Registered U.S. Mail No. RR-507-445-419-US

Return Receipt Requested

Restricted Delivery Requested







TO:       Grand Jury Foreperson [sic]

          In re: U.S.A. v. Donald E. Wishart,

          USDC Docket #CR-00-20227-JF

          Grand Jury Room

          United States District Court

          280 South First Street

          San Jose, California


FROM:     Dr. Donald E. Wishart, D.M.D., Sui Juris

          Citizen of California State and

          Federal Witness (18 U.S.C. 1512, 1513)

      c/o 5150 Graves Avenue, Suite 12-C

          San Jose, California


DATE:     September 8, 2000 A.D.


SUBJECT:  Request to Appear in Writing before a

          Lawfully Convened Federal Grand Jury:

          Petition Clause;  18 U.S.C. 1504, paragraph 2



Dear Foreperson:


The purpose of this PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION BY AFFIDAVIT, is to request an opportunity to make a special appearance de bene esse before a lawfully convened federal grand jury, and to do so in writing.  See Petition Clause and 18 U.S.C. 1504, paragraph 2, to wit:


Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the communication of a request to appear before the grand jury.


It is well known that "appearances" can be made in writing.  For example, any answer constitutes an "appearance."  Wieser v. Richter, 247 Mich. 52, 225 N.W. 542, 543.  See also the several definitions of "appearance" in Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition with Pronunciations.



Please be advised that there is currently a fatal flaw in the federal Jury Selection and Service Act (“JSSA”) at 28 U.S.C. 1865(b)(1), for the following, well documented reasons:


1.               Any federal grand jury or trial jury selected in compliance with the JSSA cannot be a legal body, even if every juror is otherwise qualified by statute:


a.               due to class discrimination against State Citizens, i.e. Citizens of ONE OF the United States of America, who are not also federal citizens by Right of Election [sic];  confer at Federal citizenship in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition;  see 1866 Civil Rights Act;  42 USCS 1983;  Wadleigh v. Newhall, 136 F. 941 (CC Cal, 1905):  only federal citizens have standing to sue under 42 U.S.C. 1983;


b.   such discrimination, against an entire class of Citizens, violates the fundamental guarantees of equal protection as enumerated at Article 7 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and at Article 26 in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the latter enacted with specific Reservations;  treaty provisions are supreme Law, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause (“6:2”) in the Constitution for the United States of America, as lawfully amended (hereinafter “U.S. Constitution”);  copies of these two Treaties are attached as Exhibit “A” and incorporated by reference, as if set forth fully herein;


c.   the ruling in Pannill v. Roanoke, 252 F. 910, 914, is definitive, and dispositive:  federal citizens were not even contemplated when the U.S. Constitution was drafted;  therefore, before 1866, there was only one class of citizens;  after 1866, there were two classes of citizens, the second of which is a municipal franchise domiciled in the District of Columbia (“D.C.”) and subject to federal municipal jurisdiction;  see Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885);


d.             numerous court citations are available to prove this class discrimination in the JSSA, at 28 U.S.C. 1865(b)(1);  see Topic “A” in the OPENING BRIEF, U.S.A. v. Gilbertson and all related pleadings (whether filed or not);  copies of this OPENING BRIEF and draft APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE ENLARGED BRIEF are attached as Exhibits “B” and “C”, respectively, and incorporated by reference, as if set forth fully herein;


e.   such discrimination means that those qualified to make federal laws, cannot now vote or serve on federal juries;  and, those eligible to vote and serve on federal juries, cannot now make federal laws;  see Qualifications Clauses for seminal authorities (1:2:2, 1:3:3, and 2:1:5);  confer also at Reductio ad absurdum in Black’s supra;  the term “United States” in these provisions means “States united” [sic];  see People v. Pablo De La Guerra, 40 Cal. 311, 337 (1870);  no taxation without representation.


Accordingly, even though you and the other “jurors” on your panel may all be qualified to serve, the entire panel is not a legal body due to this class discrimination against the very People who are qualified to make federal Laws in America.  See the Qualifications Clauses, in chief, at 1:2:2, 1:3:3 and 2:1:5 (“Article : Section : Clause”).



In addition to this serious, unconstitutional flaw which has now been thoroughly documented in the JSSA and elsewhere (e.g. voter registration affidavits), we hereby provide formal NOTICE to you of the following additional reasons for requesting an opportunity to make a written appearance before a lawfully convened federal grand jury:


2.   Messrs. ROBERT S. MUELLER III, THOMAS S. DiLEONARDO, and GREGORY S. GORDON, alleging to be employed currently by the U.S. Department of Justice and currently prosecuting the instant case, do not have valid Powers of Attorney to represent the Plaintiffs UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic]:


a.   Plaintiffs are identified by the plural, collective noun which is synonymous with, and refers exclusively to, the Union of several States united by, and under, the U.S. Constitution;  see Preamble, in chief (i.e. “We the People … do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”  [bold emphasis added]);


b.   Plaintiffs and Defendant are both identified by a nomme de guerre or “name of war” in the French language (i.e. ALL CAPITAL LETTERS) when a state of war does not exist as a matter of fact, and can not exist as a matter of Law;  warring against the several States is defined as treason in the U.S. Constitution;  see Article III, Section 3, Clause 1 (“3:3:1”);  one of the penalties for treason is death;  there are no provisions in the U.S. Constitution authorizing perpetual martial law;  the Law of Nations is emphatically NOT the supreme Law of this Land;  see also “The Lawless Law of Nations,” by author Sterling Edmunds;


c.               the several Attorneys General, representing the 50 States of the Union, have not made proper appearances, nor has any one of them brought this action, in the first instance;


d.   accordingly, by failing to make any proper appearances, Plaintiffs have failed to prosecute the instant case.



3.   Plaintiffs UNITED STATES OF AMERICA do not have standing to prosecute criminal cases in this United States District Court (hereinafter “USDC”):


a.               see citations in re standing in People v. United States, NOTICE OF INTENT TO PETITION FOR LEAVE TO INSTITUTE QUO WARRANTO PROCEEDINGS, DCUS, Billings, #CV-96-163-BLG;  a copy of said NOTICE is attached as Exhibit “D” and incorporated by reference, as if set forth fully herein;


b.               Congress has failed to grant standing to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA to sue as Plaintiffs in federal courts, although Congress has granted standing to the “United States” to sue, and be sued, in federal courts;  see, in particular, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1345, 1346.



4.   The USDC does not have any original jurisdiction to prosecute criminal cases and has no statutory or constitutional authority to convene a federal grand jury to issue criminal indictments:


a.   18 U.S.C. 3231 grants original jurisdiction to the District Courts of the United States (“DCUS”), not to the USDC;  see dispositive case of Mookini et al. v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201, 205 (1938);  confer at Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius in Black’s supra:  what was omitted, or excluded, was intended to be omitted or excluded;  the USDC was expressly omitted from 18 U.S.C. 3231;  omission of USDC was intentional;


b.               statutes granting original jurisdiction to the federal courts must be strictly construed;  see Mookini supra and numerous other cites (available upon request);


c.               USDC is a legislative court, not a constitutional court, with authority issuing from Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 (“4:3:2”);  see Balzac v. Porto Rico [sic], 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1924); numerous other cites, notably those developed at Topic “E” of the OPENING BRIEF in U.S.A. v. Gilbertson supra; recently, federal magistrates have erred by claiming authority under Article I of the U.S. Constitution;


d.               Defendant enjoys the fundamental Right to defend Himself in a federal constitutional court where Due Process guarantees are in effect and enforceable, not in a legislative court;  see Fifth Amendment, in chief (i.e. no deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law);


e.               Defendant also enjoys the fundamental Right to know precisely -- without vagueness, ambivalence or duplicity -- the nature and cause of the instant accusation(s);  see Sixth Amendment, in chief;


f.               Defendant also enjoys the fundamental Right to prosecute His own VERIFIED CRIMINAL CROSS-COMPLAINT(s) in a federal constitutional court, not in a legislative court;  see Petition Clause in the First Amendment, in chief, and the Arising Under Clause (“3:2:1”);


g.               court pleadings, and requests to appear before a lawful grand jury, are petitions to Government for redress of grievances, afforded First Amendment protections, and not allowing dubious intrusions of any kind;  see Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516;  City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 31 Cal.3d 527, 535;


h.               Under Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 (“3:2:2”), the U.S. Supreme Court has original jurisdiction of the instant case, to wit:  In all Cases … in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.  All 50 States are Proper Parties to the instant case;


i.               if “UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” refers to some other legal entity(s), Defendant is now at a total loss even to guess what it (or they) might be, and hereby alleges major fraud, if that is, in fact, the case;  see 18 U.S.C. 1031.



5.   In all criminal cases, Defendant is guaranteed federal courts of competent jurisdiction, per the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (a United States Treaty);  this guarantee is fundamental;  see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 8;  and the Supremacy Clause (“6:2”) in pari materia with the Arising Under Clause (“3:2:1”) and 28 U.S.C. 1331 (a federal question is a matter arising under the Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the United States):


a.               the USDC is not competent to prosecute this case;  to illustrate, the following dialectic is right on point:


“Q.  Does the Constitution give people any right to proceed or be proceeded against, in the first instance, in an inferior federal constitutional court rather than a federal legislative court?


“A.  As to criminal defendants charged with offenses committed in one of the states, surely.  [!!!]


Source:  "The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:  An Exercise in Dialectic," by Henry M. Hart, Jr., in 66 Harvard Law Review 1365-1366 (1953)  [bold emphasis added];


b.   Act of June 25, 1948, unlawfully extended the USDC, a legislative court [sic], into judicial districts already established within each State of the Union;


c.   Act of June 25, 1948, expressly intended to continue the judicial jurisdiction of the DCUS;  legislative intent is always decisive;  Section 2(b) of the Act June 25, 1948, provided, in part, that the provisions of this title [i.e. Title 28, U.S.C.] as set out in § 1 of the Act of June 25, 1948, with respect to the organization of the court, shall be construed as a continuation of existing law;  the Act of June 25, 1948, contains the following corresponding language, to wit:


The provisions of title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, of the United States Code, set out in section 1 of this Act, with respect to the organization of each of the several courts therein provided for ... shall be construed as continuations of existing law. ...  No loss of rights, interruption of jurisdiction, or prejudice to matters pending in any of such courts on the effective date of this Act shall result from its enactment.

[bold emphasis added]


d.               by virtue of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto Laws, the Act of June 25, 1948, was barred from re-defining terms in all prior statutes granting original jurisdiction to the DCUS;  see Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 (“1:9:3”);  also Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 240 U.S. 1 (1916), as a case in point (brought in the DCUS, Southern District of New York);  in other words, Congress cannot retroactively alter the meaning of the term “district court of the United States” as that term is found in statutes pre-dating June 25, 1948;  term has a well established historic significance, per Mookini supra;


e.   Quoting: In essence a legislative court is merely an administrative agency with an elegant name.  While Congress surely has the power to transfer portions of the business of the federal judiciary to legislative courts, a wholesale transfer of that business would work a fundamental change in the status of our independent judiciary and would seem vulnerable to constitutional attack.”  Kenneth L. Karst, Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, New York, MacMillan Publishing Company (1986), volume 3, page 1144, discussion of topic LEGISLATIVE COURT [bold emphasis added];  see also Bibliography, Note 1962, "Legislative and Constitutional Courts:  What Lurks Ahead for Bifurcation," Yale Law Journal, 71:979-1012;


f.   therefore, DCUS continues to exist within the federal court system, notwithstanding absence of any U.S. Supreme Court authority(s) to issue civil or criminal rules for the DCUS;  in this regard, see 28 U.S.C. 2072(a) and (b), in chief;


g.   Defendant has the procedural right to petition the DCUS, or the U.S. Supreme Court, for a WARRANT OF REMOVAL, transferring the instant case into the proper federal court with competent, original jurisdiction.



6.   Man alleging to preside on this Court ("JF") has an adverse conflict of interest for volunteering to allow his judicial compensation (read “pay”) to be diminished by federal income taxes;  see 28 U.S.C. 455, in chief:


a.   Article III, Section 1 (“3:1”) immunizes all federal judges from diminution of their judicial pay;  this provision has never been amended, or repealed;


b.   this immunity was expressly upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920);


c.               Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist has admitted publicly that all federal judges currently pay taxes on their pay;  a Press Release memorializing this admission is attached as Exhibit “E” and incorporated by reference, as if set forth fully herein;


d.   taxation of judical pay is proof of undue influence by Trust #62 domiciled in Puerto Rico, dba Internal Revenue Service [sic];  see Lord v. Kelley, 240 F.Supp. 167, 169 (1965) admitting undue influence, and “The Cooper File” in re Trust #62 and the Performance Management and Recognition System (“PMRS”);  Anti-Kickback Act of 1986, 41 U.S.C. 51 et seq.;  The Cooper File” is attached as Exhibit “F” and incorporated by reference, as if set forth fully herein;


e.               Downes Doctrine is specious for creating a colorable excuse for taxing judicial pay;  see Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), paraphrasing: “the Constitution of the United States, as such, does not extend beyond the limits of the States which are united by and under it”;


f.               Downes Doctrine is contravened by Acts of 1871 and 1873, expressly extending the U.S. Constitution into D.C. and into all federal Territories, respectively, to settle any lingering doubts about its applicability therein;  see cites in draft entitled FIRST SUPPLEMENT TO NOTICE OF INTENT TO PETITION SUPREME COURT FOR PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS in U.S.A. v. Gilbertson, which is attached as Exhibit “G” and incorporated by reference, as if set forth fully herein;


g.   therefore, the DCUS is currently vacant because it lacks qualified judicial officers, in all judicial districts, e.g. Northern Judicial District of California;  California State is decidedly not a “United States District” [sic] nor a “federal area” or enclave or territory or possession (i.e. none of the above), notwithstanding the Buck Act.



7.   Man alleging to preside on this USDC has failed to perfect the Oath of Office required by Article VI, Section 3 (“6:3”):


a.               judicial immunity cannot be invoked without original jurisdiction and without a valid Oath of Office;  without original jurisdiction, this USDC has only enough authority to dismiss the instant case, for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (USDC cannot issue any relief whatsoever);


b.               lacking the requisite Oath of Office, the man alleging to preside on the instant case, and all accomplices, are personally liable to Defendant for impersonating federal officers, and for all related federal offenses, e.g. 18 U.S.C. 912, also 18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 241, 1961 et seq.;


c.               Defendant reserves a fundamental Right to litigate all operative provisions of the U.S. Constitution, in equity (read “as a matter of contract with the American People”), notwithstanding current absence of rules for the DCUS;  see 28 U.S.C. 2072(a) and (b);  it is apparent that federal government employees and agents are now fraudulently attempting to enforce non-existent provisions in the U.S. Constitution;


d.               Congress has failed to enact legislation clarifying a procedure to compel disclosure of a federal judge’s Oath of Office;  litigants, whether civil or criminal, are entitled to actual notice that a valid Oath of Office has been executed by the man or woman claiming to preside as federal judge, or federal magistrate judge, in any given case.



8.   In all criminal cases, Defendant also enjoys the fundamental guarantee of qualified judicial officers, per the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights at Article 2, Section 3(b) and Article 9, Section 3;  see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 8; and Supremacy Clause (“6:2”) in pari materia with the Arising Under Clause (“3:2:1”) in the U.S. Constitution, and with 28 U.S.C. 1331 (a federal question is a matter arising under the Constitution, Laws and Treaties):


a.   man alleging to preside on the instant case is necessarily disqualified for lacking a valid Oath of Office, and for exhibiting adverse conflicts of interest, chiefly the undue executive influence resulting from taxing judicial pay;


b.   Separation of Powers Doctrine is violated when undue executive influence is discovered upon Court, resulting in judicial partiality, bias and dependence;  the Framers of the U.S. Constitution intended Article III to authorize an impartial, unbiased and independent judiciary;


c.             a gold-fringed American flag has been defined by former President and Supreme Allied Commander during World War II, Dwight D. Eisenhower, as the banner of the Commander-in-Chief, providing further proof of undue executive influence (President is Commander-in-Chief and head of the Executive Branch).



9.               Defendant has been victimized by a property conversion racket, most likely orchestrated by rogue agents and/or imposters within the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and their accomplices (whether witting, or unwitting):


a.               Mr. LeRoy Michael Schweitzer’s early “warrants” were deliberately cleared, most likely by cooperating banks, to give the appearance of overall authenticity to unsuspecting users of his later “warrants”;  this is fraud;


b.               None of Schweitzer’s so-called “liens” was ever perfected, because “true bills” [sic], bearing his “accommodation” signatures, incorrectly inferred consent from the silence of those whom he accused, in violation of the Fifth Amendment;  see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (in re the Right to remain silent);  as enjoyed by any accused, this Right is unalienable (read “un-lien-able”);


c.               None of Schweitzer’s so-called “liens” was ever perfected, because those whom he accused never enjoyed due process of law (specifically notice, hearing, trial, jury verdict, and final judgment), notwithstanding the U.C.C.;


d.               after being tendered, Schweitzer’s “warrants” were assembled at various DOJ offices, e.g. downtown Los Angeles, California, where electronic and hard-copy dossiers were collated with records of tangible, valuable assets owned by warrant users;  asset groups were then targeted for forfeiture by DOJ;


e.               DOJ continues to use the PROMIS software (Prosecutors Management Information System) evidently stolen from the Inslaw Corporation, to collate said dossiers;


f.               typically, bank fraud and/or mail fraud charges were then brought against users of Schweitzer’s “warrants,” forcing valuable assets into forfeiture, and imposing fines and penalties for violations exactly like those alleged in the instant indictment;  see 18 U.S.C. §§ 287, 1341, in chief;


g.               systematic repetition of such fines, penalties and forfeitures amounts to premeditated entrapment and a property conversion racket, in direct violation of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), at 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.;


h.               Defendant was entrapped, and thus victimized, by the very same racket; see Petitioner’s OFFER TO PROVE RACKETEEERING, which is attached as Exhibit “H” and incorporated by reference, as if set forth fully herein;


i.               under federal banking laws, Schweitzer’s “warrants” should have been refused and returned to their “maker” within 72 hours, particularly when they were endorsed “without recourse” as to the payee(s);  instead, the warrants were converted into the possession of FBI and then DOJ;


j.               Defendant’s status as a “payee” was no different from one who assigns his pay check to his landlord;  upon discovering insufficient funds, for example, the landlord’s recourse is to the maker of the warrant, not the tenant;


k.               Schweitzer either knew, or should have known, the high risks associated such tendering any such bogus warrants, and he failed to warn Defendant and other prospective users of those risks;  to this extent, he must bear some responsibility for the consequences of his advice;


l.               Defendant reserves His right to subpoena LeRoy Schweitzer:  “to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor”, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution.



10.           The income tax statutes in the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) are municipal laws deliberately written to be vague as to their territorial application, specific liabilities, known legal duties and their enforceability (if any):


a.               term “Internal” means “Municipal”;  the municipal  nature of the IRC’s income tax provisions is res judicata under ruling in plaintiffs’ favor in Knox v. U.S. et al., USDC, W.D. Texas, #SA-89-CA-1308;  see winning brief, published as Appendix “A” in The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue, and edited for spelling and grammar by Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., after John Knox’s passing;  Appendix “A” is attached as Exhibit “I” and incorporated by reference, as if set forth fully herein;


b.               the term “State” at IRC 3121(e) is restricted to the named territories and possessions of D.C., Guam, Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and Puerto Rico;  experts in the offices of the Legislative Counsel and Congressional Research Service advised U.S. Representative Barbara Kennelly of same;  identical constructions are found in other pertinent IRC sections, and many other federal laws;


c.               Defendant expressly reserves His fundamental Right to subpoena said legal experts:  “to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor”, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment;  letter from Rep. Kennelly to John Randall is attached as Exhibit “J” and incorporated by reference, as if set forth fully herein;


d.               Congress is prohibited from re-defining terms which are found in the U.S. Constitution;  see Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), prohibiting Congress from defining the term “income” (holding predicated on ratification of the so-called 16th amendment, later proven to be a fraud);  also U.S. v. Ballard, 535 F.2d 400, 404 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that “income” is not defined anywhere in the IRC);


e.               the terms “State” and “United States” figure prominently throughout the U.S. Constitution, and Congress often re-defines both terms to exclude the 50 States of the Union, in direct violation of the Eisner Prohibition supra;


f.               President Andrew Johnson’s 3-man commission, convened after President Abraham Lincoln’s assassination, issued a set of municipal codes with a nation-wide scope;  a federal judge lectured the D.C. Historical Society, on December 5, 1898, that Congress has no authority whatsoever to extend its municipal laws into the several States of the Union, in violation of the Tenth Amendment;  to do so invades the province of the 50 States, expressly reserved to them, and to their People, by the Tenth Amendment;  this federal judge’s admission is a “smoking gun”;


g.               there are no statutes creating specific liabilities for taxes imposed by IRC subtitle A, except for federal government employees [sic] and withholding agents;  Defendant is neither;  see IRC 7701(a)(16) and the statutes itemized therein;


h.               federal income taxes are completely voluntary for Citizens of ONE OF the 50 States;  compare also the “Withholding Exemption Certificate” at IRC 3402(n):  absent liability statutes, there can be no liability and no requirement to file Form 1040, for any given calendar year, unless one volunteers to assess oneself and to make oneself liable;


i.               28 U.S.C. 1746(2) governs the perjury jurat on IRS Form 1040 (i.e. jurat format is inside the “United States” [sic]);  IRS has published no form(s) for said Certificate, although many private and State governmental organizations have done so, e.g. California Franchise Tax Board (“FTB”), and John Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland;


j.               the regulations at 26 CFR 1.1-1(b) are overly broad, for creating liabilities not specifically authorized by the corresponding statute, i.e. IRC § 1, thus violating the Separation of Powers Doctrine:  the Executive Branch cannot make Law by regulations published in the Federal Register;


k.               all legislative powers are reserved to the Congress;  see Article I, Section 1 (“1:1”), i.e. “All legislative Powers herein granted” are vested in the Congress of the United States (not anywhere else);


l.               further vagueness occurs at IRC 7851(a)(6)(A), in regards to the meaning of the term “this title” [sic];  the consistent federal legislative practice is to use this term to refer to a Title of the United States Code, e.g. compare statutes in Title 28 (the laws which govern the federal courts!);  term there means Title 28;


m.               Title 26, U.S.C., has never been enacted into positive law;  see House Speaker “Tip” O’Neill’s admission in this regard;  IRC 7851 also falls within subtitle F (Procedure and Administration) i.e. IRC §§ 6000 thru 8000 roughly;  Congressional committees cannot make law either;  President must sign, before bills become Law;


n.               the high Court has defined the criterion to prove vagueness in a statute:  “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,” Connally v. General Construction Company, 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) [bold emphasis added];


o.               the term “this title” is not defined in the IRC;  by asking ten (10) people of common intelligence to explain IRC 7851(a)(6)(A), their answers will vary, and have varied, in fact;  this section, therefore, fails the high Court’s vagueness test, as do numerous other IRC sections (some of which require the equivalent of 5 Ph.D.-level degrees to comprehend);


p.               thus, IRC 7851(a)(6)(A) is null and void for vagueness, and no provisions of subtitle F have ever taken effect, inclusive also of section 7851;


q.               Defendant is charged with violating 26 U.S.C. §§ 7203 and 7212(a), both in subtitle F (IRC §§ 6000 thru 8000 roughly) and not currently in effect as positive law, as such;  any doubt of this kind must be resolved in favor of those upon whom the “tax” is sought to be laid;  see Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McLain, 192 U.S. 397, 416 (1904);


r.               accordingly, during calendar years 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998 A.D., Defendant had no legal duty to make an income tax return to the District Director of the IRS for the Internal Revenue District of Central California, at San Jose, in the Northern District of California;


s.               during calendar years 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998 A.D., Defendant had no legal duty to make an income tax return to the Director, Internal Revenue Service Center at Fresno, California;


t.               during calendar years 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998 A.D., Defendant had no legal duty to make an income tax return to any other proper officer [sic] of the United States;  California is not a “federal area” [sic] under the Buck Act (see term “California area” [sic] in the instant indictment at page 1, line 22);


u.               during said calendar years, Defendant received no “gross income” from sources inside the “United States” [sic] and Defendant was not specifically liable to the United States, nor to any other party(s), for payment of any federal income taxes upon gross receipts He may have received from sources outside the United States [sic] during those years;


v.               meaning of “United States” is controlled by general definitions at IRC §§ 7701(a)(9) and (10), which also fall within subtitle F (IRC §§ 6000 thru 8000 roughly) and have never been enacted into positive law;


w.               50 States are outside the “United States” [sic];  see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1746(1) and (2) (“United States” is therein distinguished from the “United States of America” [sic]);


x.               as a Citizen of California State, who was expressly not a federal citizen, Defendant was not liable to the United States for any taxes imposed upon His worldwide income;  see Treasury Decision 2313.



11.  In the IRS Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”), Handbook of Delegation Orders, at page 1229-80 (dated 4-3-91), Delegation of Personnel-Related Matters, Chart 2, the Deputy Commissioner was allegedly delegated authority to do the following:


·    Approve monetary awards and exceptions to monetary award scales up to and including $10,000 for any one individual or group, and incur necessary expenses for the recognition of contributions


·    Approve monetary awards and exceptions to monetary award scales of $5,000-$10,000 (excluding PMRS Cash Awards) for any one individual or group


·    As Chairperson, Executive Resources Board, to review and concur in recommendations for all awards for executives


·    Recommend to Treasury, monetary awards of $10,001-25,000 ($5,001 or more for Performance Management and Recognition System (PMRS) Cash Awards) for any one individual or group


·    Recommend an additional monetary award of $10,000 (total $35,000) to the President through Treasury.


a.   we are prepared to recommend witnesses to you who are willing to testify, under oath, that these PMRS awards are cash payments specifically reserved for the President of the United States, for federal judges, and for U.S. Attorneys, upon obtaining grand jury indictments against "illegal tax protesters" [sic] and other political “enemies” of same;


b.   on this point, we would like to emphasize that, under the First Amendment in the U.S. Constitution, protest has never been illegal in America;  compare also U.C.C. 1-207 (i.e. phrases “under protest” and “without prejudice” are equivalent and synonymous);  the term "illegal protester" is, therefore, an oxymoron which cannot survive a challenge on any constitutional grounds;  otherwise, it sanctions a “suspect” class which suffers demonstrable discrimination;


c.   accordingly, to be consistent with the U.S. Constitution, the term "illegal tax protester" as found in various Acts of Congress, and in regulations currently utilized by the “Internal Revenue Service”, must be interpreted to mean that the "tax" is "illegal", not the "protest" and not the “protester”;


d.   upon request, we can provide you with numerous Supreme Court authorities for the proposition that Congressional statutes must be construed in harmony with the fundamental Law;  see First Amendment, in chief;  also U.C.C. 1-207;


e.   thus, it now appears that there are substantial cash incentives for U.S. Attorneys to lie, tamper with juries, and obstruct evidence in seeking and obtaining indictments requested by the IRS, all in violation of applicable federal laws and of principles established in the U.S. Constitution;  for example, see 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 1031 (i.e. Major fraud against the United States);


f.   the Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”) has no authority in law whatsoever;  Lurhing v. Glotzbach, 304 F.2d 360 (4th Cir. 1962);  Einhorn v. DeWitt, 618 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1980);  United States v. Goldstein, 342 F.Supp. 661 (E.D.N.Y. 1972);  Boulez v. C.I.R., 810 F.2d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1987);  and, United States v. Will, 671 F.2d 963, 967 (6th Cir. 1982).



12.  Moreover, in order to make sure that you are not proceeding ultra vires, NOTICE AND DEMAND are hereby made of you to recognize and obey the court holding that "the indiscriminate summoning of witnesses in a spirit of meddlesome inquiry, on the mere chance that some crime may be discovered, is forbidden under the rules of the common law."  See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 L.Ed. 652, 26 S.Ct. 370.  Please also take formal NOTICE of the following pertinent holdings:



The most valuable function of the grand jury is not only to examine into the commission of crimes, but to stand between the prosecutor and the accused;  that is, to protect the citizen against unfounded accusations, whether they come from the government or are prompted by partisan passion or private enmity.


[38 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 26, page 971]

[bold emphasis added]



When the investigation is one required to be ordered by the court, under restrictions on the powers of the grand jury, the general rule that the investigation may not be a mere "fishing expedition" or a blanket inquiry for speculative purposes is applicable.  It has been so held in respect of an investigation where it appears that a system of crime exists among public officials.  McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 187 A. 498, 106 ALR 1373.


[38 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 28, page 973]

[bold emphasis added]



While the phrase "ultra vires" has been used to designate, not only acts beyond the express and implied powers of a corporation, but also acts contrary to public policy or contrary to some express statute prohibiting them, the latter class of acts is now termed illegal, and the "ultra vires" confined to the former class.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition]

[emphasis added]



The United States government is a foreign corporation with respect to a state. [citing In re Merriam's Estate, 36 N.E. 505, 141 N.Y. 479, affirmed U.S. v. Perkins, 16 S.Ct. 1073, 163 U.S. 625, 41 L.Ed 287]


[19 C.J.S. 883, emphasis added]



An act of Congress creating a private corporation is the act of Congress as the local Legislature of the District of Columbia; Congress cannot, under the federal constitution, as the Congress of the United States of America, create a private corporation;  Daly et al. v. The National Life Insurance Company of the United States of America, Indiana Supreme Court (November term, 1878).






I, Dr. Donald E. Wishart, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help Me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1) (the “outside” option).  See also Supremacy Clause (i.e. the statute at 28 U.S.C. 1746 is supreme Law).



Dated:  September 8, 2000 A.D.



Signed:   /s/ Donald E. Wishart



Printed:  Dr. Donald E. Wishart, Sui Juris



Exhibit “A”:

Human Rights Treaties


Exhibit “B”:

OPENING BRIEF in USA v. Gilbertson


Exhibit “C”:


in USA v. Gilbertson


Exhibit “D”:



in People v. United States


Exhibit “E”:

Press Release from Supreme Law Library:

The Lawless Rehnquist


Exhibit “F”:

The Cooper File


Exhibit “G”:




in USA v. Gilbertson


Exhibit “H”:


(see Page 10 of 16 et seq.)


Exhibit “I”:

Appendix A from the Book Entitled

The Federal Zone:  Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue”:

Winning Brief in Knox v. U.S. et al.

(income tax provisions are municipal law)


Exhibit “J”:

Press Release from Supreme Law Library:

Congresswoman Suspected of Income Tax Evasion

(with copy of reply to Mr. John Randall)