Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

Private Attorney General

c/o Forwarding Agent

501 West Broadway #A-332

San Diego 92101



In Propria Persona


All Rights Reserved

without Prejudice





United States Court of Appeals


Tenth Circuit


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic],  )  Appeal Docket No. 07-2017

                                 )  Civil No. 04-CV-0885 BB/WDS

          Plaintiff/Appellee,    )

     v.                          )


John S. Williamson et al.,       )


          Defendants/Appellants. )



United States                    )  INTERVENOR’S REPLY TO

ex relatione                     )  APPELLEE’S OPPOSITION TO

Paul Andrew Mitchell,            )  NOTICE OF INTERVENTION:


          Intervenor.            )  28 U.S.C. 2403(a);

                                 )  18 U.S.C. 1964.



Internal Revenue Service,        )


          Respondent.            )


COMES NOW the United States (hereinafter “Intervenor”) ex relatione Paul Andrew Mitchell, Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, Private Attorney General, Criminal Investigator and Federal Witness (hereinafter “Relator”), to reply formally to the pleading signed by Gretchen M. Wolfinger entitled APPELLEE’S OPPOSITION TO PAUL ANDREW MITCHELL’S “NOTICE OF INTERVENTION” AND VARIOUS RELATED DOCUMENTS.



(a)  Eileen J. O’Connor, Gretchen M. Wolfinger and Jonathan S. Cohen (hereinafter “attorneys”) have no powers of attorney legally to represent the Named Appellee UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic].  The latter entity did, at one time, incorporate twice in Delaware.  Recently, however, the registered agent for both foreign corporations notified Intervenor, in writing, that both corporations have been revoked by the Delaware Secretary of State.  Intervenor has now filed copies of that registered agent’s written notices in this regard.  See the Full Faith and Credit Clause in this context (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given to the public records of every other State”).

(b)  The attorneys consistently confuse the Intervenor and the Relator.  The United States is the Intervenor;  Paul Andrew Mitchell is the Relator.  Paul Andrew Mitchell is not the Intervenor;  the United States is not the Relator.  Relator has not applied for intervention on His own behalf.  The United States has intervened pursuant to a federal statute and court rules which confer upon the United States a right to intervene.  “Shall” is mandatory here.

The attorneys also contradict themselves.  On the one hand, they argue that “Relator” has demonstrated no legal or factual basis on which intervention should be “permitted”.  On the other hand, they cite the federal statute at 28 U.S.C. 2403(a) as the basis for intervention of right.  The latter statute was correctly cited in Intervenor’s NOTICE OF INTERVENTION; it confers a statutory right upon the United States, which this honorable Court may not “deny” or otherwise abridge.  The language is clear and unequivocal:  “the court shall permit the United States to intervene ....” [emphasis added])

(c)           The “government” did not file suit to reduce to judgment “several income tax assessments”.  Prior to its proper and timely intervention of right, the United States did not commence the instant lawsuit.  See the discussion above concerning the two (2) foreign corporations whose corporate charters were reportedly revoked by the State of Delaware.  The “government” never did seek to enforce any judgment(s), or any federal tax lien(s), for the very same reason.

(d)           Relator is not a “self-described Private Attorney General”.  The undelegated office of Private Attorney General is recognized by Congress, and by the U.S. Supreme Court, in pertinent cases which have adjudicated the federal statute at 18 U.S.C. 1964 (Civil RICO).

For example, see opinions in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987) (civil RICO “brings to bear the pressure of ‘private attorneys general’ on a serious national problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate”);  and Rotella v. Wood et al., 528 U.S. 549 (2000) (“The object of civil RICO is thus not merely to compensate victims but to turn them into prosecutors, ‘private attorneys general,’ dedicated to eliminating racketeering activity”).  Relator is a racket witness and victim.

(e)           The attorneys err again by claiming that a private Citizen cannot represent the United States.  One of the fastest and easiest ways to refute this error is to use the Google search engine to locate all occurrences of “United States ex rel.” anywhere on the Internet.  As of this writing, Google found 301,000 occurrences of this phrase.  Google also found 87,300 occurrences of the phrase “U.S. ex rel.

The “private attorney general” concept holds that a successful private party plaintiff is entitled to recovery of his legal expenses, including attorney fees, if he has advanced the policy inherent in public interest legislation on behalf of a significant class of persons.  Dasher v. Housing Authority of City of Atlanta, Georgia, D.C.Ga., 64 F.R.D. 720, 722.  See also Equal Access to Justice Act.

(f)           The attorneys err again by claiming that the instant appeal does not involve the constitutionality of any Act of Congress.  Appellants have filed numerous pleadings in the lower courts which raised a myriad of issues, notably the deliberate vagueness and excessive complexity which are now evident in the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) and in Title 28 of the United States Code.  The IRC and Title 28 both contain “Acts of Congress” as defined at 1 U.S.C. 101.

In particular, see also the Miscellaneous Provisions at the very end of the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 985-991;  IRC §§ 7426, 7433.

Despite the fact those Miscellaneous Provisions expressly clarify the intent of Congress, those Provisions were never codified anywhere in Title 28 of the U.S. Code.  Specifically, Congress clearly intended the provisions of that Act to be “continuations of existing law” such as the laws defining and governing many federal court jurisdictions.  See § 2(b).  Similarly, the liberal construction rule for RICO was never codified anywhere in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, even though Title 18 has been enacted.  See 84 Stat. 947, Sec. 904, Oct. 15, 1970.



Under the heading JURISDICTION AND VENUE, on Page 2 of the INITIAL COMPLAINT the following allegation is made:


This Court has jurisdiction of this action under 26 U.S.C. Sections 7402 and 7403 and 28 U.S.C. Sections 1340 and 1345.


(a)           The only reference to the “United States district court” in Section 7402 supra is at subsection 7402(e) -- To quiet title:


The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction of any action brought by the United States to quiet title to property if the title claimed by the United States to such property was derived from enforcement of a lien under this title.


All other subsections (a) thru (c) and (f) refer instead to the Article III District Courts of the United States (“DCUS”).  Such statutes conferring original jurisdiction upon federal district courts must be strictly construed.  See Intervenor’s other pleadings for standing U.S. Supreme Court authorities mandating STRICT construction.

(b)  The instant action was not brought by the United States;  it was allegedly brought by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA under auspices of different attorneys who also lacked powers of attorney to appear on behalf of that Plaintiff.  Therefore, the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA has entirely failed to prosecute the instant lawsuit.

(c)  The United States has not claimed title to any property that was derived from enforcement of a lien under Title 26 of the U.S. Code.  Prior to its NOTICE OF INTERVENTION the United States was not a Proper Party.  And, after effectively intervening the United States has still not claimed title to any property that was derived from enforcement of a lien under Title 26 of the U.S. Code.

If the term “this title” at subsection 7402(e) means Title 26 of the U.S. Code, then the statute at IRC section 7851(a)(6)(A) is controlling, because Title 26 of the U.S. Code has never been enacted into positive law by any known Act of Congress.

Accordingly, all statutes that fall within subtitle F of the IRC have never really taken effect, notably §§ 7401, 7402 and 7403 as cited in the first paragraph on Page 1 of the INITIAL COMPLAINT.

(d)           Moreover, the Article IV USDC lacked original jurisdiction, in the first instance, because there is still no valid lien in evidence anywhere in the record below.

The existence of the requisite ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATES now assumes facts not in evidence.

In order to be valid, an ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATE must be dated and signed under penalties of perjury by a duly authorized Assessment Officer in full compliance with IRC 6065, Brafman v. U.S., 384 F.2d 863, 865, hn. 5 (5th Cir. 1967), 26 CFR 301.6203-1 and all pertinent provisions of the Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”).

As of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (“RRA98”), all provisions of the IRM are now legally binding upon the Internal Revenue Service.  Specifically, the IRM is quite clear in requiring a valid ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATE before any tax collections may commence;  and, IRS personnel can now be disciplined or terminated for violating any provision of the IRM.  See RRA98, § 1203(b), 112 Stat. 721.

(e)           The term “district courts” at 28 U.S.C. 1340 is ambiguous, at best.  On the one hand, it can be interpreted to refer only to the Article IV USDCs currently established within the 50 States of the Union pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 132.  Unlike several other statutes in Title 28, however, the latter statute does not identify the correct constitutional origins of the USDC.  Compare 28 U.S.C. 251(a) which does identify Article III as the correct constitutional origin of the U.S. Court of International Trade, as mentioned at section 1340 supra.

On the other hand, the term “district courts” can be interpreted to embrace both the Article III DCUS and the Article IV USDC if it occurs in plural form.  That term is thus ambiguous.

(f)           The term “internal revenue” at 28 U.S.C. 1340 is also quite misleading and vague.  See the book entitled “The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue.”  An autographed and embossed hard copy has now been shipped to the Acquisitions Librarian of this Circuit Court, and the electronic eleventh edition is here:


(g)           The statute at 28 U.S.C. 1345 clearly confers standing upon the United States, not upon the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, to commence suits and proceedings as a plaintiff in the “district courts”.  The companion statute at 28 U.S.C. 1346 is likewise quite clear for conferring standing upon the United States, and not the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, to be sued as a named defendant in the “district courts” [sic] and in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.  See 28 U.S.C. 171(a).

Once again, the statute at 28 U.S.C. 171, establishing the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, clearly identifies its constitutional origin as Article I of the Constitution, not Article III and not Article IV.

The absence of any mention of the USDC’s constitutional origins anywhere in 28 U.S.C. 132 necessarily renders that statute vague and misleading on this essential and historically important point.



The United States did intervene ex rel. in two companion appeals to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, docket numbers #02-55021 and #01-56873.  For the convenience of all concerned, the relevant pleadings are now available at the following Internet URLs:


Gretchen M. Wolfinger made similar errors in those two appeals, because her office failed to demonstrate any powers of attorney legally to represent IRS employee Andrew Erath, even after being timely challenged to do so.  See 28 CFR 0.70(b) (“except ....”!)

When presented with the United States’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION similar to the one now filed in this appeal, Ms. Wolfinger appeared to get flustered when she notified the Ninth Circuit Clerk in writing that she would not reply to any more of Relator’s pleadings unless ordered to do so by the Ninth Circuit.

The United States then exploited that opportunity by moving the Ninth Circuit for an ORDER to Ms. Wolfinger to show cause why her pleadings should not be stricken, for lacking powers of attorney.

Subsequently, Relator was never served with any dispositive rulings issued by any duly appointed judges of the Ninth Circuit in either of those two companion appeals, however.

To make matters much worse, subsequent investigation confirmed the presence of several impostors seated on the Ninth Circuit:  namely Brunetti, Hug, Tallman, Thomas, Trott and Wardlaw have all turned up without one or more of the 4 credentials required of all federal judges.  For full details, please see the following Internet URLs:


Demonstrating a motive for criminal retaliation and prohibited discrimination against Relator in particular, Procter Hug had earlier been charged with felony federal offenses in connection with the case of a federal grand jury subpoena which Relator was authorized to litigate by U.S. District Judge John M. Roll, in Tucson, Arizona here:



The attorneys’ alleged OPPOSITION to the NOTICE OF INTERVENTION by the United States is erroneous, ill-conceived and flatly incorrect on numerous fundamental points.  Chiefly, the United States has a statutory right to intervene, and it has now effectively intervened pursuant to the federal statute at 28 U.S.C. 2403(a) and pertinent Rules of Court.

For all of the reasons elaborated in detail above and in all other pleadings filed to date by the United States ex rel. Paul Andrew Mitchell subsequent to its timely and proper intervention, the attorneys’ alleged OPPOSITION should be ignored, if not also stricken, by this honorable Court of Appeals.

On the merits, this Court should also ORDER the Circuit Clerk to certify to the Office of the U.S. Attorney General all of Intervenor’s challenges to the constitutionality of certain Acts of Congress previously enumerated in pleadings filed to date by Intervenor.

Finally, pursuant to its statutory obligations under 28 U.S.C. 2403(a), this Court shall permit the United States to intervene for presentation of evidence and for arguments on the question of the constitutionality of said enumerated Acts of Congress.

Thank you for your continuing professional consideration.


I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).  See Supremacy Clause (Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the United States are all the supreme Law of the Land).


Dated:   February 28, 2007 A.D.


Signed:  /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell


Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, Private Attorney General

         All Rights Reserved without Prejudice


I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that I am at least 18 years of age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I personally served the following document(s):





28 U.S.C. 2403(a); 18 U.S.C. 1964


by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to the following:


Clerk of Court (5x)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

1823 Stout Street

Denver 80257



Mr. and Mrs. John S. Williamson

1277 Historic Route 66 East

Tijeras 87059



Mr. John Gregory Williamson

c/o Mr. and Mrs. John S. Williamson supra


Mr. David Andrew Williamson

c/o Mr. and Mrs. John S. Williamson supra


Mr. Garrett James Williamson

824 Adams Street, N.E.

Albuquerque 87110



Ms. Deborah Kruhm

P.O. Box 23899

Santa Fe 87502



Ms. Gretchen M. Wolfinger

U.S. Department of Justice

Appellate Section

P.O. Box 502

Washington 20044



Office of Chief Counsel

Internal Revenue Service

c/o U.S. Department of the Treasury

1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington 20220




Courtesy copies:


Office of the U.S. Attorney

P.O. Box 607

Albuquerque 87103



U.S. Department of Justice

Tax Division

717 North Harwood, Suite 400

Dallas 75201



Dr. Harriet Smith Windsor

Secretary of State

State of Delaware

401 Federal Street

Dover 19901




[See USPS Publication #221 for addressing instructions.]



Dated:   February 28, 2007 A.D.



Signed:  /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell


Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, Private Attorney General

         All Rights Reserved without Prejudice