No. 03-5070
______________________________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 2003 A.D.
______________________________________
In re:
United States ex relatione
Paul Andrew Mitchell,
Private Attorney General
On Petition for Extraordinary Writs
in the Nature of Mandamus
PETITION
FOR EXTRAORDINARY WRITS
IN
THE NATURE OF MANDAMUS
(revised)
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Private Attorney General
c/o Forwarding Agent
501 West Broadway, Suite A-332
San Diego 92101
CALIFORNIA, USA
tel: (619) 491-2659
fax: (619) 232-2011
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
(UCCA 1207)
in Petition
for Extraordinary Writs
(1)
Did
Circuit Judge Kozinski, or other qualified Circuit
Judge, owe a specific duty to Mitchell to execute and serve on the Chief
Justice a Certificate of Necessity to cure a
confirmed vacancy in the Article
III District Court of the United States (“DCUS”)?
(2)
Did the
Ninth Circuit and the DCUS owe a specific duty to Mitchell to take mandatory
judicial notice of certain verified adjudicative facts in the record below?
(3)
Did the
Ninth Circuit and the DCUS owe a specific duty to Mitchell to order an
unlicensed attorney to exhibit subsequent proof of that attorney’s
unsubstantiated fraud allegation made
during a preliminary hearing?
(4)
Did the
Ninth Circuit owe a specific duty to Mitchell to require Dale A. Drozd to exhibit a proper certificate of oath as required by
section 6067 of the California
Business and Professions Code?
(5)
Did
certain federal government offices owe a
specific duty to Mitchell either to exhibit proper Presidential Commissions for Dale A. Drozd,
William B. Shubb
and Stephen S. Trott,
or to confirm that none exists?
(6)
Did
William B. Shubb owe a specific duty to Mitchell to
exhibit all credentials
required of Mr. Shubb by law?
(7)
Did Dale
A. Drozd owe a specific duty to Mitchell to exhibit
all credentials required of
Mr. Drozd by law?
(8)
Did
certain federal government offices owe a specific duty to Mitchell to exhibit
proof that a U.S. magistrate was lawfully appointed and specifically designated
to exercise civil
jurisdiction in the DCUS, after Mitchell had previously objected by proving
the absence of consent by all parties?
(9)
Did
Procter Hug owe a specific duty to Mitchell to recuse himself from the Ninth Circuit’s 3-judge panel?
(10) Did Alfred T. Goodwin owe a specific duty to
Mitchell to recuse himself
from the Ninth Circuit’s 3-judge panel?
(11) Did Jack L. Wagner owe a specific duty to
Mitchell to docket all missing entries in the
official record of the district courts?
(12) Did the Ninth Circuit and the district courts
owe a specific duty to Mitchell to compel proof that all unlicensed attorneys
were authorized by their clients to exercise powers
of attorney?
(13) Did Cathy A. Catterson owe specific duties to Mitchell, including but not
limited to: (a) docketing Mitchell’s
proper complaint of judicial misconduct
against William B. Shubb, (b) ensuring that all Ninth
Circuit ORDER’s did conform
to the federal statute at 28 U.S.C. 1691, (c) certifying Mitchell’s proper and timely
challenges to the constitutionality of certain Acts of Congress, (d) correcting
all confirmed irregularities in the Circuit
docket, and (e) notifying Mitchell that these duties had been performed in
compliance with all applicable laws?
(14) Did Jack L. Wagner owe a specific duty to
Mitchell to ensure that all ORDER’s issued by the
district courts below did conform to the federal
statute at 28 U.S.C.
1691, namely, by displaying the seal
of the court and the signature of the
clerk thereof?
(15) Did the Ninth Circuit owe a specific duty to
Mitchell and to Petitioner to order Dale A. Drozd and
William B. Shubb to demonstrate by what lawful authorities,
if any, each claimed to preside on the DCUS in Sacramento, California?
(16) Did the Ninth Circuit owe a specific duty to
Mitchell and to Petitioner to order Dale A. Drozd and
William B. Shubb to demonstrate by what lawful
authorities, if any, each claimed to exercise the judicial Power of the United
States on behalf of Petitioner under Article
III in the Constitution for the United States of America, as lawfully amended?
(17) Did the Ninth Circuit owe a specific duty to
Mitchell and to Petitioner to order
the Circuit Clerk to certify to the United States
Attorney General Mitchell’s formal challenge to the constitutionality of
certain Acts of Congress, specifically the Abrogation Clause in the Rules
Enabling Act at 28
U.S.C. 2072(b), and the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869 et seq.
(18) Did the Ninth Circuit owe a specific duty to
Mitchell and to Petitioner to order the Circuit Clerk to certify Petitioner’s
intervention for presentation of all evidence admissible in the instant appeal,
and for argument(s) on the questions of the constitutionality of the Abrogation
Clause in the Rules Enabling Act at 28 U.S.C. 2072(b),
and of the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869 et seq. as presently codified at Title 28 of the United States
Code (“U.S.C.”)?
(19) Did the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit owe
a duty to Mitchell to address all verified objections documented in Mitchell’s REFUSAL OF ORDER AND MEMORANDUM FOR FRAUD AND
OTHER CAUSES, BY AFFIDAVIT in the matter of Mitchell’s proper and timely
complaint of judicial misconduct against Dale A. Drozd? See Appendix 131.
(20) Did the Ninth Circuit owe a duty to Mitchell
to enjoin the Register of Copyrights from
any further inaction in the matter Mitchell’s three (3) separate applications
for registration of His exclusive copyrights in the subject book? See Appendix
80.
in Petition for Writ of Certiorari
(1) Is the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869 et seq., unconstitutional for exhibiting vagueness, for violating the ex post facto prohibition at Article I, Section 9, Clause 3, for violating the Separation of Powers at Article I, Section 1, and for violating the well established principle that federal statutes conferring original jurisdiction on federal district courts must be strictly construed?
(2) Does the ex post facto Clause in the U.S. Constitution prohibit Congress from enacting or otherwise authorizing legislation which retroactively re‑defines the term “district courts” in federal statutes that pre‑date the Act of June 25, 1948, without expressly amending, or repealing and re‑enacting, those statutes?
(3) Are there two (2) separate and distinct classes of federal district courts currently established and currently available to federal litigants within the 50 States: one constitutional and the other legislative?
(4) Strictly construed, does the Rules Enabling Act at 28 U.S.C. 2072(a) limit this Court’s authority to promulgate rules of evidence and procedure only for United States District Courts, and not for the District Courts of the United States?
(5) Is the Abrogation Clause at 28 U.S.C. 2072(b) in the Rules Enabling Act unconstitutional for violating the Separation of Powers Doctrine as founded upon Article I, Section 1?
(6) Likewise, are the Local Rules for the federal district courts in Sacramento, California, expressly limited in scope to cases that proceed before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California (“USDC”)?
(7) Specifically, is a Local Rule “coercive” when it refers all Pro Per cases ‑‑ automatically and without the consent of all parties ‑‑ to U.S. magistrates appointed to that USDC and, as such, does that Local Rule also violate the Federal Magistrates Act, recent decisions of this Court, pertinent decisions of the Ninth Circuit, and Article III in the U.S. Constitution?
(8) Strictly construed, did the Lanham Act at 60 Stat. 440 confer original jurisdiction on the District Courts of the United States (“DCUS”) but not on the United States District Courts (“USDC”) inside California State, and has that grant of original jurisdiction ever been amended by Congress?
(9) Did Congress expressly extend the U.S. Constitution into D.C. in 1871 A.D. and into all federal Territories in 1873 A.D.?
(10) Are UNPUBLISHED Circuit Court opinions unconstitutional?
Plaintiff:
Paul Andrew Mitchell
Defendants:
AOL Time Warner, Inc.,
Steve Case,
Lennert Leader,
Randall J. Boe,
Adit Seth,
George R. Boyce,
James R. Bramson,
Daniel Levy,
Jonathan Steuer,
Brian Oblivion,
Donald D. Hoffman,
Karl Kleinpaste,
California Institute of Technology,
Cornell University,
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University,
Florida Institute of Technology,
Indiana University,
Miami University of Ohio,
Northeastern University,
Pennsylvania State University,
Princeton University,
Stanford University,
Stetson University,
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology,
University of Arkansas,
University of California,
University of Georgia,
University of Kansas,
University of Michigan,
University of Oregon,
University of Texas,
Internet Domain INCORPTEK.COM,
Justsystem Pittsburgh Research Center,
Midwest Internet Exchange, Inc., [sic]
Simple Network Communications, Inc.,
Luke Stevens,
COWZ Technologies,
The Works BBS,
Sean Strasburg,
Michael McFarland,
David Thorburn-Gundlach,
Bob Isaacson,
Tore Nestenius,
C. J. Sollien,
Chris Hansen,
Floyd W. Shackelford,
Network Solutions, Inc.,
The Thomson Corporation,
Cosmic Awareness Communications,
Sprawlnet.com, Inc.,
Four Peaks Technology Groups,
Tzolkin Corporation,
ParabolaX Research Group,
William Harrity,
THF Pictures,
Synchron Data,
Lyle Myhr, and
Doe’s 98 thru 2,500.
Page
Questions Presented in Petition for
Extraordinary Writs in the Nature of Mandamus ................. i
Questions Presented in Petition for
Writ of Certiorari .......................................... iii
List of Parties ..............................................
iv
Table Contents (this page)
.................................. vii
Appendix Notation .......................................... viii
Table of Authorities ......................................... ix
Opinions Below ............................................... xi
Jurisdiction ................................................ xii
Constitutional / Statutory Provisions Involved ............. xiii
Statement of the Case ......................................... 1
Reasons for Granting the Writ: ................................ 4
Writs will aid this Court’s appellate jurisdiction ......... 5
Exceptional circumstances exist to warrant the Writs ....... 6
Adequate relief cannot be obtained anywhere else ........... 7
Detailed Discussion ........................................... 8
Notice of Related Case and Request for Judicial Notice ....... 12
Record Exhibits Evidence of Equal Protection Violations ...... 12
Remedy Requested ............................................. 13
Verification ................................................. 14
Conclusions .................................................. 15
Index to Appendices .......................................... 16
Proof of Service ............................................. 17
Attachments: Copies of ORDER’s
in Respect of which
Extraordinary Writs of Mandamus are sought ................... 19
For Appendix numbers, please refer in sequence to entries in the Table of Contents at Internet URL:
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/index.htm
This PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY WRITS IN THE NATURE OF MANDAMUS is entry number 164 in that Table of Contents.
The Hyper‑Text Markup Language (“HTML”) version of this PETITION will contain additional underlines, due to the addition of numerous working hyperlinks.
The hard copy version was written and printed using registered copies of Microsoft WORD 2002 and Microsoft Windows 98 Second Edition.
Cases: Page
U.S.
Supreme Court
Roell et al. v. Withrow,
2003 DJDAR 4593 (April 29, 2003) ............................... 5
U.S.
Courts of Appeal
Gillespie v. Civiletti,
629 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1980) .................................. 12
Hajek v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co.,
186 F.3d 1105, hn. 9 (9th Cir. 1999) ............................ 5
State
Courts
Carmine v. Bowen,
64 A. 932 (1906) .............................................. 12
Constitutional
Provisions:
Article I,
Section 1 ......................................... iii
Article I,
Section 9, Clause 3 ............................... iii
Article III .................................. i, ii, iii, 6, 7, 9
Article IV, Section 1 ......................................... 12
Thirteenth Amendment .......................................... 12
Statutes:
16 Stat. 419, 426, § 34 (1871) ........................ iii, 6
18 Stat. 325, 333, § 1891 (1873) ........................ iii, 6
60 Stat. 440, Jul. 5, 1946 .................. iii, xii, 1, 6, 13
60 Stat. 443, Jul. 5, 1946 .................................. 13
62 Stat. 869 et seq., Jun. 25, 1948................. ii, iii, 11
62 Stat. 870, Jun. 25, 1948
................................ xii
62 Stat. 907, Jun. 25, 1948
................................ xii
62 Stat. 991, Jun. 25, 1948 ................................ xii
63 Stat. 107, May 24, 1949 ................................ xii
96 Stat. 46, Apr. 2, 1982
................................ xii
96 Stat. 1316, Oct. 12, 1982
................................ xii
102
Stat. 3946, Nov. 16, 1988 ................................
xii
112
Stat. 3070, Oct. 30, 1998 ................................
xii
15 U.S.C. 1121, 60 Stat. 440 .............................. xii, 1
15 U.S.C. 1125, 60 Stat. 441 ....................... iii, 1, 6, 13
15 U.S.C. 1127, 60 Stat. 443 .................................. 13
18 U.S.C. 4 ............................................ 12, 13
18 U.S.C. 1512 ............................................... xii
18 U.S.C. 1513 ............................................... xii
18 U.S.C. 3231 ............................................... xii
28 U.S.C. 372 .......................................... 2, 5, 11
28 U.S.C. 453 ................................................. 3
28 U.S.C. 454 ................................................. 2
28 U.S.C. 636 ................................................. 5
28 U.S.C. 1291 ............................................... xii
28 U.S.C. 1331 ............................................... xii
28 U.S.C. 1338 ............................................... xii
28 U.S.C. 1651 ............................................... xii
28 U.S.C.
1691 ................................................ ii
28 U.S.C. 1746 ..............................................7, 14
28 U.S.C. 2071 ................................................. 5
28 U.S.C. 2072 ................................. ii, iii, 1, 7, 11
28 U.S.C. 2403 ................................................. 8
42 U.S.C. 1983 ................................................ 12
42 U.S.C. 1985 ............................................ 12, 13
42 U.S.C. 1986 ................................................ 13
42 U.S.C. 1988 ................................................ 13
California Business and Professions Code (“CBPC”):
§ 6067 ....................................................... i
Treaties
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ......................... 13
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights .......... 13
Rules:
Local Rule (“L.R.”) 73‑302(c)(21), USDC/EDCA ................... 1
Rule 201(d), Federal Rules of Evidence ......................... 7
Other:
Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition
“Coram non judice” defined ..................................... 6
Quoting:
In presence of a person not a judge. When a suit is brought and determined in a court which has no jurisdiction in the matter, then it is said to be coram non judice, and the judgment is void.
“Federal citizenship” defined ............................. 12, 13
Quoting:
Rights and obligations accruing by reason of being a citizen of the United States. State or status of being a citizen of the United States.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 2003 A.D.
Petitioner respectfully requests
that Extraordinary Writs of Mandamus issue
to compel performance of duties owed to Appellant
The “ORDER” denying rehearing by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, as filed on April 8, 2003 A.D., appears at Appendix 147.
The “MEMORANDUM NOT FOR PUBLICATION” by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, as filed on December 13, 2002 A.D., appears at Appendix 125.
The “MEMORANDUM AND ORDER” captioned “UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA” denying reconsideration on February 22, 2002 A.D., appears at Appendix 75. See also Appendix 70.
The “ORDER” captioned “UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA” adopting the findings and recommendations, as filed on January 25, 2002 A.D., appears at Appendix 57.
The “ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS” [sic] by Mr. Drozd, as filed on December 31, 2001 A.D., appear at Appendix 45.
Other alleged “ORDER’s” issued by Mr. Drozd are also listed in chronological order in the Table of Contents at Internet URL:
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/index.htm
Appendix numbers correspond to entries in that Table of Contents, in chronological order. (Appendix 1 = entry 1, etc.)
The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided this case was December 13, 2002 A.D. See Appendix 125.
A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of Appeals on April 8, 2003 A.D., and a copy of the “ORDER” denying rehearing appears at Appendix 147.
The jurisdiction of this Supreme Court of the United States is here invoked under the All Writs Statute at 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
The United States Court of Appeals enjoyed appellate jurisdiction pursuant to a strict construction of the federal statutes at 60 Stat. 440, § 39, July 5, 1946 (aka 15 U.S.C. 1121) and 28 U.S.C. 1291.
The District Court of the United States (“DCUS”) enjoyed original jurisdiction pursuant to a strict construction of the federal statutes at 60 Stat. 440 supra, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338(a), 1338(b), and also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512, 1513 and 3231. See Initial COMPLAINT.
For the convenience of this Supreme Court and all its personnel, Petitioner now documents all known amendments to 60 Stat. 440 supra:
Statute at Large Date Public Law Miscellaneous
---------------- ------------- ------------ ------------------------
60 Stat. 440 Jul. 5, 1946 Ch. 540, Title VI, § 39
62 Stat. 870 Jun. 25, 1948 Ch. 646, §§ 1, 32(a)
62 Stat. 907 Jun. 25, 1948 Ch. 646, § 32
62 Stat. 991 Jun. 25, 1948 Ch. 646, §§ 1, 32(a)
63 Stat. 107 May 24, 1949 Ch. 139, § 127
96 Stat. 46 Apr. 2, 1982 P.L. 97-164 Title I, Part B, § 148
96 Stat 1316 Oct. 12, 1982 P.L. 97-296 § 39a, 15 U.S.C. 1121(b)
102 Stat 3946 Nov. 16, 1988 P.L. 100-667 Title I, § 131
112 Stat 3070 Oct. 30, 1998 P.L. 105-330 Title II, § 201(a)(10)
Sources:
15 USCA 1121, 15 USCS 1121, and the
U.S. Code at Cornell University’s website:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/15/1121.html
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved
Constitutional
Provisions:
Article I, Section 1 (“All legislative Powers ...”)
Article I, Section 9, Clause 3, ex post facto Clause
Article III, Section 1, Compensation Clause
Article III, Section 2, Clause 1, Arising Under Clause
Article IV, Section 1, Full Faith and Credit Clause
Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, Territory Clause
Article IV, Section 4, Guarantee Clause
Article VI, Section 3, Oath of Office Clause
Ninth, Tenth and Thirteenth Amendments
Statutory
Provisions:
14 Stat. 27, 1866 Civil Rights Act
16 Stat. 419, 426, § 34 (1871) (first extension statute)
18 Stat. 325, 333, § 1891 (1873) (second extension statute)
62 Stat. 869 et seq., Title 28, U.S.C.
5 U.S.C. 552, 2104, 2902
15 U.S.C. 1121, 60 Stat. 440 (Title 15 not enacted) (see COUNT TWO)
15 U.S.C. 1125, 60 Stat. 441 (Title 15 not enacted) (see COUNT TWO)
15 U.S.C. 1127, 60 Stat. 443 (Title 15 not enacted) (see COUNT THREE)
17 U.S.C. 101 (see COUNT ONE)
17 U.S.C. 106 (see COUNT ONE)
17 U.S.C. 506 (see COUNT ONE)
17 U.S.C. 512 (see COUNT ONE)
18 U.S.C. 3-4
18 U.S.C. 241-242 (see COUNTS THREE and FOUR)
18 U.S.C. 371 (see COUNT FOUR)
18 U.S.C. 1503
18 U.S.C. 1512-1513(see COUNTS THREE and FOUR)
18 U.S.C. 2319 (see COUNT ONE)
18 U.S.C. 3231
26 U.S.C. 3402(n), IRC 3402(n) (Title 26 not enacted)
28 U.S.C. 132
28 U.S.C. 372(c)
28 U.S.C. 453-455
28 U.S.C. 631
28 U.S.C. 636
28 U.S.C. 955
28 U.S.C. 1254
28 U.S.C. 1291-1292
28 U.S.C. 1331
28 U.S.C. 1338
28 U.S.C. 1651
28 U.S.C. 1654
28 U.S.C. 1691
28 U.S.C. 1746
Statutory Provisions (continued):
28 U.S.C. 2071-2072
28 U.S.C. 2403(a)
42 U.S.C. 1983
42 U.S.C. 1985-1986
42 U.S.C. 1988
§§ 6067, 6126, 6127, and 17200 et seq., CBPC (see COUNT FIVE)
Miscellaneous:
Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition
“Sui juris” defined ................................... 14, 15, 17
Quoting:
Of his own right; possessing full social and civil rights; not under any legal disability, or the power of another, or guardianship. Having capacity to manage one’s own affairs; not under legal disability to act for one’s self.
“In Propria Persona” defined .............................. 14, 18
Quoting:
In one’s own proper person. It was formerly a rule in pleading that pleas to the jurisdiction of the court must be plead in propria persona, because if pleaded by attorney they admit the jurisdiction, as an attorney is an officer of the court, and he is presumed to plead after having obtained leave, which admits the jurisdiction.
“Ex relatione” defined ...................................... 3, 8
Upon relation or information. Legal proceedings which are instituted by the attorney general (or other proper person) in the name and behalf of the state, but on the information and at the instigation of an individual who has a private interest in the matter, are said to be taken “on the relation” (ex relatione) of such person, who is called the “relator.” Such a cause is usually entitled thus: “State ex rel. Doe v. Roe.”
Note: The Seventh Edition of Black’s Law Dictionary has removed the definition of the term “United States”. Thus, Petitioner no longer exists, as far as that dictionary is concerned!
On August 1, 2001 A.D., Plaintiff Paul Andrew Mitchell filed a civil case in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Judicial District of California (“DCUS”), in Sacramento, California, alleging five (5) counts against a total of 129 named Defendants.
The five counts included copyright infringement, trademark infringement, deprivation of fundamental Rights, conspiracy to deprive fundamental Rights, and unfair competition under California laws.
Pursuant to a Local Rule and without the consent of all parties, the case was automatically referred to Mr. Dale A. Drozd, alleging to occupy the office of a United States magistrate in Sacramento, Calif. Mitchell timely objected to that coercive referral, in numerous ways.
Over Mitchell’s timely, written objections, Mr. Drozd scheduled a preliminary hearing for December 14, 2001 A.D., to consider motions to dismiss which had been filed in the wrong court by defense attorneys appearing without the credentials required by California State laws.
Mitchell appeared under protest to challenge jurisdiction.
At that hearing, Mr. Drozd agreed that 60 Stat. 440 was exactly the correct statute conferring original jurisdiction over Mitchell’s Lanham Act claim. Compare 15 U.S.C. 1121 (not enacted). Mr. Drozd also branded Mitchell’s constitutional issues as “frivolous” [sic].
Also on December 14, 2001 A.D., the District Clerk issued a large number of SUBPOENA’s IN A CIVIL CASE: to command certain named Defendants to disclose computer activity logs and the identities of subscribers suspected of infringing Mitchell’s exclusive copyrights, and to compel defense attorneys to disclose the certificates of oath that are required to be indorsed upon their licenses to practice law.
On December 31, 2001 A.D., Mr. Drozd filed his findings and recommendations, assuming motions to dismiss had been properly filed.
Mitchell followed timely with a complaint of judicial misconduct against Mr. Drozd, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 372(c). That complaint incorporated Mitchell’s VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT against Mr. Drozd, for practicing law from the bench in violation of 28 U.S.C. 454.
The delivery of Mr. Drozd’s mail, containing his findings and recommendations, was delayed for reasons that remain undiscovered.
Immediately upon receiving those findings and recommendations, Mitchell prepared, filed and served thoroughly detailed objections, in three (3) parts entitled MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER [sic] AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE ‑‑ PARTS I, II, and III.
Assuming he had jurisdiction, Mr. William B. Shubb then adopted Mr. Drozd’s findings and recommendations in full. Mitchell followed with a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, which Mr. Shubb summarily denied.
Mitchell then appealed timely to the Ninth Circuit.
In a MEMORANDUM NOT FOR PUBLICATION [sic] dated Dec. 13, 2002 A.D., Messrs. Goodwin, Hug and Trott issued an unsigned and unsealed ruling approving all actions taken by Mr. Shubb, and affirming for reasons set forth in Mr. Drozd’s findings and recommendations.
That MEMORANDUM also agreed that leave to amend Mitchell’s Initial COMPLAINT would be “futile” and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
Finally, that MEMORANDUM erred in finding that Mitchell had failed to file timely objections to the findings and recommendations, and that Mitchell had presented no valid grounds for reconsideration of the dismissal with prejudice.
Mitchell then objected to Shubb and Trott, because the U.S. DOJ later confirmed in writing that, as the legal custodian of record, DOJ could find no Presidential Commission for either gentleman.
Mitchell also objected to Mr. Hug, because an earlier VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT, which Mitchell had filed against Mr. Hug in 1997, created conflicts of interest in connection with the case of a federal grand jury SUBPOENA that Mitchell was authorized to litigate.
And, Mitchell also objected to Mr. Goodwin, because the latter’s decision in re the Pledge of Allegiance effectively disqualified him for lacking a proper oath of office (i.e. by omitting from that oath the conditional phrase “So help me God.”) See 28 U.S.C. 453.
Mitchell continued to investigate all pertinent laws and decisions with great diligence, e.g. see his detailed MEMO to Circuit Judge Kozinski detailing 25 years of Ninth Circuit precedents in re the Federal Magistrates Act, and a shorter MEMO to Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Mary M. Schroeder concerning her dissent in one of those cases.
Mitchell formally requested rehearing en banc, and also filed an APPLICATION FOR WRIT IN THE NATURE OF QUO WARRANTO on behalf of the United States ex rel., to challenge and finally to decide any rights in Messrs. Shubb and Drozd to occupy the offices they claimed.
In another unsigned and unsealed ORDER dated April 8, 2003 A.D., Messrs. Goodwin, Hug and Trott also denied Mitchell’s petition for rehearing and all other pending motions, inclusive of a demand by Mitchell for mandatory judicial notice of Trott’s missing commission.
Petitioner now respectfully requests that Extraordinary Writs of Mandamus issue to compel the performance of specific duties owed to Mitchell by all lower courts and their employees in the instant case.
Reasons for Granting Extraordinary
Writs
Extraordinary Writs will aid this Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
II
Exceptional circumstances warrant the exercise of this Court’s discretionary powers and supervisory responsibilities.
III
Adequate relief cannot presently be obtained in any other form, or from any other court.
Petitioner now elaborates in detail as follows:
The Writs will be in aid of this Court’s appellate
jurisdiction.
The issue of “coercive referrals” of civil cases to United States magistrates has already arisen in Mitchell’s PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI. See all cases cited in Appendix 136, Hajek in particular.
After disposition of the instant case by the Ninth Circuit, this Court issued a controlling decision in Roell et al. v. Withrow, 2003 DJDAR 4593 (decided April 29, 2003 A.D.)
If that decision and the worthy principles it recited had been available to the Ninth Circuit before considering the instant case, Relator argues that the outcome there would, and should, have been entirely different. Coercive referrals are contrary to law.
Such coercive referrals violate 28 U.S.C. 2071 ‑‑ by flatly contradicting t