What is the Federal Income Tax?
by
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Counselor at Law, Federal Witness
and Private Attorney General
All Rights Reserved
(November 10, 1998)
The federal "income" tax is an excise tax which is imposed
upon profit or gain derived from sources that are INSIDE the
"United States" [sic], or from a "United States" trade or
business. In this context, the term "United States" means the
territory over which Congress has exclusive legislative authority
and where Congress is the local "State" government.
"Income" and "source" are two entirely different terms.
The "source" is the situs of the income-producing activity. The
items listed at IRC 61 are "sources", NOT "income", although the
grammar of section 61 is certainly ambiguous.
The inside/outside distinction is crucial to a correct
application of the income tax.
The several states of the Union are OUTSIDE the "United
States" [sic], and they are INSIDE the "United States of America"
[sic]. See the Guarantee Clause for constitutional authority,
and for correct use of terminology. See also the Preamble, where
"United States" and "United States of America" are both used;
these two terms define two disjoint geographic jurisdictions.
Moreover, 28 U.S.C. section 1746 makes this all-important
distinction as well, e.g. "inside the United States" and "under
the laws of the United States of America"! This statute governs
the perjury jurat on Form 1040!! Form 1040 is signed INSIDE the
"United States" [sic], and OUTSIDE the "United States of America"
(read "several states of the Union"). We never notarize Form
1040; now you know why! Yea Team!!
Got it?
The term "United States" here is synonymous with "the
federal zone," i.e. the territory over which Congress has
exclusive legislative authority and jurisdiction. Pursuant to
the Downes Doctrine, indirect taxes need NOT be "uniform" within
the federal zone, and direct taxes need NOT be "apportioned"
within the federal zone. See the chapter entitled "16th
Amendment Post Mortem," in the case of U.S.A. v. Knudson, in the
Supreme Law Library at Internet URL:
http://supremelaw.org/cc/knudson/judnot08.htm
for a thorough discussion of this key point.
Those two restrictions apply ONLY to taxes which Congress
imposes inside the several states of the Union, which are
"outside" ("without") the "United States" [sic], and "inside" the
United States of America" [sic].
These findings are predicated upon the well established
proof that the IRC is a municipal Code ("internal" means
"municipal"). See the book "The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code
of Internal Revenue" for all pertinent authorities, e.g. Treasury
Decision 2313.
See also "Congresswoman Suspected of Income Tax Evasion" in
the Supreme Law Library supra, vis-a-vis IRC 3121(e). The
Legislative Counsel and Congressional Research Service both agree
with the major thesis of "The Federal Zone" [the book which I
authored].
It makes no sense to render an excise "uniform" throughout
the several states of the Union, if said excise tax is not even
imposed ANYWHERE within that territorial jurisdiction!
The graduated income tax does not need to be uniform OR
apportioned there, because those rules are entirely irrelevant
within that limited territorial jurisdiction (according to the
Downes Doctrine).
Think about it ... Congress has the power to impose a
local, municipal tax, and that is exactly what they did with the
taxes imposed by Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code.
Just because Congress intermixed alcohol, tobacco, and
petroleum taxes in the same Code, does not change the nature of
the "income tax" provisions of that Code. The definition of
"State", in these other excise taxes, clearly mentions the "50
States" [sic], but NOT at IRC 3121(e). See URL:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/26/4612.html (a)(4)(A)
THERE is the crux of their fraud!!!
Confer at "inclusio unius est exclusio alterius" in Black's
Law Dictionary, to wit: what was omitted, was INTENDED to be
omitted (from those various, DIFFERENT definitions of "State").
In the Brushaber case, that tax was an excise imposed upon
profit generated by a "domestic" (read "federal zone")
corporation, because the Union Pacific Railroad Company was
created by an Act of Congress, to build a railroad through the
Utah Territory (BEFORE Utah joined the Union). Thus, Congress
could tax the profits of that corporation BEFORE any of those
profits were paid to stockholders, in the form of dividends.
Treasury Decision 2313 explains all of this in fine detail; this
Treasury Decision has never been repealed. The legal situs of
any corporation never changes from its original domicile.
Congress CANNOT create a corporation for the entire nation,
because to do so violates the Tenth Amendment, and invades the
province of the several states. See Daly v. The National Life
Insurance Company of the United States of America, Indiana Supreme
Court (1878), for clear authority on this crucial point. Thus,
ALL FEDERAL CORPORATIONS are domestic (read "federal zone")
corporations, by Law. "Domestic" in this context is synonymous
with "federal zone". "Domestic" does NOT have the same meaning
in this context as it does in the context of domestic and foreign
flights at international airports.
The state zone and the federal zone are perfectly disjoint,
in a geographic sense. The term "state zone" has now entered our
household vocabulary; for proof, search for "state zone" with
the Alta Vista search engine, particularly in documents which
also use the term "federal zone".
Now, federal citizens [sic] are associated with a political
jurisdiction which is NOT protected by the Guarantee Clause, and
where the direct/indirect rules simply do NOT apply. Federal
citizenship is a municipal franchise, the exercise of which CAN
be taxed by the Congress, pursuant to the Downes Doctrine,
because citizenship is a term of municipal law (a/k/a "private
international law" [sic]).
Congress cannot re-define the term "Citizen" as that term
used in the Qualifications Clauses, because Congress has no power
to amend the U.S. Constitution; only three-fourths of the Union
states have that power. The term "Citizen" [sic] in the
Qualifications Clauses, in 3:2:1, and in 4:2:1, each refers to
Citizens of ONE OF the States United. See Alla v. Kornfeld for
authority (cited and discussed in the Supreme Law Forum at
http://supremelaw.org/wwwboard): i.e. federal citizens, as such,
were NOT even contemplated when the organic U.S. Constitution was
first written and ratified.
Although the Guarantee Clause appears to authorize unequal
protection of the Law here, the Eighth Circuit dropped the ball
completely when this issue was put squarely before them, in
Gilbertson's OPENING BRIEF. That Court has now failed to rule on
an application by the People of the United States of America for
Intervention of Right, so we are presently in a Mexican Standoff,
as regards all of the far-reaching issues which arose in that
OPENING BRIEF.
If the People were to obtain leave to intervene, they would
immediately request Rehearing En Banc, on all of these issues,
and then go up to the U.S. Supreme Court "with all deliberate
speed" (a term from Brown v. Board of Education).
Instead, you have seen the U.S. House of Representatives
repeal the IRC, effective July 4, 2002. I believe this was done
because the law as explained above has begun to permeate that
House of Representatives, one Representative at a time.
The writing is definitely on the wall.
I hope this helps.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Counselor at Law, Federal Witness,
Private Attorney General, and Candidate
for the U.S. House of Representatives
email: Contact Us
website: http://supremelaw.org
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