Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S. Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness, Counselor at Law, and Relator c/o 2509 N. Campbell Avenue, #1776 Tucson [zip code exempt] ARIZONA STATE Under Protest, Necessity, and by Special Visitation DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF MONTANA BILLINGS DIVISION People of the United States ) Case No. CV-96-163-BLG of America, ex relatione ) Paul Andrew Mitchell, ) NOTICE OF MOTION AND ) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; Petitioners, ) NOTICE OF CHALLENGE AND ) CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONALITY vs. ) OF FEDERAL REMOVAL STATUTES: ) 28 U.S.C. 1441 thru 1451; United States et al., ) Sixth Amendment: ) Nature and Cause Clause; Respondent. ) human rights treaties (2) ____________________________) COME NOW the People of the United States of America (hereinafter "Petitioners"), ex relatione Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness, and Counselor at Law (hereinafter "Relator"), to request formal reconsideration by this honorable Court of the ORDER of Chief Judge Jack D. Shanstrom, dated and filed in the instant case on April 8, 1997. Petitioners submit that the multitude of issues which have already arisen in the instant case are likely to generate controversy, at times intense, concerning the correct sequence in which this Court should address said issues. Accordingly, Petitioners have herein chosen to address issues in the order in which they have arisen in the ORDER of April 8, 1997. Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes: Page 1 of 14 At the very top of said ORDER is found the nomenclature "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT" [sic] (hereinafter "USDC"). Petitioners submit that this nomenclature refers specifically to an Article IV territorial tribunal, and not to the Article III judicial forum which Petitioners have specifically petitioned in the instant case. See caption supra. Petitioners are entitled to relief that is issued from courts of competent jurisdiction; likewise, Petitioners are not entitled to any relief from courts which do not have competent jurisdiction. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Universal Declaration of Human Rights; due process clause in the Fifth Amendment. Petitioners also submit, for the careful consideration of this honorable Court, all pleadings previously filed in the instant case, as sufficient and meritorious grounds for keeping this all important distinction foremost in the minds of all interested parties, of all qualified judges who may preside in the instant case, and of all representatives of the interested parties. See Reservations enacted with human rights treaties. In particular, the authorities in American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511 (1828), 7 L.Ed 242, and Balzac v. Porto Rico [sic], 42 S.Ct. 343, 258 U.S. 298 at 312, 66 L.Ed 627 (1921), should provide more than enough proof to this honorable Court that the USDC has territorial jurisdiction within the federal zone, and the DCUS has territorial jurisdiction within the state zone. Montana state is within the state zone. Numerous other court authorities have already been cited in the instant case, and the Respondents have failed to rebut, or even to respond in any way. Petitioners now argue that the total silence by Respondents on this point now activates estoppel against Respondents. See Carmine v. Bowen, 64 A. 932 (1906). Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes: Page 2 of 14 Accordingly, it is apparent to Petitioners that any ORDER's which may be issued from the USDC in the instant case are null and void ab initio and ultra vires, solely by virtue of the fact that the District Court of the United States (hereinafter "DCUS") was petitioned in the instant case, and not the USDC. More to the point, one of the original reasons for invoking federal judicial power(s) in the instant case is the existence of an outstanding Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request for the official credentials of all six hundred thirty-three (633) alleged federal agents who rotated in and out of the standoff with the so-called Montana Freemen in Garfield county, Montana state (hereinafter "Freeman Standoff"). Said FOIA request has not been answered to date with the credentials of any of said agents. Petitioners have, therefore, already exhausted their administrative remedies in the matter of said FOIA request. The court of original jurisdiction to enjoin the withholding of documents properly requested, and to compel the production of documents improperly withheld, is the DCUS. See 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B). The court of original jurisdiction to litigate FOIA requests is res judicata. See the ORDER of United States District Judge John M. Roll, dated May 21, 1996, In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served on New Life Health Center Company, Case No. GJ- 95-1-6 (JMR), USDC, Tucson, Arizona state, to wit: ... [T]his [USDC] is not the proper forum to bring a request under the Freedom of Information Act. [emphasis added] Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes: Page 3 of 14 And so, it is with no small degree of concern that Petitioners read Judge Shanstrom's ORDER of April 8, 1997, which alleges that "petitioner's [sic] contentions lack merit and do not provide any basis for reconsideration of the October Order." On a technical point, Petitioners wish to remind this honorable Court that Paul Andrew Mitchell is the Relator in the instant case. The stated Petitioners are the People of the United States of America. For this reason alone, said ORDER errs by referring to the Relator as the "petitioner" who submitted the "contentions" in question. More importantly, however, to suggest that the contentions of Petitioners lack merit and do not provide any basis for reconsideration, is to promote the absurd proposition that identifying the court of competent jurisdiction for any judicial proceeding is a matter of no consequence. Confer at Reductio ad absurdum in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, to wit: Reductio ad absurdum. Latin. In logic, the method of disproving an argument by showing that it leads to an absurd consequence. Further on in the USDC's ORDER of April 8, 1997, the USDC discusses Petitioners' NOTICE OF INTENT TO PETITION FOR LEAVE TO INSTITUTE QUO WARRANTO PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE "INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE" [sic]. That court found that said NOTICE OF INTENT contemplates a new future lawsuit [sic] which cannot be filed in this action and does not warrant review by the USDC until filed as a separate action. Petitioners object to this finding. Without the benefit of discovering the true identity(s) of all 633 alleged federal agents who rotated in and out of the Freeman Standoff, it is quite possible, and also highly likely, that one or more of said agents were actually employed by the Internal Revenue Service. The organizational situs of the Internal Revenue Service would then become a salient issue, in the instant case, and should be litigated in this action and not in a separate action. Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes: Page 4 of 14 Petitioners also object to this finding because they have already paid two (2) separate filing fees. The requirement that Petitioners must now pay a third filing fee, in order to institute a separate "new future lawsuit," as that term was utilized in the USDC's ORDER of April 8, 1997, raises the specter of barratry, which is the offense of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits, either at law or otherwise. Confer at "Barratry" in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition. Petitioners submit that the added expense of a third filing fee constitutes barratry. On the second page of the USDC's ORDER of April 8, 1997, said ORDER again finds that Petitioners' document requesting removal lacks merit and remains denied by the USDC. This finding, again, raises the all important question of original jurisdiction. The USDC cannot deny any motion which is not properly before it. Petitioners have not submitted any motions whatsoever to the USDC in the instant case. For a federal judge to issue orders from a court which has never been moved nor otherwise petitioned, is to practice law in violation of the prohibition against same at 28 U.S.C. 454: Practice of law by justices and judges, to wit: Any justice or judge appointed under the authority of the United States who engages in the practice of law is guilty of a high misdemeanor. Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes: Page 5 of 14 The USDC's ORDER of April 8, 1997, also goes on to hold that the removal statutes do not afford a petitioner/plaintiff the power to remove a case to federal court. Petitioners applaud the efforts to which the USDC has evidently gone to explore the removal statutes which are found at 28 U.S.C. 1441 et seq. Nevertheless, by way of demonstrating newly found evidence of confusion and duplicity in the federal laws in question, Petitioners submit the following specific citations for the careful consideration of this honorable Court: 28 U.S.C. 1441(a) "district court of the United States" 28 U.S.C. 1441(d) "district court of the United States" 28 U.S.C. 1442(a) "district court of the United States" 28 U.S.C. 1443 "district court of the United States" 28 U.S.C. 1444 "district court of the United States" 28 U.S.C. 1445(a) "district court of the United States" 28 U.S.C. 1445(b) "district court of the United States" 28 U.S.C. 1445(c) "district court of the United States" 28 U.S.C. 1445(d) "district court of the United States" 28 U.S.C. 1446(a) "district court of the United States" 28 U.S.C. 1446(c)(1) "United States district court" [sic] 28 U.S.C. 1446(c)(2) "United States district court" [sic] 28 U.S.C. 1446(c)(4) "United States district court" [sic] 28 U.S.C. 1446(c)(5) "United States district court" [sic] 28 U.S.C. 1448 "district court of the United States" 28 U.S.C. 1449 "district court of the United States" 28 U.S.C. 1450 "district court of the United States" Petitioners hereby challenge all federal removal statutes, as a group, for being void for vagueness in violation of the Sixth Amendment nature and cause clause. See 28 U.S.C. 1441 thru 1452; See Balzac and American Insurance supra. Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes: Page 6 of 14 Said statutes also evidence negligence and fraud on the part of Congress. Said fraud is demonstrated by an unlawful intent to extend the territorial and subject matter jurisdictions of the USDC into the several states of the Union, over which the DCUS has original jurisdiction with respect to said territory and subject matters. The removal statutes evidence the fraud, in violation of the Tenth Amendment. Recent research has also proven that the federal judiciary has also sabotaged the U.S. Constitution and corrupted laws governing the conduct of the federal courts. This has been done in part by creating the false impression that the USDC has territorial and subject matter jurisdiction within the several states of the Union, particularly over criminal prosecutions, when it does not. The truth is that the USDC is designed to adjudicate matters that arise within the federal zone, and the DCUS is designed to adjudicate matters that arise within the state zone. This honorable Court will please take formal judicial notice of the fact that the USDC is named on the ORDER of April 8, 1997, by Chief United States District Judge Jack D. Shanstrom, allegedly ordering the instant case remanded back to State Court. This is a fraud upon Petitioners, and upon all American People, who enjoy the fundamental guarantee of due process of law. Sedition by syntax is not due process of law. See Title 28, United States Code, in toto; see also Act of June 25, 1948: "... [P]rovisions of this title [28 U.S.C.] ... with respect to the organization of the court, shall be construed as a continuation of existing law ..." [emphasis added]. Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes: Page 7 of 14 The USDC's ORDER of April 8, 1997, also attempts to remand the instant case back to the Montana Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Garfield County, and attempts to order the Clerk of Court to return the file in cause number #2721 back to said Sixteenth Judicial District Court. If this remand is allowed to proceed, Petitioners will have been denied due process of law, in clear violation of the Fifth Amendment. Petitioners began the instant case in the Montana Sixteenth Judicial District Court in Garfield County (hereinafter "State Court"). The instant case was ordered removed into federal court. Petitioners paid a second filing fee to the Clerk of the DCUS, under protest, due to the fact that the Clerk of the DCUS refused a tender of lawful money (gold) in payment for said fee. Now, Judge Shanstrom is attempting to remand the case back to State Court, before the fate of the credentials of all 633 alleged federal agents has been determined, and before all other federal questions have been properly adjudicated. Once again, it is painfully evident to Petitioners that the State Court has absolutely no jurisdiction whatsoever to litigate the original FOIA request for said credentials. Accordingly, Judge Shanstrom's ORDER has the unnecessary and unlawful result of forcing Petitioners into a vicious circle, from which there is no exit. Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes: Page 8 of 14 For this reason, among all others mentioned above, Petitioners strenuously object to the USDC's ORDER of April 8, 1997, and hereby petition this honorable DCUS for an ORDER to Chief United States District Judge Jack D. Shanstrom to reconsider his alleged ORDER of April 8, 1997, in light of all the substantive and meritorious issues which have been well documented in the instant Motion and in previous pleadings -- most notably the American Insurance opinion of Chief Justice John Marshall supra, arguably the greatest Chief Justice ever to preside on the Supreme Court of the United States. To repeat: ... [P]rovisions of this title as set out in section 1 of said Act June 25, 1948, with respect to the organization of the court, shall be construed as a continuation of existing law ...." [Historical and Statutory Notes, 28 U.S.C. 132] [West Publishing Company, 1996 Edition] In closing, Petitioners respectfully request formal Judicial Notice of the essay entitled "Karma and the Federal Courts," by Relator Paul Andrew Mitchell, which essay is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein. REMEDY REQUESTED All premises having been carefully considered, Petitioners hereby petition this honorable District Court of the United States for an ORDER compelling Chief United States District Judge Jack D. Shanstrom to reconsider his ORDER, dated April 8, 1997, and filed erroneously in the instant case under a caption which exhibits the legal nomenclature "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT", in apparent contradiction to, and outside the lawful jurisdiction of, the judicial powers of this District Court of the United States which have been invoked in the instant case. Petitioners respectfully request that Judge Shanstrom give close and deliberate attention to the distinction, now thoroughly documented, between the Article III District Court of the United States, and the Article IV United States District Court, with particular application of this distinction to the instant case. Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes: Page 9 of 14 Dated: April 14, 1997 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S. Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness, (expressly not a citizen of the United States), Counselor at Law, and Relator on behalf of the People of the United States of America All Rights Reserved without Prejudice Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes: Page 10 of 14 PROOF OF SERVICE I, Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness, and Counselor at Law, do hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the "United States", that I am at least 18 years of age, a Citizen of one of the United States of America, and that I personally served the following document(s): NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; NOTICE OF CHALLENGE AND CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL REMOVAL STATUTES: 28 U.S.C. 1441 thru 1451; Sixth Amendment: Nature and Cause Clause; human rights treaties (2) by placing one true and correct copy of same in first class U.S. Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to: Attorney General William H. Rehnquist, C.J. Department of Justice Supreme Court of the U.S. 10th and Constitution, N.W. 1 First Street, N.E. Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C. Solicitor General Warren Christopher Department of Justice U.S. Secretary of State 10th and Constitution, N.W. Department of State Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C. James M. Burns LeRoy Michael; Schweitzer United States District Court c/o Yellowstone County Jail 316 North 26th Street 3165 King Avenue, East Billings, Montana state Billings, Montana state Office of the U.S. Attorneys Judge J. Clifford Wallace United States District Court Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Federal Building c/o P.O. Box 193939 Billings, Montana state San Francisco, California Chief Judge Judge Alex Kozinski Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals c/o P.O. Box 193939 125 South Grand Avenue, #200 San Francisco, California state Pasadena, California state Executed on April 14, 1997: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S. Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness, Counselor at Law, and Relator Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes: Page 11 of 14 For Immediate Release November 2, 1996 "Karma and the Federal Courts" by Paul Andrew Mitchell All Rights Reserved (November 1996) The law of karma is this: what goes around, comes around. When you begin with freedom, freedom comes back to dwell in your house. And so, we have come to this point in decoding Title 28 of the United States Codes: there are two classes of federal "District Courts" in the federal court system. One class is for the federal zone; the other class is for the state zone. Using a very powerful rule of statutory construction, "inclusio unius est exclusio alterius," we show that the phrase "District Court of the United States" refers to federal courts for the state zone; and the phrase "United States District Court" refers to federal courts for the federal zone. We have this on the authority of the Supreme Court of the United States, most notably in the cases of American Insurance Company v. 356 Bales of Cotton, and Balzac v. Porto Rico [sic]. Now, here's the rub: Since federal courts are creatures of statutes only, they can only cognize subject matters which are assigned to them expressly by statutes. When it comes to criminal jurisdiction, the controlling statute is 18 U.S.C. 3231. This statute grants original jurisdiction to the District Courts of the United States (DCUS), but does not mention the United States District Courts (USDC)! How about them apples? Remember this carefully: Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (in Latin ). Inclusion of one is exclusion of others (in English). Since the USDC is not mentioned, its omission can be inferred as intentional. (Read that again, then confirm it in Black's Law Dictionary, any edition). So, from the historian's point of view, Congress has permitted the limited territorial and subject matter jurisdiction of the USDC to be extended, unlawfully, into the state zone, and into subject matters over which said court has no jurisdiction whatsoever. Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes: Page 12 of 14 This deception was maintained as long as nobody noticed, but now it is obvious, and quite difficult to change, without bringing down the whole house of cards (which is happening, by the way. The Liege firemen are literally hosing their own corrupt court buildings, so we're not alone in this department of judicial tyranny.) By the way, the famous Belgian Firemen from Liege have been invited, via the Internet, to discharge the Belgian debt to the United States by moving their talents state-side. They should return home debt free, in about ten years or so, depending on available supplies of soap and water. Imagine a sheet of Saran Wrap, which has been yanked too far, by pulling it beyond the strict territorial boundaries which surround the federal zone. This is the United States District Court (USDC), in all its limited Honors and tarnished glory. Further proof of this bad karma can be found by comparing 18 U.S.C. 1964(a) and 1964(c). Both statutes grant authority to issue remedies to restrain racketeering activities prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 1962. Section 1964(a) grants civil jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief to the DCUS; Section 1964(c) grants civil jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief to the USDC. Both refer to the exact same subject matter, namely, RICO (Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) activities. So, when these two statutes are otherwise identical, why did Congress need to enact two separate statutes? The answer is simple: one authority was needed for the DCUS, and the other was needed for the USDC. Simple, really, when the sedition by syntax is explained in language which penetrates the deception. Now, if this is truly the case, and nobody has been able to prove us wrong about this matter, the United States (federal government) is in a heap of trouble here, because it has been prosecuting people in the wrong courts ever since the Civil War; furthermore, those courts have no criminal jurisdiction whatsoever, because such an authority is completely lacking from Titles 18 and 28, both of which have been enacted into positive law, unlike Title 26, which has not been enacted into positive law. See Title 1 for details. What do we do with this earth-shaking discovery? Well, when any federal case is filed, the criminal defendant should submit a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request immediately, for such things as any regulations which have been published in the Federal Register, pursuant to the Federal Register Act, for 18 U.S.C. 3231. Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes: Page 13 of 14 It won't hurt to send submit similar FOIA requests for the credentials of all federal employees who have "touched" the case in any way. Since we already know that there are no regulations for 18 U.S.C. 3231, and that federal employees will usually refuse to produce their credentials, your FOIA requests will be met with silence, whereupon you will file a FOIA appeal. Once the appeal deadline has run, you are in court. But which court? Guess ... ... the answer is the District Court of the United States. What an amazing discovery, yes? A United States District Judge in Arizona, in late Spring of 1996, ruled that the United States District Court (USDC) is not the proper forum to litigate a request under the FOIA. That can only be because FOIA requests must be litigated in the District Court of the United States (DCUS). Now we have the United States checkmated. The proper forum for FOIA is now res judicata. If the DCUS is the proper forum for FOIA, and if the USDC is NOT the proper forum for FOIA, then the USDC is not the proper forum for prosecuting violations of Title 18 either, because the USDC does not show up in 5 U.S.C. 552 or in 18 U.S.C. 3231! Read that last paragraph again, and again, until you get it. It's okay to admit that you must read it several times; this writer once read a paragraph from Hooven and Allison v. Evatt some 20 different times, until the meaning was finally clear. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. The omission by Congress of the USDC from 18 U.S.C. 3231 must have been intentional; the maxim certainly allows us to infer that it was intentional. Use of this maxim allows for us to exploit one of the most powerful techniques in American jurisprudence. It is called "collateral attack" -- a broadside, rather than a head- on, collision. Knowledge is power, and power is freedom ... ... freedom. Freedom! FREEDOM!!! Love it. Common Law Copyright Paul Andrew Mitchell Counselor at Law, federal witness and Citizen of Arizona state All Rights Reserved Without Prejudice November 2, 1996 Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes: Page 14 of 14 # # #
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People v. United States et al.