Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
c/o Dr. John C. Alden, M.D.
350 – 30th Street, Suite 444
tel: (510) 452‑2020
fax: (510) 832‑8507
In Propria Persona
All Rights Reserved
United States Court of Appeals
) 372(c) No. 02‑89005
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF IN REPLY TO
v. ) APPELLEE CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY
) AND REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO FILE
AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al., ) AN ENLARGED BRIEF.
COMES NOW Paul Andrew Mitchell, Appellant in the above entitled case, to reply to CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY’S APPELLEE’S BRIEF (hereinafter “Ropers’ BRIEF”).
After receiving proper and timely demands for their requisite certificates of oath, like all other attorneys who have attempted to appear in the instant case Ms. Susan H. Handelman (“Ropers”) has also failed to produce a valid license to practice law in the State of California, with an oath of office properly indorsed upon same, as required by § 6067 of the California Business and Professions Code (“CBPC”). Like Latham’s BRIEF before it, Ropers’ BRIEF should be stricken and completely disregarded, for this reason alone.
Moreover, having failed to produce any evidence whatsoever that they have indorsed the prescribed oath, Ropers is now in violation of Local Rules 83‑180(a) (“signing the prescribed oath”) and 83‑180(d) (complying with Standards of Professional Conduct). If counsel for any named Defendants must insist on strict adherence to said Local Rules, it is an invited error for them to violate said Local Rules so stubbornly. Their failure to produce the requisite license to practice law, with oaths of office properly indorsed upon same, is conduct that degrades and impugns the integrity of this Court and interferes with the administration of justice in the instant case.
INCORPORATION OF 372(c) COMPLAINT
Appellant hereby incorporates in full and by reference Appellant’s COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT against Mr. Dale A. Drozd, and all other evidence filed to date, in Clerk’s Docket No. 02‑89005, as if set forth fully here.
AOL TIME WARNER, INC. AND INDIVIDUAL AOL DEFENDANTS
Appellant also incorporates by reference His previously filed APPELLANT’S BRIEF IN REPLY TO APPELLEES AOL TIME WARNER, INC., STEVE CASE, LENNERT LEADER, RANDALL J. BOE AND JAMES R. BRAMSON; REQUEST FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS AND LEAVE TO FILE ENLARGED BRIEF (“Latham’s BRIEF”), as if set forth fully here. If a matter in Ropers’ BRIEF has already been adequately covered in Latham’s BRIEF, Appellant will endeavor briefly to indicate as much in what follows.
Appellant will now address Ropers’ BRIEF by taking issue with its many errors in the order of their appearance.
1. Appellant’s Initial COMPLAINT does contain charging allegations as to Defendant Carnegie Mellon University (“CMU”) on the theory of copyright infringement.
2. Appellant’s Initial COMPLAINT does contain factual allegations as to CMU on the second claim of trademark infringement.
3. Venue is proper in the Eastern Judicial District of California.
4. The official record now before this Court does strongly suggest that CMU should remain a named Defendant in this action.
The alterations to Appellant’s copyrighted work involved much more than mere changes to underlining, italics and Capitalizations [sic]. See Exhibit A‑1, which was removed entirely from most of the counterfeits that made it onto the Internet.
As will be proven in the detailed reply that follows, Appellant did sue CMU by properly alleging exactly what CMU is accused of doing. See Exhibits J‑13 and K‑62, for starters, and also Appellant’s FOURTH SUPPLEMENT TO COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY, for thorough and detailed clarification.
Appellant could not serve all named Defendants with all Excerpts of the Record, because the cost to Him of doing so was prohibitive. Instead and in good faith, Appellant did upload almost all of the Excerpts to the Supreme Law Library on the Internet, and He provided clear access instructions in His TRANSMITTAL LETTER to the Clerk of this Court. Searching those Excerpts was made vastly more convenient by their availability in digital files on the Internet, using popular and powerful search engines like Google at http://www.google.com/.
Appellant cannot be faulted for Ropers’ lack of computer expertise. This is the case of a vast number of digital counterfeits that were modified substantially, and then hosted on the Internet, without the permission of the exclusive copyright owner.
APPELLANT’S INFORMAL OPENING BRIEF is not a tangled web of pleading by incorporation. On the contrary, it follows carefully the outline offered by the Ninth Circuit for simplifying opening briefs, and it too was uploaded to the Supreme Law Library with hyperlinks to all incorporated pleadings and exhibits. Seeing is believing, and Appellant fully expects that this Court will benefit enormously by taking advantage of Appellant’s hypertext database, particularly with a high‑speed “broadband” connection to the Internet (e.g. DSL or cable modem).
A. Appellant’s Initial COMPLAINT
All named Defendants in this case did find the subject book useful enough to host on the Internet, by making it available for free to literally millions of users worldwide; they did modify it substantially by removing the clear terms and conditions stated in the SHAREWARE POLICY; and, they did participate in distributing the resulting modified derivatives as far as the Internet would carry those “counterfeits”. See the Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996 (“ACPA”).
Ropers’ BRIEF openly admits that the Initial COMPLAINT does incorporate Exhibits A‑1 thru L‑10, but then it flatly misleads this Court by stating that these materials barely mention CMU and “certainly fail to state any claim against CMU”.
Appellant did an experiment after receiving Ropers’ BRIEF. It required all of 10 minutes to search the Cover Pages that correspond to Exhibits A‑1 thru L‑11 for occurrences of the phrase “Carnegie”. That experiment rapidly confirmed that CMU is expressly mentioned in Exhibits G‑14, H‑14, J‑13 and K‑62.
A similar search of the Internet Table of Contents for the instant case also located Appellant’s FOURTH SUPPLEMENT supra and AUTHOR’S FIRST CERTIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS IN RE DEFENDANT CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY, which elaborate in detail the evidence against CMU, its agents and accomplices.
This Court is encouraged to perform the same experiment.
B. Factual Allegations in the COMPLAINT
Exhibits G‑14, H‑14, J‑13 and K‑62 were formally incorporated into the Initial COMPLAINT. See the List of Exhibits at the very end of Appellant’s THIRD SUPPLEMENT, for a complete list of all incorporated exhibits.
Formal NOTICE AND DEMAND are served upon you to deliver a certified copy of this Author's written authorization, permitting you to promote a stolen electronic copy of "The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue" at Internet URL:
Clearly, Appellant’s NOTICE AND DEMAND adequately alleged that CMU promoted a stolen electronic copy of the subject book at an Internet domain identified as CMU.EDU. Appellant did exercise a rigorous research and enforcement methodology to confirm that Internet domain CMU.EDU identifies file servers owned and/or operated by Defendant Carnegie Mellon University.
See Appellant’s FOURTH SUPPLEMENT for specific details of that rigorous and objective methodology, which can be replicated at will.
Ropers’ BRIEF errs seriously by attempting to understate the significance of Exhibit K‑62; said BRIEF states that Appellant sent a “demand” and a “notice” to CMU, but it deliberately glosses over the precise contents of Appellant’s NOTICE AND DEMAND supra. Appellant’s allegations prevail using the rule of preponderance (greater weight will be given to testimony and evidence exhibiting the greater detail).
Moreover, substance prevails over form.
C. Legal Theories Advanced in the Initial COMPLAINT
In addition to violations of 17 U.S.C. §§ 506(a)(2), 512(c) and 18 U.S.C. 2319(c)(1), COUNT ONE also re‑alleges every allegation “set forth above” and incorporates same by reference, as if all were set forth fully in COUNT ONE.
Once again, let substance prevail over form.
Without citing 17 U.S.C. 106 as such, the Initial COMPLAINT does adequately allege joint and several liability in CMU for violating Appellant’s rights of reproduction, distribution, and preparation of derivative works. See also Appellant’s FOURTH SUPPLEMENT.
Insofar as any omissions are significant, Appellant submits that the Initial COMPLAINT can be easily amended by adding citations to 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), 106(2), and 106(3). For the sake of brevity, the word “and” could also be appended to the first paragraph in COUNT ONE.
COUNT TWO does allege trademark infringement by CMU, in violation of § 43(a) of Lanham Act (uncodified at 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)), because a multitude of substantial alterations produced modified derivatives that obviously violated said Act. See Exhibit A‑1.
COUNTS THREE and FOUR do allege violations of the federal criminal statutes at 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 371, 1512 and 1513. As in the case of all other counts, COUNTS THREE and FOUR also re‑allege every allegation “set forth above” and incorporate same by reference, as if all were set forth fully in those COUNTS.
COUNT FIVE is not a “conclusory” allegation of trademark infringement, in part because the federal statute at 28 U.S.C. 1338(a) expressly authorizes a claim of unfair competition to be joined with a substantial and related claim under the copyright laws.
Appellant’s COUNT ONE is a substantial claim under the copyright laws, and it obviously relates to COUNT FIVE.
D. Motions to Dismiss
As a matter of law, Appellant can state and has stated a valid claim for copyright infringement against CMU.
Appellant can state and has stated a valid claim for trademark infringement against CMU under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
Appellant can establish and has established probable cause that agents of CMU committed felony federal offenses, and Appellant has complied with His legal obligation under 18 U.S.C. 4 to report specific felony violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 1512, 1513 and 2319.
Lastly, Appellant has stated a valid State law claim for violations of California Business and Professions Code (“CBPC”) §§ 17200 et seq., and more recently of CBPC §§ 6067, 6126 and 6127 by CMU’s attorneys, because the latter have now attempted to make proper appearances without the requisite licenses to practice law or requisite certificates of oath.
E. Opposition to Motions to Dismiss
Appellant did file opposition to all motions to dismiss that were submitted in error by attorneys lacking credentials. Obviously, those attorneys must have been expecting pleadings styled “PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO CMU’S MOTION TO DISMISS” or some similar form.
However, Appellant did object timely and properly to their lack of credentials by filing His MOTION TO STRIKE ALL PLEADINGS BY ATTORNEYS LACKING CREDENTIALS. On November 15, 2001 A.D., Mr. Dale A. Drozd allegedly “denied” said MOTION for failing to provide notice of hearing in violation of Local Rule 78‑230. But, Mr. Drozd attempted to preside without jurisdiction; he impersonated a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. 912; he practiced law from the bench in violation of 28 U.S.C. 454; and, he also violated Local Rule 78‑230(b), which states in pertinent part:
Motions defectively noticed shall be filed, but not set for hearing; the Clerk shall immediately notify the moving party of the defective notice and of the next available dates and times for proper notice, and the moving party shall file and serve a new notice of motion setting forth a proper time and date.
[bold emphasis added]
The Clerk of the DCUS never notified Appellant of any defective notice(s) nor of the next available dates and times for proper notice.
The actions by Mr. Drozd in this instance were obviously prejudicial to Appellant, because they caused adverse substantive consequences for Appellant in a manner that was contrary to law.
And, Appellant did file timely objections by means of His FOURTH SUPPLEMENT TO COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY well in advance of the hearing that was had on December 14, 2001 A.D.
Similarly on November 15, 2001 A.D., Mr. Drozd attempted to “strike” this FOURTH SUPPLEMENT in response to a motion for same, submitted by attorneys lacking the requisite credentials to represent CMU in the first instance.
Moreover, their motion to strike Appellant’s FOURTH SUPPLEMENT petitioned the wrong court by invoking rules that expressly do not bind the DCUS, if Appellant’s construction of the Rules Enabling Act is correct. See 28 U.S.C. 2072(a).
Thus, Mr. Drozd committed plain errors by attempting to strike Appellant’s FOURTH SUPPLEMENT.
Appellant now believes that the proven misconduct by Mr. Drozd, in the matter of Appellant’s FOURTH SUPPLEMENT, now constitutes obstruction of justice, mainly because it prevented discovery of crucial certified evidence clearly implicating Defendant CMU and its responsible agents directly in all COUNTS alleged in the Initial COMPLAINT.
All of Appellant’s pleadings in the instant case have been certified pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1). If the caption on Appellant’s FOURTH SUPPLEMENT offended some hard and fast rule(s) or law(s), it could be easily modified to read “PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO CMU’S MOTION TO DISMISS” or a some similar caption.
Let substance prevail over form, once again.
Although Local Rules 72‑302 and 72‑304 do appear to have conferred lawful authority on Mr. Drozd, said rules expressly bind the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California (“USDC”) and they do not bind the District Court of the United States (“DCUS”) in the instant case, if Appellant’s formal challenge to the Abrogation Clause is correct. 28 U.S.C. 2072(b).
Confer also at “Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius” in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition. Appellant is protesting the Seventh Edition of Black’s because it conspicuously omits any definition of the term “United States”, which term figures prominently throughout the U.S. Constitution and in a great multitude federal statutes. See the Guarantee Clause, for an example (“United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government ....”).
Appellant’s MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT, AND CHALLENGE TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN ACT OF CONGRESS suffered a similar unfortunate fate. Ropers’ BRIEF sadly parrots Mr. Drozd by stating that Appellant also failed to give notice of any hearing date for this MOTION. Once again, however, Mr. Drozd violated Local Rule 78‑230(b), as discussed above, by attempting to “deny” said MOTION outright.
More to the points raised in that MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT, the Local Rules in question do not and can not bind the DCUS nor can they bind Appellant in the instant case, until such time as the requested interlocutory judgment is finally decided.
Moreover, Appellant was entirely justified in submitting that MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT when He did, in order to illustrate dramatically how this Court of Appeals does not have appellate jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders issued by the USDC, whereas it does have appellate jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders issued by the DCUS. See 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1), in chief.
See also the order of this Court in the case of USA v. Makarian, Ninth Circuit docket number #01‑50422, dated October 22, 2001 A.D., holding that Makarian’s motion for leave to appeal an interlocutory order issued by the USDC in Los Angeles should be denied, and his appeal dismissed, for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Appellant was an eyewitness to these proceedings, because Appellant wrote Makarian’s key motions on this question.
Given the verified evidence before Him and now before this Court, Appellant was entirely justified in filing his VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT charging Mr. Drozd with the practice of law from the bench, in violation of 28 U.S.C. 454, and charging the named attorneys with several violations of CBPC §§ 6126 and 6127, 4 U.S.C. 101, and 18 U.S.C. 242 (all misdemeanors not covered by 18 U.S.C. 4).
In particular, said attorneys also failed to produce their requisite credentials, after being served with lawful SUBPOENAS for same. No ORDER quashing said SUBPOENAS has been issued by the DCUS in the instant case.
Appellant therefore argues that CMU’s attorneys are now liable to Appellant, to the DCUS, to the USDC, and to this Court for sanctions and contempt of court, for obstructing justice and for obstructing lawful discovery in a civil case. Confer also at “Barratry” in Black’s Sixth Edition.
Similarly, CMU has failed to produce the activity logs, and identities of Internet subscribers suspected of violating Appellant’s exclusive copyrights, in response to proper, timely and lawful SUBPOENAS issued by the Clerk of the USDC for same. See 17 U.S.C. 512(h), which does confer limited authority on the USDC in this instance. The stated deadline for response to said SUBPOENAS was March 15, 2002 A.D.
Nobody can know the exact extent of actual damages incurred by Appellant, until and unless the information commanded by the latter SUBPOENAS is forthcoming, without any further obstruction or delays.
F. Order [sic] and Findings and Recommendations
It is rather hypocritical of Ropers to cite Local Rule 11‑110 (Sanctions for Noncompliance with Rules), when they themselves are so blatantly in violation of the Standards for Professional Conduct as explained by Local Rule 83‑180(e). Appellant will not tolerate such an abusive double standard, here or anywhere else.
Likewise, Local Rule 83‑183 would have bound Appellant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and to all of the USDC’s Local Rules, only if Appellant’s construction of the Rules Enabling Act were incorrect, and only if Appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of the Abrogation Clause in that Act were also incorrect.
Appellant did act timely and properly to argue, when He did, that neither the FRCP, nor the USDC’s Local Rules, bind the DCUS or Appellant when He is proceeding in the latter court. See 28 U.S.C. 2072(a), which must be strictly construed.
It is also ironic that Ropers’ BRIEF cites Local Rule 83‑183, which clearly states that a corporation or other entity may appear only by an attorney. CMU has not appeared by an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of California.
Ropers’ failure to answer the SUBPOENAS with their licenses to practice law, and with oaths of office properly indorsed upon same, is positive proof that they cannot represent CMU, and have not represented CMU, at any time in the instant case.
Appellant’s Certificate of Copyright Registration is dated July 23, 2001 A.D. See Appellant’s REPLY to Latham’s BRIEF, for fully detailed discussion of this point.
Appellant’s Initial COMPLAINT is not barred by the 3‑year statute of limitations. Laws and cases on accrual also favor Appellant.
Even though Appellant first became aware of one domain violation in December of 1995, namely DEOXY.ORG, at that time He did not have the requisite expertise to confirm any responsible individuals, corporations or other entities, nor did His busy schedule allow for the time required to do so. Appellant had to make a living, and nobody paid Him to do copyright enforcement or the necessary research to confirm the party(s) responsible for DEOXY.ORG.
The administrative procedures established by the DMCA did not become effective until October 1998 A.D. (at the earliest), when it was signed into law by President Clinton.
Appellant had to “squeeze” copyright enforcement in among His other pressing obligations, such as the plaintiff’s petition to the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Hawks v. County of Butte. That case, incidentally, described a number of instances in which William B. Shubb did deprive plaintiff Dixianne Hawks of due process of law, in a case alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 inter alia.
Appellant believes that Mr. Shubb is now demonstrably biased towards Him because Appellant later published Hawks’ petitions to the Supreme Court, and to this Court, in the Supreme Law Library (in the Court Cases section). See APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF filed by Dixianne Hawks in Ninth Circuit docket number #95‑16714.
The case law governing standing to prosecute violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 1512 and 1513 is fully discussed in Appellant’s MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE ‑‑ PART II.
Appellant’s explicit reservations of His fundamental Right to petition the DCUS for leave to institute criminal proceedings, and the United States’ statutory right to intervene ex relatione Paul Andrew Mitchell and to prosecute, are also detailed in Appellant’s REPLY to Latham’s BRIEF. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq., 3231.
The omission of Appellant’s SHAREWARE POLICY, as found in Exhibit A‑1, is proof positive that the counterfeits in question were modified in ways that were much more substantial and substantive than mere changes to Capitalizations, bold, italics, and underlining [sic].
There are several simple amendments that can be made to the Initial COMPLAINT, which will entirely cure any confirmed defects. These simple amendments are itemized, and justified, in Appellant’s REPLY to Latham’s BRIEF.
Appellant did promptly prepare and file His objections to the FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS by Mr. Drozd after receiving U.S. Mail that had been delayed for unexplained reasons. Appellant reminds this Court that another amendment justified by the official record now before this Court of Appeals is to add COUNT SIX: Civil RICO. Retaliation against a Federal Witness and copyright infringement are two of the RICO predicate acts now itemized at 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(B). In this context, see Appellant’s “Documented Retaliations” and “RICO Predicate Acts” at Exhibits D‑46 and D‑47, respectively.
G. Timely Objections to Findings and Recommendations
It is obvious from what has already said on this point that Appellant did prepare and file detailed objections to the FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS authored by Mr. Drozd.
The real issue here is not strict adherence to stated deadlines; the issue is one of good faith and fair dealing.
Appellant argues that Mr. Shubb was really reacting to Appellant’s MEMO of January 22, 2002 A.D., as addressed to the Clerk of the district court and as emailed to Mr. Tim Hinkle, one of Mr. Shubb’s law clerks.
It is in fact true that Mr. Hinkle responded to Appellant via email to confirm that he (Hinkle) did forward Appellant’s MEMO to Mr. Shubb on January 22, 2002 A.D.
Mr. Shubb then appeared to exploit the admitted delays in delivering the FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS to Appellant until January 18, 2002 A.D. ‑‑ by trying to fabricate the fiction that Appellant did not object to same. Mr. Shubb’s actions were entirely unfair.
Quite obviously, Appellant did file objections to those FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, and Ropers’ BRIEF admits as much.
H. Motion for Reconsideration
Ropers’ BRIEF evidently finds no fault with Appellant’s MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF USDC’S ORDER FILED IN ERROR ON JANUARY 25, 2002 A.D.
I. Denial of Motion to Strike and Motion for Reconsideration
Here, Ropers’ BRIEF merely reiterates the docket evidence now before this Court and, in doing so, it fails to discuss any of the merits found in Appellant’s MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION supra.
Appellant argues that this is a very serious omission by Ropers, and it was a plain error for Mr. Shubb to attempt to deny Appellant’s MOTION TO STRIKE and MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, for all of the reasons already stated above, and in what will follow below.
Here, Ropers’ BRIEF again merely reiterates docket entries.
The DCUS has not really exercised any of its judicial Powers in the instant case, so abuse of its discretion is irrelevant until such time as a qualified federal judge is assigned to preside on that constitutional court. The USDC is a legislative court.
On the other hand, the USDC did abuse its discretion, in several different ways.
Clearly, the USDC had no discretion whatsoever to hear motions filed by attorneys who lack the requisite power(s) of attorney to represent any of the named Defendants, in the very first instance. See CBPC §§ 6067, 6126 and 6127, in chief; also 28 U.S.C. 1652 (State laws as rules of decision).
The USDC had no discretion to overlook the absence of prescribed oaths, as required by Local Rule 83‑180(a), or the Standards of Professional Conduct imposed by Local Rule 83‑180(e).
The USDC had no discretion to abridge and usurp the Clerk’s obligations mandated by Local Rule 78‑230(b), particularly regarding notice of hearing dates and times, by attempting to “deny” outright certain motions filed without showing those dates and times on their caption pages. Appellant is accustomed to federal appellate practice.
The USDC had no discretion to proceed without original jurisdiction, or with a presiding “magistrate” who lacks the requisite Presidential commission, and who was never qualified to occupy the office of U.S. Magistrate Judge in the first instance. He too never produced the valid license required by CBPC § 6067.
To be qualified for the office of full‑time United States Magistrate Judge, Mr. Drozd was required to have been a member of the California State Bar in good standing for at least five (5) years. See 28 U.S.C. 631(b)(1).
Since Mr. Drozd has now refused to produce the license required by CBPC § 6067, and so have the State Bar and the Clerk of the California Supreme Court, this Court is now entirely justified in concluding here that Mr. Drozd was never a member of any State Bar in good standing.
Similarly, since the U.S. Department of Justice (the legal custodian of record), the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and the Clerk of the DCUS in Sacramento have all refused to produce a Presidential commission for Mr. Drozd, this Court is further justified in concluding here that Mr. Drozd did not lawfully exercise any of the statutory powers and authorities conferred upon full‑time U.S. Magistrate Judges presiding on the USDC in Sacramento.
Similarly, Mr. Drozd never exercised any of the authority conferred upon the DCUS by 28 U.S.C. 3008, because the instant case is obviously not a Federal Debt Collection Procedure.
Lastly and most notably on these points, the specious “order” by Mr. Drozd, filed on April 26, 2002 A.D. in the district court, acknowledges Appellant’s refusal of all such “orders” of his for causes including no jurisdiction, no license, no oath, no certificate, and no commission. In stubborn fashion, Mr. Drozd then wrote absolutely nothing to deny or to rebut any of these important causes in that “order” filed on April 26. See Pages 75‑76 in the SUPPLEMENTAL EXCERPTS OF RECORD OF APPELLEES AOL TIME WARNER, INC., STEVE CASE, LENNERT LEADER, RANDALL J. BOE, AND JAMES R. BRAMSON as filed with Latham’s BRIEF at index tab #6.
Appellant’s REPLY to Latham’s BRIEF substantiates all the many reasons why He will be able to prove numerous facts in support of the Initial COMPLAINT that will entitle Appellant to all the relief He seeks.
Appellant’s Initial COMPLAINT can also be easily amended to clarify any omissions or deficiencies that have been identified heretofore.
There is no ground in the record now before this Court which justifies affirming a dismissal with prejudice as to all named Defendants, particularly when the evidence implicating CMU is so systematically disclosed by Appellant’s Initial COMPLAINT, 5 SUPPLEMENTS, a large set of Exhibits (both printed and electronic), with particular focus on the FOURTH SUPPLEMENT TO COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY.
THE USDC COMMITTED ERRORS IN DISMISSING DEFENDANT CMU;
COMPLAINT ADEQUATELY ALLEGES A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST CMU
Ropers’ BRIEF repeats the same mistake, once again, by falsely claiming that no factual allegations are present anywhere in the complaint which describe the basis of liability on any theory against CMU. See, in particular, Appellant’s Exhibits J‑13 and K‑62, as discussed above. Without regard to any other factual allegations, these Exhibits by themselves adequately allege a federal cause of action against CMU and its employees, contract agents and users.
Appellant has not deliberately disregarded the procedural requirements established by Congress for gaining access to the federal courts, and He has never attempted to play on anyone’s sympathy (or lack of sympathy) for particular [pro se] litigants.
Appellant has objected, however, to the adverse substantive consequences that have resulted from the fact the record before this Court exhibits none of the credentials lawfully required of Mr. Drozd and Mr. Shubb. They are simply facts that are not in evidence.
Both are obviously bent on scuttling this case.
Using the well established federal principle mandating strict construction of statutes conferring original jurisdiction on those courts, Appellant timely and properly requested an interlocutory judgment on the scope of the Rules Enabling Act, and on the constitutionality of the Abrogation Clause.
Appellant argues that such a judgment should rightly hold that Congress and the Supreme Court have both failed to establish procedural requirements for gaining access to the DCUS.
Thus, no such requirements have been disregarded or could be disregarded, because such procedural requirements simply do not exist in the first instance, if the Rules Enabling Act is construed strictly and consistently with all the pertinent case authorities which Appellant has carefully cited and quoted verbatim in His INFORMAL OPENING BRIEF.
THE USDC ERRED BY ATTEMPTING TO DISMISS
APPELLANT’S COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CLAIM AGAINST CMU
The Certificate of Copyright Registration number TX 5‑436‑561 is fully discussed in Appellant’s REPLY to Latham’s BRIEF. The Register of Copyrights was notified of the instant action when that office was properly served with Appellant’s MOTION FOR ORDER ENJOINING FURTHER INACTION BY THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS.
The DCUS does enjoy subject matter jurisdiction over a registered copyright in this case.
THE USDC ERRED BY ATTEMPTING TO DISMISS
APPELLANT’S SECTION 43(a) LANHAM ACT CLAIM AGAINST CMU
Contrary to more false statements in Ropers’ BRIEF, Appellant’s Initial COMPLAINT has properly alleged that certified evidence does implicate CMU in falsely designating the true origins of “counterfeits” that were reproduced and distributed by computers owned and operated by CMU. See the ACPA, enacted in 1996 A.D.
Those counterfeits were hosted and distributed at the behest of CMU’s responsible officers, employees, and contract agents, particularly a contract agent, and named Defendant, Karl Kleinpaste (hereinafter “Kleinpaste”).
As fully documented in Appellant’s FOURTH SUPPLEMENT, Kleinpaste openly admitted that the subject book was once available at a CMU FTP site “in its electronically distributable form”. “FTP” stands for File Transfer Protocol. The electronic shareware version of the subject book still contained a Preface with unmistakable copyright notices and a price schedule, even if the file with the SHAREWARE POLICY had been removed. See Exhibit A‑1 for the SHAREWARE POLICY.
Kleinpaste then openly admits, in his “philo.htm” file (read “his philosophy”), that he made grievous errors removing certain digital files from his FTP site at CMU. But, he goes on to admit, “Fortunately, the single most important piece of those archives was TFZ, which you can find here.” [!!]
It is essential for this Court to understand and fully to appreciate that “here”, as that term is used in Kleinpaste’s philo.htm file, is a hyperlink to the proven violations at domain DEOXY.ORG, at a time when DEOXY.ORG was hosted by Defendant AOL Time Warner, Inc.
Clearly, Kleinpaste considered TFZ (read “The Federal Zone”) to be the single most important file in his entire FTP archive. Kleinpaste obviously needs to be called as a material witness, if only to tell us how many other digital files he kept at his CMU FTP site with the full knowledge and approval of CMU’s officers, employees, and other contract agents.
By hosting and encouraging Internet users worldwide to obtain counterfeit copies of the subject book, CMU is liable to Appellant for falsely designating the true origins of these counterfeits, for falsely representing the fact of those counterfeits, and also for falsely designating Appellant as the sole author responsible for authorizing the publication and maintaining the availability of those counterfeits, on the Internet’s World Wide Web.
By allowing the wholesale removal of Exhibit A‑1 from those counterfeits, CMU is implicated in making, maintaining and/or broadcasting relatively major substantive alterations that obviously violated § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
Ropers’ BRIEF even admits that Exhibit A‑1 is missing; this omission is decidedly not a “non‑substantive, formatting‑type change”, because the SHAREWARE POLICY was found only in Exhibit A‑1, and that exhibit was the only component file of the subject book that explained the specific terms and conditions of that policy.
This one omission alone is an actionable claim under the Federal Trademark law. It is entirely unfair to characterize this omission as a “limited deletion of text”, or words to that effect.
These facts, then, strongly suggest that CMU did engage in conduct falsely designating the true origins of the subject book, and falsely describing the literary work Appellant had authored as something that was free for the taking (or free for the “clicking,” more accurately) by anyone with access to the World Wide Web.
Appellant does address COUNTS THREE, FOUR and FIVE in His INFORMAL OPENING BRIEF, by incorporating His MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE ‑‑ PARTS I, II and III into the outline provided by the Ninth Circuit for such informal briefs. That outline encourages such incorporations.
Whatever minor defects have now been identified in the Initial COMPLAINT, such as failing to itemize subsections of 17 U.S.C. 106, or failing to state ‑‑ in so many words ‑‑ that the standard $30.00 fee did accompany His original application for copyright registration, all of such defects can be easily cured by amending the appropriate pleadings with supervision by the DCUS.
No such registration is required to bring a claim under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
Appellant has emphatically not acquiesced in the district court’s ruling in regard to amending the Initial COMPLAINT.
THE INSTANT CASE WAS BROUGHT IN A PROPER VENUE
As stated at the beginning of the Initial COMPLAINT, venue is proper in the Eastern Judicial District of California under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(2) and 1400(a) & (b). For what it’s worth, Mr. Drozd agreed here.
JUSTIFYING REVERSAL AND/OR VACATING THE USDC’S JUDGMENT
Issue 5(a): Subject Matter Jurisdiction
As repeated enough times already, the U.S. Copyright Office did issue a Certificate of Copyright Registration, effective July 23, 2001 A.D., at least eight (8) days before the instant case was filed.
The Initial COMPLAINT, 5 SUPPLEMENTS and all Exhibits, taken together, do allege sufficient facts and thereby do state valid federal claims upon which the DCUS and only the DCUS is expressly authorized by Congress to issue relief in the instant case.
Issue 5(c): The USDC did not have original jurisdiction.
Because the USDC was first broadcasted into the several States by the Act of June 25, 1948, now codified at 28 U.S.C. 132, the Lanham Act could not have conferred original jurisdiction on any USDC inside those States.
The USDC simply did not exist inside California in the year 1946.
The statute at 60 Stat. 440 (uncodified at 15 U.S.C. 1121) was never amended to change or otherwise alter the court upon which Congress had thereby conferred original jurisdiction over all claims that arise under the Lanham Act. See Arising Under Clause.
The statute at 60 Stat. 440 is not even mentioned in the Schedule of Laws Repealed by the Act of June 25, 1948. See 62 Stat. 1008: there is no reference to 15 U.S.C. 1121; there is no reference to 60 Stat. 440; and, there is no reference whatsoever to Title 15 of the United States Code, in that Schedule of Laws Repealed!
Repeals by implication are decidedly not favored by this honorable Court, nor by the U.S. Supreme Court.
In the Act of June 25, 1948, the DCUS is also expressly mentioned at §§ 2(a), 9, 17, and 21. Moreover, Congress uses the term “Federal district court” at 62 Stat. 992. If Congress had wanted to change the names of all district courts, it could have changed their names to “Federal District Courts” [sic] based on that one usage.
Congress chose instead to broadcast a federal court whose constitutional origin is the Territory Clause at Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, as held by the U.S. Supreme Court in Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) and others not cited here.
Appellant carefully argues that the federal government has systematically violated the Guarantee Clause by invading the several States with federal municipal laws which have no jurisdiction there.
By fraud and other fictions, such as the voter registration affidavits, Congress has created a population of “federal citizens” who inhabit the 50 States, thus replacing a Constitutional Republic with a legislative democracy where the U.S. Constitution operates only if Congress makes its guarantees applicable there. See Downes v. Bidwell, J. Harlan dissenting and Hooven & Allison v. Evatt.
Thus, by treating the several States and its “residents” as members of a territorial jurisdiction ‑‑ where the guarantees of the U.S. Constitution are extended only by legislative fiat, and not by Constitutional mandate ‑‑ Congress could and did enact federal municipal laws which blatantly violated that Constitution in innumerable ways, e.g. by taxing judges in violation of Article III.
Consistent with this theme, it is not surprising, therefore, that Congress would attempt to broadcast a summary territorial tribunal into the 50 States, to execute a colorable jurisdiction over federal citizens resident there, but without expressly abolishing the constitutional court which had existed there for so many years.
Congress obviously erred by enacting laws based on two false and rebuttable presumptions: (1) that the Constitution did not bind D.C. or any of the federal territories, and hence (2) that the Constitution did not need to govern any of these new territorial courts, so recently situated inside the 50 States, unless those courts chose on their own to exercise their extensive legislative discretion in the matter of Constitutional guarantees.
This was and still is a classic, monumental abuse of discretion ‑‑ discretion which those territorial courts never had, in part because Congressional statutes conferring original jurisdiction on them must still be strictly construed.
The USDC were established as classic legislative courts, for this one very important reason. They operate as legislative courts inside the 50 States, in theory and in actual practice.
Paraphrasing the Hooven case supra, the guarantees of the Constitution would be enforced by those new federal legislative tribunals only as those tribunals chose to make these guarantees applicable, using the enormous albeit colorable discretion they simply assumed ‑‑ in blatant opposition to well established principles of federal court practice and to years of constitutional jurisprudence.
However, it is utterly painful for Appellant also to allege that the Congress, the President and the U.S. Supreme Court have all chosen to overlook two (2) federal statutes which expressly extended all guarantees of the U.S. Constitution into the District of Columbia in 1871, and then again into all federal territories in 1873.
Thus, the doctrine established in Downes v. Bidwell is a false doctrine; this Downes Doctrine is the one of which Justice Harlan complained so eloquently, and with such amazingly accurate foresight, in his dissenting opinion in that case.
It should come as no surprise, then, that Ropers’ BRIEF should cite as its only legitimate “authority” one of the court’s holdings in Lake v. Department of Treasury, 905 F.Supp. 1061, 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1995). Here is the controlling passage from that published decision:
Plaintiff used his opportunity before the court to allege, inter alia, that the District Court of the United States, and not the United States District Court, was the appropriate forum to hear this matter .... The foregoing is merely a sample of the disjointed discourse presented the court by plaintiff. It is sufficient, however, to leave no doubt as to the frivolity of this lawsuit.
In other words, it is sufficient for the day to omit all authorities that might support, or oppose, this question, particularly decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, which has grappled often with the important distinction between constitutional and legislative courts, with mixed results. Even Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist once wrote that these cases do not admit of an easy synthesis. In His OPENING BRIEF, Appellant cited several from the long lineage of courts that have confronted this distinction. Still more can be cited, if it should please this honorable Court. Appellant will happily comply.
Issue 5(d): Shubb did not properly enter judgment.
Even if Mr. Shubb had been duly commissioned by the President to preside on the USDC for the Eastern District of California, and even if Mr. Shubb had executed the requisite oath of office, the USDC had no original jurisdiction over Appellant’s Lanham Act claim.
All the more so is Mr. Shubb prohibited by law from entering any final judgment(s) in the instant case, when he, the Clerk of the district court, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and the U.S. Department of Justice have all stubbornly refused to disclose any Presidential commission appointing him to that office.
Issue 5(e): State Bar numbers are not licenses or oaths.
A State Bar number is evidence of membership in a club. However, CBPC § 6067 mandates that an oath of office shall be indorsed upon a member’s license to practice law. The term “shall” is mandatory and imperative in this context.
Appellant has correctly imported this California State law, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1652.
Without a valid license to practice law within the State of California, and without a certificate of oath indorsed thereon, Appellant continues to argue correctly that attorneys are not and can not be members in good standing of the State Bar of California, nor can they be lawfully admitted to practice in the Eastern Judicial District of California ‑‑ not without that license and oath.
See, in particular, U.S. v. High Country Broadcasting Co., 3 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1993), holding that entry of a default judgment was appropriate when an unlicensed corporate president attempted to represent his corporation in court. Appellant argues that this authority is dispositive, in the present context.
See also Clark v. Willett, 35 Cal. 534, 539, holding that California courts do have the power to inquire into the existence of an attorney’s license, and to dispose that question summarily.
A California court has declared that CBPC § 6067 is constitutional. See Cohen v. Wright, 22 C. 293 (1863).
A California court has also declared that the California Legislature does have a right to impose on attorneys the oath required by § 6067. See Ex parte Yale, 24 C. 241 (1864), 85 Am. Dec. 62 (1864). The legislative intent of this statute is instructive.
Thus, Appellant has cited specific laws and cases for the proposition that a judgment of the USDC can be challenged by means Appellant has selected here.
Issue 5(f): The USDC erred by not striking attorneys pleadings.
Appellant did not commit any fatal errors by failing to notice all parties of hearing dates and times. See Local Rule 78‑230(b), as discussed above. The Clerk of Court could easily have cured this minor omission, with written notice mandated by that Local Rule.
Thus, Appellant’s MOTION TO STRIKE ALL PLEADINGS BY ATTORNEYS LACKING CREDENTIALS was properly filed and presented the DCUS, and should never have been stricken by the USDC, particularly when Mr. Drozd had no right whatsoever to exercise civil jurisdiction over that MOTION.
Ropers’ BRIEF completely misconstrues the holding in Clark v. Willett supra. That case is right on point and does provide clear support for Appellant’s contentions in this regard.
If the attorneys in this case can not or will not exhibit valid licenses to practice law, with valid certificates of oath properly indorsed upon those licenses, then Appellant is justified in concluding that those licenses, and those certificates, simply do not exist, as a matter of fact.
Compare the statewide practice of issuing driver’s licenses and citations, and possibly also arresting persons who drive without a valid driver’s license. Within California State, driver’s licenses are physical documents that police routinely require drivers to produce on demand, with serious adverse consequences to drivers if they do not produce them on demand.
Appellant is correct to argue that a license to practice law is rendered a physical document by the legislative prerequisites inherent in CBPC § 6067. One cannot “indorse” a verbal statement.
Issue 5(g): SUBPOENAS for licenses warrant court enforcement.
Appellant did not waive His right to compel compliance with the SUBPOENAS issued by the Clerk of the DCUS. Again, Ropers’ objections to the SUBPOENAS for their licenses, such as they were, did not petition the DCUS for the relief requested.
Appellant has expressly reserved all rights, including of course the right to petition the DCUS for a summary ruling on the lack of licenses and oaths of office required by CBPC § 6067. See Clark v. Willett supra.
Moreover, the holding of the Ninth Circuit in High Country Broadcasting supra makes it abundantly clear that summary judgment against a named Defendant like CMU ‑‑ for all relief requested in Appellant’s Initial COMPLAINT ‑‑ would be proper and timely as long as CMU’s attorney(s) cannot produce the credentials clearly and expressly mandated by California State law.
If they don’t have licenses, they should expect to be punished, just like California’s drivers.
Issue 5(h): Summary judgment is proper against Defendants whose attorneys have attempted to appear without requisite credentials.
High Country Broadcasting Company is exactly on point here. In that case, the Ninth Circuit ruled that entry of default judgment was appropriate when an unlicensed corporate president attempted to represent his corporation in court. It mattered little that he was an officer of that corporation; he was still not a licensed attorney.
Those facts are directly analogous to the present situation. Here, unlicensed attorneys are attempting to represent Carnegie Mellon University, which is not a human being and therefore cannot represent itself either Pro Se or In Propria Persona.
Ropers’ BRIEF simply confuses the issue by arguing that an oath of office and a license to practice law are matters that are completely different from the requirement that a corporation be properly represented.
These matters are not different. The common thread is the existence, or absence, of a valid license to practice law.
If an attorney does have a valid license to practice law, with a proper oath indorsed thereon, then s/he is eligible to represent Defendant Carnegie Mellon University in the instant case.
If an attorney does not have a valid license to practice law, with proper oath indorsed thereon, then s/he is not eligible represent Defendant Carnegie Mellon University in the instant case.
Admission to practice before the Eastern District of California is simply not possible, without the requisite license and oath. Compare Local Rule 83‑180(a) (“by signing the prescribed oath and paying the prescribed fee”).
Issue 5(i): Lack of hearing dates was not fatal to any motions.
This matter has already been adequately addressed above.
Issue 5(j): Without credentials, Messrs. Shubb and Drozd are barred from exercising the judicial Power of the United States.
These are mandates expressly imposed by the U.S. Constitution.
Issue 5(k): Failure to assign an Article III judge proves that the DCUS was, and still is, legally vacant.
Even if Mr. Shubb’s presidential commission had ever been produced, Appellant has every reason to expect that it did appoint Mr. Shubb to preside on the USDC for the Eastern District of California, and not the District Court of the United States. See Article II, Section 2, Clause 2.
However, that Presidential commission is nowhere in evidence before this honorable Court.
Even Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, in a lecture to a class of law students at the University of Arizona in January 1997 A.D., openly admitted that all federal judges are currently paying income taxes on their judicial compensation. This practice violates the brilliant holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920), which is still the governing case law on this question. Appellant was an eyewitness to that admission by C.J. Rehnquist.
Insofar as Messrs. Shubb and Drozd are paying income taxes on their judicial compensation, they are thereby barred by Article III, Section 1, from exercising the judicial Power of the United States in the instant case. The existence of undue influence creates bias and impedes, if it does not entirely destroy, their independence in such cases. The so‑called 16th amendment never amended the Compensation Clause supra. Once again, repeals by implication are never favored.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees Appellant’s fundamental Right to judicial officers who are competent, independent and impartial. See Article 14, for example.
Issue 5(l‑n): The FRCP and the Local Rules do not bind the DCUS.
Appellant was timely and correct to move the DCUS for an interlocutory judgment clarifying the exact scope of the Rules Enabling Act, and challenging the constitutionality of the Abrogation Clause in that Act. This important motion, and its implications, have already been thoroughly discussed elsewhere in this REPLY, and in Appellant’s REPLY to Latham’s BRIEF.
Since federal statutes granting original jurisdiction to the federal district courts must be strictly construed, Appellant is entirely justified in strictly constructing the Rules Enabling Act: strictly construed, it does not authorize the U.S. Supreme Court to promulgate rules of practice and procedure, or rules of evidence, for the Article III DCUS.
Issue 5(o): Mr. Drozd is disqualified from participating at all.
Appellant submits that the matter of his qualifications, or lack thereof, has already been thoroughly disposed in the discussions above, and in Appellant’s REPLY to Latham’s BRIEF.
Issue 5(p): Verified Criminal Complaints are proper and relevant to the propriety of any orders issued by those charged.
Appellant’s VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT against Mr. Drozd, and against attorneys who appeared without valid licenses, contained a clear demand for recusal of Mr. Drozd. Practice of law from the bench is a high misdemeanor and impeachable offense under 28 U.S.C. 454.
Due process of law mandates that those exercising the judicial Power of the United States must also obey all pertinent laws. See the Fifth and Seventh Amendments, in chief. Criminal conduct interferes with the administration of justice, and degrades or impugns the integrity of the Court. Compare USDC Local Rule 83‑180(e) (Standards of Professional Conduct).
Said Local Rule mandates compliance with the standards of professional conduct required of all members of the State Bar of California and contained in the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California and decisions of any Court applicable thereto, and those standards have been adopted as standards of professional conduct in the USDC.
Issue 5(t‑v): Threats of sanctions for violating the FRCP and the USDC’s Local Rules were inappropriate.
This matter of threats by Mr. Drozd arose because Appellant did direct certain first class U.S. Mail to certain named Defendants, instead of directing that mail to the attorneys they had retained.
That mail attempted to inform certain named Defendants that the attorneys they had retained did not appear to have the requisite credentials mandated by CBPC § 6067.
Appellant argues that He was correct to do so, because their proven failure to exhibit the requisite credentials was a matter that should not have been concealed from their clients.
Concealing the fact of their missing credentials is a fraud upon their clients, just as practicing medicine without a license is a fraud upon a doctor’s patients.
Appellant did not wish to be regarded as an accessory to such a fraudulent concealment. Confer at “Fraud” in Black’s Sixth Edition.
On the basis of Appellant’s well documented arguments already made in those pleadings, Appellant now believes that the Remedies Requested and Recommended in His Initial COMPLAINT, in His INFORMAL OPENING BRIEF, and lastly in His REPLY to Latham’s BRIEF, do adequately itemize the judicial remedies that ought to be issued by this Court.
Accordingly, no additional remedies are being requested here.
Thank you all for your most professional consideration.
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, Appellant in the above entitled action, hereby verify under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).
Dated: July 9, 2002 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Sui Juris
Appellant In Propria Persona (not “Pro Se” [sic])
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that I am at least 18 years of age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I personally served the following document(s):
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to the following:
Judge Alex Kozinski Clerk of Court (16x)
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Attention: Cathy Catterson
P.O. Box 91510 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Pasadena 91109‑1510 P.O. Box 193939
CALIFORNIA, USA San Francisco 94119‑3939
Latham & Watkins Ropers Majeski Kohn & Bentley
633 West Fifth Street 1001 Marshall Street
Los Angeles 90071‑2007 Redwood City 94063
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
[Please see USPS Publication #221 for “addressing” instructions.]
Dated: July 10, 2002 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, Appellant In Propria Persona