Ramona Kaye Simons, Sui Juris
4620 South Washington Road
All Rights Reserved
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Ramona Kaye Simons, Appeal Case No. 05-2460
Plaintiff/Appellant APPELLANT’S REPLY TO
PROOF BRIEF OF
Credit-Based Assets Servicing Circuit Rule 28(g).
and Securitization et al.,
Appellant Ramona Kaye Simons now comes to REPLY to the PROOF BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES, as accepted and filed by the Circuit Clerks despite a multitude of nasty typographical errors. Appellant hereby protests such sloppy and unprofessional work by Appellees’ attorney, Mr. Richard Welke, and the apparent error by the Circuit Clerks in accepting and docketing Mr. Welke’s PROOF BRIEF as the final version.
Appellant now urges this honorable Court of Appeals to focus its undivided attention on the merits of Her comprehensive legal theory, specifically as applied to this appeal. Appellant will now show that Appellees have erred fatally, and in numerous fundamental ways, by submitting apparent authorities which clearly defeat the very points their sloppy PROOF BRIEF hopes in vain will control this litigation.
APPELLANT’S ROBUST LEGAL THEORY SURVIVES EVERY TEST
By way of introducing the all important details which follow, Appellant has now proven that the Act of June 25, 1948 violated the Constitution in several fundamental ways. Contrary to 159 years of American constitutional jurisprudence accumulated after the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Act of June 25, 1948 effectively “broadcasted” the Article IV United States District Courts (“USDC”) into the several States of the Union. However, the latter Act did not expressly abolish the Article III District Courts of the United States (“DCUS”) where the vast majority of Federal court cases originated during that well documented period of 159 years. See 62 Stat. 869-1009.
From this legal theory it necessarily follows that, prior to June 25, 1948, all Federal district court cases within the several States did originate pursuant to original jurisdiction conferred upon the DCUS by Acts of Congress. Subsequent to June 25, 1948, a “sea change” was attempted by which the USDC were exploited to usurp the original jurisdictions of the DCUS, but without the required Acts of Congress either amending, or repealing and re-enacting, specific grants of original jurisdiction that remain in force today. Cf. 15 U.S.C. 1121.
The material evidence of this usurpation can be confirmed by comparing all Federal statutes which conferred original jurisdiction, with the actual Federal district courts that were in fact convened, as documented in the decisions issued and published by the latter courts.
On a point of methodology, this Court is strongly encouraged to examine in detail all Miscellaneous Provisions at the very end of the Act of June 25, 1948, with emphases on the stated legislative intent and Schedule of Laws Repealed. 62 Stat. 985, Sec. 2(b); 992, Sec. 39.
TITLES 18 AND 28 HAVE BEEN ALTERED WITHOUT ACT OF CONGRESS
Those Miscellaneous Provisions in the Act of June 25, 1948 contain at least three explicit references to the DCUS, as follows:
“district courts of the United States”
occurs at 62 Stat. 986, 987, Sec. 9
(“There is hereby established ....”)
“district court of the United States”
occurs at 62 Stat. 989, Sec. 17
(“In every civil action ....”)
“District Court of the United States”
occurs at 62 Stat, 990, Sec. 21
(“All pleadings ....”)
The latter Sec. 21 is particularly revealing and immensely important, in the present context, because it was later codified at 48 U.S.C. 864. The Explanatory Notes at 48 USCS 864 state this:
The “United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico” was substituted for “District Court of the United States for Puerto Rico” on authority of Act June 25, 1948, ch 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 895, which appears as 28 USCS §§ 132(a) and 119, and which provide respectively, that there shall be a district court of record in each judicial district known as the United States District Court for that district and that Puerto Rico shall comprise one judicial district. For the status of the Code as evidence, see 1 USCS § 204.
And, under “Codifications” [sic] the Historical and Statutory Notes at 48 USCA 864 make a similar revealing claim:
“United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico” was substituted for “District Court of the United States for Puerto Rico” in view of section 132(a) of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, which states that “There shall be in each judicial district a district court which shall be a court of record known as the United States District Court for the district” and section 119 of Title 28, which states that “Puerto Rico constitutes one judicial district.”
Now, ask yourself this all important question:
Who was responsible for such changes, if not the Congress of the United States? Only Congress can make law. Article I, Section 1.
Upon close scrutiny, these textual changes to 48 U.S.C. 864 did not result and could not have resulted from the Act of June 25, 1948, because that Act used the term “District Court of the United States” at 62 Stat. 990; because 62 Stat. 895, § 132 did not expressly rename the district court mentioned at 62 Stat. 990; and, because absolutely no subsequent Acts of Congress are cited anywhere as the required legislative authority for these textual alterations.
To demonstrate the language Congress uses whenever it decides to change the name of any Federal court, see § 32(b) at 63 Stat. 107 amending 62 Stat. 991 where Congress expressly changed the name of the Federal district court in the District of Columbia from DCUS to USDC.
Confer now at “Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius” in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition. A mandatory inference must be drawn that whatever was omitted or excluded from Federal statutes was intended to be omitted or excluded by Acts of Congress. In this context, then, the omission of name changes in the Statutes at Large from which Titles 28 and 48 were derived must be inferred to be intentional Acts of Congress. Congress did not change certain names!
In the example above, the codified version of Title 48 has been modified without the required Acts of Congress either amending, or repealing and re-enacting, the original Statute at Large from which 48 U.S.C. 864 was derived. Again, only Congress can make law. This finding is also consistent with the liberal construction rule for RICO statutes which was likewise never codified anywhere in Title 18, even though Titles 18 and 28 have both been enacted into positive law by Acts of Congress. 1 U.S.C. 204 supra is controlling now because it requires this Court to revert to the Statutes at Large as The Source.
THE DCUS WAS CONVENED WITHIN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT IN 1956
Appellant has also requested mandatory judicial notice by this Court of evidence that employees of the USDC at Bay City, Michigan, still lack one or more of the credentials required of all Federal judges and of all Federal magistrates. Impersonating an officer of the United States is a felony violation of 18 U.S.C. 912. Appellant’s Counsel has assembled a list of § 912 opinions which this Circuit Court has issued, and published. In chronological order, please see:
1919 DCUS Brafford v. U.S., 259 F. 511 (6th Cir. 1919)
1930 DCUS Roney v. U.S., 37 F.2d 341, 342 (6th Cir. 1930)
1936 DCUS Pierce v. U.S., 86 F.2d 949, 950 (6th Cir. 1936)
1944 DCUS Laing v. U.S., 145 F.2d 111, 112 (6th Cir. 1944)
[Act of June 25, 1948 puts USDC in 48 States: see 28 U.S.C. 132]
1954 USDC Newman v. U.S., 212 F.2d 450 (6th Cir. 1954)
1956 DCUS !! Snipes v. U.S.A., 230 F.2d 165, 166 (6th Cir. 1956)
1957 USDC Massengale v. U.S.A., 240 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1957)
It is obvious, from the published historical record above, that the DCUS was correctly convened within this Circuit 8 years after the Act of June 25, 1948 was first signed into law by President Truman. Correctly applied, as it should be, statutes such as 18 U.S.C. 3231, 62 Stat. 826, § 3231, must be strictly construed. Therefore, in Snipes the DCUS did enjoy original jurisdiction to institute a criminal prosecution after 1948 for alleged violations of the Federal statute at 18 U.S.C. 912!
Detailed proof from the published historical record now follows:
In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee; John E. McCall, Judge.
[Brafford v. U.S., 259 F. 511 (6th Cir. 1919)]
Appeal from District Court of the United States for the Western Division of the Northern District of Ohio; George P. Hahn, Judge.
[Roney v. U.S., 37 F.2d 341, 342 (6th Cir. 1930)]
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee; John D. Martin, Judge.
[Pierce v. U.S., 86 F.2d 949, 950 (6th Cir. 1936)]
On motion to vacate Judgment and Correct Sentence of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan; Edward J. Moinet, Judge.
[Laing v. U.S., 145 F.2d 111, 112 (6th Cir. 1944)]
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, Northern Division, Taylor, J., overruled motion to vacate.
[Newman v. U.S., 212 F.2d 450 (6th Cir. 1954)]
From a judgment of conviction in the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee, Western Division, Marion Speed Boyd, J., the defendant appealed. ... first tried to a jury on February 14, 1955.
[Snipes v. U.S.A., 230 F.2d 165, 166 (6th Cir. 1956)]
Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, John H. Druffel, J., ....
[Massengale v. U.S.A., 240 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1957)]
RELATED RESEARCH NOW REVEALS A THIRD EXTENSION STATUTE
The chain of evidence leading to statutes codified in Title 48 now compels Appellant to present a key holding of the Third Circuit, in a case again comparing constitutional courts, on the one hand, and territorial courts also known as legislative tribunals, on the other:
... [V]esting a territorial court with jurisdiction similar to that vested in the District Courts of the United States does not make it a “District Court of the United States.”
[Parrot v. Government of Virgin Islands]
[230 F.3d 615, 623, hns. 11-12 (3rd Cir. 2000)]
[bold emphasis added]
In this context, see also the following finding by a Federal district judge presiding upon a territorial court in U.S. v. King, in 1954 before the Territory of Alaska was admitted to the Union in 1959:
... [T]he term “district court of the United States” standing alone includes only the constitutional courts.
[United States v. King, 119 F.Supp. 398 (DC/Alaska 1954)]
[bold emphasis added]
The Parrot case cites high Court authorities in Mookini v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201 (1938) and also in Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 551-552 (1989). The decision in Barnard held that the Supreme Court lacked supervisory power over the District Court of the Virgin Islands because that Court was not an Article III Federal district court.
Moreover, the Barnard case also reveals the existence of a third “Extension Statute” as follows:
By extending the Privileges and Immunities Clause to the Virgin Islands, Congress has made the same decision with respect to that Territory. The residency requirements of [Local] Rule 56(b) violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2, of the Constitution, as extended to the Virgin Islands by 48 U.S.C. § 1561.
[Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 559 (1989)]
[bold emphasis added]
Appellant now lodges a formal objection to 48 U.S.C. 1561 supra, because Congress has previously extended all guarantees of the U.S. Constitution into all Federal Territories –- even future Federal Territories –- by Act of 1873 as previously cited and discussed in Appellant’s other pleadings now pending before this Court of Appeals.
Paraphrasing the Parrot decision supra, vesting a territorial tribunal like the USDC with jurisdiction similar to that vested in the District Courts of the United States cannot make the USDC an Article III “District Court of the United States”! See Balzac v. Porto Rico.
This must be true notwithstanding the Statute at Large which effectively “broadcasted” the USDC into all States of the Union on June 25, 1948, but without expressly abolishing the Article III DCUS which had existed inside those several States for at least 159 years prior to that date. See 28 U.S.C. 132, 62 Stat. 895, § 132(a).
When Congress extended the entire U.S. Constitution into D.C. in 1871, and then into all Federal Territories in 1873, even future Federal Territories, and then again into the Virgin Islands (with some qualifications: cf. 48 U.S.C. 1561), a clear pattern was established. That pattern is quite the opposite of any Congressional intent to change the DCUS substantially by eliminating its historic jurisdiction and/or by vesting all DCUS with jurisdiction similar to that vested in territorial tribunals, where Congress enjoys exclusive legislative jurisdiction (read “the federal zone”). The latter intent is also quite the opposite of the clear legislative intent as stated in the Miscellaneous Provisions, i.e. “as continuations of existing law”, e.g. the law of court jurisdiction. See 62 Stat. 985, Sec. 2(b).
The historical record therefore proves that Congress never expressed any intent to abolish the DCUS, nor is there any evidence in that record that Congress intended to make the USDC a “District Court of the United States”. Appellant is forced to speculate that FDR returned from the Yalta Conference with a secret deal which he shared with Truman, namely: to end WWII, foreign banks agreed to finance the United States, provided that its government agreed to lien on the assets of all American People, in order to repay those massive loans. When FDR died, Truman inherited that “deal” and thus was launched the Bill which later broadcasted the USDC into every State of the Union.
THE SEA CHANGE IN 1948 INTRODUCED SERIOUS AND SYSTEMATIC ERRORS
IN ALL FEDERAL COURT OPINIONS RE: THE FOIA AND PRIVACY ACT
Appellant’s Counsel also went the extra mile to inventory all Sixth Circuit Privacy Act opinions, as abstracted in the USCA, in the cumulative pocket supplement, and elsewhere, as follows:
1979 USDC/SDOH U.S. v. Collins, 596 F.2d 166
1980 USDC/SDOH Hanley v. U.S. DOJ, 623 F.2d 1138
1982 USDC/EDMI Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272
See also 476 F.Supp. 561 (USDC/EDMI 1979)
1983 USDC/MDTN Windsor v. The Tennessean, 719 F.2d 155
1988 Admin.Law NLRB v. U.S. Postal Service, 841 F.2d 141
1988 USDC/EDMI Manuel v. V.A. Hospital, 857 F.2d 1112
1994 USDC/NDOH Henson v. NASA, 14 F.3d 1143, 23 F.3d 990
1996 USDC/WDKY Mount v. U.S. Postal Service, 79 F.3d 531
1997 USDC/EDTN Hudson v. Reno, 130 F.3d 1193
2000 USDC/EDTN McKay v. Thompson, 226 F.3d 752
2001 USDC/WDKY Cardamone v. Cohen, 241 F.3d 520
2001 USDC/EDMI Risch v. U.S. Postal Service, 244 F.3d 510
See also 128 F.Supp.2d 437 (USDC/EDMI 1999)
2001 UDSC/NDOH Sneed v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 14 Fed.Appx. 343
2002 USDC/NDOH Downie v. City of Middleburg Heights, 301 F.3d 688
See also 76 F.Supp.2d 794 (USDC/NDOH 1999)
2004 USDC/NDOH Williams v. Bezy, 97 Fed.Appx. 573
2004 USDC/SDOH Whyde v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 101 Fed.Appx. 997
Not one of the cases cited above originated in the DCUS, despite the clear grant of original jurisdiction which Congress conferred upon the DCUS at 5 U.S.C. 552a(g). To repeat a monumentally important and controlling authority, statutes conferring original jurisdiction on Federal district courts must be strictly construed. Similar results obtain from Circuit opinions cited in Appellees’ sloppy PROOF BRIEF:
1982 USDC/D.C. Greentree v. U.S. Customs, 674 F.2d 74, 76, hn. 1
see 515 F.Supp. 1145 (USDC/D.C. 1981)
1982 USDC/EDNY FDIC v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230, hn. 3
see 92 F.R.D. 468 (USDC/EDNY 1981)
1983 USDC/D.NM Thomas v. U.S. DOE, 719 F.2d 342, 345-346, hn. 6
1985 USDC/WDWI Shapiro v. DEA, 762 F.2d 611, 612 (on remand)
1986 USDC/D.C. Vymetalik v. FBI, 785 F.2d 1090, 1092
1986 USDC/NDIL Kimberlin v. U.S. DOJ, 788 F.2d 434, 436, hn. 1
see 605 F.Supp. 79 (USDC/NDIL 1985)
1986 USDC/EDWA Hewitt v. Grabicki, 794 F.2d 1373, 1377, fn. 2
see 596 F.Supp 297 (USDC/EDWA 1984)
1987 USDC/D.C. Tijerina v. Walters, 821 F.2d 789, 797, hn. 3
Again, not one of the cases cited above originated in the DCUS, despite the clear grants of original jurisdiction which Congress conferred upon the DCUS in the FOIA at 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B), and in the Privacy Act at 5 U.S.C. 552a(g). Identical results obtain from the district court opinions cited in Appellees’ sloppy PROOF BRIEF:
1977 USDC/SDNY Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Mathews,
428 F.Supp. 523, 527, hn. 4
1982 USDC/D.NJ Ryans v. New Jersey Com’n for the Blind, Etc.,
542 F.Supp. 841, 852, hn. 11
1986 USDC/EDNY Miller v. U.S.A.,
630 F.Supp. 347, 348, hn. 1
2000 USDC/WDVA Falwell v. Executive Office of the President,
113 F.Supp.2d 967
2002 USDC/D.C. Judicial Watch v. NEPDG,
219 F.Supp.2d 20, 55, hns. 24-25
Once again, not one of the cases that are cited above originated in the DCUS, despite the clear grants of original jurisdiction which Congress conferred upon the DCUS at 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B) supra, and at 5 U.S.C. 552a(g) supra (FOIA and Privacy Act, respectively).
Title 5 of the U.S. Code has also been enacted into positive law, and that Title was derived from certain Statutes at Large which expressly conferred original jurisdiction upon the DCUS, not the USDC!
See 81 Stat. 54-55, P.L. 90-23 adding § 552(a)(4) (“On complaint, the district court of the United States ... has jurisdiction ....”); and 88 Stat. 1901, P.L. 93-579 (“(g)(1) Civil Remedies. ... the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction ....”) which enacted the Privacy Act. See also 88 Stat. 1909:
While we are on this delicate subject, this Court will please also take note that Sec. 7 of P.L. 93-579 (1974), concerning the privacy of social security numbers, was never codified anywhere in Title 5 either. The text of this statute can only be found in the Historical and Statutory Notes after the full text of the Privacy Act!
WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS, ALL OPINIONS SUBMITTED BY
APPELLEES SUFFER FROM FATAL AND FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS
In light of the basic historical foundations established above, it is easy to show how each opinion submitted by Appellees did fail one or more of the following legal tests, with a few key exceptions:
(2) Appellant correctly applied to the DCUS with Petitions for Judicial Review of Privacy Act claims, and for leave to amend;
(3) the Rules Enabling Act authorized the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of evidence and procedure for the USDC, but not the DCUS;
(4) Appellees filed motions to dismiss and related pleadings in the USDC, which lacked jurisdiction in the first instance;
(5) Appellees filed motions to dismiss and related pleadings which invoked one or more rules of the FRCP, but the FRCP have no legal force or effect upon cases proceeding in the DCUS;
(6) as such, in spite of certain limited merits, all motions and related pleadings filed to date by Appellees in the USDC failed to state any claims upon which relief could be granted by that USDC, because that USDC lacked original jurisdiction;
(7) even if it had jurisdiction, the USDC’s personnel assigned to preside lacked one or more of the credentials required of all Federal judges and magistrates by the Constitution and statutes;
(8) all actions and decisions by those unqualified personnel were null and void, ab initio, pursuant to the Oath of Office Clause, statutes enacted to implement that Clause, and pertinent cases;
(9) no orders of reference, no valid rulings on any motions, and no final judgments were ever issued by the DCUS, or by the USDC;
(10) ironically, the USDC’s employee who impersonated a Federal magistrate did prepare findings and conclusions which agreed that the USDC did lack jurisdiction, but for several wrong reasons;
(11) all of the above were also true of Appellant’s “Prior Action”;
(12) Appellant now challenges the Abrogation Clause in the Rules Enabling Act at 28 U.S.C. 2072(b) and the entire Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869-1009, for violating fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution as expressly extended into D.C. and into all Federal Territories. See Article I, Section 1.
One of the exceptional opinions cited in Appellees’ sloppy PROOF BRIEF is the decision in Giba-Geigy Corp. v. Mathews supra. Appellant has not applied the above 12 points to that decision. Nevertheless, it is valuable to the instant appeal for holding that an organization can be considered the “functional equivalent” of a Federal agency if the latter agency routinely adopts that organization’s decisions as its own. See Ciba-Geigy at 527, headnote 4.
Similarly, in Hewitt v. Grabicki supra, the Ninth Circuit held that a Privacy Act plaintiff was entitled to amend his complaint to add the Veterans Administration as a defendant, and that this amendment would relate back to the date of the original pleading filed by that plaintiff. Hewitt at 1377, fn. 2. Appellant attempted same.
Furthermore, in that opinion the Ninth Circuit observed the weight of authority is that the Privacy Act’s authorization of suits only against an “agency” thereby excludes individual officers and Federal government employees. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit also agreed with several courts which held that heads of Federal agencies are proper party defendants in their official capacities in Privacy Act cases. Such agency heads have the final authority and ultimate responsibility for custody and disclosure of records. Hewitt supra.
In Shapiro v. D.E.A. supra, the Seventh Circuit explained the intent of Congress to construe the Privacy Act and FOIA separately and independently. Exemption from disclosure under the Privacy Act does not exempt disclosure under the FOIA, and vice versa. Thus, the Seventh Circuit has held that information may be unavailable when a party requests access to that information under the Privacy Act, but it may be available when that information is requested under the FOIA.
The standing precedent of this Sixth Circuit in U.S. v. O’Dell, 160 F.2d 304, is also worthy of emphasis here, not merely because it originated in the DCUS. In that case, this Circuit Court held that the Internal Revenue Service may not levy a bank account without first obtaining a warrant of distraint, making the bank a party, and serving the bank with a notice of levy, the warrant of distraint, and a copy of the lien. Appellant offers to prove that this precedent is not being honored within this Circuit, nor anywhere else within the USA; as such, current IRS and bank practices violate due process of law.
Insofar as the U.S. Department of the Treasury and its various collection “agencies” continue to adopt and approve of current IRS practices in similar situations, particularly when those practices violate Federal laws, the IRS has become the “functional equivalent” of that Department. See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87 (1959), in chief; and 2 Am Jur 2d, page 129 (1962).
This is true, even though the IRS now masquerades as Trust #62 domiciled in San Juan, Puerto Rico, under color of the former Federal Alcohol Administration (“FAA”), and even though that FAA was declared unconstitutional inside the several States by a standing decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
As such, IRS is expressly excluded from the statutory definition of “agency” at 5 U.S.C. 551(1)(C) (governments of U.S. Territories and Possessions are not “agencies” for purposes of the FOIA and Privacy Act). 27 CFR 26.11 defines “Revenue Agent” as an office in San Juan!
Because the U.S. Department of the Treasury routinely adopts IRS decisions as its own, and because the vast majority of banks cooperate with the IRS without attempting to enforce the requirements set out in O’Dell supra, it does not require a great stretch of imagination to show that all American banks are likewise rendered the “functional equivalent” of the U.S. Treasury by these cooperative arrangements. The late author Dan Meador called it “cooperative federalism.”
Appellees’ PROOF BRIEF lists the Internal Revenue Service as one of the “agencies” covered by the Privacy Act (at Pages 29-30).
APPELLEES MAY HAVE SET A NEW RECORD WITH A
RUN-ON SENTENCE SPANNING THREE FULL PAGES
Not only is their “run-on” sentence at Pages 21-23 replete with punctuation and spelling errors; Appellees try to collapse Appellant’s requested actions by this Court into one single phrase: those actions “should be summarily rejected in their entirety because they are patently frivolous with no basis in the record, fact or law.”
Appellees make this statement after stressing that moving parties must prove there is no genuine issue of material fact! FRCP Rule 12.
Now pending before this honorable Court is Appellant’s MOTION FOR THREE ORDERS TO SHOW CAUSE, one of which would order Mr. Welke to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of standing U.S. Supreme Court decisions previously cited and discussed by Appellant.
In light of all the substantial authorities which Appellant cites elsewhere and above, and in light of Appellant’s prior objections to Mr. Welke’s continued misuse of the term “frivolous,” it remains unclear to Appellant whether Mr. Welke willfully intends to apply that pejorative to standing decisions of the Supreme Court, and also now to standing decisions of this Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
No one in his right mind should read to this point, and conclude that Appellant’s requested actions also have no basis in the record, in fact or in law. What a ridiculous insult to Simons and this Court!
APPELLANT OFFERS TO PROVE THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
IS INFILTRATED WITH AGENTS OF FOREIGN BANKS
If Appellees do not contest the credentials of any jurist involved in this case, then why has Mr. Welke not filed opposition to Appellant’s MOTION FOR THREE ORDERS TO SHOW CAUSE? If granted, that MOTION would also result in ordering the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts to appear and to show cause why all A.O. personnel should not be held in contempt of the outstanding SUBPOENA IN A CIVIL CASE i.e. for all APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS and all OATHS OF OFFICE of all federal justices, judges, magistrates, clerks and deputy clerks.
Form 61 of the Office of Personnel Management is also known as the APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVIT required of all Federal court personnel by the Federal statute at 5 U.S.C. 3331. This Form 61 is unique among the 4 credentials required of all Federal judges, because it expressly identifies the “Department or agency” to which a judge is appointed, in addition to the “Position to which [s/he is] appointed”.
Even if Messrs. Lawson and Binder did produce originals or certified copies of the APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS required of them, it is Appellant’s contention that the “Department or agency” identified on those credentials would be the United States District Court, and not the District Court of the United States. Thus, a truly genuine issue of material fact is now confirmed in the existence, or absence, of OPM Form 61 APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS for all Federal personnel who have been involved to date in Appellant’s court cases in any manner whatsoever.
If Mr. Welke cannot or will not recognize the legal significance of missing credentials, then he is also in contempt of the U.S. Constitution, and this is hardly a trivial matter which Appellant intends to overlook or treat lightly, ever! See 28 U.S.C. 132(b).
I, Ramona Kaye Simons, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty of the perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1). See Supremacy Clause (Constitution, Laws and Treaties are all the supreme Law of the Land).
Dated: May ____ 2006
Printed: Ramona Kaye Simons, Appellant Sui Juris
PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Ramona Kaye Simons, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that I am at least 18 years of age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I personally served the following document(s):
APPELLANT’S REPLY TO
PROOF BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:
Circuit Rule 28(g)
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to the following:
Leonard Green, Clerk of Court (7x)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
532 Potter Stewart U.S. Courthouses
100 East Fifth Street
Office of the Director (3x)
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
One Columbus Circle, N.E.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Clerk of Court (3x)
District Court of the United States
Eastern Judicial District of Michigan
1000 Washington Ave., Room 214
Bay City 48706
Richard Welke (3x)
Trott & Trott
Attorney for C-BASS and Litton Loan
30400 Telegraph Road, Suite 200
Bingham Farms 48025
Courtesy copies to:
Office of Solicitor General (3x)
950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Dated: May ____ 2006
Printed: Ramona Kaye Simons, Appellant Sui Juris
[Please see USPS Publication #221 for addressing instructions:
(see 6th Cir. Rule 28(g))
Sneed v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 14 Fed.Appx. 343 (2001)
Williams v. Bezy et al., 97 Fed.Appx. 573 (2004)
Whyde v. Rockwell International Corp., 101 Fed.Appx. 997 (2004)