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1):
Verified Statement Challenging Grand Jury Selection Policy:
Page 1 of 36
Chapter 11:
Sovereignty
The issue of sovereignty as it relates to jurisdiction is a
major key to understanding our system of government under the
Constitution. In the most common sense of the word,
"sovereignty" is autonomy, freedom from external control. The
sovereignty of any government usually extends up to, but not
beyond, the borders of its jurisdiction. This jurisdiction
defines a specific territorial boundary which separates the
"external" from the "internal", the "within" from the "without".
It may also define a specific function, or set of functions,
which a government may lawfully perform within a particular
territorial boundary. Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition,
defines sovereignty to mean:
... [T]he international independence of a state, combined
with the right and power of regulating its internal affairs
without foreign dictation.
On a similar theme, Black's defines "sovereign states" to be
those which are not under the control of any foreign power:
No foreign power or law can have control except by
convention. This power of independent action in external
and internal relations constitutes complete sovereignty.
It is a well established principle of law that the 50
States are "foreign" with respect to each other, just as the
federal zone is "foreign" with respect to each of them (In re
Merriam's Estate, 36 NE 505 (1894)). The status of being
foreign is the same as "belonging to" or being "attached to"
another state or another jurisdiction. The proper legal
distinction between the terms "foreign" and "domestic" is best
seen in Black's definitions of foreign and domestic
corporations, as follows:
Foreign corporation. A corporation doing business in one
state though chartered or incorporated in another state is
a foreign corporation as to the first state, and, as such,
is required to consent to certain conditions and
restrictions in order to do business in such first state.
Domestic corporation. When a corporation is organized and
chartered in a particular state, it is considered a
domestic corporation of that state.
The federal zone is an area over which Congress exercises
exclusive legislative jurisdiction. It is the area over which
the federal government exercises its sovereignty. Despite its
obvious importance, the subject of federal jurisdiction had been
almost entirely ignored outside the courts until the year 1954.
In that year, a detailed study of federal jurisdiction was
undertaken. The occasion for the study arose from a school
playground, of all places. The children of federal employees
residing on the grounds of a Veterans' Administration hospital
Verified Statement Challenging Grand Jury Selection Policy:
Page 2 of 36
were not allowed to attend public schools in the town where the
hospital was located. An administrative decision against the
children was affirmed by local courts, and finally affirmed by
the State supreme court. The residents of the area on which the
hospital was located were not "residents" of the State, since
"exclusive legislative jurisdiction" over this area had been
ceded by the State to the federal government.
A committee was assembled by Attorney General Herbert
Brownell, Jr. Their detailed study was reported in a
publication entitled Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the
States, April 1956 (Volume I) and June 1957 (Volume II). The
committee's report demonstrates, beyond any doubt, that the
sovereign States and their laws are outside the legislative and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States** federal
government. They are totally outside the federal zone. A
plethora of evidence is found in the myriad of cited court cases
(700+) which prove that the United States** cannot exercise
exclusive legislative jurisdiction outside territories or places
purchased from, or ceded by, the 50 States of the Union.
Attorney General Brownell described the committee's report as an
"exhaustive and analytical exposition of the law in this
hitherto little explored field". In his letter of transmittal
to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Brownell summarized the two
volumes as follows:
Together, the two parts of this Committee's report and the
full implementation of its recommendations will provide a
basis for reversing in many areas the swing of "the
pendulum of power * * * from our states to the central
government" to which you referred in your address to the
Conference of State Governors on June 25, 1957.
[Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the States]
[Letter of Transmittal, page V, emphasis added]
Once a State is admitted into the Union, its sovereign
jurisdiction is firmly established over a predefined territory.
The federal government is thereby prevented from acquiring
legislative jurisdiction, by means of unilateral action, over
any area within the exterior boundaries of this predefined
territory. State assent is necessary to transfer jurisdiction
to Congress:
The Federal Government cannot, by unilateral action on its
part, acquire legislative jurisdiction over any area within
the exterior boundaries of a State. Article 1, Section 8,
Clause 17, of the Constitution, provides that legislative
jurisdiction may be transferred pursuant to its terms only
with the consent of the legislature of the State in which
is located the area subject to the jurisdictional transfer.
[Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the States]
[Volume II, page 46, emphasis added]
Verified Statement Challenging Grand Jury Selection Policy:
Page 3 of 36
Under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution,
States of the Union have enacted statutes consenting to the
federal acquisition of any land, or of specific tracts of land,
within those States. Secondly, the federal government has also
made "reservations" of jurisdiction over certain areas in
connection with the admission of a State into the Union. A
third means for transfer of legislative jurisdiction has also
come into considerable use over time, namely, a general or
special statute whereby a State makes a cession of specific
functional jurisdiction to the federal government.
Nevertheless, the Committee report explained that "... the
characteristics of a legislative jurisdiction status are the
same no matter by which of the three means the Federal
Government acquired such status" [Volume II, page 3]. There is
simply no federal legislative jurisdiction without consent by a
State, cession by a State, or reservation by the federal
government:
It scarcely needs to be said that unless there has been a
transfer of jurisdiction (1) pursuant to clause 17 by a
Federal acquisition of land with State consent, or (2) by
cession from the State to the Federal Government, or unless
the Federal Government has reserved jurisdiction upon the
admission of the State, the Federal Government possesses no
legislative jurisdiction over any area within a State, such
jurisdiction being for exercise entirely by the State ....
[Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the States]
[Volume II, page 45, emphasis added]
The areas which the 50 States have properly ceded to the
federal government are called federal "enclaves":
By this means some thousands of areas have become Federal
islands, sometimes called "enclaves," in many respects
foreign to the States in which they are situated. In
general, not State but Federal law is applicable in an area
under the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the United
States**, for enforcement not by State but Federal
authorities, and in many instances not in State but in
Federal courts.
[Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the States]
[Volume II, page 4, emphasis added]
These federal enclaves are considered foreign with respect to
the States which surround them, just as the 50 States are
considered foreign with respect to each other and to the federal
zone: "...[T]he several states of the Union are to be
considered as in this respect foreign to each other ...."
Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U.S. 1 (1885). Once a State surrenders
its sovereignty over a specific area of land, it is powerless
over that land; it is without authority; it cannot recapture any
of its transferred jurisdiction by unilateral action, just as
the federal government cannot acquire jurisdiction over State
area by its unilateral action. The State has transferred its
sovereign authority to a foreign power:
Verified Statement Challenging Grand Jury Selection Policy:
Page 4 of 36
Once a State has, by one means or another, transferred
jurisdiction to the United States**, it is, of course,
powerless to control many of the consequences; without
jurisdiction, it is without the authority to deal with many
of the problems, and having transferred jurisdiction to the
United States**, it cannot unilaterally capture any of the
transferred jurisdiction.
[Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the States]
[Volume II, page 7, emphasis added]
Once sovereignty has been relinquished, a State no longer
has the authority to enforce criminal laws in areas under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States**. Privately owned
property in such areas is beyond the taxing authority of the
State. Residents of such areas are not "residents" of the
State, and hence are not subject to the obligations of residents
of the State, and are not entitled to any of the benefits and
privileges conferred by the State upon its residents. Residents
of federal enclaves usually cannot vote, serve on juries, or run
for office. They do not, as matter of right, have access to
State schools, hospitals, mental institutions, or similar
establishments.
The acquisition of exclusive jurisdiction by the Federal
Government renders unavailable to the residents of the affected
areas the benefits of the laws and judicial and administrative
processes of the State relating to adoption, the probate of
wills and administration of estates, divorce, and many other
matters. Police, fire-fighting, notaries, coroners, and similar
services performed by, or under, the authority of a State may
result in legal sanction within a federal enclave. The "old"
State laws which apply are only those which are consistent with
the laws of the "new" sovereign authority, using the following
principle from international law:
The vacuum which would exist because of the absence of
State law or Federal legislation with respect to civil
matters in areas under Federal exclusive legislative
jurisdiction has been partially filled by the courts,
through extension to these areas of a rule of international
law that[,] when one sovereign takes over territory of
another[,] the laws of the original sovereign in effect at
the time of the taking[,] which are not inconsistent with
the laws or policies of the second[,] continue in effect,
as laws of the succeeding sovereign, until changed by that
sovereign.
[Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the States]
[Volume II, page 6, commas added for clarity]
[emphasis added]
Verified Statement Challenging Grand Jury Selection Policy:
Page 5 of 36
It is clear, then, that only one "state" can be sovereign
at any given moment in time, whether that "state" be one of the
50 Union States, or the federal government of the United
States**. Before ceding a tract of land to Congress, a State of
the Union exercises its sovereign authority over any land within
its borders:
Save only as they are subject to the prohibitions of the
Constitution, or as their action in some measure conflicts
with the powers delegated to the national government or
with congressional legislation enacted in the exercise of
those powers, the governments of the states are sovereign
within their territorial limits and have exclusive
jurisdiction over persons and property located therein.
[72 American Jurisprudence 2d, Section 4]
[emphasis added]
After a State has ceded a tract of land to Congress, the
situation is completely different. The United States**, as the
"succeeding sovereign", then exercises its sovereign authority
over that land. In this sense, sovereignty is indivisible, even
though the Committee's report documented numerous situations in
which jurisdiction was actually shared between the federal
government and one of the 50 States. Even in this situation,
however, sovereignty rests either in the State, or in the
federal government, but never both. Sovereignty is the
authority to which there is politically no superior. Outside
the federal zone, the States of the Union remain sovereign, and
their laws are completely outside the exclusive legislative
jurisdiction of the federal government of the United States**.
This understanding of the separate sovereignties possessed
by each of the State and federal governments was not only valid
during the Eisenhower administration; it has been endorsed by
the U.S. Supreme Court as recently as 1985. In that year, the
high Court examined the "dual sovereignty doctrine" when it
ruled that successive prosecutions by two States for the same
conduct were not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. The "crucial determination" turned on whether
State and federal powers derive from separate and independent
sources. The Supreme Court explained that the doctrine of dual
sovereignty has been uniformly upheld by the courts:
It has been uniformly held that the States are separate
sovereigns with respect to the Federal Government because
each State's power to prosecute derives from its inherent
sovereignty, preserved to it by the Tenth Amendment, and
not from the Federal Government. Given the distinct
sources of their powers to try a defendant, the States are
no less sovereign with respect to each other than they are
with respect to the Federal Government.
[Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89-90 (1985)]
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Now, if a State of the Union is sovereign, is it correct to
say that the State exercises an authority to which there is
absolutely no superior? No, this is not a correct statement.
There is no other organized body which is superior to the
organized body which retains sovereignty. The sovereignty of
governments is an authority to which there is no organized
superior, but there is absolutely a superior body, and that
superior body is the People of the United States*** of America:
The words "people of the United States" and "citizens" are
synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both
describe the political body who, according to our
republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold
the power and conduct the government through their
representatives. They are what we familiarly call the
"sovereign people," and every citizen is one of this
people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty.
[Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1856)]
[emphasis added]
The source of all sovereignty in a constitutional Republic like
the 50 States, united by and under the Constitution for the
United States of America, is the People themselves. Remember,
the States, and the federal government acting inside those
States, are both bound by the terms of a contract known as the
U.S. Constitution. That Constitution is a contract of delegated
powers which ultimately originate in the sovereignty of the
Creator, who endowed creation, individual People like you and
me, with sovereignty in that Creator's image and likeness.
Nothing stands between us and the Creator. I think it is fair
to say that the Supreme Court of the United States was never
more eloquent when it described the source of sovereignty as
follows:
Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for
it is the author and source of law; but in our system,
while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of
government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by
whom and for whom all government exists and acts. And the
law is the definition and limitation of power. It is
indeed, quite true, that there must always be lodged
somewhere, and in some person or body, the authority of
final decision; and in many cases of mere administration
the responsibility is purely political, no appeal except to
the ultimate tribunal of the public judgement, exercised
either in the pressure of opinion or by means of the
suffrage. But the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual
possessions, are secured by those maxims of constitutional
law which are the monuments showing the victorious progress
of the race in securing to men the blessings of
civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so
that, in the famous language of the Massachusetts Bill of
Rights, the government of the commonwealth "may be a
government of laws and not of men." For, the very idea
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that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the
means of living, or any material right essential to the
enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being
the essence of slavery itself.
[Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)]
[emphasis added]
More recently, the Supreme Court reiterated the fundamental
importance of US the People as the source of sovereignty, and
the subordinate status which Congress occupies in relation to
the sovereignty of the People. The following language is terse
and right on point:
In the United States***, sovereignty resides in the people
who act through the organs established by the Constitution.
[cites omitted] The Congress as the instrumentality of
sovereignty is endowed with certain powers to be exerted on
behalf of the people in the manner and with the effect the
Constitution ordains. The Congress cannot invoke the
sovereign power of the people to override their will as
thus declared.
[Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935)]
[emphasis added]
No discussion of sovereignty would be complete, therefore,
without considering the sovereignty that resides in US, the
People. The Supreme Court has often identified the People as
the source of sovereignty in our republican form of government.
Indeed, the federal Constitution guarantees to every State in
the Union a "Republican Form" of government, in so many words:
Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and
shall protect each of them against Invasion; ....
[United States Constitution, Article 4, Section 4]
[emphasis added]
What exactly is a "Republican Form" of government? It is one in
which the powers of sovereignty are vested in the People and
exercised by the People. Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition,
makes this very clear in its various definitions of
"government":
Republican government. One in which the powers of
sovereignty are vested in the people and are exercised by
the people, either directly, or through representatives
chosen by the people, to whom those powers are specially
delegated. In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 11 S.Ct. 573, 35
L.Ed. 219; Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 22
L.Ed. 627.
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The Supreme Court has clearly distinguished between the
operation of governments in Europe, and government in these
United States*** of America, as follows:
In Europe, the executive is almost synonymous with the
sovereign power of a State; and generally includes
legislative and judicial authority. ... Such is the
condition of power in that quarter of the world, where it
is too commonly acquired by force or fraud, or both, and
seldom by compact. In America, however, the case is widely
different. Our government is founded upon compact.
Sovereignty was, and is, in the people.
[Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 Dall 6 (1794)]
[emphasis added]
The federal Constitution makes a careful distinction
between natural born Citizens and citizens of the United
States** (compare 2:1:5 with Section 1 of the so-called 14th
Amendment). One is an unconditional Sovereign by natural birth,
who is endowed by the Creator with certain unalienable rights;
the other has been granted the revocable privileges of U.S.**
citizenship, endowed by the Congress of the United States**.
One is a Citizen, the other is a subject. One is a Sovereign,
the other is a subordinate. One is a Citizen of our
constitutional Republic; the other is a citizen of a
legislative democracy (the federal zone). Notice the
superior/subordinate relationship between these two statuses. I
am forever indebted to M. J. "Red" Beckman, co-author of The Law
That Never Was with Bill Benson, for clearly illustrating the
important difference between the two. Red Beckman has delivered
many eloquent lectures based on the profound simplicity of the
following table:
Chain of command and authority in a:
Majority Rule Constitutional
Democracy Republic
X Creator
Majority Individual
Government Constitution
Public Servants Government
Case & Statute Law Public Servants
Corporations Statute Law
individual Corporations
In this illustration, a democracy ruled by the majority
places the individual at the bottom, and an unknown elite, Mr.
"X" at the top. The majority (or mob) elects a government to
hire public "servants" who write laws primarily for the benefit
of corporations. These corporations are either owned or
controlled by Mr. X, a clique of the ultra-wealthy who seek to
restore a two-class "feudal" society. They exercise their vast
economic power so as to turn all of America into a "feudal
zone". The rights of individuals occupy the lowest priority in
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this chain of command. Those rights often vanish over time,
because democracies eventually self-destruct. The enforcement
of laws within this scheme is the job of administrative
tribunals, who specialize in holding individuals to the letter
of all rules and regulations of the corporate state, no matter
how arbitrary and with little if any regard for fundamental
human rights:
A democracy that recognizes only manmade laws perforce
obliterates the concept of Liberty as a divine right.
[A Ticket to Liberty, November 1990 edition, page 146]
[emphasis added]
In the constitutional Republic, however, the rights of
individuals are supreme. Individuals delegate their sovereignty
to a written contract, called a constitution, which empowers
government to hire public servants to write laws primarily for
the benefit of individuals. The corporations occupy the lowest
priority in this chain of command, since their primary
objectives are to maximize the enjoyment of individual rights,
and to facilitate the fulfillment of individual
responsibilities. The enforcement of laws within this scheme is
the responsibility of sovereign individuals, who exercise their
power in three arenas: the voting booth, the trial jury, and
the grand jury. Without a jury verdict of "guilty", for
example, no law can be enforced and no penalty exacted. The
behavior of public servants is tightly restrained by contractual
terms, as found in the written Constitution. Statutes and case
law are created primarily to limit and define the scope and
extent of public servant power.
Sovereign individuals are subject only to a Common Law,
whose primary purposes are to protect and defend individual
rights, and to prevent anyone, whether public official or
private person, from violating the rights of other individuals.
Within this scheme, Sovereigns are never subject to their own
creations, and the constitutional contract is such a creation.
To quote the Supreme Court, "No fiction can make a natural born
subject." Milvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 8 U.S. 598 (1808). That
is to say, no fiction, be it a corporation, a statute law, or an
administrative regulation, can mutate a natural born Sovereign
into someone who is subject to his own creations. Author and
scholar Lori Jacques has put it succinctly as follows:
As each state is sovereign and not a territory of the
United States**, the meaning is clear that state citizens
are not subject to the legislative jurisdiction of the
United States**. Furthermore, there is not the slightest
intimation in the Constitution which created the "United
States" as a political entity that the "United States" is
sovereign over its creators.
[A Ticket to Liberty, November 1990 edition, page 32]
[emphasis added]
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Accordingly, if you choose to investigate the matter, you
will find a very large body of legal literature which cites
another fiction, the so-called 14th Amendment, from which the
federal government presumes to derive general authority to treat
everyone in America as subjects and not as Sovereigns:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United
States**, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States** and of the State wherein
they reside.
[United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment [sic]]
[emphasis added]
A careful reading of this amendment reveals an important
subtlety which is lost on many people who read it for the first
time. The citizens it defines are second class citizens because
the "c" is lower-case, even in the case of the State citizens it
defines. Note how the amendment defines "citizens of the United
States**" and "citizens of the State wherein they reside"! It is
just uncanny how the wording of this amendment closely parallels
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) which promulgates Section
1 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Can it be that this
amendment had something to do with subjugation, by way of taxes
and other means? Yes, it most certainly did. Section 1 of the
IRC is the section which imposes income taxes. The
corresponding section of the CFR defines who is a "citizen" as
follows:
Every person born or naturalized in the United States** and
subject to its jurisdiction is a citizen.
[26 CFR 1.1-1(c), emphasis added]
Notice the use of the term "its jurisdiction". This leaves no
doubt that the "United States**" is a singular entity in this
context. In other words, it is the federal zone. Do we dare to
speculate why the so-called 14th Amendment was written instead
with the phrase "subject to the jurisdiction thereof"? Is this
another case of deliberate ambiguity? You be the judge.
Not only did this so-called "amendment" fail to specify
which meaning of the term "United States" was being used; like
the 16th Amendment, it also failed to be ratified, this time by
15 of the 37 States which existed in 1868. The House
Congressional Record for June 13, 1967, contains all the
documentation you need to prove that the so-called 14th
Amendment was never ratified into law (see page 15641 et seq.).
For example, it itemizes all States which voted against the
proposed amendment, and the precise dates when their
Legislatures did so. "I cannot believe that any court, in full
possession of its faculties, could honestly hold that the
amendment was properly approved and adopted." State v. Phillips,
540 P.2d. 936, 941 (1975). The Utah Supreme Court has detailed
the shocking and sordid history of the 14th Amendment's
"adoption" in the case of Dyett v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 403, 439
P.2d 266, 270 (1968).
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A great deal of written material on the 14th Amendment has
been assembled into computer files by Richard McDonald, whose
mailing address is 585-D Box Canyon Road, Canoga Park,
California Republic (not "CA"). He requests that ZIP codes not
be used on his incoming mail (use "ZIP code exempt (DMM 122.32)"
instead). Richard McDonald has done a mountain of legal
research and writing on the origins and effects of the so-called
14th Amendment. He documents how key court decisions like the
Slaughter House Cases, among many others, all found that there
is a clear distinction between a Citizen of a State and a
citizen of the United States** . A State Citizen is a
Sovereign, whereas a citizen of the United States** is a subject
of Congress. The exercise of federal citizenship is a statutory
privilege which can be taxed with excises. The exercise of
State Citizenship is a Common Law Right which simply cannot be
taxed because governments cannot tax the exercise of a right,
ever.
The case of U.S. v. Cruikshank is famous, not only for
confirming this distinction between State Citizens and U.S.**
citizens, but also for establishing a key precedent in the area
of due process. This precedent underlies the "void for
vagueness" doctrine which can and should be applied to nullify
the IRC. On the issue of citizenship, the Cruikshank court
ruled as follows:
We have in our political system a government of the United
States** and a government of each of the several States.
Each one of these governments is distinct from the others,
and each has citizens of its own who owe it allegiance, and
whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must protect.
The same person may be at the same time a citizen of the
United States** and a citizen of a State, but his rights of
citizenship under one of these governments will be
different from those he has under the other. Slaughter-
House Cases
[United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)]
[emphasis added]
The leading authorities for this pivotal distinction are,
indeed, a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions known as the
Slaughter House Cases, which examined the so-called 14th
Amendment in depth. An exemplary paragraph from these cases is
the following:
It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the
United States** and a citizenship of a State, which are
distinct from each other and which depend upon different
characteristics or circumstances in the individual.
[Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 16 Wall. 36]
[21 L.Ed. 394 (1873), emphasis added]
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A similar authority is found in the case of K. Tashiro v.
Jordan, decided by the Supreme Court of the State of California
almost fifty years later. Notice, in particular, how the
California Supreme Court again cites the Slaughter House Cases:
That there is a citizenship of the United States** and a
citizenship of a state, and the privileges and immunities
of one are not the same as the other is well established by
the decisions of the courts of this country. The leading
cases upon the subjects are those decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States and reported in 16 Wall. 36, 21
L. Ed. 394, and known as the Slaughter House Cases.
[K. Tashiro v. Jordan, 256 P. 545, 549 (1927)]
[affirmed 278 U.S. 123 (1928)]
[emphasis added]
The Slaughter House Cases are quite important to the issue
of citizenship, but the pivotal case on the subject is the
famous Dred Scott decision, decided in 1856, prior to the Civil
War. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote one of the
longest decisions in the entire history of American
jurisprudence. In arriving at their understanding of the
precise meaning of Citizenship, as understood by the Framers of
the Constitution, the high Court left no stone unturned in their
search for relevant law:
We have the language of the Declaration of Independence and
of the Articles of Confederation, in addition to the plain
words of the Constitution itself: we have the legislation
of the different States, before, about the time, and since
the Constitution was adopted; we have the legislation of
Congress, from the time of its adoption to a recent period;
and we have the constant and uniform action of the
Executive Department, all concurring together, and leading
to the same result. And if anything in relation to the
construction of the Constitution can be regarded as
settled, it is that which we now give to the word "citizen"
and the word "people."
[Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1856)]
[emphasis added]
In the fundamental law, the notion of a "citizen of the
United States" simply did not exist before the 14th Amendment;
at best, this notion is a fiction within a fiction. In
discussing the power of the States to naturalize, the California
State Supreme Court put it rather bluntly when it ruled that
there was no such thing as a "citizen of the United States":
A citizen of any one of the States of the union, is held to
be, and called a citizen of the United States, although
technically and abstractly there is no such thing. To
conceive a citizen of the United States who is not a
citizen of some one of the States, is totally foreign to
the idea, and inconsistent with the proper construction and
common understanding of the expression as used in the
Constitution, which must be deduced from its various other
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provisions. The object then to be attained, by the
exercise of the power of naturalization, was to make
citizens of the respective States.
[Ex Parte Knowles, 5 Cal. 300 (1855)]
[emphasis added]
This decision has never been overturned!
What is the proper construction and common understanding of
the term "Citizen of the United States" as used in the original
Constitution, before the so-called 14th Amendment? This is an
important question, because this status is still a qualification
for the offices of Senator, Representative and President. No
Person can be a Representative unless he has been a Citizen of
the United States for seven years (1:2:2); no Person can be a
Senator unless he has been a Citizen of the United States for
nine years (1:3:3); no Person can be President unless he is a
natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States (2:1:5).
If these requirements had been literally obeyed, there could
have been no elections for Representatives to Congress for at
least seven years after the adoption of the Constitution, and no
one would have been eligible as a Senator for nine years after
its adoption. Author John S. Wise, in a rare book now available
on Richard McDonald's electronic bulletin board system (BBS),
explains away the problem very simply as follows:
The language employed by the convention was less careful
than that which had been used by Congress in July of the
same year, in framing the ordinance for the government of
the Northwest Territory. Congress had made the
qualification rest upon citizenship of "one of the United
States***," and this is doubtless the intent of the
convention which framed the Constitution, for it cannot
have meant anything else.
[Studies in Constitutional Law:
[A Treatise on American Citizenship]
[by John S. Wise, Edward Thompson Co. (1906)]
[emphasis added]
This quote from the Northwest Ordinance is faithful to the
letter and to the spirit of that law. In describing the
eligibility for "representatives" to serve in the general
assembly for the Northwest Territory, the critical passage from
that Ordinance reads as follows:
... Provided, That no person be eligible or qualified to
act as a representative, unless he shall have been a
citizen of one of the United States*** three years, and be
a resident in the district, or unless he shall have resided
in the district three years; ....
[Northwest Ordinance, Section 9, July 13, 1787]
[The Confederate Congress, emphasis added]
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Without citing the case as such, the words of author John
S. Wise sound a close, if not identical parallel to the argument
for the Respondent filed in the case of People v. De La Guerra,
decided by the California Supreme Court in 1870. The following
long passage elaborates the true meaning of the Constitutional
qualifications for President and Representative:
As it was the adoption of the Constitution by the
Conventions of nine States that established and created the
United States***, it is obvious there could not then have
existed any person who had been seven years a citizen of
the United States***, or who possessed the Presidential
qualifications of being thirty-five years of age, a natural
born citizen, and fourteen years a resident of the United
States***. The United States*** in these provisions, means
the States united. To be twenty-five years of age, and for
seven years to have been a citizen of one of the States
which ratifies the Constitution, is the qualification of
a representative. To be a natural born citizen of one of
the States which shall ratify the Constitution, or to be a
citizen of one of said States at the time of such
ratification, and to have attained the age of thirty-five
years, and to have been fourteen years a resident within
one of the said States, are the Presidential
qualifications, according to the true meaning of the
Constitution.
[People v. De La Guerra, 40 Cal. 311, 337 (1870)]
[emphasis added]
Indeed, this was the same exact understanding that was reached
by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Dred Scott decision. There,
the high Court clearly reinforced the sovereign status of
Citizens of the several States. The sovereigns are the Union
State Citizens, i.e. the Citizens of the States United:
It is true, every person, and every class and description
of persons, who were at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution recognized as citizens in the several States,
became also citizens of this new political body; but none
other; it was formed by them, and for them and their
posterity, but for no one else. And the personal rights
and privileges guarantied [sic] to citizens of this new
sovereignty were intended to embrace those only who were
then members of the several state communities, or who
should afterwards, by birthright or otherwise, become
members, according to the provisions of the Constitution
and the principles on which it was founded.
[Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 404 (1856)]
[emphasis added]
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Thus, the phrase "Citizen of the United States" as found in
the original Constitution is synonymous with the phrase "Citizen
of one of the United States***", i.e., a Union State Citizen.
This simple explanation will help to cut through the mountain of
propaganda and deception which have been foisted on all
Americans by government bureaucrats and their high-paid lawyers.
With this understanding firmly in place, it is very revealing to
discover that many reprints of the Constitution now utilize a
lower-case "c" in the sections which describe the qualifications
for the offices of Senator, Representative and President. This
is definitely wrong, and it is probably deliberate, so as to
confuse everyone into equating Citizens of the United States
with citizens of the United States, courtesy of the so-called
14th Amendment. There is a very big difference between the two
statuses, not the least of which is the big difference in their
respective liabilities for the income tax.
Moreover, it is quite clear that one may be a State Citizen
without also being a "citizen of the United States", whether or
not the 14th Amendment was properly ratified! According to the
Louisiana Supreme Court, the highest exercise of a State's
sovereignty is the right to declare who are its own Citizens:
A person who is a citizen of the United States** is
necessarily a citizen of the particular state in which he
resides. But a person may be a citizen of a particular
state and not a citizen of the United States**. To hold
otherwise would be to deny to the state the highest
exercise of its sovereignty, -- the right to declare who
are its citizens.
[State v. Fowler, 41 La. Ann. 380]
[6 S. 602 (1889), emphasis added]
In a book to which this writer has returned time and time again,
author Alan Stang faithfully recites some of the other relevant
court authorities, all of which ultimately trace back to the
Slaughter House Cases and the Dred Scott decision:
Indeed, just as one may be a "citizen of the United States"
and not a citizen of a State; so one apparently may be a
citizen of a State but not of the United States. On July
21, 1966, the Court of Appeal of Maryland ruled in Crosse
v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 221 A.2d 431; a
headnote in which tells us: "Both before and after the
Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, it has
not been necessary for a person to be a citizen of the
United States in order to be a citizen of his state ...."
At page 434, Judge Oppenheimer cites a Wisconsin ruling
in which the court said this: "Under our complex system
of government, there may be a citizen of a state, who is
not a citizen of the United States in the full sense of the
term ...."
[Tax Scam, 1988 edition, pages 138-139]
[emphasis added]
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Conversely, there may be a citizen of the United States** who is
not a Citizen of any of the 50 States. In People v. De La
Guerra quoted above, the published decision of the California
Supreme Court clearly maintained this crucial distinction
between the two classes of citizenship, and did so only two
years after the alleged ratification of the so-called 14th
Amendment:
I have no doubt that those born in the Territories, or in
the District of Columbia, are so far citizens as to entitle
them to the protection guaranteed to citizens of the United
States** in the Constitution, and to the shield of
nationality abroad; but it is evident that they have not
the political rights which are vested in citizens of the
States. They are not constituents of any community in
which is vested any sovereign power of government. Their
position partakes more of the character of subjects than of
citizens. They are subject to the laws of the United
States**, but have no voice in its management. If they are
allowed to make laws, the validity of these laws is derived
from the sanction of a Government in which they are not
represented. Mere citizenship they may have, but the
political rights of citizens they cannot enjoy until they
are organized into a State, and admitted into the Union.
[People v. De La Guerra, 40 Cal. 311, 342 (1870]
[emphasis added]
Using language that was much more succinct, author Luella
Gettys, Ph.D. and "Sometime Carnegie Fellow in International
Law" at the University of Chicago, explained it quite nicely
this way:
... [A]s long as the territories are not admitted to
statehood no state citizenship therein could exist.
[The Law of Citizenship in the United States]
[Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1934, p. 7]
This clear distinction between the Union States and the
territories is endorsed officially by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Using language very similar to that of the California Supreme
Court in the De La Guerra case, the high Court explained the
distinction this way in the year 1885, seventeen years after the
adoption of the so-called 14th amendment:
The people of the United States***, as sovereign owners of
the national territories, have supreme power over them and
their inhabitants. ... The personal and civil rights of the
inhabitants of the territories are secured to them, as to
other citizens, by the principles of constitutional
liberty, which restrain all the agencies of government,
state and national; their political rights are franchises
which they hold as privileges in the legislative discretion
of the congress of the United States**. This doctrine was
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fully and forcibly declared by the chief justice,
delivering the opinion of the court in National Bank v.
County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129.
[Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885)]
[italics in original, emphasis added]
The political rights of the federal zone's citizens are
"franchises" which they hold as "privileges" at the discretion
of the Congress of the United States**. Indeed, the doctrine
declared earlier in the National Bank case leaves no doubt that
Congress is the municipal authority for the territories:
All territory within the jurisdiction of the United States*
not included in any State must, necessarily, be governed by
or under the authority of Congress. The Territories are
but political subdivisions of the outlying dominion of the
United States**. They bear much the same relation to the
General Government that counties do to the States, and
Congress may legislate for them as States do for their
respective municipal organizations. The organic law of a
Territory takes the place of a constitution, as the
fundamental law of the local government. It is obligatory
on and binds the territorial authorities; but Congress is
supreme and, for the purposes of this department of its
governmental authority, has all the powers of the People of
the United States***, except such as have been expressly or
by implication reserved in the prohibitions of the
Constitution.
[First National Bank v. Yankton, 101 U.S. 129 (1880)]
[emphasis added]
This knowledge can be extremely valuable. In one of the
brilliant text files on his electronic bulletin board system
(BBS), Richard McDonald utilized his voluminous research into
the so-called 14th Amendment and related constitutional law when
he made the following pleading in opposition to a traffic
citation, of all things, in Los Angeles county municipal court:
17. The Accused Common-Law Citizen [Defendant] hereby
places all parties and the court on NOTICE, that he is not
a "citizen of the United States**" under the so-called 14th
Amendment, a juristic person or a franchised person who can
be compelled to perform to the regulatory Vehicle Codes
which are civil in nature, and challenges the In Personam
jurisdiction of the Court with this contrary conclusion of
law. This Court is now mandated to seat on the law side of
its capacity to hear evidence of the status of the Accused
Citizen.
[see MEMOLAW.ZIP on Richard McDonald's electronic BBS]
[see also FMEMOLAW.ZIP and Appendix Y, emphasis added]
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You might be wondering why someone would go to so much
trouble to oppose a traffic citation. Why not just pay the fine
and get on with your life? The answer lies, once again, in the
fundamental and supreme Law of our Land, the Constitution for
the United States of America. Sovereign State Citizens have
learned to assert their fundamental rights, because rights
belong to the belligerent claimant in person. The Constitution
is the last bastion of the Common Law in our country. Were it
not for the Constitution, the Common Law would have been history
a long time ago. The interpretation of the Constitution is
directly influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed
in the language of the English common law:
There is, however, one clear exception to the statement
that there is no national common law. The interpretation
of the constitution of the United States is necessarily
influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in
the language of the English common law, and are to be read
in the light of its history.
[United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 891, 893 (1898)]
[emphasis added]
Under the Common Law, we are endowed by our Creator with
the right to travel. "Driving", on the other hand, is defined
in State Vehicle Codes to mean the act of chauffeuring
passengers for hire. "Passengers" are those who pay a "driver"
to be chauffeured. Guests, on the other hand, are those who
accompany travelers without paying for the transportation.
Driving, under this definition, is a privilege for which a State
can require a license. Similarly, if you are a citizen of the
United States**, you are subject to its jurisdiction, and a
State government can prove that you are obligated thereby to
obey all administrative statutes and regulations to the letter
of the law. These regulations include, of course, the
requirement that all subjects apply and pay for licenses to use
the State and federal highways, even though the highways belong
to the People. The land on which they were built, and the
materials and labor expended in their construction, were all
paid for with taxes obtained from the People. Provided that you
are not engaged in any "privileged" or regulated activity, you
are free to travel anywhere you wish within the 50 States.
Those States are real parties to the Constitution and are
therefore bound by all its terms.
Another one of your Common Law rights is the right to own
property free and clear of any liens. ("Unalienable" rights arerights against which no lien can be established precisely
because they are un-lien-able.) You enjoy the right to own your
vehicle outright, without any lawful requirement that you
"register" it with the State Department of Motor Vehicles. The
State governments violated your fundamental rights when they
concealed the legal "interest" which they obtained in your
vehicle, by making it appear as if you were required to register
the vehicle when you purchased it, as a condition of purchase.
This is fraud. If you don't believe me, then try to obtain the
manufacturer's statement of origin (MSO) the next time you buy a
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new car or truck. The implications and ramifications of driving
around without a license, and/or without registration, are far
beyond the scope of this book. Suffice it to say that effective
methods have already been developed to deal with law enforcement
officers and courts, if and when you are pulled over and cited
for traveling without a license or tags. Richard McDonald is
second to none when it comes to preparing a successful defense
to the civil charges that might result. A Sovereign is someone
who enjoys fundamental, Common Law rights, and owning property
free and clear is one of those fundamental rights.
If you have a DOS-compatible personal computer and a 2400-
baud modem, Richard McDonald can provide you with instructions
for accessing his electronic bulletin board system (BBS). There
is a mountain of information, and some of his computer files
were rather large when he began his BBS. Users were complaining
of long transmission times to "download" text files over phone
lines from his BBS to their own personal computers. So,
McDonald used a fancy text "compression" program on all the text
files available on his BBS. As a consequence, BBS users must
first download a DOS program which "decompresses" the compressed
files. Once this program is running on your personal computer,
you are then free to download all other text files and to
decompress them at your end. For example, the compressed file
"14AMREC.ZIP" contains the documentation which proves that the
so-called 14th Amendment was never ratified. If you have any
problems or questions, Richard McDonald is a very patient and
generous man. And please tell him where you read about him and
his computer bulletin board (voice: 818-703-5037, BBS: 818-888-
9882).
As you peruse through McDonald's numerous court briefs and
other documents, you will encounter many gems to be remembered
and shared with your family, friends and associates. His work
has confirmed an attribute of sovereignty that is of paramount
importance. Sovereignty is never diminished in delegation.
Thus, as sovereign individuals, we do not diminish our
sovereignty in any way by delegating our powers to State
governments, to perform services which are difficult, if not
impossible for us to perform as individuals. Similarly, States
do not diminish their sovereignty by delegating powers to the
federal government, via the Constitution. As McDonald puts it,
powers delegated do not equate to powers surrendered:
17. Under the Constitutions, "... we the People" did not
surrender our individual sovereignty to either the State or
Federal Government. Powers "delegated" do not equate to
powers surrendered. This is a Republic, not a democracy,
and the majority cannot impose its will upon the minority
because the "LAW" is already set forth. Any individual can
do anything he or she wishes to do so long as it does not
damage, injure, or impair the same Right of another
individual. This is where the concept of a corpus delicti
comes from to prove a "crime" or a civil damage.
[see MEMOLAW.ZIP on Richard McDonald's electronic BBS]
[see also FMEMOLAW.ZIP and Appendix Y, emphasis added]
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Indeed, to be a Citizen of the United States*** of America
is to be one of the Sovereign People, "a constituent member of
the sovereignty, synonymous with the people" [see 19 How. 404].
According to the 1870 edition of Bouvier's Law Dictionary, the
People are the fountain of sovereignty. It is extremely
revealing that there is no definition of "United States" as such
in this dictionary. However, there is an important discussion
of the "United States of America", where the delegation of
sovereignty clearly originates in the People and nowhere else:
The great men who formed it did not undertake to solve a
question that in its own nature is insoluble. Between
equals it made neither superior, but trusted to the mutual
forbearance of both parties. A larger confidence was
placed in an enlightened public opinion as the final
umpire. The people parcelled out the rights of sovereignty
between the states and the United States**, and they have a
natural right to determine what was given to one party and
what to the other. ... It is a maxim consecrated in public
law as well as common sense and the necessity of the case,
that a sovereign is answerable for his acts only to his God
and to his own conscience.
[Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 14th Edition, 1870]
[defining "United States of America"]
[emphasis added]
We don't need to reach far back into another century to
find proof that the People are sovereign. In a Department of
Justice manual revised in the 1990 (Document No. M-230), the
meaning of American Citizenship was described with these
eloquent and moving words by the Commissioner of Immigration and
Naturalization: "You are no longer a subject of a government!"
The Meaning of American Citizenship
Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization
Today you have become a citizen of the United States
of America. You are no longer an Englishman, a Frenchman,
an Italian, a Pole. Neither are you a hyphenated-American
-- a Polish-American, an Italian-American. You are no
longer a subject of a government. Henceforth, you are an
integral part of this Government -- a free man -- a Citizen
of the United States of America.
This citizenship, which has been solemnly conferred on
you, is a thing of the spirit -- not of the flesh. When
you took the oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the
United States, you claimed for yourself the God-given
unalienable rights which that sacred document sets forth as
the natural right of all men.
You have made sacrifices to reach this desired goal.
We, your fellow citizens, realize this, and the warmth of
our welcome to you is increased proportionately. However,
we would tincture it with friendly caution.
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As you have learned during these years of preparation,
this great honor carries with it the duty to work for and
make secure this longed-for and eagerly-sought status.
Government under our Constitution makes American
citizenship the highest privilege and at the same time the
greatest responsibility of any citizenship in the world.
The important rights that are now yours and the duties
and responsibilities attendant thereon are set forth
elsewhere in this manual. It is hoped that they will serve
as a constant reminder that only by continuing to study and
learn about your new country, its ideals, achievements, and
goals, and by everlastingly working at your citizenship can
you enjoy its fruits and assure their preservation for
generations to follow.
May you find in this Nation the fulfillment of your
dreams of peace and security, and may America, in turn,
never find you wanting in your new and proud role of
Citizen of the United States.
[Basic Guide to Naturalization and Citizenship]
[Immigration and Naturalization Service]
[U.S. Department of Justice]
[page 265, emphasis added]
Executed on ___________________________
/s/ Sheila Wallen
_______________________________________
Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris
Citizen of Arizona state
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EXHIBIT "A":
"The Day Our Country Was Stolen:"
"How the 14th Amendment" [sic]
"Enslaved Us All"
"Without a Shot Fired"
The Day Our Country Was Stolen:
How the 14th Amendment [sic]
Enslaved Us All
Without a Shot Fired
by
L. C. Lyon
Most Americans would agree that we, as a people, are
treated by our public servants -- the judges, politicians, law
enforcement and bureaucrats who are paid their salaries by our
taxes -- as if we were in complete bondage to them. When we
joke about being slaves to the Government, we don't realize that
we are exactly correct, joke or not. In fact, all those 99% of
Americans who call themselves "U.S. citizens" are actually
subjects of the corporate United States Government -- not the
sovereign states of the Union. The moment you uttered your
first cry on American soil, you became the chattel property of
the corporation known as the United States of America which,
because of the federal debt, handed title (Birth Certificate) to
your body and soul to the Federal Reserve Bank, to be held in
the archives of the Department of Health and Human Services.
As incredible as this sounds, it is sadly true. The next
question is: How did I automatically become subject to a
government, when I'm supposedly a free American? How did this
all come about, that I should be made to register myself, my
family, and all that I own; be made to obey oppressive laws;
and forfeit almost half of my earnings upon threat of jail?
Only those who are "subject" to a government can be made to do
these things. Free American Inhabitants are subject to no one
but God, and all the laws and responsibilities which that Divine
allegiance entails.
Which "United States" Do You Live In?
The answer to the above questions goes back to the American
Civil War. The war that was supposedly fought to free the
slaves from bondage actually did just the opposite -- for all
Americans then and in the future. By enacting the 14th
Amendment (which technically is an Article, not a true
amendment, but that's a topic for another discussion), a whole
nation of newly freed slaves and free-born white American
Inhabitants became "citizens of the United States", i.e. of a
federal government corporation, at the stroke of a pen and
without a shot being fired.
Because we Americans are a different breed and demand the
right to personal freedom, those who had planned decades ago to
enslave us (even if it took generations to do so) knew that, as
long as we were armed and willing to fight to maintain our
freedom, the only way to accomplish this enslavement was by
deception.
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To proceed further, we must understand that there are two
"United States". There is the "united States" (note the small
"u" in "united") which describes the ideological and
geographical position of the sovereign states of America. An
individual was the voluntary inhabitant of the state in which he
resided. If he did not like the laws or practices of that
state, he could simply move to another state. Each state was
sovereign to itself, and could not be forced to accept the laws
and practices of any other state.
The "United States of America", however, is the name of the
corporate entity (note the capital "U" in "United") that exists
to carry out the functions delegated to it by the States for the
protection of the Union. This corporate entity's jurisdiction
is supposed to be (according to the Constitution) confined to
the District of Columbia, the federal territories and the
federal enclaves. Enclaves are areas within a State's
boundaries which are ceded to the Federal Government by the
State Legislature.
Anyone can come under the direct jurisdiction of the
corporate United States in three ways: (1) by living in one of
its territories (Guam, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, etc.),
(2) by living in the District of Columbia, or (3) simply by
choice. Back when America still had vast territories not-yet-
become states and several thousands of people lived in these
territories, these people had no rights protected by state
sovereignty. They lived under federal jurisdiction, which was
the reason why people living in territories were so anxious to
achieve statehood. The President could order federal troops
into any territory and enact any edicts he wanted. Once a
territory became a state, it had sovereignty and, from that
point on, the state's rights prevailed.
So, if you don't live in a territory or enclave, and you
don't live in the District of Columbia, then the only way you
could have fallen under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government is by choice. But neither I, nor anyone I know,
voluntarily or knowingly surrendered their personal sovereignty
to the Government, which means that it (our sovereignty) was
taken from us by deception.
This deception, which took place in the year 1868, is what
this article will explain -- how our ancestors were tricked and
coerced into giving up their rights (and ours!) to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Government.
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Civil War Sets the Stage for Takeover
The Constitution for the United States of America specifies
in the opening paragraph that the Constitution was written for
the newly formed corporation, not for us, the People living in
America. Our rights come from God and are inalienable. They do
not come from a piece of paper. And, because the Federal
Government exists only on paper -- a man-created entity -- it
can also be dismantled anytime We the People decide it has
become a threat to our inalienable God-given rights of
sovereignty.
The Constitution is the contract between those who
administer the Government's affairs and the People of the united
States. In essence, it states that the People will give the
Government certain powers necessary to administer the defense of
the States, and control the commerce into the States from
foreign countries. In exchange, the State governments (not the
individual people -- direct taxation by the Federal Government
is unconstitutional) would provide the Federal Government the
money it needs to operate. The Federal Government had limited
powers; in fact, the Bill of Rights was hotly debated at the
time of its passage because there were several people who wisely
cautioned that the Bill of Rights would eventually be construed
as rights endowed by the Constitution, not protected by it
(which is exactly what has happened).
How often do you hear patriots mistakenly vow to defend
"their Constitutional rights"? This thinking reflects the
decades of public school brainwashing to which we have all been
subjected. We need to correct each other and understand that
our rights are God-given, not constitutional.
So, how does the Civil War enter into this present-day
power struggle between the Federal Government and Us the People?
Slavery was not the true underlying reason for the war. It was
an emotional, social issue that was used as an excuse to incite
people to go to war, people who did not realize that foreign
agencies were responsible for that conflict. International
bankers, seeing the slavery issue as an opportunity not only to
divide the country, but make millions of dollars as well, fanned
the flames of debate until, under cover of the most bloody war
in the history of the world, they were to accomplish that very
objective -- the complete takeover of America. They almost
succeeded years sooner, except for the intervention of one man
-- President Abraham Lincoln.
"Honest Abe" Knew the Truth
President Lincoln was against slavery, but he understood
that it was wrong to force the southern States to give up
slavery -- to force Federal jurisdiction over the issue of
States' Rights. Four of the southern States were already
considering the abolition of slavery, but they couldn't just
abandon it overnight. It would take time. After all, their
whole economy was built upon slavery; a sudden disruption would
bankrupt the South. Lincoln understood this. But, it wasn't
until Lincoln got into office that he began to see the whole
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picture. He learned that the war was begun by the International
Bankers as a means of dividing the country in two, forcing both
sides to borrow heavily from the Bankers to pay war debts.
Then, when failing to repay those loans, the divided America
would be forced into bankruptcy. The Rothschilds and other
bankers could then simply foreclose on the corporations known as
the United States of America and the Confederate States of
America. President Lincoln knew he had to keep the nation
together at all costs -- including war.
Saved by the National Banks
Near the end of the war, the South was on its knees and the
U.S. Government was nearly bankrupt. Seeing their opportunity,
the Bankers offered to loan the U.S. Government enough to see it
through. Lincoln said no. He would find another way.
What he did then was to ask Congress for permission to
print paper money. Even though he knew it was unconstitutional
(only gold and silver are lawful U.S. money), it was the only
way he knew to buy provisions for the Army -- but only if the
U.S. banks would accept it. They did. When Lincoln gave his
word that the Government would redeem those notes for gold and
silver at a later time, they believed him and honored the notes.
By doing this, the planned takeover by the Bankers was averted
-- at that time.
The Bankers' Revenge -- Assassination
Because he had given his word to the nation's bankers;
because he had promised the South that, upon surrender, the
Government would help them rebuild; and because he had promised
the Southerners there would be no recriminations or punishments
if they again swore loyalty to the Union, Lincoln knew he had to
get re-elected, though he was tired, tormented by migraine
headaches, and worried about his suffering family life. He had
to make sure those promises were kept.
Lincoln's complete thwarting of the International Bankers'
plans doomed him to assassination at their hands. Papers found
in Booth's locker show communications with an agent hired by the
Rothschild family.
Weeks before he was killed, Lincoln knew he would die in
office. His spies were reporting plots to kill him; it was
only a matter of who got to him first. So, he met regularly
with his Vice President, Andrew Johnson, and educated him as
quickly as he could so that he could follow through on Lincoln's
promises. Johnson listened carefully and understood what was
expected of him, and why. Then, after Lincoln's murder, he did
exactly as he was supposed to do.
In school, when we were taught this part of American
history, we were told that Andrew Johnson was uneducated and
ignorant, and fumbled continuously in office, which was
supposedly why he was impeached. Johnson was of humble origin,
but he was an honest, self-educated man who stood firmly for
what he saw clearly were the best interests of his country.
This is what got him impeached.
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Impeachment!
At this time, the only men in Congress were those
representing the northern States. After Fort Sumter, all the
southern States had seceded. After Lincoln's death, Congress
began passing laws to punish the South, in contradiction to
Lincoln's promise. Johnson began vetoing them, sometimes three
and four times, until Congress began passing them over his veto.
One particular bill that he vetoed, the Civil Rights Bill, was
intended to make all former slaves automatic citizens of the
Federal Government, and under its direct jurisdiction (and
protection). This seemed like a compassionate and generous
gesture to the newly freed slaves but, as Johnson pointed out,
it would have serious consequences for the Negroes. In his veto
message in March of 1866, Johnson pointed out the pitfalls of
this bill:
He [the Negro] must, of necessity, from his previous
unfortunate condition of servitude, be less informed as to
the nature and character of our institutions than he who,
coming from abroad, has to some extent at least,
familiarized himself with the principles of a government to
which he voluntarily entrusts "life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness".
The 1st Section of the bill also contains an
enumeration of the rights to be enjoyed by these classes so
made citizens "in every state and territory in the United
States". These rights are "to make and enforce contracts;
to sue, be parties, and give evidence; to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property"; and to have "full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of person and property as
is enjoyed by white citizens". So too, they are made
subject to the same punishment, pains and penalties, in
common with white citizens ....
[emphasis added]
Johnson could clearly see that to immediately place a
string of governmental "rights and benefits" upon a totally
naive and uneducated people as the Negroes, would also make them
easy prey for every carpetbagger who would trick them into
contracts, in which they would have no knowledge of the legal
ramifications. This bill would, in effect, make the former
slaves as slaves again to different masters: unscrupulous
businessmen, attorneys and judges.
Johnson saw that this bill was also a means of foisting
unconstitutional jurisdiction of the Federal Government in every
state:
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Thus a perfect equality of the white and colored races
is attempted to be fixed by federal law in every state of
the Union over the vast field of state jurisdiction covered
by these enumerated rights.
If Congress can declare by law who shall hold lands,
who shall testify, who shall have capacity to make a
contract in a state, then Congress can by law also declare
who, without regard to color or race, shall have the right
to sit as a juror or as a judge, to hold any office, and
finally, to vote "in every state and territory of the
United States".
The legislation thus proposed invades the judicial
power of the state. It says to every state court or judge:
if you decide that this act is unconstitutional; if you
refuse, under the prohibition of a state law, to allow a
Negro to testify; if you hold that over such a subject
matter the state law is paramount ... your error of
judgment, howev